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Whatever its strict methodic rules and claims for objectivity, I believe that scientific 
research always begins with highly personal preoccupations. There is much hard- and 
software available to academics and employed as tools for ordering materials and 
developing theories, but people may wonder what personal preoccupations led me to 
start this project and—whatever the boredom and backlash which those like us meet 
with along the way—how I remained focused on a topic so distant from the experi-
ence of everyday life, indeed a topic which so few would find interesting, except a 
few academic diehards and, alas, some family and friends. 
Was it ‘religion’, the topic of the controversy, that interested me? To be sure, re-
ligion interests me. I consider religion and its continuing relevance for the future of 
our civilization a topic of utmost importance. However, I did not expect to find an 
easy answer to the problem. It is difficult to determine whether religion is ‘good’, or 
‘bad’ or ‘evil,’ let alone the fact that there is still no universal agreement on what 
exactly we mean by the term ‘religion’—e.g. what belongs to its essence and what is 
mere manifestation or function.  For my part, the various answers to the problem of 
religion given in the course of the controversy surrounding Simon Vestdijk’s De
toekomst der religie were less than satisfying. 
Without a doubt, some interesting people were involved in the controversy. 
Rather than Vestdijk, it was Sierksma who fascinated me the most. Born and bred in 
a lower middle-class and Calvinist environment, Sierksma studied Theology in the 
late 1930s. Yet, though he surely belonged to the class of believers, he began to ques-
tion the very concept of religion, wondering why people believe in religious phe-
nomena in the first place. Gradually, his attention shifted from mere questioning to 
developing theories by which religion could possibly be understood. A few back-
ground similarities, whether social or intellectual, caught my attention. The first thing 
that struck me was his extremely interesting and challenging approach to religious 
phenomena. Even in the early 1990s, when I started to study Religious Studies at 
Leiden University, the old-fashioned classification schemes of Theo van Baaren and 
Lammert Leertouwer were still being used as a common introduction to the study of 
religions.1 Though it was a required part of the curriculum at the Faculty of Theol-
ogy (what did I expect?), I found this approach disappointing. I must admit that for 
this reason I did not attend the course, nor did I read their book—except the first 
few pages on the definition of religion. Instead, I set out in search of alternatives. To 
my surprise, hardly twenty years before, at the same Faculty at which I was studying 
now, Sierksma had pointed in directions that, to me, seemed far more promising than 
                                                     
1 Cf. Van Baaren & Leertouwer 1980. 
6anything that had been done up to that point. Rather than allowing theologians a 
monopoly on the subject, he preferred to involve other disciplines such as History, 
Psychology and Sociology in the study of religious phenomena. This is evident in the 
controversy dealt with in the present thesis. However, although Sierksma’s answers 
were far more satisfying than those of his opponents, this was not a particularly im-
portant reason for studying the controversy either. 
On the one hand, I admired him for his pioneering work in the study of relig-
ions. Moreover, I liked his straight, clear and logical style of writing. On the other 
hand, his fierce attacks on his opponents diverged drastically from the way I would 
expect those to react who had left the ‘Ur of religion’ and—enlightened by the torch 
of reason—reached the promised land of Israël. It contrasted sharply with the moder-
ate and tolerant attitude of orthodox-Calvinists, who never let themselves become 
triggered to react to others aggressively or attack the “evil” outside world. 
The problem which has intrigued me for so long—and which has proved crucial 
to my interest in the controversy—is why people with reasonable ideas sometimes 
behave so unreasonably, whereas others who believe in sheer myth often behave so 
rationally and self-confidently. Vestdijk knew the answer. He loved chatting with 
those self-confident Calvinists who did not seem to doubt—not even for a minute—
the purpose of their lives. This observation has been confirmed by my own experi-
ence. I was raised in a strict Calvinist environment. Even though I did not share in 
the Calvinists’ beliefs, their state of mind and attitude to the world often impressed 
me as perfectly sane and sanguine. And yet, Vestdijk accused them of being intolerant 
tyrants who could stand dissention from nobody. Though he went a long way in 
trying to understand this apparent contradiction, I was not convinced. His friend 
Sierksma offered me a clear counter-example of someone who did not believe in 
‘God’, yet often behaved in the same tyrannical way which Vestdijk criticized Cal-
vinists for. Vestdijk’s theory (to which we shall return later on in this study) fails to 
account for fact. Thus, I felt the need to develop a theory of my own, without pre-
judging either Sierksma or any Calvinist. I did this by trying to find a systematic 
correlation between outward behavior (polemic) and social position (authority). 
To outsiders, it might be a bit surprising that I was researching a controversy that, 
though it dealt with religion, was hardly religious in and of itself. And yet, I would 
like to thank all those within the confines of the Faculty of Theology and the De-
partment of the History of Religions and Comparative Religion who allowed me to 
continue with the project. To my colleagues at the Faculty of Theology, I am espe-
cially grateful and I admire their tolerance. I wonder how they are able to breed so 
many Trojan horses among themselves. Personally, I believe that Theology (taken 
here to mean the study of ‘God’) should not be confused with the study of religious 
phenomena, as is done by the (‘neutral’) state curriculum at the Faculty. Surely, the 
discipline of Religious Studies might serve as an introduction to Theology. Yet, too 
7often it does not, at least not explicitly. To claim a legitimate position within a Fac-
ulty of Theology, however, it is obliged to do so. In the end, however, I have to 
apologize for not having been able to contribute to the Study of Religion, let alone 
to provide for any progress in Theology. 
Apart from my colleagues and professors at Leiden University, I want to thank 
those who took issue with me during regular conferences organized by LISOR and 
NOSTER. They often forced me not to take things so lightly and to continue 
searching in areas which I was not familiar with before. Early on, Arie Molendijk 
offered me some newspaper articles on the issues I was studying, especially the replies 
by ‘modernist’ theologians to Sierksma. These articles indicated that a fruitful dia-
logue between Theology and Science is possible when the former actually belongs to 
the field of Religious Studies (as Tiele already argued more than hundred years ago). 
Tony Watling was kind enough to send me his PhD dissertation on the construction 
of religious identities in the Netherlands—a fine example of empirical research indi-
cating how religion accommodates to changing circumstances and new challenges. I 
am grateful to Damian Pargas for editing and correcting my English. His comments 
clearly confirm the common wisdom that improving foreign language skills after your 
teenage years is almost impossible. I want to express my gratitude to the Hotels van 
Oranje at Noordwijk ZH for allowing me to finish my study at their night desk. I 
thank all of the colleagues who repeatedly asked me when this book would be fin-
ished. On a subconscious level, they always reminded me that pretension (being a 
former student of the “university”) comes with obligations (such as sharing my ideas 
and keeping them up to date on my activities). 
Despite the importance of the institutional setting as well as the professional and 
personal support from professors, colleagues and others, they do not deserve the 
respect I owe my family—my parents in particular. Whatever the positive attitude I 
met with at the university, my theoretical perspectives—though different—did not 
pose any serious threats to my professors’ positions as experts within their respective 
fields of research. The same did not apply to those who belong to the community in 
which I was raised. My decision to study at Leiden University—with atheism and 
moral decadence lurking at every corner and taught by professors ex cathedra—was 
perceived as a threat to the orthodox-Calvinist faith and lifestyle. And yet, whatever 
the moral objections to some of the choices which I have made during the last few 
years, my parents never failed to support me. This is not only because I am their son. 
And it is certainly not because they do not believe that a difference between good 
and evil exists—on the contrary. Rather, their attitude is a perfect example of the 
tolerance that is terribly lacking in today’s public life. I am talking about the type of 
tolerance that allows people to pursue their own goals, but which forces us to be 
accountable and, if necessary, to face our social responsibilities. It is such an attitude 
8that is needed in order to keep our families together and prevent our society from 
turning to civil war. 
Whereas my parents willfully supported my endeavors—though they were free to 
choose whether or not to withdraw their support—I am aware that most people in 
the Netherlands do not have the opportunity which I have been given. My parents 
granted me the financial resources needed to undertake this project. And they never 
thought twice about spending money on a project from which they would not bene-
fit directly and which they might have preferred to invest in other, more useful, 
enterprises. 
I have thoroughly enjoyed researching the controversy, and so I find it only fair 
to express my gratitude to all those decent fellows who continue to pay taxes to be 
invested for educational purposes that, often, do not make any sense to them. Their 
generosity has given me great pleasure and the time to study a fascinating polemical 
conflict, as Kant wrote, “peaceably from the safe seat of critique, a conflict which 
must be exhaustive for the combatants but entertaining for you, with an outcome 
that will certainly be bloodless and advantageous for your insight.”
2
 And even though 
there might only be a few people that are able to make any sense out of the theory 
which I developed during this study, I hope that in the future its results might be 
fruitfully applied to ways of dealing with issues of public importance. However, as 
long as any positive effects remain purely speculative, the least I can do is to dedicate 
this dissertation to my fellow taxpaying citizens. 
                                                     
2 Kant 1998: 647. 
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INTRODUCTION: HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR POLEMICS 
Instinct, intuition, or insight is what first leads to beliefs 
which subsequent reason confirms or confutes. 
Bertrand Russell 
As Plato once warned: do not believe what you hear at the marketplace. The only 
thing people do there is sell their stories by trying to convince you it is the truth. In 
the end, the only one to benefit from the deal is he who gets his merchandise paid 
for.
If you think truth is something to be sold at the marketplace, you are wrong. On 
the contrary, trade and the easy talk that accompanies it are completely different from 
the painstaking efforts that philosophers make to get at the heart of those things 
which we are used to watching from the outside.1
Convincing as this story at first sight may seem, the danger with Plato was that he 
believed himself to be somewhere beyond the marketplace. And as soon as philoso-
phers (and their modern counterparts: ‘the intellectuals’)2 take their own truths too 
seriously and start imposing them on reality, intolerance and totalitarianism are wait-
ing just around the corner.3 Whatever might be said about the stories told at the 
marketplace, we had better stick with them. The advantage of the latter are twofold. 
First, they are more easily confuted by everyday experience. Second, everybody has 
free access to the market, and, consequently, the chance to provide for some alterna-
tive.
In the market economy of opinions in which we live, each day we receive offers 
which we are free to accept or turn down. What, e.g., should we think about this 
one?
Personally, I wish Christianity to die. And, as I will try to show in more detail, it will. How-
ever, this does not mean that religion will die too. On the contrary, man has always been in need 
of religion, and he cannot be happy without. Even though Christianity will die, religion survives 
and will have a new life in the form of socialism and Buddhism. 
                                                     
1 Levin 2001. 
2 Bauman 1987. 
3 Popper 1945. 
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Who would believe such an outdated opinion nowadays? Apart from some hardhea-
ded atheists, nobody would seriously argue any longer that Christianity will sooner or 
later die. Nor would anybody argue the idea that Christianity will someday be substi-
tuted by either socialism or Buddhism. At the moment, the failure of the latter two 
worldviews to successfully compete with Christianity is all too obvious.4 Moreover, 
whether people are looking for happiness in life, and, worse, whether religion is the 
way to provide for it, are highly doubtful. 
Yet, when the famous Dutch novelist Simon Vestdijk published an essay entitled 
De toekomst der religie (‘The Future of Religion’)—more than fifty years ago—things 
were different. In that time, any attack on Christianity and, worse, arguing for a new 
type of religion as its substitute was taken to be highly provocative and, in fact, cau-
sed a great deal of polemics. According to many critics, Vestdijk could only arrive at 
his conclusions by offering a distorted picture of Christianity. In the end, others ar-
gued, this could only be due to some mental disorder. Actually, some argued, this 
made him fight with ‘the Angel’. 
This is not to say that, today, attacks on Christianity or arguments for atheism 
would not trigger polemical controversy anymore. On the contrary, the topic of 
religion is still highly relevant to many people. Forty years after Vestdijk published his 
essay, Henk Versnel was invited to the centennial anniversary of the Free University 
of Amsterdam to explain why he no longer believed in God. According to Versnel, 
the arguments in favor of Christianity were too arbitrary and inconsistent to be con-
vincing. This, he said, was not a conclusion he arrived at after a life-long struggle 
with ‘the Angel’; one morning he woke up when the idea crossed his mind: “I belie-
ve that I do not believe any longer.” Versnel’s lecture triggered fierce polemics. And 
even though he did not wish Christianity to die, some found him guilty of denying 
the truth and ignoring the unmistakable presence of God in the world. Hence, ac-
cording to some critics, there was no other explanation than that something was 
mentally or morally wrong with Versnel.5 Similar arguments recurred after the de-
vastating critiques of religion in general, and Christianity in particular, by people like 
Karel van het Reve6 and, more recently, Herman Philipse7, who publicly announced 
themselves to be atheists. 
Yet, there were some crucial differences between the polemics triggered by Ver-
snel, Van het Reve and Philipse on the one hand, and that of Vestdijk on the other. 
                                                     
4 Fukuyama 1992, 1995. 
5 Versnel 1991; further contributions to the controversy in Maurice & Noorda 1991, Kuitert & 
Versnel 1993. 
6 Van het Reve 1986; the essay originally appeared in NRC-Handelsblad; later to be collected 
in Van Weerlee 1986. 
7 Philipse 1998, 2004.
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First of all, whereas the controversy around Vestdijk went on for five decades, the 
contributions of the others failed to call attention for more than a few years. Second-
ly, the media and communities participating in the controversy around Vestdijk were 
far more diverse than those of later polemics. The cases triggered by Van het Reve 
and Versnel were limited to one newspaper—the NRC-Handelsblad and Trouw, res-
pectively—and a few collections of essays. Philipse consciously addressed the broad 
public in his essay. Reviews appeared in some newspapers and opinion magazines. 
And of those, only a few felt triggered to reply or react polemically. Vestdijk’s essay, 
however, called the attention of a wide variety of media, from literary critical maga-
zines to religious orthodox newspapers, from media that did not belong to any speci-
fic community to opinion magazines with a clear-cut Roman Catholic, Dutch Re-
formed or Free Reformed signature. 
On the other hand, something that applies to all of the aforementioned contro-
versies, is the diversity of ways in which people reacted to the arguments of either 
Vestdijk, Van het Reve, Versnel or Philipse. Whereas some were fiercely polemical, 
others, though equally critical, were far more moderate, if not sympathetic. Whereas 
some denounced the essay outright and held that its author was indeed in need of 
treatment, others admitted that the arguments employed deserved attentive reading 
and detailed discussion. 
In this study, we focus on the controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie. Gi-
ven the diversity of reactions, as well as the developments in the reception of the 
essay over time, we are tempted to ask what this controversy was all about. To conti-
nue our marketplace-metaphor, what kinds of ideas did people try to sell? In order to 
clarify this, I will offer a summary of Vestdijk’s argument in De toekomst der religie,
followed by a brief overview of its reception during the fifty years after its publicati-
on, i.e. from 1948 till 1998. Furthermore, based on this overview, I will try to for-
mulate the problem that I have been dealing with over the past years. Put briefly, 
why did some sellers attempt to prevent their potential public from buying somebody 
else’s products? After that, I intend to develop a hypothesis which might give us an 
answer to the aforementioned problem. People who find somebody interfering in the 
market they tried to reserve for themselves, are more likely to raise their voice in 
order to discredit their colleagues. Finally, I will address the question whether my 
hypothesis transcends the polemical style of arguing. And if so, in which sense does it 
differ from polemics? Even though the opinion I am trying to present or sell here 
myself is not to be found anywhere beyond the market economy of ideas, I will try 
to argue that it might be very helpful in understanding the way some people deal 
with their competitors. 
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The polemic 
To support his position that, even though Christianity must inevitably die, religion 
would survive, Vestdijk did not define religion as ‘belief in God’, as Christian theolo-
gians were accustomed to. According to him, such a definition could not be justified 
if Buddhism was to be regarded as a religion. And after Nietzsche had announced the 
‘death of God,’ by definition, religion would then be dead too. Yet, apparently, this 
was not the case. Therefore, Vestdijk argued, religion had to be defined as something 
more universal and everlasting than the mere belief in God. According to him, inter-
pretive psychology could be helpful. There he found religion to be the human drive 
towards ‘lasting spiritual happiness’, consisting in the ‘experience of totality’. Accor-
ding to Vestdijk, three types of religion were available in order to achieve this goal: 
the ‘metaphysical-projective’, the ‘social’, and the ‘mystical-introspective’. The first 
type he almost exclusively identified with Christianity, and Calvinism in particular. 
The theology of the latter focused on unity with ‘God’ through the substitutive death 
of Christ, the ‘Son of God’, on the cross. Personally, Vestdijk explained to his rea-
ders, he had serious problems with this conception. He simply could not accept that 
somebody else was supposed to take responsibility for the crimes or sins he himself 
had committed. Moreover, Vestdijk felt strong aversions to the intolerance that, 
according to him, was one of the most dramatic effects of metaphysical religion. The 
latter type of religion was governed by the mechanism of, what he called, ‘metaphy-
sical projection’. By means of projection, Vestdijk held, people are able to create 
images. Those images turn into metaphysical entities, however, when people forget 
that they themselves had created them; they tend to deny or ignore the fact that those 
images are mere dreams or myths, notably by claiming absolute validity for them; 
they are the Truth. In consequence, war must be declared on all those who dared 
deny this Truth and the claims to Justice on which it is based. This was the reason, 
Vestdijk argued, that the history of Christianity—and indeed any metaphysical religi-
on, including Judaism and Islam—offered so many examples of intolerance, violence, 
and persecution. 
The only solution for the problems inherent to the metaphysical-projective type 
of religion was the death of Christianity. According to Vestdijk, it had to be replaced 
by a mix of the social and the mystical introspective types. This union (a fusion of 
socialism and Buddhism) would be the only possibility for people to be at peace with 
each other and with their inner selves. The images of their own inner drives would 
only have relative value and be related to the reality of everyday life. To teach the 
ordinary people to live according to these rules, an élite with spiritual (rather than 
theological or bureaucratic) authority was needed. And this élite would himself have 
to be taught and trained at state-supervised institutions that would combine the best 
of the Catholic retreat, the English universities, and the Buddhist monastery. 
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This argument triggered heated controversy among Dutch intellectuals. Yet, what 
kind of commentary did Vestdijk get? Critics acknowledged the value of his artistic 
work. And even though they did not agree with his arguments, some admitted that 
his ideas were original and challenging. Others, however, found his statements on 
religion misleading and seriously doubted whether, in general, a novelist could make 
any legitimate claims on the future development of religion. Some tried to be reason-
able, whereas others seemed outrageous. Some took his argument seriously; to others 
it was utter nonsense. Some praised Vestdijk for his courage to spark a debate on 
highly important issues, whereas others accused him of cowardice for not daring to 
become either a Christian or Buddhist himself. Some appreciated his generous style 
of writing; according to others his attitude too much resembled that of an intellectual 
and outsider to serve as a useful starting point for discussion. Some believed Vestdijk’s 
argument to be brilliant, whereas others felt bothered by his apparent hatred towards 
Christians and, more importantly, God. 
Yet, how did critics arrive at their conclusions? Some offered highly extensive 
discussions of Vestdijk’s argument, whereas others limited themselves to short com-
ments. Some found his essay in line with important trends in scientific research and 
modern thinking, whereas others dismissed the entire argument as misguided. Some 
disagreed, offering reasons why they believed Vestdijk to be mistaken in his conclu-
sions. Others, on the other hand, merely declared the argument misguided. Accord-
ing to them, this should come as no surprise, given the fact that its author was either 
morally confused or suffering from a mental disorder, or perhaps even both. 
Apart from these different ways of understanding the argument of Vestdijk’s essay, 
the historical dimension of its reception shows some interesting developments as well. 
The first years after the publication of Vestdijk’s essay in 1947, polemic was most 
intense among politically progressive Netherlands Reformed theologians as well as 
polemically oriented literary critics. These were also the critics Vestdijk and some of 
his adherents replied to. With some exceptions, among the politically more conserva-
tive Roman Catholic and Dutch Reformed intellectuals, reactions were far more 
moderate. The orthodox Free Reformed commentators were highly critical, yet only 
some of them were polemical. Their fiercest attacks were mainly directed against the 
same progressive theologians that had criticized Vestdijk for his arguments. 
In general, Vestdijk’s replies to his critics from 1948 onwards did not get much 
attention in the media. Apart from frequent re-editions of his essay, it was mainly 
through the intervention of a literary critic and a scholar of religion that the contro-
versy would continue to grasp the attention of a broad public. By means of an essay 
published in 1952 and a theoretical study on religious projection in 1956, the debate 
over the issues triggered by Vestdijk, was given new momentum. And whereas the 
essay fiercely attacked theologians, the second publication was a massive challenge to 
the metaphysical presuppositions of Christianity. Polemics continued. Yet, within 
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some intellectual circles, attempts at serious discussion of the issues presented by both 
Vestdijk and Sierksma were made as well.  
New impetus was given to the controversy when the third edition of Vestdijk’s 
essay was published in 1960. It was published at the same time that the translation of 
an argument by the German atheist Gerhard Sczcesny became widely available. The 
number of polemical contributions, however, would steadily decrease, as would the 
interest of the broad public. A special issue of the progressive magazine Wending in 
1963, as well as the publication of an extensive discussion of the theory of religious 
projection by Roman Catholic psychologist Han Fortmann, generally indicated the 
changing style of arguing among intellectuals that could not agree with Vestdijk’s and 
Sierksma’s arguments. On the other hand, the argument became too sophisticated to 
reach a wide audience. 
A notable exception to the general trend towards serious discussion or sheer ir-
relevance would be a lecture by the journalist and historian J. Kamphuis from the 
Free Reformed seminary at Kampen in 1973. His was also what I consider to be the 
last polemical contribution to the controversy in 1998. His voice, however, would 
not be heard outside some orthodox religious circles. 
Trying to draw some conclusions from this brief overview of the controversy 
triggered by De toekomst der religie, two things are of special importance to an analysis 
of polemical exchange. On the one hand, we see marked differences between people 
reacting polemically and those who were moderate. On the other hand, the role of 
polemics has decreased considerably during the fifty years of reception we are study-
ing. These conclusions allow me to start with a more detailed discussion of the prob-
lems we must address in the course of our analysis of the controversy.  
The problem 
When attempting to analyze polemical contributions, we must avoid taking sides 
with either the polemist or the putative victim. This is something of which Monique 
Despret, in her thesis on the reception of De toekomst der religie, was not sufficiently 
aware. Too easily, she takes Vestdijk to be the victim of the controversy. And her 
antipathy for the intellectuals attacking his arguments is at times quite explicit 
throughout her study. The first was taking a “paternalistic” attitude, another one felt 
“self-imporant” and “bloated”, whereas a third one merely showed “disdain”.8 Ac-
cording to her, these critics failed to consider Vestdijk’s arguments properly. Their 
intolerance, she concludes, was “really shocking.” And to mark her distance towards 
those people, she holds that, today, “we are able to admit that our opponents have 
the right to their own arguments.” Though admitting that one of the literary critics 
                                                     
8 Despret 1980: 82. 
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was reacting quite “facetiously”,9 she only blames the theologians for being unfair 
towards Vestdijk.10 For people taking these theologians too seriously, she laments, it 
would be difficult if not impossible to get an idea of Vestdijk’s real arguments.11 And 
without properly defining what she means by “polemic”, she frequently employs the 
term to refer to theologians who, according to her, were treating Vestdijk unfairly. 
Yet, this way, the term implies a mere judgment, without having much analytical 
value. It is lamentable that her advisor, the Belgian expert on Dutch literature Roger 
Henrard from Leuven, agreed with the terminology which Despret employed. Yet, 
the fact that he himself was part of the reception of De toekomst der religie by defend-
ing Vestdijk may have interfered with his own judgment of theologians.12
This is not to say that in polemics the arguments of the people attacked are not 
distorted. On the contrary, as I will argue, distorting elements always play a role. Yet, 
the same might be the case in moderate criticism. Some critics praised Vestdijk for 
things which he, in fact, had not advocated at all. Moreover it would be quite pre-
mature to exclude the possibility that an adequate picture of Vestdijk’s argument 
might in fact be used for polemical purposes. 
Instead of accusing people of being polemical, I will attempt to understand why. 
How should we account for the many different reactions to Vestdijk’s essay? How to 
account for the fact that the history of its reception developed the way it did? Why 
did people feel tempted to react the way they did? Why did some people regard his 
arguments as highly provocative and feel the need to react polemically, while others 
did not? And why did the polemic turn out to be less interesting for an increasing 
number of people throughout the history of the reception we are studying? In other 
words, we must find an explanation for the polemical controversy surrounding Vest-
dijk’s essay at both the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of history, while avoid-
ing any kind of value judgment that might distort our own analysis of the facts. 
In order to give some direction to the analysis, I will develop a hypothesis that 
might account for some important features of our controversy. Then I shall indicate 
how this hypothesis is put into practice in each of the following chapters. In the end, 
it is my ambition to arrive at a theory that can possibly be applied and tested on a 
wider field of phenomena than only the polemic which we are dealing with. 
Hypothesis
To put things briefly, I will argue that our polemic is a means by which intellectuals 
attempt to defend themselves against—or establish their authority over—others who 
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are regarded as a threat to their position as opinion leaders of a specific public. In this 
sense, polemic is the way in which a structural contradiction between the ambition of 
intellectuals and the behavior of a certain audience leads to a conflict in the media in 
which specific individuals try to defend themselves against—or establish their author-
ity over—that of others, in an attempt to defeat them. 
Though highly abstract, in what follows I make some further remarks on crucial 
elements in the definition of the hypothesis. First, I will attempt to identify in a pre-
liminary fashion what type of people are involved in public controversies in general, 
and those of a textual nature in particular, whether polemical or not. Then, I will 
focus on what exactly those people are aiming at. If we say that authority is the ideal, 
what we are indicating by that? On the one hand, in the case of textual interactions, 
we are talking about encounters between intellectuals, deliberating, exchanging opin-
ions, criticising each other, and at times attempting to excommunicate their oppo-
nent. On the other hand, in the case of encounters that are not limited to private 
correspondence, there is also a public addressed, or at least attending the show. And it 
is before this public that authority has to be defended or established. Thus, while 
polemic is the actual encounter between intellectuals, authority is the problem which 
stimulates the people involved to participate and try to play their role as opinion 
leaders for a certain group of people. Finally, we must focus not only on textual en-
counters in general, but define more exactly some characteristics of polemic in par-
ticular and explicitly distinguish it from other kinds of interactions between intellec-
tuals, such as discussion, dialogue and criticism in general. 
The people: intellectuals. At first sight it might seem strange to call those involved in a 
religious controversy ‘intellectuals’. This is especially the case because many of the 
participants in the controversy were theologians. And how is it possible to count the 
latter among the intellectuals? According to many critics, theologians are the very 
opposite of true intellectuals. 
Along with an immense corpus of literature on intellectuals, the Netherlands has 
an academic tradition in the field of sociology of intellectuals. Perhaps it is more 
accurate to speak of three different traditions. The first one started with Lolle Nauta 
in Groningen and was soon joined by a group of sociologists in Amsterdam. The 
latter were inspired by American Alvin Gouldner and organized around the figure of 
Joop Goudsblom.13 The second tradition was originally developed at the Catholic and 
Dutch Reformed universities. In the early 1970s, Nijmegen sociologist J. Thurlings 
initiated his attempts to explain the process of secularization in the Netherlands, and 
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its consequences for pillar organizations in particular.14 The theory of American soci-
ologist Ronald Inglehart, by which he attempted to account for the “silent revolu-
tion” that had been taking place in western societies during the 1960s en 1970s, 
would become highly influential and stimulated research at both the Free University 
in Amsterdam and Catholic University in Tilburg.15 The third tradition started in 
Tilburg in the 1980s, and was closely associated with the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu. C.J. van Rees and H. Verhaasdonk are the main representatives of this 
direction in research on intellectuals.16
In this study, I will draw inspiration from the more empirically oriented traditions 
of Thurlings/Inglehart and Bourdieu.17 Even though Bourdieu at times does not 
escape from the ideological lure of defining intellectuals in a normative manner, his 
approach is far more sophisticated and empirically informed than that of the Gould-
ner/Goudsblom-tradition. As I will argue in more detail, the latter is too heavily 
burdened by ideological assumptions to be of analytical value.18
The Gouldner/Goudsblom-school of analysts defined intellectuals almost exclu-
sively as learned people with no ties to any fixed social group whatsoever. That is 
why they, with Mannheim, prefer to speak of the relativ freischwebende Intelligenz. By 
that they wish to suggest that this category of people is intellectually independent 
from any group interests and is able to think about the common good. They are able 
to transcend the limited viewpoints of local and religious authorities and often reach 
out for the interest of the world as a whole. They are Weltbürger, proud to be wholly 
secular, i.e. enlightened and free. 
This becomes especially clear in the tirades of Nauta—the latter being one of the 
foremost members of the Gouldner/Goudsblom-school—against a particular brand of 
religious authorities, namely theologians. According to him, these people completely 
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failed to positively contribute to any discussion on matters of public importance in 
the post-war era. Among these theologians he also includes philosophers with any 
religious affiliations. It is especially curious that Nauta should argue so, given his own 
contribution to the controversy surrounding Vestdijk in Wending, a magazine edited 
by exactly the kind of people he would denounce some twenty years later.19
However, apart from Nauta’s personal history, his attitude towards theologians is 
similar to that of many critics. And Despret, as we have seen, shows a similar bias. 
She suggested that only theologians employed the polemical style of arguing, and that 
a possible explanation for this would be that theologians are by nature unfair to their 
opponents. Here she uncritically follows the argument Vestdijk himself had defended. 
According to him, theologians were the people who used to sell the images they 
themselves had created for the truth. Their projections he called metaphysical, be-
cause these were not to be corrected or refuted by everyday experience. And every 
critique of their truth would trigger fierce attacks and an aggressive kind of intoler-
ance. Today, the intolerance and inability of many theologians to take facts into 
account and argue reasonably is taken for granted. Critics and so-called intellectuals 
do not require any explanation of the kind Vestdijk offered. The opinions of theolo-
gians is no longer seen as relevant.
Nauta has correctly been criticized for ignoring the works of so-called ‘progres-
sive’ theologians, mainly involved in the breakthrough-movement that attempted to 
get rid of the sectarian way in which Dutch society was organized. These people, 
mainly being members of the Netherlands Reformed Church (NHK) or outcasts 
within either the Dutch Reformed Churches (GKN) or the Roman Catholic 
Church (RKK), intended to cross the barriers of the pillar-system. At that time, the 
Dutch Reformed, the Roman Catholics, as well as the Socialists had their own set of 
organizations, ranging from scout groups to political parties and labor unions. The 
‘progressive’ theologians tried to break through the pillar boundaries and unite all 
Christians to join the struggle of the Socialists against injustice, capitalism and war. 
Now, these theologians were surely aiming at the common good, attempting to 
transcend group boundaries and contribute to discussions being held in the public 
square at that time. 
Sociologists must be grateful to especially Ido Weijers, Tity de Vries and Jan Wil-
lem Duyvendak to have qualified Nauta’s verdict on the theologians (or any kind of 
people with religious affiliations). Yet, these critics only focused on ‘progressive’ 
theologians.20 By that, they excluded the members of the establishment, both within 
and outside the pillar-structure. Were they justified in doing so? What kind of im-
plicit criteria did they use in order to distinguish between intellectuals and other 
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public figures that were intelligent as well? The answer, I believe, is to be found in a 
highly specific association between persons, their social position and the content of 
their ideas. In any case, the people involved here are intelligent people who were at 
least academically trained to formulate their opinions. Secondly, they did not belong 
to any of the established pillar organizations that dominated the public sphere in the 
Netherlands till the 1960s. Thirdly, intellectuals were generally making a case for 
both oppressed and depressed people while employing the state as a means to create 
the institutional facilities to address these social problems. This way, ‘the intellectuals’ 
became the partisans of the people against the establishment of either high-class citi-
zens or sectarian interests organized into traditional pillar associations. Rather then 
being the product of private initiatives, society had to be constructed by means of 
state intervention.21 And this policy was to be scientifically informed by a new class of 
academics at state universities that, instead of being involved in any kind of sectarian 
interest, were advocating the common good. The fact that this development led to a 
new establishment, politically correct consensus, or a super-pillar or organizations, led 
some critics within the Gouldner/Goudsblom-school, notably Dick Pels, to empha-
size the nomadism and strangeness of intellectuals.22 In this sense, even Pim Fortuyn 
has been analyzed as the most recent example of intellectual dandyism.23
Yet, even recent developments within the Gouldner/Goudsblom paradigm in the 
study of intellectuals do not include any comment on intellectual developments 
within the academic centers originally linked to either the GKN or RKK. This way, 
even so-called ‘progressive’ elements within traditional pillar structures are ignored. 
And this is precisely the reason why I believe the sociological tradition initiated by 
Thurlings and Inglehart to be important. This school focused on the mechanisms of 
change within the pillar organizations and the role of intellectuals in the process of 
secularization in particular. Based on detailed empirical research, these sociologists 
concluded that, rather than being a mere ‘conservative’ force, clerics and theologians 
often acted as catalysts in the “silent revolution” that began early on in the 1950s— 
long before its transforming power surfaced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The definition of intellectuals, as used by members of the Thurlings/Inglehart-
school of sociologists, is highly similar to the definition employed by the tradition 
initiated by Bourdieu. Rather than being freischwebend or independent from any social 
group, intellectuals are considered to deal with issues of public importance. Of 
course, they must be intelligent. They are educated. They are able to formulate their 
own opinions. They have access to what Bourdieu called “cultural capital”. In order 
to be an intellectual, however, it is important to engage in discussions of social prob-
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lems. That is, they do not deal exclusively with issues that they are supposed to deal 
with professionally (teaching or doing research at the university; visiting people who 
are poor, sick, disabled or on their deathbed; being a missionary or a member of the 
parliament). Rather they argue for their ideas and are able to publicly defend them 
against others.24 To continue the marketplace-metaphor Bourdieu employs (as I have 
been doing at the beginning of this introduction), intellectuals do not merely invest 
their capital in the production and consumption of cultural artifacts; rather they at-
tempt to sell these artifacts at the market. 
Surely, the focus on ‘progressive’ intellectuals within pillar organizations might 
imply only the bias implicit in the selection made by sociologists of the Gould-
ner/Goudsblom-school. And if we consider the terminology developed by Bourdieu 
to analyze the field of intellectual production in more detail, often we find distinc-
tions like those between priests and prophets, the curators and the creators of culture. 
Without jumping to judgments immediately, Bourdieu argues that both are strug-
gling for the monopoly of cultural legitimacy and the right to withhold and confer 
this “consecration” in the name of fundamentally opposed principles: the personal 
authority called for by the creator and the institutional authority favored by the 
teacher.25 And it seems as if, according to Bourdieu, the creators are to be regarded as 
intellectuals, whereas the curators, mainly because of their ‘conservative’ attitude and 
authority, are to be regarded as mere clerics. In an attempt to follow the argument 
developed in his study on academics, Bourdieu distinguished between people who 
reproduce and transmit legitimate bodies of knowledge on the one hand, and those 
who create new forms of knowledge on the other. This distinction has its parallel in 
the distinction between teachers and researchers, between professors and independent 
intellectuals.26
In an attempt to avoid the possible bias implied in the opposition between profes-
sors and independent intellectuals, I am arguing that, as soon as both enter the public 
sphere, they belong to the category of intellectuals. And I definitely agree with 
Bourdieu’s observation that within the intellectual field, people are struggling for 
cultural legitimacy. They try to convince the public somehow, i.e. employing differ-
ent styles of arguing, that their claim to the status of authority on the issues at hand is 
legitimate, whereas that made by the other is not. This brings us to the second im-
portant term in my hypothesis.  
The problem: power and authority. A category that is often regarded as having much 
analytical value within the context of cultural fields is ‘power’. When applied to 
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intellectuals, we speak of power exercised or aimed at by means of ideas or knowled-
ge. The concept of power was mainly developed within the field of sociology.27
Though originally understood to be a means to get things done,28 later on it also 
designated something that makes people act according to certain rules and regulati-
ons.29 In progressive intellectual circles, however, both senses got a bad reputation. 
While the first notion included the exercise of physical violence, the latter referred to 
the employment of so-called ‘symbolic violence’30 by means of ‘ideology.’31 And it is 
precisely this notion of ideology that is relevant to an analysis of fields of intellectual 
interaction. The term indicates a situation in which intellectual élites manipulate the 
categories people employ to order their worlds.32 Essentially, ideology distorts and 
keeps people from seeing their own reality (Marx)—a reality that, as later theorists 
would argue, required scientific analysis in order to reveal its true nature as well as 
the ideological nature of dominant worldviews (Althusser). Every ideology was em-
ployed for the benefit of the establishment and prevented people from taking the 
necessary steps to overthrow the dominant political system. Ordinary people usually 
did not realize that their worldview as well as behavior rested on the assumption that 
there exists a certain class of people who not only are capable, but also competent to 
direct their lives. In fact, however, the norms and values that are employed to govern 
the life of the people are the symbolic counterpart of an economic and political sys-
tem to which those people are submitted and by which they are exploited. And this 
symbolic system is violent because it forces people to act according to the interests of 
the establishment without any regards for their own interest, as Marxist and Althusse-
rian philosophers concluded.33
Surely, this critical perspective on the role of intellectuals in society is highly lim-
ited. This talk of power and violence is typical for what sociologist Jacques van 
Doorn has called “the clerics of the proletariat”.34 The latter believe that there is an 
essential antagonism between the establishment or dominant classes on the one hand, 
and the oppressed (if not depressed) people on the other. Yet, as other philosophers 
and some anthropologists have argued, the suspicion of these clerics of the proletariat 
against the dominant classes rests on the speculative assumption that the ordinary 
people are always suffering. The critical approach to social phenomena fails account 
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for the integrative function of power and ideology. According to them, science can 
only provide some elements for worldviews that people employ in order to find 
solutions for some problem situations; in order to satisfy them and to organize and 
guide their social life, it has to be complemented by a set of culturally specific sym-
bols.35 Ideology, in this sense, does not force people to do things, even against their 
own will or interest. On the contrary, instinctively, people feel the need for ideology 
in order to get their lives in order. This focus on the role of ideology as an integrative 
power is typical of the functionalist approach to social phenomena. 
However, whereas the Marxist/Althusserian tradition of critics claims to be spea-
king for the real interests of the people (as is required of ‘true intellectuals’ in their 
worldview), the functionalist tradition suggests that it is offering a true (sometimes 
‘thick’) description of the interests of the people as well. For an analysis of a polemi-
cal controversy, these approaches do not provide any useful analytical tool. They stop 
where we have to start. Whereas the critical tradition simply assumes that a dominant 
worldview cannot be an expression of the will and interest of the people, the functi-
onalist approach is merely stating the opposite. Apart from the fact that in present day 
pluralist societies worldviews often only dominate limited areas of life, they will ne-
ver remain uncontested, nor do we find a society without internal conflict. If other-
wise, how are we supposed to account for polemical controversy?  
Rather than starting with assumptions made by other approaches, in the case of 
our polemic we will have to focus on the interrelationship between intellectuals, 
power and the people or public in more detail. And it cannot be denied that this 
relationship might have some violent aspects, especially when intellectuals serve poli-
tical power as curators of culture. Yet, does that mean that creators of culture do not 
exploit the people whose very interest they claim to express? Apart from serving the 
interests of either power or the people, is it reasonable to assume that intellectuals do 
not have any interest of their own?  
Again, limiting ourselves to the polemic we have to analyze, first of all, it is im-
possible to show empirically that people are suffering from symbolic violence as long 
as they themselves do not show any signs of discomfort. The only ones showing 
dismay about the argument that they took to be a personal attack were fellow intel-
lectuals, rather than the ordinary public. And if they felt triggered to counter this 
attack by means of a polemical style of arguing, were they not exploiting the audien-
ce for their own benefit? And what about the author they tried to derogate? Were 
they not trying to defeat him? And if so, whose interest were they serving by that? 
Might it be their own interest? And if so, how should we define this interest?  
                                                     
35 Durkheim 1912, Radcliffe-Brown 1952, Douglas 1973, Geertz 1973, Turner 1974, Sahlins 
1976, Leach 1976, Lewis 1977, Evans-Pritchard 1981. 
25 
It is certainly too easy to discuss symbolic violence of intellectuals directed to-
wards ordinary people who are, in turn, dominated ideologically. Instead, the people 
might be a force of their own as well, directing the movements of intellectuals them-
selves. Here the perspective of traditional sociology must be supplemented by that of 
cultural studies focusing on the possibilities for resistance and turning the balance of 
power in favor of the people.36
The problem for intellectuals begins when the power of the people turns against 
them. Yet, does this mean that, rather than the people, they wish to be in power? 
When we see the concept of ‘power’ being broadened in this way, we might doubt 
whether it is still useful as an analytical tool in order to explain polemics. As I have 
suggested, the disciplines of sociology and cultural studies disagree about exactly 
where power is to be located within social systems. As soon as it appears that the 
concept might be applied to explain every movement within society –whether that 
of politics, the intellectuals or the public– then perhaps it is time to be more specific, 
or to even choose another term that more accurately applies to the reality of pole-
mics.
Intellectuals are interested in something other than power alone; what they desire 
is authority. Authority is distinct from power in the fact that the concept excludes the 
possibility of physical violence or punishment for which only politics or the public 
have the means. And whether residing in religious or academic titles, personal signa-
tures, styles of performance, or royal insignia, authority is a matter of “assurance, 
superior judgment, the ability to impose discipline, the capacity to inspire fear...”37 As 
soon as these aspects of authority are employed in favor of institutional authority, 
critical philosophers begin to speak of symbolic violence. In my opinion, however, 
this is a rash judgment. Even the so-called authoritarian regimes which usually inspire 
fear among the populace, are based on authority rather than sheer power. And even 
though for outsiders it might seem like something horrible, even here authority is a 
matter of cultural legitimacy rather than physical violence. 
Much like power, however, authority is often unstable and can be challenged.38
As Bourdieu has summarized, each intellectual or group of intellectuals struggles for 
the monopoly on cultural legitimacy and the right to confer or withhold this conse-
cration, whether being a matter of personal or institutional authority.39 And even 
though the competition seems to be one between intellectuals, the public is always 
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present as the third party in the ordeal. To borrow from Bourdieu once more, we 
might say that ideologies as a means to gain legitimacy,40
owe their structure and their most specific functions to the social conditions of their 
production and circulation, that is, first, to the functions they perform for specialists 
competing for a monopoly over the competence under consideration (religious, artis-
tic, etc.); and second, and as a by-product of this, to the functions they perform for 
non-specialists. We must remember that ideologies are always doubly determined, that 
they owe their most specific characteristics not only to the interests of the classes or 
class fractions they express (the function of sociodicy), but also to the specific interests 
of those who produce them and to the specific logic of the field of production (com-
monly transfigured into the form of an ideology of ‘creation’ and of the ‘creative ar-
tists’).
And even if the third party, i.e. the public, is not always (or almost never) present in 
a conflict between intellectuals, it nevertheless plays a decisive role. It serves as a jury, 
even though, in the absence of a judge to transmit the final verdict, we do not always 
know exactly what it says. To continue the marketplace-metaphor we have previous-
ly employed: the public is like those who, rather than buy any merchandise, merely 
browsing. And it is difficult to figure out exactly whether or not the public which we 
are aiming at appreciates the offers we are making it. What holds for sellers at the 
marketplace also holds for the intellectuals involved in our controversy. As long as 
they have no reason to doubt that many people still regard them as authorities on the 
issues at hand, they are likely to feel confident. On the other hand, when their posi-
tion within the cultural field does not provide them with the proper environment to 
feel secure, they are likely to feel vulnerable when others criticize the opinions with 
which they identify. 
What happens when intellectuals believe their authority to be threatened? How 
do they counter the imminent danger of losing sight of the cultural legitimacy they 
aim to achieve? Here we arrive at the last crucial term in my hypothesis. As I will 
argue, polemic is something which immediately offers itself as a means to defend 
one’s authority before a public for which adherence is doubtful and far from secure. 
The means: polemics. To say that polemic is a means of defending or re-establishing 
authority is one thing, but we still need to know what a concept like polemic might 
consist of.
There are many descriptions of polemics available. In general, however, no clear 
definition of the subject has been given. The controversies we are discussing are 
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rather intuitively and rather uncritically classified under this label. Another striking 
feature of these studies is the fact that they are almost always focused on either anci-
ent times (Biblical, polemics between Jews and Christians, Protestants and Catholics, 
ideological dispute and controversy within early science) or other cultures and religi-
ons (artistic circles, Zionism, Afro-American Christianity, Islam). With the advent of 
so-called Modernity, polemic became superfluous and out of place. 
Surely, there has been extensive discussion on intellectual controversies in gene-
ral. Whereas theologians and philosophers have advocated dialogue as an ethically 
superior kind of discourse, whether religious or not,41 philosophers and historians of 
science have dealt with the problem of either scientific progress,42 the conflict of 
paradigms,43 or scientific controversy in general.44 In the field of linguistics and rheto-
rical studies, on the other hand, scholars have focused on the structure, rhetoric and 
resolution of scientific, judiciary, political as well as public controversy.45
Yet, like Despret in her study of the controversy surrounding Vestdijk, all of the-
se analyses and descriptions suggest that polemic belongs to a period in history which 
we haven’t been able to transcend. Ours is a time of progress through serious discus-
sion and dialogue. Polemic belongs to times past or portions of society that are 
governed by irrational behavior or religious beliefs. Often, it is assumed that the 
process of secularization has been a civilizing process as well. And whereas theologi-
ans, with their authoritarian style of arguing and intolerance towards people of diffe-
rent opinions, are usually classified among the primitives, today’s intellectuals are 
considered to be the prime examples of reasonable thinking.  
This, however, ignore the role polemics continue to play, not only in everyday 
life, but also in scientific and highly intellectual discourse. As my own analysis will 
show, theologians might well be polemical in their way of dealing with opinions of 
their opponents. On the other hand, we will find many examples of theologians 
deriving their status from institutional authority, thus keeping themselves miles away 
from any kind of polemical attack. 
The only person who has devoted part of his work to the definition of polemic, 
as well as its role in social life, is the philosopher-linguist Marcelo Dascal. It is striking 
that Dascal defines polemics so broadly, including all kinds of disagreement in every-
day life, whether leading to conflict or closure. Contrary to critics assuming polemics 
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to be a mode of conversation typical of other times and cultures, Dascal does not 
think it even necessary to persuade his readers of its central place in our public and 
private discursive life.46
Whichever way we look, we are entangled in endless polemizing: from daily domestic 
quarrels, through disputes over parking places or office space, to political decisions; 
from mild disagreement, through bitter bickering, to schism; from critical book re-
views, through congress round-tables, to scientific controversies; in matters of literary 
taste, in courtrooms, in the workplace, in parliaments, and at home. 
Dascal thus equates polemics with criticism, making things quite complicated when 
he continues to argue that the latter is “primarily a form of dialogical activity, which 
manifests itself most naturally in polemical exchanges of various sorts.”47 Instead of 
distinguishing polemics from dialogue, he prefers to define three types of polemical 
exchange, i.e. discussion, dispute and controversy. According to Dascal, “all involve 
at least two persons who employ language to address each other, in a confrontation of 
attitudes, opinions, arguments, theories and so forth.”48 These types of exchanges 
differ only in the way in which the other is confronted. While discussion is a logical 
way of solving problems and finding truth, and dispute tries to win a contest between 
ideologies, controversy is a deliberative attempt to persuade a critic and the audience 
by means of facts, evaluations, attitudes, goals and methods. “Whereas a discussant is 
prepared to admit defeat if the adversary provides a knock-down argument against 
her position and a controversialist is prepared to acknowledge the weight of the op-
ponent’s reasons, a disputant begins and ends the dispute (whatever its ‘external’ 
outcome) convinced he is right.”49 Whatever the facts or arguments employed in the 
case of a polemical move, dispute makes use of evidence that does not need to be 
valid or true, but only has to be ‘effective’ vis-à-vis the intended addressee and au-
dience.50 Though neither discussion nor controversy have the intention of ending in 
agreement, they might end as such. Dispute, on the other hand, never ends in 
agreement, but only attempts to gain victory over the other. 
I would like to make some critical remarks concerning Dascal’s categorical dis-
tinctions. First of all, his definition of polemics as an exchange between at least two 
persons fails to take the public nature of this type of exchange into account. Several 
times he mentions the audience, but it does not play any decisive role in the analysis 
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of polemics. And that is exactly what I shall attempt to do in my explanation of the 
controversy on De toekomst der religie. Secondly, Dascal extends the category of pole-
mics too far, while including such diverse types of interaction as discussion, contro-
versy and dispute. For that he equates polemics with criticism. And, I believe, he is 
correct to point to an element of criticism in all of these different types of exchange. 
Yet, as he himself seems to acknowledge, both discussion and controversy, are more 
or less opposed to dispute; unlike the former, dispute merely attempts to overpower 
the other. When compared to this fundamental difference, those between discussion 
and controversy are of minor importance. Thirdly, Dascal interprets polemics as a 
form of dialogical activity. In this case, I believe, he extends the category of dialogue 
too far. And even though he follows a linguistic tradition,51 it is almost impossible to 
include the definition of dispute Dascal has offers into a useful conception of dialo-
gue. At least dialogue, as it is commonly known, has the intention of arriving at some 
kind of agreement, and, consequently, has some similarities with discussion and con-
troversy, rather than dispute. As such, it also doesn’t have much to do with polemics 
that, which, like dispute, does not aim at finding an agreement between opponents 
either.
 Continuing our line of thinking in a more positive direction, I would like to in-
terpret controversy rather broadly, including discussion, dialogue and polemics. And, 
instead of taking polemics broadly, I prefer to emphasize its similarities with dispute, 
while adding some further elements which are, according to me, highly important for 
a proper analysis of polemics, i.e. its aggressive nature, as well as its personal and 
public nature.  
Derived from polemos, polemic stands out for its violence in the way it treats 
others. It is “the art of attack” according to Richard Griffiths definition.52 It is a war-
like interaction of attack, defense or counter-attack by means of words. Even in the 
case of defense, polemic is an intensive and violent form of aggression.53 In this man-
ner, it distinguishes itself from dialogue. Both are highly personal encounters. Howe-
ver, whereas dialogue aims at mutual understanding, even when trying to convince 
others, polemics is merely an attempt to gain victory over the other.54 On the other 
hand, whatever the difference between these forms of interaction, both are to be 
distinguished from discussion for their subjectivity. Whereas polemics and dialogue 
are personal encounters, discussion pretends to be an attempt to find a common 
ground without any respect for the persons involved. For this reason, people tend to 
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regard it as a more objective way of communication.55 Discussion may also include 
criticism, even though the latter usually shares something of its violence with pole-
mics. Moreover, criticism may also be personal. But, whereas mere criticism resem-
bles a contest in private, polemic is a contest on public display.56 Taken together, we 
may define polemic as an attack directed against a person before a public by means of 
words in order to overpower the opponent.57
Involved in a struggle for authority, why would intellectuals turn to polemics? 
Why not limit themselves to criticism or discussion, or try to find a common ground 
by means of dialogue? Why employ such an intensive and violent form of aggression? 
To answer these questions, I shall turn to sociological and psychological studies on 
so-called ‘excessive’ violence. As has been argued, there might be historical and situ-
ational explanations for particular persons becoming victims of this type of violence, 
though these do not include their own immediate harmfulness or aggression towards 
the people attacked. In private, victim and aggressor might even be friends. Thus, as 
social-psychologists Kelman and Hamilton concluded, “their selection as targets for 
violent attack at a particular time can be ultimately traced to their relationship to the 
pursuit of larger policies. Their elimination may be seen as a useful tool or their con-
tinued existence as an irritating obstacle in the execution of policy.”
58
 In psychologi-
cal experiments, an aggressive response is most likely to occur when the subject is 
either physically attacked—that is, when pain is inflicted, usually by electric shocks.
59
In social life, the same result is achieved when the subject’s self-concept, self-esteem 
and social image are threatened. This holds for all mammals, man included.
60
 Apart 
from physical abuse, however, in the case of human beings, abuse, insult, verbal at-
tack and criticism can give rise to anger and aggression as well. In sociological and 
social-psychological theory it is argued that the latter type of reactions are most likely 
to occur in an unstable environment in which individuals feel insecure and their 
sense of self-identity is easily questioned.
61
The person, as well as the pattern of behavior constituting the core of my hy-
pothesis, is aptly described by Robin Robins and Jerrold Post in their study of indi-
viduals suffering from paranoia.
62
 Earlier, I considered polemic as a distortion of ar-
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guments in order to defeat the opponent. Here, this activity is explicitly linked to a 
specific personality disorder.
63
 And even though this might seem to constitute a 
highly subjective judgment on others, there are several criteria that will prove helpful 
in identifying the people involved. First, the latter are accustomed to being highly 
suspicious. Without sufficient basis, they may think that others are exploiting or 
harming them. To the paranoid, things are not what they seem to be. The paranoid 
man does not permit himself to be distracted by apparently innocent facts, but claims 
to see through them. He searches continuously for hidden meanings, for clues to the 
enemies and threats he believes to be real.
64
 Secondly, for the paranoid man, every-
thing has meaning in reference to him. Actions and comments that do not necessarily 
have anything to do with him are interpreted as being directed against him; he feels 
he is the object of great interest. And being of interest, he perceives attacks on his 
character or reputation that are not apparent to others.
65
 Thirdly, the paranoid is 
quick to react angrily and aggressively. He is belligerent and irritable, extremely sen-
sitive to slight. He is “combative” and “quarrelsome”, “tightly wound” and “bristly 
defensive”. And this “defensive posture” contains a “poised readiness to attack”, as 
Robins and Post argue.
66
 According to them, the character traits just mentioned are 
triggered by the inability to stand and give in to external pressure or authority. Un-
able to tolerate imperfection or to accept compromises, the paranoid finds himself in 
constant warfare with both real and imaginary adversaries that threaten his autonomy. 
Yet, whereas suspicion is the hallmark of paranoia, the imagination transforms a per-
ceived state of affairs into something determined by external causes.
67
 In order to 
defend oneself against unbearable feelings of insignificance, the paranoid man devel-
ops a compensatory grandiose delusion. From the unbearable reality of being fired “as 
a dishwasher” he constructs the preferable reality of becoming “the king of the 
world”, as Robins and Post remark. And, they concluded, though feeling highly 
insecure and living in a world full of threats, “the paranoid appears self-centered and 
arrogant, with little concern for the needs and feelings of others.” In fact, however, 
“he is extremely concerned with how others feel about him. The arrogance is a 
mask, concealing pervasive uncertainty and profound self-doubt.”
68
To apply all of this to polemical controversy, attempting to publicly denigrate 
somebody else is a method employed by intellectuals as a way of defending or re-
establishing their authority. This must be done, because their position as legitimate 
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spokesperson on an important issue is threatened by the argument of their opponent. 
And as I have indicated, it is not only the one who developed the argument that is 
perceived as a threat, but rather the feeling that there is an audience that might take it 
seriously. Unlike discussion or dialogue, polemic is not merely a competition be-
tween ideas and ideologies; rather it is a personal attack. And this attack must neces-
sarily be personal in order to compensate for an imbalance in the social conditions 
that determine whether one will be taken as an authority on important issues or not. 
The issue to which we shall now turn is whether it is possible to analyze our con-
troversy in the light of the hypothesis outlined before (and if so, how). For this we 
must have an idea of both the quantity and the quality of our materials as well as the 
methods which will be employed to study them. 
Materials
With respect to the quantity of sources available to test my hypothesis, I have identi-
fied almost 180 contributions to the controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie.
Certainly, these do not account for all of the references to the essay in the media 
during the period we are focusing on. With respect to the quality of the materials, I 
will focus merely on the ones that paid substantive, rather than exclusive, attention to 
either Vestdijk’s argument or the future of religion. 
Most of the sources I have used are provided by bibliographies on Vestdijk’s oeu-
vre in general, and De toekomst der religie in particular. First of all, the work of Jean 
Brüll was of much value. Especially important was his six-volume survey of both the 
writings of Vestdijk and the reviews his oeuvre triggered in literary and generally 
cultural magazines from 1930 till 1972.
69
 In addition, Brüll published a survey of the 
reception of Vestdijk in books, magazines, newspapers and broadcastings till 1980.
70
Second, whereas most of his sources are to be found in Brüll as well, the second 
edition of Fokke Sierksma’s Tussen twee vuren offers some further references.
71
 Soon, 
however, it became clear that these bibliographies were far from exhaustive. Some 
contributions to the controversy referred to material ignored by either Brüll or 
Sierksma. The bibliographies of the works of K.H. Miskotte and H. Kraemer clearly 
indicated that, apart from the reviews and discussions already included in other refer-
ence works, they did not write anything else on Vestdijk (or Sierksma).
72
 On the 
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other hand, bibliographies of the writings of J. van Heugten, H. de Vos, G.C. 
Berkouwer and Sierksma pointed to some other contributions.
73
With respect to the quantity of sources, some significant progress has been made 
since the work done by Monique Despret till 1980. Even though the bibliographies 
by Brüll were not fully completed at the time she conducted her research, the second 
edition of Sierksma’s essay was already available. Given these circumstances it is sur-
prising that she counted only sixty sources. This is partly due to her focus on contri-
butions that analyzed De toekomst der religie exclusively. Yet, to study the reception of 
the essay in its entirety as well as the way it was judged by critics, the perspective 
must be broadened considerably. Whereas Despret does not include the controversy 
between Kraemer and Sierksma on issues originally presented by Vestdijk, already the 
fact that, apart from Sierksma also Vestdijk and his ideas are commented upon is 
sufficient reason to include their contributions into the analysis. Whereas Despret 
counted sixty sources, I found at least a hundred more.  
For the period after 1980 –the last year covered by the bibliographies of Brüll– I 
was forced to research newspapers and opinion magazines myself. Given the fact that 
the interest for Vestdijk’s work had already steadily declined during the 1970s, apart 
from the essays published in the Vestdijkkroniek, this task provided me with a few 
interesting sources. It is possible that in the future more material will be discovered. 
In general, I believe that the material gathered thus far is rich enough to offer oppor-
tunities for serious analysis. The question, then, is by which methods our materials 
are to be analyzed. 
Method
In this study analysis of the controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie, I shall 
apply four different methods. This will be done in four chapters. In each of these 
chapters the material will be analyzed according to the rules determined by the me-
thod relevant to the perspectives developed. 
The first chapter will offer a broad outline of trends and developments within the 
history of the reception, and indicate the role played by polemics. The next two 
chapters are meant to analyze the mechanisms characteristic of polemical texts. The 
final chapter will link historical developments in general and polemical contributions 
in particular with their social context.  
In chapter I, the historical method will be applied. Previously, I argued that there 
is a synchronic as well as a diachronic dimension to the way our controversy has 
unfolded. Whereas the latter points to some general developments, the former might 
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indicate the specific role played by either polemic or any other style of exchanging 
opinions throughout the history of the reception of De toekomst der religie.
For the sake of analysis, different periods will be identified, more or less 
corresponding to the years in which certain important contributions to the 
controversy were published. Vestdijk’s essay became available in 1947. The first 
period began with the first reviews in 1948 and lasted till 1951. The second period 
began with the publication of both the second edition of De toekomst der religie and
Sierksma’s essay Tussen twee vuren (‘Between Two Fires’) in 1952; it ended with the 
controversy between Sierksma and Kraemer in 1959. The third period began with 
the third edition of Vestdijk’s essay; it ended in 1972. The fourth period, finally, 
began with both the first issue of the Vestdijkkroniek (‘Vestdijk Cronicle’) and J. 
Kamphuis’s study Vestdijk en de kerkgeschiedenis (‘Vestdijk and Church History’); it 
ended with the last polemical contribution in 1998, again by Kamphuis. 
Apart from the date on which certain important essays and studies appeared in 
print, other criteria determined the way in which I distinguished between different 
periods as well, i.e. the role played by polemical contributions, the role of the con-
troversy within the general public sphere as well as the variety of people contributing 
to it. Yet, even then, we must look at the contributions in more detail. This will be 
done in chapters II and III.  
In chapter II, I will employ methods derived from linguistics in order to identify 
the distinguishing feature of polemical texts and to figure out which contributions 
can be classified into this category. Terminology will be derived from poetical analy-
sis (as it has been inspired by psychoanalysis74). Even though mainly applied to literary 
texts, I agree with Hayden V. White that the mechanisms underlying these artifacts 
are equally relevant for the study of other textual material. White himself has em-
ployed them for his analysis of historical narrative and cultural criticism.75
Based on the insights offered by this direction in textual analysis, it will be argued 
that any exchange of opinions involves summary or condensation of arguments. Sig-
nificant for polemics, however, is the fact that it substitutes or displaces the argument 
for its author. Instead of taking the text as its main object of attack, in polemic a 
subject is created in order to account for the contradiction between the opinions 
defended in the text and the ones held by the critic. And rather than countering the 
argument, it is rendered invalid simply by derogating the author imagined behind the 
text. This is done by questioning the moral, mental or professional capacity of the 
subject accountable for the argument. As will be shown, the mechanism, previously 
defined as paranoia, is similar to that identified by Freud in his study on wit-work. 
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In chapter III, the method of rhetorical analysis is employed in order to identify 
how critics attempt to convince their public. Terminology will be derived especially 
from the work of Robert Hariman on political style.76 The latter identified four diffe-
rent styles that function as ideal types for the conduct of public figures. And even 
though texts are not to be confused with political reality, in both cases there is always 
an element of pretense. As in the case of paranoid personality disorder, with its arro-
gance and compensatory grandiose delusion, styles are employed in order to create a 
sense of authority, rather than to reflect some actual state of affairs. Hariman identifies 
four different political styles, namely realist, republican, bureaucratic and authoritarian 
ones. With the help of others I will attempt to translate these styles of conduct into 
ways of arguing as exemplified in texts.77
Based on the insights offered by this direction in textual analysis, it will be con-
cluded that the authoritarian style of arguing is often employed in polemics. This fits 
with the way arguments are substituted by their author. Rather than attempting to 
convince the public by being realistic, moderate and referenced, critics tend to mere-
ly declare the author unfit, and by that, the argument is declared invalid. For that 
they do not need any support; their personal judgment must be sufficient to remove 
the contradiction between the arguments developed in the text and those held by the 
critic involved. The interesting question to be answered is whether the personal and 
authoritarian style is tied to the personal authority of which Bourdieu wrote. The 
latter type of authority he thought to be characteristic of ‘cultural creators’. In order 
to come to a conclusion about that, we cannot limit ourselves to textual analysis only. 
In chapter IV, I will apply the method of sociological analysis. By this I mean to 
identify both the institutional network in which intellectuals participate and their 
relationship with the public. Rather than employing the so-called secularization thesis 
to account for the trends in the history of the reception of De toekomst der religie—as
other students of polemics have done—, I intend to focus on the position of each 
individual within the field of cultural production. Of particular interest here is the 
sociology of Bourdieu78, as well as the sociological direction within the discourse 
analysis stimulated by Michel Foucault and further developed by Norman Fair-
clough.79 This approach requires us to move from the text (or primary sources) to 
secondary material offering clues to the context of the controversy. Instead of assu-
ming that texts do not have any link with the outside world, I agree with Bourdieu 
that the ideologies developed in polemic are always doubly determined. More speci-
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fically, I wish to explain the subject (or content) and style (or form) by systematically 
relating them to social conditions by which attacks are shaped. The framework to be 
employed for this kind of analysis is the one constituted by the oppositions between 
‘dominant’ and ‘marginal’ intellectuals or between ‘the established’ and ‘the outsi-
ders’.80 Contrary to what studies on the activity of intellectuals within the public 
sphere suggest, to be ‘dominant’ or belonging to ‘the establishment’ does not always 
imply figuring prominently in media forms which we consider important. Applied to 
the context of the Netherlands from 1945 till 2000, some intellectuals might have 
been dominant within their own local community, without having had much influ-
ence in wider society. Significant developments within the country did not prevent 
people from staying within tightly structured pillar organizations. We must remember 
that the public sphere was highly fragmented, and that reactions to Vestdijk’s essay 
depended upon the relative position of each single intellectual within certain public 
areas. On the other hand, people we are used to calling ‘outsiders’ are often far from 
‘marginal’ and, instead, holding key positions at universities or within the political 
arena. Also, however, for those intellectuals, their relations with the public will be 
considered of the utmost importance in understanding their contributions to the 
controversy which we are studying. And rather than being ‘dominant’ or belonging 
to ‘the established’, it was precisely the marginal figures and outsiders among the 
intellectuals that used to fancy themselves a higher and better order of human beings, 
asserting their superiority over others and casting a sidelong glance on the others as 
people of a lesser breed. The centerpiece of this moral configuration is an uneven 
balance of power and the tension inherent within it.81
Put briefly, throughout this study I will argue that polemic is a means by which 
intellectuals attempt to identify or defend themselves before an audience of people 
that might have some doubts about whether or not to assign their opinion leaders 
and spokespersons any authority.  
Hypothesis: scientific or not? 
I shall now devote what remains of my introduction to confronting criticism by those 
who find my hypothesis unfit because it includes some value judgments. These critics 
might even doubt whether my claims are any different form the methods employed 
in polemic and, consequently, conclude that they are not scientific at all. 
First of all, does the fact that I interpret some contributions to the controversy as 
polemical include a value judgment on my part? Critics are correct in believing detai-
led arguments not to be value free for the mere fact that they are detailed. There is 
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surely always an element of instinct, intuition and imagination in any kind of descrip-
tion and analysis of facts. And the latter are selected according to the limits set by the 
questions for which both description and analysis are meant to provide an answer. In 
concert with the postmodern authorities which I have invoked throughout my study, 
I believe that even the ego of scientists always plays an important role in the enterpri-
se. Yet, I definitely do not believe that science is to be reduced to any kind of perso-
nal aberration on the part of the scholars involved. If that would be implied by post-
modernism, I definitely do not agree. I do not believe that there is no qualitative 
difference between the personal judgments we found in polemics on the one hand 
and my judgment that in polemics, arguments are distorted and people launch attacks 
against others that cannot be justified by means of facts about the other. Personally, I 
wish Christianity to die. This statement by Vestdijk surely included a personal judg-
ment. He did not deny this. The point is that he tried to offer reasons for why he 
wished Christianity to die. Yet, his opponents did not let themselves be deceived by 
that. According to them, nobody could reasonably argue such a claim. Moreover, 
Vestdijk was a novelist rather than a theologian or scholar of religion. Instead of 
taking his argument seriously, they attempted to suggest that he was either mentally 
or morally disturbed. To be sure, somebody arguing that he, personally, wishes 
Christianity to die might be insane. The point, however, is whether this is a fact or 
mere speculative inference. Without serious discussion of the symptoms that are 
usually linked to mental disorders, we might be incorrect in judging people that are, 
in reality, quite sanguine and sane. 
Popper did not consider science to be completely different from other opinions 
expressed within the public sphere either (and polemical exchange has to be inclu-
ded, as well). On the contrary, he agreed with Russell that science begins with in-
stinct and intuition as much as any other cognitive enterprises. The fundamental 
difference between scientific claims on the one hand, and other statements on the 
other, is that the former can be rationally tested and, in the end, either confirmed or 
refuted.82
Thus, though I admit that my hypothesis began as a matter of intuition and 
imagination, I believe that subsequent analysis will be both quantitatively and qualita-
tively different from the polemical remarks made by those contributing to our con-
troversy. Certainly, I make claims about the personal situation of my objects as much 
as these did of Vestdijk and his opponents. Yet, instead of being mere speculation, I 
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have attempted to develop these claims as parts of a hypothesis that will be further 
outlined in this thesis. 
39 
I – THE POLEMIC: ITS HISTORY 
…the end of the book and the beginning of writing… 
Jacques Derrida 
Introduction
Shortly after the World War II, the Zondagspost announced the publication of certain 
works by some important Dutch writers.1 Among those were some novels and essays 
written by Simon Vestdijk during the period of German occupation. In a way, this 
came as no surprise, as even before the war Vestdijk had been the acknowledged 
primus inter pares of Dutch literature. Though others would soon join him, after the 
death of Menno ter Braak, Edgar du Perron and Hendrik Marsman, Vestdijk was the 
only one left of a pre-war generation of leading literary critics. 
Though he did not doubt whether or not his reputation was justified, Adriaan 
Venema, in his study on writers, publishers and their collaboration with the Germans, 
minutely described Vestdijk’s activities during the war. He concluded that it was 
extremely difficult to situate him between the extremes of good and evil. At all times, 
Vestdijk had written and published in what Venema called the twilight zone of pro-
test, adaptation, and adjustment, or even collaboration.2
Even though those people who still venerated Vestdijk felt offended by Venema’s 
critique, and refused to believe that their hero had ever collaborated, Venema’s con-
clusions did not differ considerably from what Sierksma had said forty years earlier. 
According to Sierksma, by giving the Germans the idea that he did not pose any 
threat to their authority, Vestdijk had just been trying to save his neck.3 As historian 
Jacques Presser once summarized the point, people like Vestdijk “collaborated in 
order to obstruct, and tried to obstruct while leaving the impression they were col-
laborating.”4
The facts were already available to anyone who did not wish to keep his eyes 
shut. The only thing that had changed was the way in which critics judged public 
figures that did not participate in the resistance. As Regine Grueter observed in her 
discussion of the Weinreb-affair, it was only from the 1960s onwards that criteria of 
good and evil were more systematically applied to persons playing a public role dur-
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ing the war. According to her, this was typical of a period in which public sentiment 
turned against a pre-war-yet-still-powerful establishment.5 Surely, it is only in this 
kind of atmosphere that the painstaking efforts by Venema make sense; not only 
Vestdijk, but many other once famous writers were shunned for having collaborated 
with the wrong side during the war.6
Immediately after the war, however, Vestdijk was not openly judged for his con-
tacts with the Germans. On the contrary, people remembered him as one of the 
intellectuals taken hostage by the enemy. For the broad public he was the only fa-
mous Dutch writer remaining from the prewar period. Nobody asked why he had 
been released by the Germans so early in the war, while others would have to remain 
imprisoned until the very end. His fellow hostages may have been jealous, as Vestdijk 
himself observed,7 but they were not aware of the reasons for which the Germans let 
him go. Only a small circle of friends were told of Vestdijk’s promise to become a 
member of the Kultuurkamer, a society of leading Dutch artists and writers supervised 
by the German occupiers.8 For the broader public he was merely one of the heroes 
that after the war would take the lead in Dutch culture and society again. 
In this post-war atmosphere, the publication of De toekomst der religie was an-
nounced by the Zondagspost, though it was actually published two years later. The 
publisher was well known for its publications in the field of psychology. Clearly, 
Vestdijk had written a study on religion from a psychological and humanist perspec-
tive. At that time, it was likely that such an essay from one of the Netherlands’ fore-
most writers would call attention. In fact, people from a wide variety of intellectual 
circles felt challenged. 
Vestdijk expected a reaction to his arguments. The essay consisted of a series of 
lectures that were originally meant to be delivered before his fellow hostages in 
Beekvliet. Yet, even though an earlier series of lectures was received enthusiastically, 
the one on religion did not receive much attention. Only the first lecture was deliv-
ered, and with only one person in attendance, the lecture series was discontinued.9
According to Vestdijk, in a letter to his friend Theun de Vries from early 1944, the 
series was boycotted by “orthodox theologians”, who were by nature, as he put it, 
unable to appreciate his style of arguing. “Here we get a foretaste of its public recep-
tion,” he wrote to Theun de Vries. “We have to be careful with the book. I got 
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enough experience with this scum. I will have to proceed cautiously in these mat-
ters.”10
To conclude that the attention Vestdijk received was due to his status as a famous 
writer is one thing. However, to understand why it triggered the intense debate it did 
is something quite different. At first, Vestdijk’s fellow hostages could simply deny 
him any attention. But, as soon as the essay became available to a wider public, this 
approach would not do anymore.  
We are dealing here with quite a lengthy essay, numbering 365 pages. And for 
many critics, for many different reasons, it was not easy to swallow. Nevertheless, it 
triggered many responses (180), from many people (almost 100), over a considerable 
period of time (50 years). Certainly, attention waned over time. Every time the essay 
was re-edited, it received some response. However, at the end of the 20th century, 
interest had died out almost completely. Upon the occasion of Vestdijk’s 100th 
birthday in 1998, critics mentioned that hardly anybody read his novels anymore. 
And, with the exception of one critic, nobody paid much attention to his essay on 
religion anymore. 
In the present chapter, I will outline the history of literary responses to Vestdijk’s 
De toekomst der religie. No attention will be paid to the essay itself. Though it was 
published shortly after the war, in a sense, the job was not finished yet. On the con-
trary, whereas the writing process had initially been hidden from the eyes of the 
outside public, the real work in fact began immediately after the public started read-
ing the end product and tried to make sense of it. In the words of Derrida, a book 
ends as soon as it becomes available for consumption; from that moment on, the 
process of re/writing begins.11
Four periods in the history of writing on Vestdijk’s essay will be distinguished. 
From a synchronic point of view, each period consisted of polemical as well as non-
polemical contributions. From a diachronic point of view, we will see the polemics 
becoming increasingly marginal. Only in the last chapter will an explanation be given 
for why some critics reacted in a polemical manner, and why their influence receded 
in the course of the controversy. 
The periods of the reception 
In the present chapter, I wish to focus on the chronological sequence on the one 
hand, and the interconnections between contributions on the other. The first will be 
done in order to indicate developments, the latter to identify some specific traditions 
within the history of reception. With respect to the developments, different periods 
can be distinguished. For this, I propose to use the following three criteria.  
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First of all, I think it is important to focus on the intensity of the exchanges. Each 
period has a specific ratio of contributions that are to be considered as polemical. 
Which contributions count as polemical will be discussed in the next two chapters; 
here we shall simply make distinctions in a preliminary fashion. Secondly, the institu-
tional context is important, for it indicates the radius of both the essay and each con-
tribution to the history of its reception. As we will see, in the early periods, it is easy 
to define groups of intellectuals according to their institutional memberships and 
contributions to the media. As in the case of the intensity of the exchanges, we shall 
deal here with these contexts only in a preliminary fashion; in the last chapter, I will 
offer a detailed discussion of the issue. Thirdly, in accordance with the dynamics in 
any history of reception, the changing role of the text itself will be an important 
feature of each period. In general, it developed from being the main focus of almost 
every single review, to increasingly becoming part of a discussion either of single 
issues or of other writings. As such, it participates in a continuous process of produc-
tion and progress of reflection, in which it gradually shifted into the margins of public 
attention.
These three criteria are more diverse and specific than the ones employed by 
Monique Despret, on whom I have commented extensively in the introduction. 
Whereas she only distinguished between two periods (the first from 1948 till 1950, 
the second from 1950 till 1980), I shall distinguish between four. 
The first period (from 1948 till 1951) started with the early reactions in the me-
dia, and ended before the publication of Fokke Sierksma’s Tussen twee vuren (‘Be-
tween Two Fires’). This essay also marked an era in which almost all contributions 
exclusively focused on both Vestdijk and De toekomst der religie. This period was the 
most intensely polemical. By far the most contributions were written during this 
time. The diversity of people responding, as well as the role of the media, were more 
intense than in later periods. On the other hand, it is quite easy to identify several 
distinctive traditions of criticism, partly made up by pillar organizations, and partly by 
independent magazines. This also holds true for the next period. 
The second period (from 1952 till 1959) started with the publication of the sec-
ond edition of Vestijk’s book. Sierksma’s essay played a far more important role in 
the controversy. The latter focused on both Vestdijk and the polemics around De 
toekomst der religie. On the one hand, this triggered new polemics. On the other hand, 
however, Vestdijk was forced to share attention with Sierksma. Far less immediate 
references were made to Vestdijk’s essay in this period. Far less people responded, 
and, in general, the media—newspapers and opinion magazines—were less interested 
in publishing the issue for a wider public.  
The third period (from 1960 till 1972) continued the tendencies started earlier. 
An important catalyst for discussion was the publication of Sierksma’s De religieuze 
projectie (‘The Religious Projection’). Only some opinion magazines paid any atten-
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tion to this study; the discussion became far too abstract for the general public. De
toekomst der religie was often mentioned, but played only a marginal role. However, 
the publication of a third (1960) and fourth (1965) edition of the essay showed that 
there were still people interested in the topic which Vestdijk had dealt with. Yet, 
even in these cases, he was forced to share attention with Gerhard Szczesny’s De
toekomst van het ongeloof (‘The Future of Unbelief’) and Han Fortmann’s Als ziende de 
onzienlijke (‘As Seeing the Invisible’). For most commentators, Vestdijk seemed a part 
of history, and even an expression of the modern mentality in general. Traditions of 
criticism in this period were less easily identified than before, primarily through ecu-
menical tendencies in formerly well-established institutions. Not surprisingly, the end 
of the period was marked by a theological critique by theologians from highly diverse 
backgrounds.  
The fourth period (from 1973 till 1998) began with the founding of a special 
magazine devoted to the study of Vestdijk’s work, as well as a critical study by J. 
Kamphuis. The publication of the fifth edition of the essay (1975) was only briefly 
mentioned in the media; discussion was limited to highly esoteric circles of Vestdijk 
fans. The publication of the last edition of the essay (1992) did not receive any atten-
tion at all. The edition ended up in discount bookstores. In general, interest for Vest-
dijk’s work, and his essays in particular, had sharply declined. By the end of the cen-
tury, only Kamphuis felt challenged by the arguments formulated in De toekomst der 
religie.
After briefly summarizing the reception of Vestdijk’s essay, I now wish to turn to 
a more detailed discussion of the different periods. First, I wish to discuss each period 
of reception more specifically and to identify the writings on the essay by means of 
their authors and the media involved. Secondly, I will attempt to draw some conclu-
sions with respect to the developments and traditions within the reception and the 
appropriation of the essay. 
Period 1 – 1948-1951 
After the war, religious differences still dominated public life. It is the institutional 
aspect of these differences that will be employed in order to classify the contributions 
to our polemic. Church membership, university positions end media activities will be 
considered as the most distinguishing features. As was previously mentioned, during 
this period it is quite easy to classify the people who participated in the controversy. 
Many of them belonged to tightly knit organized institutions; others contributed to 
media forms that held a more or less independent position within the public sphere 
in the Netherlands. Given this analytical difference, the Free Reformed Churches 
(VGKN), the Reformed Churches (GKN) and the Roman Catholic Churches 
(RKK) are to be counted among the highly organized institutions. The Netherlands 
Reformed Church (NHK), as well as both cultural ‘breakthrough’ and literary critical 
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magazines, did not belong to any well-established institutions. Yet, instead of viewing 
institutions as whole entities and judging the relationships within the outsiders’ media 
harmonious, I shall attempt to identify conflicts and hierarchies between dominating 
and marginal intellectuals. Next, I shall attempt to present the intellectuals who con-
tributed to the polemic during the first period of the reception.  
Reactions from the intellectuals of the VGKN, an orthodox group which contin-
ues with its critiques to this very day, came early on. It is, however, unlikely that 
these were the theologians to which Vestdijk had referred in his letters to Theun de 
Vries. Dominated by the dogmatist K. Schilder,12 this group had separated from the 
GKN in 1944. Though well known for his polemical style of arguing, Schilder did 
not play any role in the controversy around Vestdijk. Instead, three other intellectuals 
from the VGKN commented on De toekomst der religie, namely ‘Marnix’ (pseudonym 
for A. Zijlstra), M. Siesling, and P.A. Hekstra.13 Whereas the first two critics were 
highly critical, if not polemical, the latter was much too involved in exchanges with 
intellectuals from the GKN or NHK to follow their styles of criticism. 
Though generally critical, some members of the GKN reacted to Vestdijk quite 
positively. G.C. Berkouwer, the dogmatist of the Vrije Universiteit, devoted one of his 
weekly commentaries in Trouw on De toekomst der religie.14 For the Reformed opinion 
magazine Bezinning, he wrote a more detailed critique.15 Yet, surprisingly, both of 
these reviews were highly sympathetic and far from polemical. Something similar 
held true for the commentary of J.H. Bavink, the prominent missionary theologian of 
the GKN.16 Another leading intellectual, S.J. Popma, made some positive remarks as 
well.17 These replies differed considerably from the commentary of relatively marginal 
intellectuals like A. Wapenaar in Trouw18 as well as J. Wytzes and Chr.W.J. Teeuwen 
in the Reformed opinion monthly Horizon.19
A sympathetic review of De toekomst der religie was offered by a leading philoso-
pher at the Catholic University in Leuven, J.H. Walgrave.20 Though critical, he did 
not attempt to attack Vestdijk. The only polemical contribution during this period 
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was written by J. van Heugten.21 A Jesuit and chief editor of the opinion monthly 
Streven, Van Heugten could be regarded as one of the main cultural and literary crit-
ics of his group, though not quite a widely acknowledged religious authority.22 In 
turn, Van Heugten was criticized by G.H. Barneveld.23 Both were representatives of 
rival student parties shortly after the war.24
Besides Van Heugten, the most polemical contributions during this period came 
from the middle-orthodox25 and politically progressive ‘breakthrough’ circles of the 
NHK.26 Here we find the most intensive and lively interaction between Vestdijk (and 
later on Sierksma) and his critics. It is likely that these were the ‘orthodox’ theologi-
ans which Vestdijk had mentioned in his letters to Theun de Vries. Banning made 
only a passing critical remark regarding Vestdijk,27 but the review of the Groningen 
philosopher H. de Vos in Het Parool was highly polemical indeed.28 For this he re-
ceived criticism by G.H. Barneveld and O. Noordenbos.29 It is likely that upon re-
ception of this criticism, De Vos attempted to justify his comments.30 The reaction 
that followed, however, turned out to be no less polemical than the first one. Vest-
dijk himself wrote a counter-critique,31 which was not accepted by Het Parool. De 
Vos did not answer Vestdijk. The same thing happened after the highly polemical 
contributions by G. van der Leeuw, the leading Groningen phenomenologist of 
religion whose review appeared in Wending,32 and K.H. Miskotte, a famous dogmatist 
at Leiden who wrote for Vrij Nederland.33 Neither did they reply to Vestdijk’s cri-
tiques.34 Vrij Nederland allowed only for some comments by readers of the magazine 
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who were not immediately involved in the controversy.35 A response to the polemi-
cal comments made the by Netherlands Reformed literary critic J.G. Bomhoff in 
Wending would be made only later, in what I call the second period of the contro-
versy.36 To this we shall later return, among other things because Bomhoff’s contribu-
tion marked another era of discussion regarding Vestdijk’s oeuvre in its entirety.  
Even though her contribution was also polemical, a kind of dialogue took place 
between the Mennonite reverend A. Mankes-Zernike and Vestdijk. She wrote a 
critique in De Groene Amsterdammer, to which Vestdijk responded in the literary criti-
cal magazine Criterium. She again responded, but Vestdijk was allowed the last 
word.37 
Compared to the more polemical contributions just mentioned, the comments 
made by C.J. Bleeker in a liberal theological magazine were tasteful. Vestdijk wrote a 
response, though Bleeker did not react to it.38 Both knew each other from 
‘Beekvliet’. Why both Vestdijk and Sierksma counted his among the core polemical 
reactions to Vestdijk’s essay is difficult to say. He was a theologian and a member of 
the NHK, to be sure. But so were others, to which Vestdijk (and, later on, Sierksma) 
did not react. There was S.F.H.J. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, who wrote a moder-
ate yet critical review in a newspaper.39 Then there was the contribution of P.J. Ros-
cam Abbing, which appeared in a theological magazine.40 And, finally, there was the 
philosopher P. Sterkman, invited by P.H. Ritter, Jr. to comment on Vestdijk’s essay 
before the AVRO microphone. Later, his remarks were published in a book maga-
zine.41 All of those contributions received at least as much publicity as that of Bleeker, 
but they were never regarded as part of the polemic. 
Critical, but far more respectful, than the theologians were the intellectuals with 
esoteric liberal and literary critical orientations. Some of them belonged to the the-
osophist circle. They used to operate independently from every other religious 
group. N. Kluwer,42 the editor of Mensch & Kosmos, an esoteric magazine, offered a 
sympathetic review of De toekomst der religie. After that, in the same magazine, D.H. 
Prins wrote a more critical essay in which he criticized Vestdijk’s reductive approach 
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to religion. Unlike other monthly magazines like Wending, Mensch & Kosmos allowed 
Vestdijk to respond. Afterwards, Prins wrote a response to Vestdijk’s counter-
critique.43 Likewise, another esoteric magazine, Theosophia, published the private 
correspondence between J.J. Poortman and Vestdijk. Poortman had offered a sympa-
thetic, yet critical, review of Vestdijk’s essay. Vestdijk responded, though Poortman 
was allowed the last word on the subject.44 A critical, yet cordial, commentary of De
toekomst der religie was made by the humanist H. Redeker within the context of an 
essay on existentialist philosophy.45 Redeker’s contribution was published in Het
Woord, a literary critical magazine that was sympathetic to esoteric tendencies in 
literature.46 Even as one of its editors, Redeker had close contacts with the editors of 
Podium. On several occasions the latter invited him to join their circle.47
Equally sympathetic, and far more critical of theologians, were the socialist critics. 
Among them was O. Noordenbos, who wrote a positive review of De toekomst der 
religie in a moderately socialist opinion monthly, De Nieuwe Stem.48 In a similar 
monthly, De Vrije Katheder,49 he criticized theologians like De Vos, although he did 
remark that Berkelbach van der Sprenkel served as a more humane example of theo-
logical critique. In the same magazine, upon the occasion of Vestdijk’s fiftieth birth-
day, Theun de Vries wrote an article in which he made some critical remarks on De 
toekomst der religie from a socialist perspective.50 So too did H. van Praag in a sympa-
thetic yet critical review which appeared in the opinion magazine De Vlam.51
Another commentator, G.H. Barneveld, was also positive about Vestdijk.52 His 
first contribution to the controversy was published in the Amsterdam students’ 
weekly, Propria Cures, of which he was one of the editors.53 In this period, Propria 
Cures did not have the polemical style for which it would later become famous (or 
notorious).54 Further positive references to De toekomst der religie by Barneveld were 
                                                     
43 Prins 1949, Vestdijk 1950c, Prins 1950; on Prins cf. Kuilman 2001: 22-24. 
44 Poortman 1950ab, Vestdijk 1950d, Poortman 1950c; on Poortman cf. Scharwächter 1988. 
45 Redeker 1948. 
46 On Redeker and Het Woord cf. Calis 1999: chapter 1-2. 
47 Calis 1999: 145-146. 
48 Noordenbos 1948b; on Noordenbos cf. Trapman 1999: 103-121, on De Nieuwe Stem cf. 
Faber 1995. 
49 Noordenbos 1948a; on De Vrije Katheder cf. Van den Burg 1983. 
50 De Vries 1948. 
51 Van Praag 1948. 
52 Barneveld 1948a. 
53 On Barneveld and Propria Cures cf. Ligtenberg & Polak 1990. 
54 Ligtenberg & Polak 1990: 157, 165. 
48 
published in a contribution on Vestdijk as an essayist.55 Barneveld wrote a sympa-
thetic review in a literary critical magazine, Libertinage.56 He fiercely criticized theolo-
gians such as De Vos, Van Heugten, and Mankes-Zernike. The only criticism aimed 
at Vestdijk was the latter’s betrayal of the concept of ‘human dignity’. For this criti-
cism he was attacked by Sierksma, the main editor of the literary and opinion 
monthly, Podium.57 Barneveld, in turn, wrote an equally polemical reply to Sierksma’s 
critique.58
Apart from the polemic between Barneveld and Sierksma, an interesting polemic 
was triggered by an extensive criticism of De toekomst der religie by the editor of Liber-
tinage, H.A. Gomperts.59 The latter, pretending to be a true heir of the Forum-
tradition (a famous and influential pre-war magazine edited by Menno ter Braak and 
Edgar du Perron), attacked Vestdijk for his objective and impersonal style as well as 
for his positive arguments regarding religion. He also accused Vestdijk, who had also 
been one of the Forum-editors, of betraying his own past. However, while Sierksma 
published his critique of Barneveld in Podium, Vestdijk was allowed to counter 
Gompert’s criticism in Libertinage itself.60 Gomperts responded.61 Later on, Sierksma 
defended Vestdijk’s position against Gomperts in Podium.62
From other intellectual circles, Ben Stroman, who published a review in Algemeen 
Handelsblad as well as Kroniek voor Kunst en Kultuur, was highly sympathetic, though 
somewhat critical.63, Paul Rodenko expressed his appreciation for Vestdijk’s argu-
ments on freedom, tolerance and democracy in an essay on Vestdijk and religion 
published in Podium.64 Similar points were made by J.H.W. Veenstra in an essay on 
Vestdijk as cultural critique,65 published in the same collection as Barneveld’s article 
on Vestdijk as an essayist. 
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The main contributions, however, came from the essayist Fokke Sierksma.66 First 
of all, he gave Vestdijk the opportunity to publish his counter-critiques against theo-
logians like De Vos, Van der Leeuw, Miskotte, and Bleeker in Podium. Secondly, he 
himself attacked Barneveld. Thirdly, he wrote a highly polemical essay against 
Mankes-Zernike, De Vos, Van der Leeuw, Miskotte, Bleeker, Van Heugten, and 
Gomperts.67 Finally, however, he also criticized Vestdijk, especially for his theory of 
projection. To this critique, Vestdijk responded.68 Here for the first time we find the 
issues that will be elaborated upon after the publication of Sierksma’s De religieuze 
projectie.69 The latter book, along with a reprint of Sierksma’s essay, intended for a 
wider public under the title Tussen twee vuren70, would become landmarks in the 
history of our polemic. Moreover, the latter also offered a reprint of the critiques 
made by Mankes-Zernike, De Vos, Van der Leeuw, Miskotte, and Bleeker, as well as 
Vestdijk’s counter-critiques.71
As we shall later see, the contributions by Sierksma would set the stage for other 
periods. The first period, however, would be by far the most polemical. A great 
diversity of people criticized Vestdijk’s essay. Minor intellectuals, politically progres-
sive theologians from the NHK, the Mennonite community as well as literary critics 
were among the most aggressive opponents. Vestdijk himself launched counter-
attacks against some of these opponents. Apart from Sierksma, Noordenbos and 
Barneveld would join him. The controversy was played out in newspapers, opinion 
monthlies and literary magazines. Both the intensity of the polemic and the range of 
public that it reached differed considerably from later periods. Yet, whereas in the 
first period the public consisted of more or less isolated groups of people, during the 
second period Sierksma’s widely available essay challenged especially the theologians 
to continue discussion in order to counter his attacks. 
Period 2 – 1952-1959 
As has been previously mentioned, the second period started both with the publica-
tion of the second edition of Vestdijk’s essay and the publication of Sierskma’s essay 
for the wider public. Critiques of theologians had been written for Het Parool, Vrij 
Nederland, and Wending, but the editors had not allowed them to be published. And 
though Sierksma offered Vestdijk the opportunity to let them appear in Podium, the 
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commentary did not reach the public it was intended for. Sierksma’s response did not 
get much attention either as long as its audience was limited to the readers of his 
magazine. All this changed after Sierksma’s essay, together with Vestdijk’s response to 
some polemical contributions, became widely available through the well-known 
Amsterdam publisher De Bezige Bij.
The massive challenge that Sierksma’s essay put to Vestdijk’s opponents did not 
trigger any response from those whom he was actually criticizing. Philosopher and 
literary critic J. Bomhoff paid some attention to De toekomst der religie in his overview 
of Vestdijk’s work. A friend of Vestdijk and Sierksma, A. Marja (pseudonym for J.J.A 
Mooij)72, made some positive comments regarding Sierksma’s essay in both Algemeen 
Handelsblad and the NRC, and included Bomhoff in the list of critics whose polemics 
had been successfully countered by Sierksma.73 Bomhoff responded in the NRC,
though Marja was allowed the last word in this controversy.74 Later, Marja would 
return to this case in a review of De schandalen, one of Vestdijk’s many novels, which 
appeared in the literary critical magazine Vandaag.75 Referring to a speech in Parlia-
ment made by Reverend P. Zandt76 in which Vestdijk was criticized as a representa-
tive of godless modernity, Marja claimed to be surprised that Vestdijk’s work was 
even notorious among the ultra-orthodox Protestants. He concluded that writers 
become especially well-known when they have a bad reputation. In Vestdijk’s case, 
he held not only theologians such as Van der Leeuw and Miskotte accountable, but 
Bomhoff as well. 
Other contributions mainly focused on Tussen twee vuren, without even mention-
ing the reprint of De toekomst der religie. Th.P. van Baaren made some positive com-
ments for Northern Netherlands Broadcasting (RONO), later published in Literair
Kwartier.77 O. Noordenbos wrote a review for De Nieuwe Stem.78 The editors of the 
latter (moderately socialist) magazine also mentioned the publication of Sierksma’s 
essay and proposed a dialogue between Vestdijk and the theologians. Within this 
context they referred to a review of Tussen twee vuren by J.M. de Jong, a prominent 
liberal theologian of the NHK.79 In this review, published in an important progressive 
opinion weekly, Vrij Nederland, De Jong especially criticized the style of contribu-
tions such as those of De Vos, Miskotte, and Van der Leeuw. And here we meet 
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with a new tendency within politically progressive religious circles: to aim at dialogue 
rather than to denigrate. 
A clear example of the trend towards dialogue is observable in the contributions 
by H. Kraemer,80 one of the prominent members of the past Dutch People’s Move-
ment (De Nederlandse Volksbeweging), the PvdA, as well as a reformer of the NHK, 
and a regularly contributor to Wending. In the latter monthly, he initiated something 
which, according to him, was meant as a serious attempt at dialogue with both Vest-
dijk and Sierksma. He admitted that the polemical style previously employed by 
theologians was not justifiable. Instead, he attempted to initiate an extensive discus-
sion of some of the most relevant topics. At the same time, he aligned himself with 
the attacks on De religieuze projectie previously launched by Mennonite J.A. Ooster-
baan and humanist Kwee Swan Liat.81 Moreover, he heavily criticized the liberal 
theologian L.J. van Holk for being too sympathetic towards Sierksma’s arguments.82
Even though his main target was Sierksma, he expected Vestdijk to be more ready 
for dialogue. Yet, Vestdijk did not feel forced to engage in the type of dialogue 
which Kraemer pursued. In fact, it was Sierksma who responded, without, however, 
expecting too much to come out of the discussion. Kraemer offered a counter-
critique, while the editors of Wending allowed Sierksma to close the discussion.83 Of 
course, this was a generous gesture of Wending to an acknowledged ‘unbeliever,’ as 
was its previous offer to Sierksma to engage in a dialogue with Van der Leeuw on 
crucial matters of faith ten years before.84 The discussion with Kraemer, however, was 
more polemical than that with Van der Leeuw. And it is not at all clear why Wending
offered Sierksma the opportunities to respond, while they did not accept Vestdijk’s 
critique of Van der Leeuw immediately after the publication of De toekomst der religie.
Liberal theologians of the NHK distanced themselves from the type of dialogue 
initiated by Kraemer in Wending. Certainly, Vestdijk and Sierksma had to be taken 
seriously, as Remonstrant J.C.A. Fetter and H. Faber previously argued in opinion 
and church magazines. Theologians had to justify their stance not only towards or-
thodox tendencies, but also to the outside world.85 Van Holk advocated a similar 
point of view. In addition, P. Smits and G.J. Sirks supported Van Holk in the liberal 
protestant church weekly Kerk & Wereld against the attacks of Kraemer.86 Especially 
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after the publication of an article by Smits—in which he confessed that, like Vestdijk, 
he refused to believe in the substitutary death of Jesus on the cross for sins committed 
by Smits himself—he received lots of criticism from middle-orthodox circles within 
the NHK. One of the fiercest and most influential critics was J.J. Buskes, who at-
tacked Smits in the NHK monthly In de Waagschaal, while in Wending the reverend 
H.C. Touw made some polemical remarks.87 Attempts at dialogue in order to settle 
the case did not succeed. In the end, Smits resigned as the chief editor of Kerk & 
Wereld and was suspended from his duties as a minister of the NHK. Though Vest-
dijk did not figure in the rest of this polemic, indirectly he contributed to the case as 
a means by which liberals and middle orthodox defined their boundaries. And, as we 
will see, Smits would on several occasions express his sympathy for Vestdijk, as well 
as for Sierksma. 
The exchanges and increasing interaction between Mennonite and NHK theolo-
gians and their opponents were not the only contributions to the controversy. GKN-
theologians contributed as well. Berkouwer offered a review of both the reprints of 
De toekomst der religie and Tussen twee vuren.88 At the time, he gave commentary on 
recent social and religious currents in Trouw. Apart from that, he had discussed Vest-
dijk’s arguments extensively throughout his dogmatic studies.89 Though critical, we 
see in this period the beginnings of an increasingly ecumenical spirit among the 
Dutch Reformed opinion leaders. Berkouwer, for example, did not spare theologians 
for their personal attacks without accusing Vestdijk and Sierksma of the same weak-
nesses. He warned his own brothers about committing the same mistakes. This be-
comes especially clear in his review of collected polemical essays by Vestdijk,90 as well 
as in his comments on the literary exchange between Sierksma and Kraemer.91 Even 
more sympathetic, though critical, was the GKN psychologist A.L. Janse de Jonge. 
He published an essay in Bezinning in which he offered an extensive review of De 
religieuze projectie. He also used this opportunity to criticize both De toekomst der religie
and Tussen twee vuren. For this he made positive reference to early comments on 
psychological approaches to religion and religious projection by Berkouwer and 
Bavinck.92 Though the topics were similar, his style differed from that of a prominent 
member of the NHK, Kraemer, in that he did not use personal invectives. His ap-
proach was also much more sympathetic and moderate than that of minor GKN 
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intellectuals like A. Wapenaar and A. Pos, who attacked Vestdijk for his arguments 
against Christianity in Horizon.93
Whereas Hekstra’s comments just after the publication of De toekomst der religie
were mainly directed against intellectual trends within the GKN,94 his contributions 
to the second period of the controversy were equally polemical towards the politi-
cally progressive intellectuals of the NHK.95 In a series of articles on Vestdijk and 
Schilder published in the Free Reformed opinion magazine Ruimte, P.A. Hekstra 
emphasized the superiority of both over their opponents, particularly Miskotte. One 
article was simply a reprint of Siesling’s critique of De toekomst der religie. Here he 
even criticized his fellow member of the VGKN, ‘Marnix’ (A. Zijlstra), for his per-
sonal attack.96 Yet, as soon as he started to focus on Vestdijk exclusively, his style 
turned polemical as well.97
Apart from people like Wapenaar, Pos and Hekstra, who focused exclusively on 
De toekomst der religie, and others like Kraemer, Berkouwer and Janse de Jonge who 
dealt with both Vestdijk and Sierksma, literary critics also treated Vestdijk’s essay 
within the context of his oeuvre in its entirety. According to them, a discussion 
could be useful to illuminate themes and characters figuring in his novels. Though 
they greatly appreciated his artistic qualities, he was constantly criticized for the moral 
confusion thought to be characteristic of his novels. According to these critics, there 
was an immediate link between this confusion and his atheism. This ambivalence was 
clear in the contributions by Bomhoff.98 A similar notion holds true for the reviews 
by Popma in Horizon and Van Heugten in Streven.99 The latter defined Vestdijk’s 
novels as mirrors of their own time. Vestdijk’s friend and literary critic Jeanne van 
Schaik-Willing as well as sculptor and art historian Bernard ‘Majorick’ (pseudonym 
for J.J. Beljon) appreciated his work in much the same way.100 Yet, with the excep-
tion of Popma, all of these critics were highly polemical. Catholics like Josine Meyer 
and Th. Govaart were more moderate, thus more resembling Popma himself.101
One important contribution of this period has yet to be mentioned: namely the 
two-volume study on the future of western civilization, written by the prominent 
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socialist intellectual F.L. Polak.102 Polak reviewed Vestdijk’s arguments regarding 
religion extensively, and made some interesting points of criticism. Without being 
polemical, he admitted that he understood why Vestdijk’s style of arguing had driven 
some critics so furious. In his counter-critique, Vestdijk praised Polak for his intelli-
gent and careful treatment of the issues, yet explained why he believed that his critics 
needn’t get angry at all.103
Apart from the exchanges between Vestdijk and Sierksma during this period, the 
dialogue with Polak was the only example in which Vestdijk took the opportunity to 
counter his critics. In general, however, interaction between intellectuals of different 
traditions was increasing. First of all, the humanist literary and cultural critics such as 
Marja and Noordenbos continued to criticize the ‘breakthrough’ theologians and 
critics of the NHK, of whom Miskotte, De Vos and Bomhoff were among the most 
challenging. Apart from them, two other groups of intellectuals were equally critical 
of both these theologians and their critics, notably Vestdijk and Sierksma. On the one 
hand, a clash arose between middle-orthodox and more liberal theologians within the 
NHK. Kraemer, Buskes and Smits played a leading role within this context. On the 
other hand, theologians and critics from the GKN and VGKN, as well as intellectuals 
from GKN and VGKN, such as Berkouwer and Hekstra, commented upon the po-
lemics between Vestdijk and these theologians as well. Yet, after all, the ‘break-
through’ theologians of the NHK who were organized around Wending changed 
their rhetoric with respect to ‘unbelievers’, explaining to their readers that dialogue 
was the style required in order to properly engage with their critics. The contribution 
of Kraemer offered a genuine attempt to follow this strategy. 
These tendencies towards interaction were favored by Sierksma’s essay on Vest-
dijk and the polemics surrounding De toekomst der religie. A period of reflection had 
begun. Partly overlapping with this tendency, critics no longer focussed exclusively 
on Vestdijk’s arguments. The only exceptions were some minor intellectuals of the 
GKN, who still seemed to be isolated from other critical traditions. All others pre-
ferred to view Vestdijk’s essay as either part of his work as a whole, or as an exponent 
of the modern mentality. Given these trends, it is not surprising that essays, rather 
than reviews, prevailed in this period. These essays were mainly written for opinion 
monthlies or published as (a chapter or part of) a book, rather than as articles in 
newspapers.  
In general, contributions were limited to certain intellectual circles. However, 
though there was less diversity among the critics, reactions became more serious and 
thorough. This also meant that the public aimed at was more limited, especially with 
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respect to educational level and expertise. This tendency would become even more 
pronounced in the third period. 
Period 3 – 1960-1972 
As we observed during the previous period of the controversy, contributions no 
longer focused exclusively on De toekomst der religie. This trend continued into the 
period which we shall now discuss. In 1960, the third edition of Vestdijk’s essay was 
published. Yet, without any exception, every review that mentioned it focused 
mainly on Gerhard Szczesny’s De toekomst van het ongeloof.104 From different religious 
perspectives, the latter essay was commented upon primarily, and only within this 
context was any reference made to Vestdijk’s arguments, mostly to point out the 
similarities between the two authors. 
P.A. van Stempvoort wrote a polemical review in the politically conservative El-
seviers Weekblad. To this Vestdijk responded, arguing that Van Stempvoort was mis-
taken on some matters of fact and, as a man of science, should be more careful. Even 
though it initiated some new attention for De toekomst der religie, critiques of its third 
edition also triggered the very last reply which Vestdijk would make to his oppo-
nents. After that, neither Vestdijk nor Sierksma would contribute to the controversy 
anymore. Van Stempvoort wrote a counter-critique, in which he avoided the points 
made by Vestdijk, and focused, instead, on the role played by Western intellectuals in 
general. Yet, as previously indicated, Vestdijk had written his final contribution to 
the controversy, and would not respond to Van Stempvoort anymore.105
 The Roman Catholic magazine Roeping devoted a volume to De toekomst 
van het ongeloof.106 The editor, C.W.M. Verhoeven, was highly polemical in his com-
ments on the essay.107 He also drew some parallels between Vestdijk and Szczesny.108
Lambert Tegenbosch did something similar for both Brabantsch Dagblad and Nieuw 
Eindhovensch Dagblad.109
Far more sympathetic were critiques from either the Humanist, GKN or NHK 
perspective. O. Noordenbos wrote an extensive and positive review in De Nieuwe 
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Stem.110 On the other hand, GKN S.J. Popma in Bezinning111 as well as NHK J. 
Sperna Weiland in Wending,112 were highly critical of the arguments offered by both 
Szczesny and Vestdijk. Nevertheless, their style of arguing was moderate and they did 
not use any personal invectives.
Apart from this focus on Vestdijk in the wake of Szczesny’s essay, De toekomst der 
religie received further attention within the context of the ongoing debate on 
Sierksma’s De religieuze projectie. It was still possible to distinguish between different 
critical traditions. On the one hand, ‘breakthrough’ intellectuals from both NHK and 
Remonstrant Society continued their search to find the proper way in which to deal 
with the issues at hand. On the other hand, intellectuals from the RKK drew wide 
attention with their highly sophisticated critiques of Vestdijk and Sierksma.  
A special issue of Wending was devoted to ‘religious projection’.113 As the editors, 
H.J. Heering114 and A.J. Nijk,115 explained, the volume was intended to offer a serious 
theological reflection on the problems raised by Vestdijk and especially Sierksma. The 
issue started with two articles written by two experts in their fields. The psychologist 
J.H. Plokker dealt with the psychology of projection, while the chemist C.J. Dippel 
focused on the problem of observation in the natural sciences. As a kind of inter-
mezzo, two philosophers’ articles were devoted to the problem of communication 
between secular and theological viewpoints. The first, written by A. Dumas, dealt 
with the relevance of the concept of projection as developed in the Marxist tradition. 
The other, written by L.W. Nauta116 offered a detailed summary of both Vestdijk’s 
and Sierksma’s arguments, after which the possibilities for a fruitful dialogue between 
scientists and theologians was discussed. The contributions by J. Sperna Weiland, A. 
Th. Van Leeuwen, and C.W. Mönnich were clearly theological. The article by Nijk, 
a liberal protestant theologian, triggered some critical comments from C.J. Dippel, 
one of the foremost middle-orthodox intellectuals of Dutch Protestantism.117 Heering 
attempted to draw some conclusions relevant to theologians. After reading the con-
tributions, it seemed more difficult than ever to find a common ground between 
scientists and theologians. While the first clearly did not take God into account, the 
latter continued to include God in their reflections, arguing that scientific theory was 
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too limited to understand reality. The problem, however, became even more com-
plicated since believers did not agree on the means by which the existence of God 
could be known. Heering thus referred to a problem that had been pressing since the 
rise of liberal Protestantism. Important in this case, however, was the fact that a dis-
cussion arose regarding theories offered by acknowledged unbelievers. And it seemed 
as though the editors did not truly believe in a dialogue between unbelievers and 
theologians. Unlike Kraemer, they invited neither Vestdijk nor Sierksma for a 
counter-critique. 
Serious and extensive discussion and criticism was initiated by progressive intel-
lectuals within Roman Catholic circles. First, the Leuven philosopher W.A.M. Luij-
pen published a book on phenomenology and atheism.118 Though it has since been 
reprinted several times, his critique of Sierksma was only reflected upon by S.M. 
Benjamins—who published an essay on Sierksma’s oeuvre—and C.W.M. Verhoe-
ven, both of which featured in the Roman-Catholic literary and opinion monthly 
Raam (the successor of Roeping).119 Apart from Luijpen’s contribution to the issue, the 
psychologist H.M.M. Fortmann presented a lecture for the prominent Roman 
Catholic intellectuals’ society, the Thijmgenootschap.120 Yet, the latter’s four-volume 
study entitled Als ziende de onzienlijke (‘As if seeing the unseen’) received far more 
attention.121 In this book, Fortmann offered an excellent summary of Vestdijk’s and 
Sierksma’s theories of projection as developed by both Vestdijk and Sierksma. His 
critique, however, was extremely sophisticated and serious in tone. Even though the 
study’s arguments were highly theoretical and abstract, it got several reviews in news-
papers and opinion monthlies. Among others, the Netherlands Reformed Reverend 
C. Aalders wrote a laudatory review in Het Vaderland, while the psychologist H. 
Faber offered some sympathetic comments in Wending.122 In De Volkskrant, the Ro-
man Catholic literary critic Gabriël Smit wrote a page-long article in which Fort-
mann was presented as the man who had, together with Jung, saved religion from the 
reductive criticisms of Marx and Freud, Vestdijk and Sierksma.123 Interesting from an 
ecumenical point of view was the extensive review in Wending written by the Ro-
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man Catholic philosopher-psychologist H.J.L. van Luijk.124 Like Fortmann, Van Luijk 
was highly critical of Sierksma. However, the fact that he—as a Catholic—published 
for the progressive Wending indicates the development of a tighter network between 
intellectuals of originally independent traditions. 
For the first time since he had attacked Vestdijk immediately after the publication 
of De toekomst der religie, NHK H. de Vos felt ready to make some moderate com-
ments in Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift.125 Employing the arguments offered by 
Fortmann, he criticized Vestdijk and Sierksma, and defended Bleeker, Kwee, and 
Kraemer against the two. Yet, nowhere did he get personal, the way he had almost 
twenty years earlier. The fact that he, like Fortmann, positively referred to GKN 
psychologist Janse de Jonge, might count as more evidence of the ecumenical spirit of 
the times. 
In general, it seemed as though the trend towards integration of different tradi-
tions was triggering a far more moderate approach to Vestijk and Sierksma. How-
ever, as was observed in the case of Verhoeven, the more intimately Catholic circles 
continued their polemical way of arguing. As in the previous period, the more con-
servative circles, at that time represented by Hekstra, even employed Vestdijk in 
order to attack revolutionary tendencies within the intellectual scene. Something 
similar happened in the case of Father A. van der Wey. He wrote a critic for the 
Roman Catholic newspaper De Tijd-Maasbode, in which he asked himself whether 
Vestdijk had indeed been correct in his opinions on the future of Christianity. He 
mentioned several secularizing tendencies, especially within Catholicism, of which he 
was highly critical.126 
To return to Janse de Jonge, his case must be seen as somewhere in between the 
usual positions taken by other critics. As early as the second period, he was dealing 
with Vestdijk and Sierksma. In an essay published for Horizon,127 he focused on Vest-
dijk’s views on religion as underlying themes of his novelistic work. Other critics 
were interpreting De toekomst der religie either as a work with an explicit statement on 
the themes underlying the rest of Vestdijk’s work, or as a general sign of the times. 
The first approach was typical for literary critics.128 The more theologically oriented 
                                                     
124 Luijk 1970. 
125 De Vos 1966. 
126 Van der Wey 1965; on Van der Wey cf. Van der Wey 1976, Struyker Boudier 1987: 85-89. 
127 Janse de Jonge 1962. 
128 Cf. especially R.A. Cornets de Groot. In a variety of literary and opinion magazines he 
analyzed poems, novels, and essays in which he referred to De toekomst der religie in general, and 
Vestdijk’s typology of religious man in particular in order to understand the characters. He 
published his essays in Maatstaf, Merlyn, and Kentering, but also in Raam and De Gids (1964, 
1965abcd, 1966ab, 1967, 1969ab, 1971abc). For J.J. Oversteegen in Merlyn, De toekomst der 
 59 
scholars usually chose the second interpretation. These scholars belonged to either the 
GKN or the NHK. They offered clear examples of our earlier observation, namely 
that Vestdijk had become a part of history and was no longer a main target for criti-
cism; indeed, his was taken to be just another expression of the modern mentality.129 
In any case, the polemical style that had been characteristic of many earlier contribu-
tions no longer appeared in these volumes. 
Two cases might further illustrate the non-polemical attitude within ecumenically 
oriented circles. First of all, the Smits-affair of the late 1950s within the NHK was 
resolved more than ten years later. As a critic of the NRC/Handelsblad wrote,130 in the 
end the NHK decided that the disciplinary measures against Smits were no longer an 
adequate answer to differences of opinion, even on matters concerning theology. In 
the early 1970s, the NHK granted him the salary of a retired reverend and the rights 
of a Church professor. As we shall see, Smits was even allowed to publish his opin-
ions in the NHK media.131 Thus, he would argue in Hervormd Nederland, anybody 
who truly wanted a dialogue with the ‘unbelievers’ needn’t look outside, but rather 
look in the mirror and search for the ‘unbeliever’ within. Though he did not agree 
with everything that both Vestdijk and Sierksma had argued for, the polemic against 
the two was, according to him, a black page in the history of Christianity. 
Secondly, outside the NHK, a study which was published by three theologians at 
the end of what I have been calling the third period of the controversy was clearly 
ecumenical. Together with Lutheran J.T. Bakker, Remonstrant H.J. Heering and 
GKN G.Th. Rothuizen made some passing comments on Vestdijk and Sierksma.132 
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Though critical, these comments were far from polemical, simply confirming the 
tendency previously identified. Almost nobody, even within theological circles, took 
offense anymore. The important point to be later determined is whether or not this 
should be attributed to the fact that De toekomst der religie, Tussen twee vuren, and De 
religieuze projectie had become a part of history, or to the far less controversial status 
that theological critics had employed as compared to earlier periods.
Polemics arose concerning issues brought to light after the release of Blue Movie, a 
film which, according to its director Wim Verstappen, had been based on Vestdijk’s 
ideas on religion and sexuality.133 This movie was criticized for its sexual morality, 
and was regarded as ‘pornographic’ by the Dutch film censure. Verstappen defended 
its ‘pornography’ by referring to arguments developed by Vestdijk himself in his 
“widely acknowledged” and “serious essay” De toekomst der religie. Eventually, Ver-
stappen succeeded in convincing his critics, and the movie passed censure. His de-
fense of the movie was published in Skoop, Krities Filmblad, together with a polemical 
critique of the Netherlands Reformed theologian and film specialist A. Dronkers.134
The latter had not only stated his problems with the movie, but also with Vestdijk’s 
opinions regarding religion in general. On the other hand, Charles Boost, one of the 
editors of Skoop, criticized the Dutch film censure in Haarlems Dagblad. According to 
a critic of De Volkskrant, B.J. Bertina, Dutch film censure would have made a mistake 
if it had not allowed the film to be released.135 Under the rubric ‘laughing about’, a 
critic of De Telegraaf wrote that s/he had laughed her head off when s/he heard about 
the objections of the Dutch film censure against Blue Movie.136 This polemic on ‘por-
nography’ shows that problems with Vestdijk’s opinions on religion and sexuality did 
not cause any shock among the broader public; only the intellectuals of certain (not 
only clerical, but also political) circles were still highly critical in an attempt to resist 
the rising tide of ‘moral anarchy’. 
 To conclude, several aspects distinguish this third period from the previous 
ones. We don’t find any contributions that deal exclusively with Vestdijk’s essay, 
even though its third and fourth edition were published in these years. Other essays, 
as well as the study by Sierksma, De religieuze projectie, called the most attention in the 
form of critiques that referred to De toekomst der religie. The essay was mentioned in 
magazine articles and books that were primarily published for an expert public of 
theologians, philosophers, psychologists and literary critics. On the high level of dis-
cussion in the Netherlands concerning the problem of religious projection (as com-
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pared to Germany), H. Faber published an essay,137 and in the U.S. Lee W. Bailey 
and Van A. Harvey have recently drawn attention to the interesting contributions by 
Vestdijk, Sierksma, and Fortmann.138 Yet, not only the level, but also the increasing 
interaction between intellectuals previously separated by ideological and church 
boundaries during this period is striking. The media involved allowed for contribu-
tions from experts formerly excluded from their pages. Fortmann got laudatory re-
views for his thorough arguments by theologians from GKN, NHK and Remon-
strant communities. An RKK psychologist was allowed to write an extensive review 
of Fortmann’s books in the ‘breakthrough’ magazine Wending. GKN, Remonstrant 
and Lutheran theologians published together. Conflicts within the NHK regarding 
Vestdijk, among other things, were resolved. 
Polemics were limited to the more isolated and lay circles within the RKK and 
VGKN. Certainly, when it came to new media like cinema and television, positively 
rewarded in newspapers and film magazines, even NHK critics were prepared to 
attack their opponents. Isolation and the wider public were two important aspects of 
the polemical contributions during the fourth period.  
Period 4 – 1973-1998 
This period started with the founding of a magazine wholly devoted to the study of 
Vestdijk’s work, the Vestdijkkroniek, as well as J. Kamphuis’ inaugural address at the 
VGKN Seminary at Kampen, entitled Vestdijk en de kerkgeschiedenis.139
Those contributing to the Vestdijkkroniek came from a wide variety of back-
grounds. Whereas some were independent literary critics, others belonged to either 
the RKK, NHK or Humanistisch Verbond (HV, ‘Humanist Association’). Even though 
most intellectuals within this circle were faithful to Vestdijk’s person and opinions, a 
few dared to criticize the master. An example of the first category is Mrs. L.G. Abell-
van Soest, who wrote an article on Vestdijk and the problem of evil.140 Far more 
critical was Harry Bekkering in a review of a short study by J. Kamphuis on Vestdijk 
and church history, originally presented as a lecture for students at the Free Re-
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formed Seminary at Kampen.141 Bekkering agreed with certain points of Kamphuis’ 
critique of Vestdijk. 
In his lecture, Kamphuis attempted to paint a clean picture of Vestdijk’s argu-
ments concerning religion. He also made clear that he did not agree with those ar-
guments. This becomes especially evident at the end, when he compared his own 
belief regarding the future of religion with that of Vestdijk. But all this had more an 
air of confession about it, rather than any kind of critique intended to discredit Vest-
dijk as a person or a specialist. For Wim J. Simons, however, Kamphuis’s study was 
an opportunity to write a polemical review for the conservative Utrechts Nieuwsblad in 
which Vestdijk was presented as a hedgehog hunting for God.142 After a reprint of 
Kamphuis’s lecture as a chapter of a book on the voices of their times, far more mod-
erate comments were made by K. Nolles,143 literary critic for Nederlands Dagblad, a 
newspaper for members of the VGKN, to which Kamphuis himself belonged.144
Kamphuis’s last book, and the chapter on Vestdijk in particular, received a moderate 
critique by Jan Kooistra145 in the literary critical magazine Argus. In general, however, 
the contributions made by Kamphuis and his critics played a marginal role. As will be 
argued in the last chapter, his isolated position within the public sphere must have 
been decisive here. 
Apart from Kamphuis, only one polemical remark was made in Hervormd Neder-
land.146 The literary critic and minor intellectual J. Noordegraaf argued that it was 
clear to everybody that Vestdijk’s opinions on religion were at least disputable, if not 
dubious. Moreover, his agreement to collaborate with the Germans during the war 
was telling as well.  
Yet, in all other contributions, whether in religious or literary critical media, De
toekomst der religie received sympathetic, though often critical attention. In the same 
magazine in which Noordegraaf had published his review, Smits published an article 
on both Vestdijk and Sierksma. And this time he again took their side against their 
theological critics.147 Even A. van der Wey took Vestdijk’s critique of Christianity 
seriously in Trouw, and took issue with his modernist fellow Catholics over the ques-
tion of whether or not they were still Christians.148
                                                     
141 Bekkering 1977; on Kamphuis cf. Valkenburg 1974: 133-148. 
142 Simons 1974. 
143 Kamphuis 1978, Nolles 1979. 
144 On Nederlands Dagblad cf. Breuker 1993. 
145 Kooistra 1979. 
146 Noordegraaf 1975. 
147 Smits 1978. 
148 Van der Wey 1978. 
63 
In the literary critical magazine Maatstaf, René Marres discussed the value of 
Vestdijk’s essay in the light of historical developments since.149 He concluded that on 
many points, Vestdijk had been correct, while on other points he had been wrong. 
However, the latter conclusion was not meant as a critical remark; it may be that 
Vestdijk was wrong precisely because of his historical intervention by means of his 
essay.
In 1980, the ‘Vestdijk circle’ organized two symposia on De toekomst der religie.
The lectures presented on that occasion were published (of course) in the Vestdijkkro-
niek.150 Smits’ contribution151 triggered a personal critique from Martin Hartkamp;152
so also within the ‘Vestdijk circle’ did people differ on certain points, and they were 
not afraid to argue their opinions in public. Martin Ros made some comments re-
garding the two symposia in Boekblad. Specific attention was paid to the contribution 
of Hartkamp. He also referred to the study of Kamphuis, and that of Monique De-
spret, who, under the supervision of Henrard, had written a doctoral dissertation on 
the reception of De toekomst der religie.153 Finally, Ton Oostveen, commentator of the 
Roman-Catholic opinion weekly De Tijd, published a review of the two symposia. 
According to him, the contributions showed that Christianity seemed to be learning 
the lessons it had received from Vestdijk in his critique of metaphysical religion. (He 
also mentioned a biological critique of Vestdijk’s opinions on religion by A. de Froe, 
not published in the Vestdijkkroniek).154
Besides the more thorough contributions previously mentioned, there were only 
short announcements concerning the reprint of De toekomst der religie in 1975 and of 
Tussen twee vuren in 1979, mainly from local newspapers like the Graafschapsbode, Gooi
& Eemlander, Hasselter Courant, Provinciale Zeeuwsche Courant, as well as the AVRO. 
They did not add any opinions to the controversy. Also, two opinion weeklies in 
which, long before, highly polemical reviews had been published, namely De Groene 
Amsterdammer and Vrij Nederland, paid some attention to the reprint.155 Only the latter 
magazine refered to Vestdijk’s main arguments against Christianity (its intolerance) 
and the polemic that it later triggered. According to Vrij Nederland, it would be inter-
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esting to study this polemic more closely, but more as an amazing piece of history; 
Vestdijk’s opinions themselves no longer seemed relevant. After the reprint of Tussen 
twee vuren, similar comments were made by Hans Warren in the Provinciale Zeeuwse 
Courant and Rob Schouten, at that time a critic for Algemeen Dagblad.156
Though originally intended as media for highly isolated groups, both Hervormd 
Nederland and Trouw showed a trend towards integration of different religious per-
spectives. Besides theologians, other intellectuals argued for a general kind of religios-
ity. This trend is especially clear in the reflexive comments made by Rob Schouten 
in a page-long article in Trouw.157 He gave a summary of Vestdijk’s arguments and 
concluded that, though Vestdijk had made some apparent mistakes, in many respects 
his projections had turned out to be correct. Especially the differences between relig-
ions and religious denominations were less clear than before. And, clearly, Trouw
itself was proof of those developments. It had developed from a strictly Dutch Re-
formed newspaper to a daily newspaper for a broader public with a general religious 
interest. After the end of De Tijd, many Roman-Catholic journalists and commenta-
tors joined Trouw. Van der Wey and Verhoeven are only two examples of this trend. 
Similar trends were observed earlier between Roman-Catholic circles and Wending.
We need only remember the essay on Fortmann by Luijk.158 Another example is 
offered by L. Laeyendecker. He contributed to an issue of Wending on the future of 
Church and Christianity.159 In this article he attempted to distinguish between a sense 
of history and the future on the one hand, and scientific prognosis on the other. 
Thirty years later he applied the same categories to De toekomst der religie in an article 
for the Vestdijkkroniek.160 He concluded that the essay touched upon themes that have 
since caused much religious reflection. With many of its conclusions, however, the 
public need not agree. From a scientific perspective it contained too many mistakes. 
And with respect to the future, for the most part it was little more than wishful 
thinking. A similar critique was offered S.W. Couwenberg in a special issue of Civis
Mundi.161
Yet, whereas some traditions lost their character and became less easily identifi-
able, others remained solid and highly isolated from the wider public sphere. VGKN 
member Kamphuis, mentioned before, offers an interesting example. As a member of 
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the orthodox-protestant denomination, he remained extremely critical of the reli-
gious arguments presented in De toekomst der religie.162
I regard Kamphuis’s critique to be the last polemical contribution to the contro-
versy surrounding De toekomst der religie that had begun exactly fifty years before. 
During the last period, only two intellectual circles still seemed to be highly inter-
ested in the arguments presented by Vestdijk in De toekomst der religie: those with an 
orthodox-protestant persuasion on the one hand, and the members of the brother-
hood of Vestdijk friends or fans on the other. While the latter attempted to interpret 
Vestdijk’s work and discuss its relevance, the others remained highly critical and 
denied his work of any value for the contemporary world, nor for the future of west-
ern culture. We might submit that especially within the latter circle, Vestdijk is still 
widely read.163 Among the more ecumenically oriented intellectuals he was only 
mentioned as a great figure who, however, belonged to a past in which his polemical 
arguments were relevant. The discussions of De toekomst der religie began to fade away. 
As we have seen, the reprint of 1975 did not call much attention. The reprint of 
1992 got a worse reception—it ended in the ramsj. In general, this period showed a 
dramatically decreased interest in Vestdijk’s oeuvre. Upon the occasion of the 100th
anniversary of his birthday, critics busied themselves with attempting to answer the 
question why a great artist like Vestdijk is not read anymore. Most concluded that it 
must be a matter of content and writing style. Moreover, the medium does not enjoy 
much popularity anymore; people prefer to watch television and movies, rather than 
read books. Ironically, filmed versions of Vestdijk’s novels have been quite successful. 
Conclusions 
Looking back at the history of the controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie after 
its publication in 1947—during the first period (1948-1952)—we see polemics being 
triggered from a wide variety of critics. Apart from literary critics, many theologians 
attacked Vestdijk (and later on Sierksma). Whether these theologians belonged to the 
‘orthodox’ group which Vestdijk had mentioned to his friend Theun de Vries is 
difficult to determine. It seems as if he used the term somewhat uncritically. Whereas 
philosophers and theologians who could reasonably be called ‘orthodox’ (i.e. those of 
the RKK and GKN) were in fact quite moderate, ‘middle-orthodox’ theologians of 
the NHK and ‘orthodox’ literary critics and commentators of RKK, GKN as well as 
VGKN were often highly polemical. 
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With regards to the institutional traditions from which critics came, things did not 
change considerably during the second period (1952-1959). Sierksma’s contribution 
only initiated a process of increasing interaction between different traditions on the 
issues brought forth by Vestdijk. The middle-orthodox theologians of the NHK 
attempted to moderate their style of arguing, but polemics still prevailed among 
them. All of this changed during the third period (1960-1972). With regards to theo-
logians, we see different traditions merging and ecumenical tendencies gaining 
ground. In the end, polemics ceased to play their dominant role. Only limited circles 
of literary critics who still belonged to some institutional tradition (mainly RKK) or 
specific media (as diverse as Elsevier and Skoop) continued to attack Vestdijk. How-
ever, the latter’s work was still widely recognized. This changed during the fourth 
and last period (1973-1998). Apart from critics belonging to isolated intellectual 
strata, nobody felt triggered to attack Vestdijk anymore during this period. First, we 
found one literary critic who contributed to a generally theological magazine. Fur-
thermore, there was a theologically oriented cultural critic from the VGKN, who 
fiercely criticized Vestdijk’s arguments. One commentator, finally, felt urged to fol-
low the latter’s attack on Vestdijk. All the others regarded the essay as interesting at 
best. Apart from a few bookworms, few people seem to read his work—not even his 
novels—anymore. 
To understand the intensity of the controversy during its history, the following 
overview might be helpful. For each period, I shall indicate the total amount of con-
tributions that were made. The third column shows how many of those were po-
lemical. Finally, the percentage of polemical contributions for each period will be 
given.
Period Total Polemical Per year Percentage  
I  1948-1951 60 30 7.5 50 
II 1952-1959 50 25 3.0 50 
III 1960-1972 40 10 0.8 25 
IV 1973-1998 30 3 0.2 10 
If counted per year, these trends would appear even more significant. And even then 
we would have to remind ourselves that the public became more and more limited 
over time. Thus, the relative importance of the controversy cannot be estimated by 
means of numbers only. Yet, as we have seen in the outline of the developments I 
have already given, focus on the De toekomst der religie gradually shifted either towards 
67 
other contributions or to a broader discussion of matters concerning religion in gen-
eral.
These trends should be no surprise, if we take into account the way in which the 
history of literary reception often develops. To be sure, some books do not call any 
attention, but are recovered many years later only to become best-sellers. Especially 
in the case of an already famous author, however, books are eagerly awaited and 
reviewed immediately after publication. And so it was in the case of Vestdijk’s essay. 
Its publication was announced shortly after the end of the war and it triggered plenty 
of comments. Of course, it was not only because of Vestdijk’s fame that the essay got 
so many reviews; the way in which its arguments were presented and the topic itself 
must have been relevant to a broad spectrum of media and opinion leaders. 
After its initial enthusiasm, interest usually declines. This is understandable when 
we remember that public is faced every day with new books that gain attention, and 
new authors that become famous as a result. Besides, the original publication might 
trigger its own history by challenging people to elaborate on the topics discussed. In 
any case, any book has to share attention with other books and authors.  
Then the question arises whether these circumstances are the only factors which 
account for declining interest. It might be reasonable to assume that the issues dealt 
with lost their relevance for later generations, or that its writing style had become 
old-fashioned. As I will argue in the last chapter of this study, both of these factors 
were indeed the case. Yet, this might explain why the number of contributions gen-
erally decreased, but it cannot adequately account for the fact that compared to de-
clining interest, the percentage of polemical pieces declined even more dramatically. 
In any case, the central question of this study should still be answered, i.e. how to 
understand why some people feel challenged to counter arguments polemically 
whereas others do not.  
In order to answer this question, we must still clarify the concept of polemics and 
then analyze the role which this style of arguing developed during the fifty years of 
the controversy. In this chapter, I have discussed personal attacks and polemical styles 
in reference to texts. In order to categorize the authors of these texts, I discussed 
opinion leaders on the one hand, and minor or marginal intellectuals on the other.
In chapter II, I shall focus more specifically on the way in whcih attacks were 
personal in the case of Vestdijk and why I believe that to be an important characteris-
tic of polemics. Later, the problems of polemical style (chapter III) and the institu-
tional position of the those contributing, as well as the social context of the contro-
versy (chapter IV), will be dealt with in more depth. 
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II – THE POLEMIC: ITS SUBJECT. 
When two principles really do meet, without any 
chance to be reconciled, then the people involved declare 
each other a fool and heretic. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Introduction
In the previous chapter, a general overview of the reception of De toekomst der religie
was given. Within this tradition, I distinguished intuitively between polemics, critical 
discussion and attempts at dialogue, without paying much attention to the specific 
characteristics of these types of interactions. However, in a study focusing on polem-
ics and its function in particular, the terms employed must have analytical value. 
Therefore, we will have to distinguish between those terms and define the specific 
features that might help us to identify polemical contributions within the history of 
the reception of Vestdijk’s essay. 
Previously, I defined polemics as a highly personal encounter meant to scorn and 
denigrate ‘the other’. In the present chapter, I will focus on the question how ‘the 
other’ has been identified in the course of the controversy we are dealing with. As I 
will argue, in the context of polemics, it is imperative to show how an argument is 
transformed in such a way as to offer an image of its author. This means that the text 
becomes interpreted as if it were simply the effect of a certain state of mind or moral-
ity. Of significance for the way polemics are pursued is a focus on the subject sup-
posed to be present in the text, while in fact being the person behind the argument. 
Critics try to create somebody to be held accountable. Especially when people feel 
attacked, it is important to counter its threat, whether real or imaginary. This can be 
done by showing the argument to be entirely false. Yet, depending on the force by 
which these people feel challenged, it is highly unlikely that they will leave it at that. 
Not only the argument, but also its author needs to be attacked. More likely even, 
the latter is ridiculed without paying much attention to his line of reasoning at all. 
To identify polemics, I will focus on the way persons supposed to be responsible 
for something perceived as a threat, are defined. For the moment, I am not interested 
in ‘the author’ of the arguments. Nor do I intend to argue with those contributing to 
the controversy whether or not their judgment of ‘the author’ is in fact justified. On 
the contrary, I merely wish to read the available texts and limit myself to the terms 
that are actually employed in order to create an opponent. 
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This does not mean that I hold ‘the author’ defined in the course of the polemic 
to be the real person behind the text. On the contrary, to adopt a notorious phrase of 
Derrida, at this stage we assume that there is nothing, i.e. no referent, outside the 
text. This does not mean that I really believe that there is nobody outside the text 
(just as it would be naive to think that Derrida tried to argue such a thing). Already 
my attempt to explain polemics by referring to the social positions of the people 
involved suggests in which direction I am looking for the person behind the text. In 
chapters III and IV, I will elaborate on that. As long as we don’t know anything 
about the historical background of the intellectuals contributing to the polemic, and 
as long as we don’t know anything about the principles meeting here—to borrow 
from Wittgenstein—, it is too early to draw conclusions about that. And It is defi-
nitely too early to assume that the persons characterized in the controversy are the 
same as those outside the text. Instead, I would like to argue, the polemic is about 
fun rather than the truth. Again, in the present chapter, we are not talking about 
principles, but rather about the fools people are making of each other, as Wittgen-
stein had already observed.
1
Polemics: humor rather than truth 
In polemics, people are not interested in the essay or in what Vestdijk wrote; on the 
contrary, they refigure the content of the text in a way that allows for derisive laugh-
ter. In fact, as I will argue, the mechanisms that are at work in polemics are similar to 
those identified by Sigmund Freud in his analysis of humor.
2
This is not to say that the whole controversy was intended to be merely a joke. 
Rather I think that there are important similarities between polemics on the one 
hand and witticism on the other. As in the case of jokes, polemical remarks are meant 
to shift the sympathy an argument might trigger away from ‘the author’ involved, 
while trying to change the picture in favor of the critic. As Freud already indicated, 
at least three parties are involved in joke-work. First, there’s the one who writes 
something that will turn out to be witty. Secondly, jokes need an object to be 
laughed at. Finally, there must be a person or public that feels triggered to laugh at 
the object. And the fact that people are laughing already constitutes witticism. Simi-
larly, already the fact that some people take something personally and feel the need to 
attack the person they hold accountable, is enough for me to speak of a polemical 
controversy. I will not make any attempt to find intentions behind the text, while the 
process of selecting sources is far too arbitrary to be of any relevance to the type of 
analysis I have in mind. Trying to recover intentions would lead us into an analysis of 
his text by means of hermeneutic and historians’ critical methods. I am neither inter-
                                                     
1 Wittgenstein 1970: 611; translation mine. 
2 Freud 1938.
71 
ested in intentions, nor in the various sources Vestdijk used for his argument. For me 
the concept of intention starts from a highly simplistic idea of man and fails to con-
sider unintended consequences. To study something ineffable, like sources the argu-
ment has been derived from, requires a student far more erudite than I. Worse, it 
does not explain why polemics arise in the first place. And the latter issue is precisely 
what I am dealing with in this study. 
Instead of looking for either intentions or sources, I will try to take the essay it-
self— i.e. the actual collection of letters, terms, sentences and whatever other textual 
elements there are—as a starting point for my investigations. Without implying that 
other methods and aims are irrelevant for the study of literary texts in general, I be-
lieve that in my case they do not offer the proper means to analyze the polemic at 
hand. Those methods only work with a certain intuitive concept of polemics, while 
for my purposes, I need to have a clear idea of what exactly is meant by ‘polemics’ 
and what are the techniques employed in this type of symbolic interaction. What 
interests me here are the differences within the history of the essay’s reception. I need 
to know which different mechanics are typical of the reactions to Vestdijk’s argu-
ments. Especially interesting are the different ways in which they are re-working the 
materials offered in the original text. More specifically, I will try to show that persons 
and their intentions are created discursively in the process of reading and polemical 
reaction. In other words, remembering Kolakowski, what I am interested in are the 
ways in which language is manipulated in order to, borrowing from Michel Foucault, 
create human beings as subjects of textual exchange. 
This points to the question why I think polemics is about creating subjects 
whereas Freud focussed on the object of a joke. According to me, the object in the 
case of polemics is the argument. Yet, it is difficult to win people for a war against an 
evil power of which the face cannot be identified. To wage a war, it is far more 
effective to define evil in terms of defects that we know from our everyday experi-
ence with people living nearby. For that, as has already been indicated, behind some-
thing abstract like a text, a subject to be held accountable has to be imagined. 
First, I wish to look more closely at the mechanism of the type of writing we call 
polemics. For that, I need to compare the original text with its offspring, to use a 
romantic metaphor. Even in the case of polemics, with all its distortions, misunder-
standings and disagreements, this metaphor certainly applies. We need only remind 
ourselves that links between parents and their children are not always harmonious 
either. Something similar has been argued with respect to the oeuvre of James Joyce. 
This might have something to do with the esoteric character of the textual corpus he 
wrote. A similar notion would apply to Vestdijk, whose work has been compared 
with that of Joyce.
3
 However, the same could be argued for literary texts in general. 
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To quote Derrida, who was in fact commenting on Joyce and the reception of his 
oeuvre:
4
Whatever the difference between them, even if, as in the present case, it is immense 
and even incommensurable, the ‘second’ text, the one which, fatally, refers to the 
other, quotes it, exploits it, parasites it and deciphers it, is no doubt the minute parcel 
detached from the other, the metonymic dwarf, the jester of the great anterior text 
which would have declared war on it in languages. 
Yet, all that which we have been arguing till now applies to any employment of 
language, whether it be quotation, commentary, critique, controversy, discussion, 
dialogue, or, as in our case, polemic. We still have to find what exactly distinguishes 
the latter from other linguistic activities. It is my objective to identify the mechanisms 
governing polemical exchanges, arguing that it is displacement that distinguishes 
polemics from other kinds of writing. Furthermore, I wish to identify what exactly 
displacement consists of and is aiming at while creating an image of the subject be-
hind the argument trying to question its authority. Only after these theoretical explo-
rations will the practice of polemics be dealt with in more detail. Finally, some con-
cluding remarks in which I will specify the interconnection between the theory and 
practice of polemics will conclude the chapter. 
Polemics: the mechanics of humor 
We need to investigate how exactly a subject is created and what kind of textual 
mechanisms are employed in order to subject the author to criticism. As previously 
indicated, the subject presented in the course of the controversy is not taken here as a 
real picture of Vestdijk himself. Instead, we are dealing with an artificial construction. 
And in the process of writing, several techniques are used in order to arrive from the 
argument to a picture of its author. Thus, at least for polemics applies the concept of 
truth that Nietzsche had defined long before. After having asked himself the question 
of what he understood ‘truth’ to be, he concluded that it was simply a movable host 
of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms.
5
The techniques identified by Nietzsche as constitutive forces in the process of 
creating truth, are highly similar to the mechanics we find in wit. In the following I 
will argue that the analytical framework Freud developed in order to understand wit 
might be helpful to make sense of polemics as well. 
                                                     
4 Derrida 1984: 148. 
5 Nietzsche 1999; translation mine. 
73 
Though at first sight it might seem strange to draw from the study of jokes and 
jests, it is possible to argue that there are some structural similarities between wit-
work on the one hand, and war-like activities like polemics on the other. In his Se-
mantics of Humor, Victor Raskin even asserted that “laughter is born out of hatred and 
hostility.”
6
 Freud himself drew attention to the aggressive character of jokes. At-
tempting to determine the tendency of wit, while leaving out his own obsession with 
obscene wit, we find it to be hostile, he argued, “serving as an aggression, satire, or 
defense.”
7
 The means which serve to make a person comical, he continues, are trans-
ference into comic situations, imitations, disguise, irony, unmasking, caricature, par-
ody, travesty and the like; on other occasions he also mentions exaggeration as a 
means of providing comic pleasure. “It is quite evident that these techniques may 
enter into the service of hostile or aggressive tendencies,” Freud concluded.
8
 As 
Linda Hutcheon says, “it can mock, attack and ridicule; it can exclude, embarrass and 
humiliate.” This applies even more to irony; it always has an edge, it is always po-
lemical, “belonging to the armory of controversy, and not fitted to any entirely pea-
cable occasion.”
9
Thus, while jokes are meant to create pleasure among an audience, actually, they 
serve to shift the attention away by creating a subject at which the laughter is di-
rected. The effect of ridicule is a bond between people as well as between the public 
and the author of the joke. As Hutcheon emphasizes in her study on irony, it “can be 
used as a weapon has always been known: the social put-down and the satiric barb 
have their corollary in the critics’ wielding of authority over texts, and especially over 
previous imperceptive readers.”
10
 According to Freud,
11
in the case of the aggressive tendency, wit by the same means changes the original in-
different hearers into active haters and scorners, and in this way confronts the enemy 
with a host of opponents where formerly there was but one. […] By the pleasure pre-
mium which it offers […] it overthrows critical judgment which would otherwise have 
examined the dispute in question; […] it shatters the respect for institutions and truths 
in which the hearer [or reader, HvdB] had believed, first by strengthening the argu-
ment, and secondly by resorting to a new method of attack. Where the argument seeks 
to draw the hearer’s reason to its side, with strives to push aside this reason, there is no 
doubt that wit has chosen the way which is psychologically more efficacious. 
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Apart from identifying the movement, Freud also indicated for what purposes wit 
could be employed. According to him, “a person is ridiculed in order to render him 
contemptible, or to deprive him of his claims to dignity and authority.”12
Does this hold for polemics as well? The answer, I believe, is yes. The most im-
portant difference between humor and polemic is a matter of perspective. Whereas 
for the one something might trigger laughter, for the other it seems more aggressive. 
The former perspective is likely to be held by people that do not identify with the 
object of a joke. The latter perspective, on the other hand, is usually shared by people 
who take the joke to be directed against themselves as people. Yet, both humor and 
polemic share an affective intensity that is likely to be derived from a structural simi-
larity between the two. And it is exactly because of this similarity that I find it useful 
to employ Freud’s analytical framework in order to understand how polemics works. 
What kinds of techniques are employed in order to make writing, or any other 
use of language, witty? First of all, according to Freud, language has to be ‘expres-
sive’. A term more frequently employed in this context is repetition. This repetition 
might occur at the level of sounds or letters (as in the case of alliteration, assonance, 
and rhyme), terms, sentences, or more extensive elements of texts. In wit, however, 
they get their expressive character through an element of incongruity, either between 
two terms related to each other in the text (so-called ‘verbal irony’) or between terms 
and their context (‘situational irony’).13 In the previous chapter we saw how Vestdijk 
wrote about the “orthodox theologians” he met in St. Michielsgestel during the war. 
He warned his friend Theun de Vries to beware of them. “I got enough experience 
with this scum,” Vestdijk told him. Clearly, the link between “orthodox theologi-
ans” and “scum” is no verbal irony, but rather a situational one. Instead of the usual 
gestures by which ordinary people show their respect for theologians, Vestdijk is 
scorning them. It is likely that the apparent incongruity between the attitude of the 
people towards theologians and that of his friend triggered the laughter of his friend. 
Yet, how does expressive language create a humorous effect? According to Freud, 
it is employed as a ‘condensation’. By this he indicates a process by which elements 
from an original text are selected, re-connected and deconstructed in order to repre-
sent its meaning like something of a summary. One might doubt whether it is justi-
fied to speak here of a summary, especially when we hear Laplanche & Pontalis de-
fine it as the process by which “a sole idea represents several associative chains at 
whose point of intersection it is located.” They continue:14
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Condensation should not, however, be looked upon as a summary: although each 
manifest element is determined by several latent meanings, each one of these, inversely, 
may be identified in several elements; what is more, manifest elements do not stand in 
the same relationship to each of the meanings from which they derive, and so they do 
not subsume them after the fashion of a concept. 
Especially within the context of humor, I believe that they are right. As far as we can 
speak of a summary here, it always includes a sense of ambiguity. According to La-
can, a process of transformation is essential. In order to clarify his point, he links the 
movement of condensation (Verdichtung) to that of a metaphor. Here the link with 
the Nietzschean terminology becomes clear. By this he simply means that one term is 
substituted for another without losing the implicit meanings that constitute the link 
between them; on the contrary, the first term is both employing and indicating the 
ambiguity in the second term.15 To return to the example given before, if we used to 
think of “orthodox theologians” as honorable persons, the term Vestdijk chooses as a 
substitute points to the other side of the coin. The word “scum” cannot be taken as a 
summary of the term it replaces; it only emphasizes one aspect of the different mean-
ings that can possibly be attributed to “orthodox theologians”.  
As soon as the process of condensation starts to become confusing or offensive, 
the idea of a summary completely disappears. And this is always the way in which 
both humor and polemics develop. Here, condensation turns into ‘displacement’. In 
the terminology of Laplanche & Pontalis, displacement is16
the fact that an idea’s emphasis, interest or intensity is able to be detached from it and 
to pass on to other ideas, which were originally of little intensity but which are related 
to the first idea by a chain of associations. 
Here we have a link with the concept of metonymy employed in earlier quotes of 
both Nietzsche and Derrida. According to Lacan, as in the movement of metonymy, 
the possible meanings of a term are reduced, while in effect leading to a shift of focus 
(Verschiebung).17 This is clearly the case in Vestdijk’s substitution of “scum” for “or-
thodox theologians”. Any positive association is excluded; only the negative aspects 
of a group of people are highlighted. Moreover, by employing “scum” as a character-
istic of theologians, the latter are discarded as morally inferior. And even though we 
don’t know who exactly he was pointing at, the qualification is certainly to be under-
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stood as an attack on the persons (other entities cannot be held accountable for some 
state of affairs).  
Surely, displacement can be employed in many different circumstances. However, 
as I will try to explain, it is the shift from argument to author that is a distinctive 
characteristic of polemical controversy. And just like wit, in the course of this process 
a subject is created for humorous effect. 
Polemics: humor by means of a subject 
Again, I wish to emphasize that it is not my aim to find out whether either Vestdijk 
or his critics were justified in treating each other the way they did. I am not inter-
ested in whether or not they intended to attack their opponents personally. Such a 
perspective would imply that we are discussing fixed subjects and, for instance, that 
Vestdijk had some specific people in mind when he was writing. As we have seen 
before, they probably belonged to the middle-orthodox circle of theologians within 
the NKH, of whom some prominent members were among his fellow hostages in St. 
Michielsgestel during the war. But even then, it remains unclear who exactly he was 
hinting at in his letter to Theun de Vries about the “orthodox theologians” who, 
according to him, had been trying to prevent his lectures from being presented to a 
possibly interested audience. On the other hand, it is striking that none of his fellow 
hostages ever responded to his essay in public. Only more than twenty years later 
would Kraemer attempt to start what he called a dialogue on the issues presented by 
Vestdijk (and Sierksma). Surely, his fellow middle-orthodox theologians were highly 
polemical. And, contrary to his dialogue-talk, Kraemer did not offer any exception to 
this rule.
Yet, even though Vestdijk might be regarded as the poor victim of the contro-
versy triggered by his essay, he was not as innocent as his contributions suggested at 
first sight. As he argued, he personally wished for Christianity to die.
18
 Yet, in a letter 
to his friend De Vries, August 1943, his remarks on Christianity became far more 
personal. “Within hundred years, it will be impossible to root up Christianity, (un-
fortunately),” he admitted. “You can try, but you will never exterminate the Chris-
tians; on the contrary, they will exterminate you, because they are far better than 
anybody else in those matters.” Having substituted Christians for Christianity, Vest-
dijk continues quite polemically. According to him “they cannot be enlightened 
either; they will, damn, not allow anybody to do so, and if you try, they become 
extremely offensive. I have seen things in Gestel that were highly interesting from a 
psychological point of view, but even made me doubt whether I myself was sane. 
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Such a dogmatic and strong faith in God—terrifying, especially because of the intol-
erance that always accompanies their beliefs.”
19
Just like the critics who were quite polemical, neither could Vestdijk avoid substi-
tuting persons for concepts. And the predicates he used in order to qualify Christians 
did not apply to Christianity. A human being can be enlightened; in the case of 
Christianity this is far more difficult. A person can be offensive; a religion, however, 
cannot. Men and women can have a strong faith; it is difficult to imagine anything 
similar with respect to Christianity. Only a highly anthropomorphic understanding of 
the concept of Christianity can be regarded as intolerant. However, as we will see 
later, Vestdijk told his readers that he would not have too many problems with 
Christian dogmas; what almost exclusively bothered him was “the intolerance of its 
believers.”
20
Whether intentionally or not, both Vestdijk and his critics were somehow trig-
gered to react polemically. This meant that they were creating an image of their 
opponent that, whether intentionally or not, might have some humorous effect. Yet, 
again, this did not mean that the orthodox theologians or Christians that Vestdijk was 
referring to existed somewhere outside of the letters he sent to his friend. It could 
even be seriously doubted whether or not there would have been people among his 
fellow hostages who recognized themselves in the picture he had painted of them.  
As has previously been argued, instead of simply assuming any identity between 
the names mentioned in the text and the persons outside of it, I will simply try to 
figure out how subjects are created and made ridiculous in the course of the polemic, 
and how this process triggers reactions that, in their turn, counter and re-formulate 
their own subjectivity. As we will see, in order to question the authority of some-
body else, the validity of his statements is rendered problematic by pointing out the 
moral defects of their author. In short, I will deal here with the question how a 
seemingly objective text (the collection of letters available to/observable by every-
body) is turned into something subjective by giving it certain anthropomorphic fea-
tures. In other words, in the terminology defined before, I will try to identify the 
processes by which the argument (the essay) is displaced by its author (Vestdijk) in 
the course of polemics. 
In her essay on the creative potential of language, Judith Butler argues that, “be-
ing called a name is one of the conditions by which a subject is constituted in lan-
guage.”
21
 In wit, often this is just enough to cause laughter. But in the case of polem-
ics, the subject mostly receives some predicates that indicate either intellectual or 
moral deficits. This process resembles humor as far as it establishes an incongruity 
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between the things people expected from a text or author on the one hand, and 
what, in fact, is exemplified in the argument on the other. Yet, as has already been 
mentioned, by this it is not the argument that the critic tries to let people laugh at, 
but rather “the author,” which is something suggested to be inside while often being 
projected behind the text.  
If we apply the terminology of Nietzschean philology to these processes, the fol-
lowing development appears. As far as the text itself is critically summarized, and the 
author remains implicit, authority is questioned by means of metaphor. As far as a 
critique of the text leads to some conclusions applying to its author, we are speaking 
of metonymy. And, finally, as far as human attributes are assigned to this subject, the 
process of anthropomorphism has been employed.  
Butler maintains that the subject projected behind an utterance appears only as “a 
consequence of the demand for accountability. […] The requirements for blame 
figure the subject as the ‘cause’ of an act. In this sense, there can be no subject with-
out a blameworthy act, and there can be no ‘act’ apart from a discourse of account-
ability and, according to Nietzsche, without an institution of punishment.”
22
 Any-
how, there needs to be someone culpable, resurrecting the ‘subject’ (which could just 
as well be a corporate group or entity as an individual) in response to the demand to 
seek accountability for injury. 
Yet, Butler asks, is such a location of the subject as the ‘cause’ of injurious lan-
guage justified?
23
 Personally, I believe that there is no general answer to this question. 
Often we do not recognize whether a text offers a genuine judgment on the original 
one. Of course, some reduction has taken place. A metaphor is not to be mistaken 
for reality, though it might emphasize some important aspect of it. Nor can we take a 
metonymy merely to reflect some causal relation outside the text. Detailed historical 
research on the person responsible for a text taken to be injurious might show some, 
or even many, similarities with the subject created. Yet, too often it simply remains 
highly speculative whether or not there is any likeness between the image of an ‘au-
thor’ and the way other people see him, let alone his real existence (whatever that 
might be). 
The practice of creating subjects through polemic
Thus far we have outlined how arguments might be transformed into a subject from 
a theoretical point of view. In the following, we must focus on the way in which this 
was actually done in the course of the controversy which Vestdijk’s essay triggered. 
As we have seen, despite the objectivity which Vestdijk claimed to be aiming for, 
he also included personal confessions that clearly indicated the subjectivity of his 
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argument. Yet, even in these cases, we can better not take his statements at face va-
lue, as if they refer to actual states of affairs. Rather, consistent with our aims here, I 
interpret them as attempts by Vestdijk to create a subject (‘Vestdijk’) of his own.24
Not surprisingly, he presented his character as somebody to be taken seriously. He 
began by emphasizing that he did not pretend to be a prophet. Instead, he was trying 
to be scientific, though he admitted that this approach was limited with respect to the 
future. In so doing, he allowed himself a few more or less speculative remarks. What 
critics made of all this, we shall soon see.  
Pretentions –Vestdijk attempted to avoid at least one risk right from the start. Since he 
was writing about the future, he feared that some might see him as a prophet, and he 
clearly did not wish to be regarded as such. According to him, the future was a closed 
book, as it was for everybody else (9). Instead of issuing warnings of certain inevitable 
events yet to come, he simply tried to develop certain logical predictions. In doing so 
he immediately linked himself to Western scientific tradition, though not in the sense 
that he would be able to offer a clear picture of what would happen in the future. He 
was not promising anything, on the contrary. Only after long critical and theoretical 
reflection would he attempt to uncover certain secrets of a history not yet born. And 
as usual in the case of predictions, he acknowledged that he must proceed cautiously, 
fumbling and limiting himself to some provisional statements (9). However, Vestdijk 
maintained, even though speculative imagination would play an important role, logi-
cal reasoning always needed to be invoked as well in order to criticize and check the 
results of creativity. In matters concerning the future, knowledge could never be as 
reliable as in the natural sciences. In the humanities, Vestdijk claimed, one must al-
ways find a balance between imagination and critique, combinations and bare facts, 
constructive fantasy and exact knowledge (9). For this reason he did not pretend to 
offer more than “hints” for the future (361). 
The question then arises how Vestdijk wished to meet the limited pretentions he 
had formulated. The method by which he attempted to gather clues for the future, 
he discovered within the discipline of interpretive psychology, as it had become well-
known by this time, especially in Germany (10). This method aimed at understand-
ing human phenomena such as religion by studying the workings of the human 
mind. For that, it required a basic sympathy (10) and intuition (11). As such, how-
ever, it was subjectively determined. It did not make any sense to dissimulate or deny 
this aspect of argument in matters concerning the humanities. On the other hand, in 
order to be as objective as possible, one must also be prepared to keep some distance 
and dare to be critical. The latter perspective required more specific capacities, such 
as being reasonable, impartial, righteous and moderate (11). It was a matter of charac-
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ter rather than intellect. From a strictly scientific point of view, interpretive psychol-
ogy was something in between natural science and art (11). At least, it required the 
skill—almost the art, according to Vestdijk—of keeping a critical distance from one’s 
own inclinations. In general, it was better not to have any opinion at all than to de-
fend a position that did not allow for critique. Personal convictions must never get 
the chance to dominate arguments in matters of science, Vestdijk concluded (12). 
However, Vestdijk admitted, things were not that easy. When trying to be rea-
sonable, impartial, righteous and moderate, especially in matters of religion, he ar-
gued, critics would suspect us to be outsiders rather than insiders or true believers. 
And in a sense, the critics would be right (12). We must keep some distance and 
even be highly critical of religion. Believers however, Vestdijk maintained, simply 
attempted to convince their public that critics of religion were as subjective as they 
recognized themselves to be. The only difference between believers and critics was 
that the former took each other seriously, whereas the methods of psychology to 
them were interpreted as sheer nonsense (89). Vestdijk found this way of reasoning 
highly misleading. We must always be prepared to admit our subjectivity, he con-
tended, while at the same time trying to be as objective as possible. For example, he 
argued (13),
25
the future of religion for us, people of the West, primarily turns around the question 
how Christianity will develop and adapt itself to new circumstances. All of us, we are 
involved. We are the heirs of a culture that has been created by Christianity. We 
would be nobody without this tradition. We would still be walking around in furs, be-
lieve in Wodan, gambling away our wives and children, no, we would have massacred 
each other. While being part of this particular history, we cannot avoid to have a 
highly personal relation to this tradition. And even the most objective argument will 
not do without some kind of subjective judgment. 
Yet, he also allowed himself to express some desires which, he believed, would not 
necessarily become reality. So, he was clear when, after a lengthy discussion, he in-
formed his readers that, personally, he preferred Christianity to die (327). 
In the next chapter, we will see how Vestdijk tried to substantiate the claims 
made in the introduction of De toekomst der religie. Here we must describe what his 
critics made of it in order to create a subject to be held accountable for the arguments 
with which they were faced. Thus far, however, it is clear that Vestdijk did not ex-
plicitly assign himself the role of a prophet, but, instead, merely attempted to make 
his subjective opinions sound serious, reasonable and scientific (13).26 Commentators, 
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on the other hand, took him to be a prophet and easy talker at the same time. And it 
was perfectly understandable—and even to be expected—that Vestdijk failed to meet 
his own standards, being anything but scientific. 
Prophet – For some, Vestdijk’s attempt to present an inspired and eloquent vision of 
the future turned him into a prophet or apostle. Whereas many were not trying to be 
ironic,27 others clearly were. According to these critics, the prophets of the Old Tes-
tament, as well as the apostles of the New Testament, had been famous for their 
revelations and vivid pictures of the future. Of course, critics warned their public, 
reading Vestdijk would be highly disappointing compared to reading the ancient 
prophets and apostles.28
De Vos argued that rather than presenting himself as a prophet, Vestdijk simply 
proclaimed “his own pious wishes” for the future of religion, presenting them as 
“highest wisdom.”29 Yet, De Vos and Miskotte agreed that there was nothing pro-
found in Vestdijk’s argument.30 Kraemer’s points were similar; according to him this 
was exactly why Vestdijk could not be counted among the great prophets of older 
times.31 Zijlstra simply took Vestdijk to be a false prophet.32 Van Heugten referred to 
the ancient Israelites who had once asked themselves: “Is Saul also among the proph-
ets?”33 He also compared Vestdijk’s style of arguing with the missionary fervor of St. 
Paul, the apostle. This was highly ironical from Van Heugten’s point of view, be-
cause of the incongruity between Paul’s zeal for Christianity on the one hand, and 
that of Vestdijk for Buddhism on the other.34
On the other hand, some critics were far more sympathetic, appreciating Vest-
dijk’s cautious style of arguing. Berkouwer and Wapenaar acknowledged that Vest-
dijk denied himself the title of a prophet.35 Rodenko did not find any “exciting per-
spectives” in the essay. Yet, according to him, this could not be regarded a failure on 
Vestdijk’s part, because the latter did not intend to offer any exciting perspectives. If 
he resembled anything of a prophet, then the psychologist was always prepared to 
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prevent him from flying too far. Vestdijk did not merely declare his opinions con-
cerning the future, but his style of exposition exemplified the method of careful rea-
soning that he himself had advocated. First, he offered a theory. However, he 
immediately added some counter-examples which people would certainly be able to 
relate to from everyday experience. Thereby he indicated that his ideas had only 
relative validity.36 Rodenko appreciated this method, as did Barneveld and Veenstra.37
Walgrave concluded that the whole style of arguing was reminiscent of the 
Echternach-procession; for every three steps forward, two steps were taken back.38
Polak would later admit that it might be taken as an example of “intellectual 
hygiene,” while, in fact, he was left wondering whether it was a matter of “honesty” 
or just an attempt to take the wind out of his opponent’s sails. At least, he observed, 
nowhere in the essay were counter-examples taken as refutations of the theory. 
According to Polak, this implied that Vestdijk’s scientific pretentions had only 
relative validity.39
Scientist – Vestdijk argued that, by means of his interpretive method, he was too 
much of an artist to be regarded as a natural scientist, and, at the same time, too 
much a scientist to be regarded as just an amateur.40 Some critics, however, found an 
incongruity between his scientific pretentions on the one hand, and his artistic pref-
erences on the other. According to others, he lacked the artistic sensibility to be 
scientific. Still others found his interpretation of the facts and authorities which he 
had added to his argument highly insufficient. In short, even if his modesty had been 
taken into account, he had failed by any scientific standard. 
Some admitted that, as an artist, Vestdijk was indeed great. According to some, 
his artistic intuition even made him a great interpretive psychologist.41 Miskotte ar-
gued, though sourly according to Sierksma,42 that following intuition was doing a big 
job.43 Others, no less ironic than Miskotte, spoke of a world of dreams (Wapenaar),44
lyrical descriptions (Mankes-Zernike)45 and poetic visions (Schaik-Willing),46 as well 
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as adventurous flights of the mind (Kraemer).47 The arguments which Vestdijk had 
offered were artificial,48 providing merely, as Bomhoff remarked, a “fashion show.”49
More explicitly, Vestdijk’s argument was too artistic to be taken seriously (Schaik-
Willing, Majorick, Pos),50 and to be regarded as scientifically appropriate (De Vos, 
Miskotte, Van der Leeuw, Bomhoff).51 For Mankes-Zernike, this was reason enough 
to put her own feelings in the middle in order to make her point against Vestdijk.52
To this, Sierksma answered that the intuition for which women were famous might 
in some specific cases play an important role, but that in matters of science, it could 
not be allowed to determine any decisive argument.53
Miskotte and Bomhoff argued that Vestdijk was not artistic enough to identify 
with his subject and protect himself from any negative judgment.54 Instead of sympa-
thy and a positive attitude, Van Heugten, Schaik-Willing and Verhoeven only found 
sharp cerebrality and intellectualism.55 And, Schaik-Willing added, something similar 
was true for his adherents and followers.56 This was the reason why, Kraemer argued, 
Vestdijk could not be counted among the great artists in history. A similar critique 
was levelled against Gerhard Sczcesny. The arguments of the latter even died, Cor-
nelis Verhoeven maintained, in mere phraseology.57 Kamphuis took issue with Vest-
dijk’s hermetic language. If this was meant to suggest profundity, we should be disap-
pointed. Kamphuis, in the end, felt that Vestdijk did not look at theologians with a 
warm and respectful eye.58
Whereas Berkouwer found Vestdijk too careful in his reasoning and too scientific 
to be regarded as a prophet,59 others saw him as not scientific enough to even be 
taken seriously. According to the latter, Vestdijk had chosen his sources and theoreti-
cal instruments in a quite arbitrary fashion.60 Moreover, he could not be regarded as a 
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phenomenologically oriented scholar61 or theologian.62 Only the latter were com-
monly regarded as specialists in matters of religion. Vestdijk did not belong to any of 
these circles. Thus, his pretension to offer a scientific discussion of the future of relig-
ion was simply ridiculous, especially since he ignored acknowledged authorities in 
the field,63 choosing instead to study unknown, irrelevant authors.64 What was worse, 
Van Heugten argued, was that even during the German occupation Vestdijk did not 
mind employing the results of German Forschung and Wissenschaft.65 G.H. Barneveld 
held that though he was not professionally involved in the scientific study of religion, 
Vestdijk took the stance of a “professor”, teaching students the prolegomena of his 
discipline; actually, however, he failed to move beyond the prolegomena and offer a 
synthetic argument.66 The professorial stance, Miskotte remarked, might then be 
taken as an attempt to provide the argument merely with the air of scientificity, to 
render his beliefs reasonable and beyond doubt. “Of course,” he concluded, “it was 
not to be expected that Vestdijk, whatever his brilliance, would be able to carry the 
burden of supporting his gross simplifications scientifically.”67
Instead of a scientific treatise, Miskotte and Kraemer concluded, Vestdijk’s essay 
had more of “a sermon” and “atheist confession,” “full of vindictiveness,”68 “shouting 
out his frustrations,”69 much like the way Russian communists did.70
Apart from those critics who maintained that Vestdijk failed to meet any scientific 
standard, only a few admitted or agreed with Vestdijk that, in general, his arguments 
were appropriate and to the point.71 O. Noordenbos even noted that his competence 
in matters of science was remarkable if one would take Vestdijk’s own warning more 
seriously than did critics like De Vos and Van Heugten.72 As we have seen, Vestdijk 
never presented himself as a specialist; instead, as he wished to make clear right from 
the start, he was merely a layperson, though, according to P. Smits, a highly intelli-
gent one.73
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Intellectual – Though perhaps failing to meet scientific standards, Vestdijk at least 
attempted to apply his theories to create an ideal for future society. Dealing as such 
with issues of public importance, his was an argument worthy of any “intellectual.” 
Yet, in general, this was not regarded as something positive. According to many 
critics, intellectuals were outsiders playing with a topic that they happened to find 
interesting enough to spend some time pondering. 
Some argued that intellectuals were used to being merely interested in—rather 
than committed to—religion.74 And whereas Bleeker held that religion always had to 
be taken the way its believers took it,75 Sterkman, Van der Leeuw and Kraemer all 
went further, suggesting that Vestdijk simply lacked religious sensibility. According to 
the them, any attempt to understand religion along the same lines which their oppo-
nent had pursued was undoubtedly doomed to failure.76
While Vestdijk generally agreed that religious phenomena had to be understood 
the way their adherents did, he maintained that, with respect to the future, a critical 
distance towards religion could not be avoided.77 According to De Vos however, 
Vestdijk himself had argued that outsiders as such were better equipped to study 
religion—as if only distance guaranteed a certain objectivity. On this issue, De Vos 
definitely did not agree with Vestdijk; editors of a newspaper, he remarked, would 
never let music be reviewed by somebody who did not have any musical sense.78
Sierksma countered. According to him, it was far from self-evident that music re-
views were never written by people without any musical sense; some newspapers 
even allows for professors who don’t know what a decent review looks like, he con-
cluded.79
Other critics held that Vestdijk did not show enough respect for religion. This 
was especially clear from his writing style. He proved himself to be just an “eclectic” 
and “dilettante” (Miskotte, Van der Leeuw and Kraemer),80 and even a “clown” 
(Verhoeven).81 On this serious topic, they argued, he was “too frivolous” (Mankes-
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Zernike),82 took the attitude of an “easy talker,” (Bomhoff and Kraemer),83 used to 
conversations at “the coffee table” (Verhoeven),84 “participated in one of those cozy 
literary circles talking about Freud as if he was a friend” (Van der Leeuw).85
Vestdijk admitted that psychology might seem a little frivolous. And, he confes-
sed, he sometimes preferred a chat with one of those self-confident Calvinists.86 Yet, 
Vestdijk did not believe that interpretive psychology was such nonsense that it should 
not be taken seriously. In fact, his critics were not even able to falsify the conclusions 
which he had derived from this method of thinking.87 And, Vestdijk argued, to sug-
gest that he belonged to some cozy literary circle in which intellectuals enjoyed dis-
cussing Freud, was purely speculative. He wondered what Van der Leeuw knew 
about the intellectual circles he used to visit. How, Vestdijk asked, did Van der 
Leeuw know that he liked cozy circles?88 “Of course, he just tries to suggest that 
what I have been writing is superficial, employing some of Freud’s formulas, without 
thinking them over, pretending too much familiarity with his theories, while using 
them only arbitrarily, without understanding their implications. Something of this,” 
Vestdijk held, “must have been intended by the association of my essay with the 
things people are used to writing in literary journals.”89 All those commentators, 
however, that had criticized him for being a Freudian, ignored the fact that he had 
been far more critical to Freud than their comments suggested, as even a superficial 
reading of his essay would make clear to anyone less biased than his critics, Vestdijk 
concluded.90 Moreover, according to Sierksma, Vestdijk had offered much more 
about Freud than one would ever find in the work of his critics. He added, not wit-
hout irony, that one would have expected the comments of these critics from literati, 
exactly the people whom they seemed to despise. For years already, Vestdijk had 
been living in Doorn (a small village near Utrecht), and he had been the only man of 
letters in that area. Thus, Sierksma concluded, the insinuations simply turned out to 
be lies.91
Many others, however, appreciated Vestdijk’s style of writing as worthy of an in-
tellectual. According to Barneveld, he sometimes sounded like a prophet, a professor, 
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though at other times he sounded more like a talker.92 The essay, others argued, was 
neither a novel, nor a scientific treatise, neither a phenomenology, nor a history, nor 
a psychology of religion; it was a combination of all of these genres.93 His friend 
Veenstra called Vestdijk a philosopher of culture.94 According to Berkelbach van der 
Sprenkel, however, he could not be labelled as such because he did not try to build a 
system.95 Certainly, Veenstra admitted, Vestdijk was not a philosopher in the usual, 
academic sense of the word—not because he was less familiar with the work of Des-
cartes, Kant or Hegel than university professors (he definitely was not, Veenstra con-
cluded), but rather because his style of presenting problems did not fit that of profes-
sors who held a chair. He simply was not an architect.96
Yet, whatever the way critics tried to suggest that Vestdijk had merely experi-
mented with his topic, all agreed that he was often highly ironical. One never knew 
whether or not he was being serious, Barneveld and Bleeker complained.97 Vestdijk 
merely observed religion from a distance. Wapenaar and J. Noordegraaf referred to a 
poem by Gerrit Achterberg in order to show that Vestdijk was simply playing a 
game:98
On matters of salvation he is fighting with theologians, 
yet the child inside watches … and smiles. 
Bourgeois – The playfulness of Vestdijk’s way of arguing did not have only to do with 
ironical distance between himself and his subject. According to his friend Sierksma, it 
was also due to his habit of not betting on one horse.99 Josine Meyer argued that 
Vestdijk’s critics forgot that he had repeatedly defended the right of the artist to keep 
himself from taking sides in political struggles.100 Instead of joining these struggles, 
intellectuals had to continue writing on topics of public importance from the per-
spective of individual freedom, she held.101 And even though she disagreed with him 
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on several issues, Meyer praised him for his brave attempt to reflect upon so difficult 
a problem as the future of civilization. 
Critics found this attitude wanting, especially when dealing with ultimate pro-
blems. In fact, they blamed it on a lack of nerve. According to Van der Leeuw and 
Kraemer, Vestdijk was simply unable to make a choice between God and the devil.102
Whatever their intelligence, brilliance and commitment, these critics (together with 
Miskotte and Teeuwen) concluded that Vestdijk and Sierksma simply remained 
“bourgeois” intellectuals.103 In this context, Noordegraaf referred to a comment by 
one of Vestdijk’s contemporaries and fellow hostages in Beekvliet during the war. 
Always and everywhere, the latter argued, Vestdijk was seen writing, but never ta-
king part in discussions. He was an outsider. Noordegraaf linked this observation 
explicitly to Van der Leeuw’s judgment on the bourgeois. This way he seemed to 
suggest that Vestdijk was somebody living far away from the world of everyday life. 
He preferred not to risk his life in the search for truth. That was one of the reasons 
why Vestdijk became a member of the Kultuurkamer, rather than staying with his 
fellow hostages.104
A similar, yet far more severe critique than that of Sierksma, came from Barne-
veld and H.A. Gomperts. According to the former, Vestdijk could not help whisper-
ing “human dignity,” as if, in the end, he suffered from a lack of nerve to bid religion 
a farewell.105 “Always,” Gomperts scorned, “when I hear people talking about ‘hu-
man dignity,’ I think of somebody wearing tails and plastron tie, at least some dress 
that has to be put off when nothing remains but our vulnerable and mortal body.”106
According to him, it was merely a scholastic justification of an established, religiously 
determined morality.107 True intellectuals needed only a set of personal values for 
which they stood and for which they would fight till death (Gomperts was almost 
certainly hinting at his hero Menno ter Braak, who had fought the Germans with the 
word and committed suicide as soon as they invaded the Netherlands). And this was 
not because any higher cause was needed to justify their activities; rather they be-
lieved their ideas to be pragmatic solutions to actual problems.108 Vestdijk, however, 
with his scientific pretentions and religiously inspired morality, was not personal 
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enough and failed to be the man behind his argument and stand up for his case, 
Gomperts concluded.109
Vestdijk countered his critics by first of all asserting that he would not respond to 
their comments because he felt personally attacked. According to him, their com-
ments were proof that those who’d felt the need to criticize him had not read his 
arguments properly. Such a defense from a former editor of Forum might have been 
disappointing.110 This literary critical magazine had always looked for the man behind 
the argument. Not the artistic form, but rather the person was to be held account-
able—and responsible for the ultimate explanation—for its creativity. As the editors 
emphasized in their founding statement: “We intend to be polemical, if necessary. 
For us, it is a way of defining the person. People who try to hide behind a careful 
and decent objectivity, show they do not understand polemics to be a way of life.”111
Vestdijk, however, denied to have any polemical intentions. 
According to Vestdijk himself, he had been able to keep distance enough to allow 
his essay to be attacked by others, even if by theologians.112 Yet, he concluded, no-
body had been able to refute any of his statements. The only thing he asked for was a 
bit more respect for the arguments which he had put forward. He did not want his 
arguments to be dismissed that easily. In the future, of course, others might find bet-
ter arguments. He did not regard his essay as a finished product, once and for all. 
“Beyond a certain critical limit,” he argued, “my work must be burned. That is, I 
think, a quite normal idea, even though it is seldom formulated explicitly.”113
Gomperts replied that he did not understand why, if he had really taken so much 
distance from his work, he was still trying to defend it against all kinds of attacks. 
According to him this was the strangest reaction he could imagine. In this way, Vest-
dijk only cheated himself.114
Sierksma argued that already the fierceness with which Vestdijk had defended his 
essay indicated a strong personal commitment.115 As stubborn as a terrier, he had 
fought critics from both left and right.116 According to Sierksma, however, this should 
come as no surprise. Artists always reveal something of their inner selves to the pub-
lic. Vestdijk was writing about religion in a time of war. This he did not deny. As he 
admitted: nobody, fighting something charged with emotions like religion (Dutch: 
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godsdienst), could deny being convinced of the relevance of a religion without God 
(Dutch: religie).117 Yet, Sierksma maintained, even though artists might give the im-
pression of saying the ‘last word,’ they at least must also have the right of not saying 
the ‘very last word.’118 Vestdijk himself had argued something similar. He admitted 
that critics might have been disappointed that not every statement in his essay was 
derived from his private life. Yet, he continued, if they think that this is what Forum
intended, then they are wrong. It is also part of the Forum tradition to refuse to deal 
with questions which the work under review does not give rise to, Vestdijk con-
cluded.119
Why, if the topic was not treated seriously enough, did critics pay any attention 
to Vestdijk’s arguments rather than merely ignoring the issues brought up for discus-
sion? According to Zijlstra and Van der Leeuw, it might be dangerous to let the 
wider public read Vestdijk without any serious criticism from intellectual opinion 
leaders.120 And, as Van der Leeuw and De Vos argued, his attempts were consciously 
directed at keeping people from choosing the correct faith.121 Kraemer asserted that 
the psychological approach to sacred phenomena is chilling, killing all religious sensi-
bility and spontaneity.122 On the other hand, Sierksma held that, instead of being too 
cold, some had been grateful for the psychological perspective on religion which he 
had developed. Many had written him letters of thanks for showing them new ways 
of appreciating religious experiences. Thus, Kraemer’s insinuations were easily coun-
tered by the facts, he concluded.123 In general, though not quite serious, the argument 
might be highly influential among the public and attractive to those less easily con-
vinced of the truth which theologians were used to telling them. 
According to Sierksma, however, critics who maintained that Vestdijk had merely 
been joking and was not serious about religion, were mistaken. They had forgotten 
that irony was merely the manifestation of another type of seriousness.124 His attitude 
of superior objectivity, in fact, dissimulated a subjective hyper-sensitivity, Sierksma 
argued. On this point, Vestdijk’s irony differed completely from that of Gomperts, 
for whom irony merely provided an air of superiority. It is striking that Gomperts’ 
irony ceased immediately when he got serious, something which Sierksma had ob-
served in Miskotte’s attack on Vestdijk as well. However, that his irony was artificial 
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was not the worst thing—that his seriousness failed to be to the point was dangerous, 
something which Barneveld also accused theologians like De Vos and Van Heugten 
of. It was better, Sierksma continued, to see people being passionately serious when 
there was no room left for irony.125 Ultimately, irony was a gift of the happy few. 
And both theologians and a certain type of literary critics failed to appreciate the 
seriousness of it. Whereas for Barneveld only professors were serious,126 Gomperts 
resembled more a minister.127 Though this might sound strange, whereas both were 
used to criticizing the Dutch tradition of minister-poets, Sierksma preferred the seri-
ousness of theologians, for he though the latter to be naïve and choleric in their at-
tempts to save their religion. Instead, both Barneveld and Gomperts, though part of 
the literary bourgeois, were only afraid of religion.128 They should not feel too 
ashamed to be ministers, Sierksma contended. According to him, the latter had his 
own dignity, besides that of the French bourgeois (and his double, the libertarian) 
and the German Feldwebel (and his counterpart, the professor).129
Theologian – If Vestdijk was indeed neither religious nor scientific, neither serious nor 
personal enough to earn any respect—as his critics contended—then who was quali-
fied to make any legitimate claims on religion? Unfortunately, there didn’t seem to 
be any specific answer to that question. No critique even attempted to make explicit 
what a serious critic was supposed to look like. Surely, as we have seen, the different 
styles of writing were necessary in order to deal with such a complex problem as the 
future of religion. Yet, concluding that polemical attacks were mainly launched by 
so-called theologians, Noordenbos argued that he did not wish to simply leave it to 
the kinds of specialists that these people thought they were. “Why should only theo-
logians be allowed to discuss subjects of public importance like religion?”130 Theolo-
gians could not accept the notion that a non-theologian and unbeliever even claimed 
the right to speak out on matters concerning religion.131 Moreover, as other critics 
argued, theologians are always biased by their ‘belief’, whatever their relation to a 
specific religion.132
In his own responses to theologians, Vestdijk tried to make clear that he was far 
more competent dealing with religion than his opponents suggested. After all, they 
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had not been able to refute his arguments.133 Sierksma agreed.134 Though he found 
some mistakes in Vestdijk’s account of the facts, in general, his statements were sound 
and convincing, and certainly serious enough to invite thorough discussion. His 
critics, however, failed to even offer him the opportunity.  
Though some critics took Vestdijk’s intention to interpret religion psychologi-
cally seriously,135 others regarded his approach as merely an attempt to reduce religion 
to a psychological phenomenon, or even to explain the reality of religion away.136
Vestdijk’s and Sierksma’s was an essentially atheist philosophy in which there was no 
room left for biblical anthropology as a possible alternative, as J.A. Oosterbaan com-
plained.137 They, however, were unable to indicate why their anthropology was supe-
rior to that of the Bible,138 or indeed any kind of belief in the supernatural, as Kwee 
Swan Liat argued. Without any support for their own ideas, these were no more than 
mere beliefs as well. Consequently, Sierksma’s way of arguing did not differ consid-
erably from that of theologians. 
Kraemer found it significant that Sierksma had excluded theologians from his in-
terdisciplinary team of scholars to study religious projection. By ignoring their judg-
ments, Kraemer warned, intellectuals and scholars would always fail to understand 
anything of religion. Whatever the expertise needed to understand religion properly, 
to know what religion is really all about, he argued, we must believe in God and be 
able to think systematically about this reality. According to Sierksma, however, it was 
not clear what Kraemer meant by theology. If he had been referring to Old and New 
Testament studies, church history, the history of dogma, then Sierksma agreed. If 
Kraemer meant dogma, then he would have to object. Theology in this sense did not 
meet the standards of scientific methodology. Instead, it entered the domain of meta-
physics.139 According to Kraemer, however, this suggested a highly naïve conception 
of science, beginning with the belief that objectivity is possible. Instead, we needed 
to admit that science is at least partly a subjective enterprise, in which we, as men, are 
personally involved.140 If taken this way, Sierksma argued, and dogma continued to 
play a role in theology, then we had to determine whether it was justified to teach 
theology at the university. Maybe, Sierksma challenged his opponent, Kraemer 
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would be able to explain to him where theology—defined as something between 
dogma and the scientific study of religion—belonged. Especially if he, like Ooster-
baan before him,141 thought that he could give up the natural scientific method that 
easily, perhaps it was justified to ask whether theology should still be taught at the 
university, or limited to the seminary?142 Kraemer admitted that there might be some 
confusion about the position of theology at the university, but for the moment he 
was not able to clarify it.143 However, he maintained, both Sierksma’s and Vestdijk’s 
approach to religion was far too limited in order to account for the reality it referred 
to. In an attempt to be interpretive psychologists, especially their theory of projection 
not only failed to offer a proper understanding of religion, but it was also taken as a 
polemical attack on the reality behind religion.144
Kraemer went so far as to assume that when a psychologist teaches phenomenol-
ogy of religion (according to the rules of this difficult art, of course), in general, the 
effect will not be the feeling of awe required for an appreciation of religion. On the 
contrary, Sierksma’s approach was chilling and killed religious spontaneity, and at the 
same time claimed to understand everything. By that, Kraemer did not wish to sug-
gest that it was Sierksma’s intention to distort religious experiences, but everywhere, 
he argued, we feel this tendency in his theoretical expositions.145 Sierksma dismissed 
this as pure speculation.146 Yet, Kraemer answered, whatever his intentions, he 
needed to be aware that he was getting a bad reputation.147 This didn’t seem to 
bother Sierksma. He countered that if one intended to start a dialogue, like Kraemer 
said he did, the reputation as well as the person of the other needed to be abstracted 
from the content of the argument.148 That his courses at the university were chilling 
and killed religious sensitivity, Sierksma took as a personal insult, and he asked 
Kraemer to apologize if he wanted to continue a dialogue. Kraemer, of course, had 
himself felt offended when Sierksma discarded biblical anthropology as a serious al-
ternative to the results of empirical research. Worse, according to Sierksma, since the 
first could only be argued as a sermon, and not as part of a scientific discussion.149
Kraemer took this critique to be proof of a value-judgment that could not be justified 
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in an open and fair dialogue.150 At that, Sierksma answered that he left it to the intel-
ligent reader to judge whether he was right to call the argument for biblical anthro-
pology as it was made by Oosterbaan a sermon or not.151 According to Smits, 
Sierksma was perfectly correct on this point.152
The controversy was not just one between theologians on the one hand, and 
atheists on the other. The fact that Smits agreed with Sierksma already testifies to this. 
Kraemer, for his part, had attacked L.J. van Holk. Even if theologians agreed on 
some issues with Sierksma, this did not mean that they counted him among their 
friends. Here, Sierksma took the opportunity to criticize Van Holk (as much as he 
could have other liberal-protestant theologians153) for his ignorance towards scientific 
theories that implied a serious threat to the truth in general, and theology in particu-
lar. Van Holk already warned the “traditional theologian” that Sierksma’s argument 
would be a shock, because, according to him, it did not leave any room for apologet-
ics.154 By this, Kraemer argued, Van Holk seemed to regard the truth-claims of Chris-
tianity ridiculous, as it was for all modern avant-garde leaders and the intellectual 
plebeians who followed them.155 With apparent pleasure, he sent the orthodox be-
lievers to the stake, as if Sierksma’s theory did not apply to himself as well. Here, 
clearly, Kraemer meant to disqualify Van Holk as a faithful believer. According to 
Kraemer, it was the advantage of any radical psychological approach: it applied to 
“liberal theologians” as much as to any other religious thinker.156 In defense of Van 
Holk, Smits stated his opposition to Kraemer. By taking both Vestdijk’s and 
Sierksma’s arguments as clear confessions of the modern unbeliever, Smits argued, 
Kraemer ignored the fact that others—even members of the church—agreed with 
him on some points.157 According to him, Kraemer was taking the projective nature 
of Christian dogmas too easily.158 In fact, the image of Christ dying on the cross, as 
well as his resurrection some days later, were myths.159 In this sense, there was no 
difference between liberal Christians and non-Christian believers.160 “I was really 
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angry [with Kraemer],” Smits admitted many years later.161 According to Smits, 
Kraemer failed to pursue the dialogue he pretended to offer. In fact, he limited him-
self mostly to polemical remarks. Instead of polemics, he continued, what they 
needed was real dialogue in order to clarify the modern predicament.162 Later on, in a 
truly moderate fashion, he would even argue that dialogue with the unbeliever had 
to start by looking in the mirror, looking oneself in the eye.163
Yet, Kraemer simply declared that behind their mask of scientificity, they could 
not hide their own struggle with the angel or, perhaps more accurate, the devil.164
The personal background of Sierksma’s critiques also justified his personal style of 
arguing, Kraemer maintained. According to him, in matters of such importance as 
the study of religion, one must be clean and honest. People like Sierksma could not 
pretend to be scientific and modest, while at the same time treating Christianity with 
aversion and arrogance, being unwilling (and therefore unable) to reach the level of a 
truly phenomenological approach, as he prescribed when dealing with other relig-
ions. Sierksma failed to understand the Christians, Kraemer argued, not because he 
lacked the knowledge, but rather because he did not want to understand them. And 
he needed the theory of religious projection in order to try to get rid of God. He 
hated Him, he was afraid of Him, he was like a hedgehog, following His trail, hunt-
ing after him. Clearly, God did not leave him in peace! And if there was no other 
proof of His existence, then the examples of both Vestdijk and Sierksma would suf-
fice, Kraemer concluded.165 Strikingly, this argument recurred many years later in the 
contributions of J. Kamphuis.166
Getting closer to the subject: irony turning into outright scorn 
As we have seen, Vestdijk did not wish to be regarded a prophet. However, accord-
ing to many critics, in fact, his pretentions were obvious. Already by writing an essay 
on the future of religion, he had assigned himself the role of a prophet. And, even 
though the contemporary world was looking for a prophet, Vestdijk failed to meet 
the standards. According to them this was partly due to his scientific stance, which 
implied a certain critical distance from the object with which he was dealing. 
 While Sierksma and Smits countered critiques of people accusing Vestdijk of 
indecent behavior, Vestdijk himself had already asserted that the religion could only 
be properly studied by somebody with the right character or personality.167 In order 
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properly studied by somebody with the right character or personality.167 In order to 
avoid the danger of presenting a distorted picture of religion, Vestdijk argued, crea-
tive fantasy did not suffice. On the contrary, without having the right personality, 
this fantasy would be pursued in the wrong direction. Apart from theoretical reflec-
tion, he asserted, sympathy is an absolute prerequisite. However, in short, Vestdijk 
employed too much theoretical reflection according to his critics. Moreover, they 
seriously questioned whether his sympathy with Christianity was sufficient. If his 
understanding of its basic tenets were to be measured in this case, it would even be 
justified to doubt whether or not he had any sympathy for Christianity. It seemed far 
more reasonable to argue that he hated Christianity, and felt haunted by its God. His 
essay was interpreted as a polemic with God, and, as such, an attack on Christianity—
and in particular with its theologians. Even his critical distance and so-called objectiv-
ity could not dissimulate that, in actuality, he was driven by negative effect. The 
theories and typologies he had used were merely employed in order to derogate 
religion. Curiously, his critics often forgot that Vestdijk had advocated religion 
(Dutch: religie), which critics took to be religion without God, while remaining 
highly critical of the definition of religion as belief in God (Dutch: godsdienst). His 
fiercest critics concluded that the essay, though denying God, had actually been born 
of a struggle with God. God clearly did not leave him be. Vestdijk felt bothered, was 
obsessed, felt outraged, and tried to get rid of him. While trying (or better: pretend-
ing), to be objective, the argument was driven by subjective sentiments. His theoreti-
cal framework was merely a projection of his own frustrations, and, though sounding 
methodologically appropriate, all this was sheer nonsense. In the end, critics held, a 
proper judgment of the argument could be made only when the intentions and sen-
timents of the author were included. 
And here, as will also become clear in the next chapter, we find a difference with 
those critics who provided for arguments against Vestdijk’s position without trying to 
derogate the person behind them. They simply did not agree with him. They, how-
ever, refrained from any attempt to insult, tease or personally critique; rather they 
questioned the validity of his arguments, sometimes even interpreting them as projec-
tions. Though his statements could not always be justified according to those critics, 
they did not question the sincerity of his intentions and the intelligence of the au-
thor. On the contrary, though they were critical—and though they didn’t always 
offer a summary of his arguments or fail to understand them the way they were 
meant to be—at least they did not question his authority. 
Every exchange of arguments might be taken as a matter of discussion or criticism 
as long as the position of the author is appreciated as plausible, whether an attempt to 
find common ground is made or not. Polemic starts when, in addition, persons are 
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presented as unfit to offer a proper understanding and judgment of the problem at 
hand. And that was precisely what some critics tried suggest. They explicitly argued 
this point of view and did their best to convince the public to believe them. If Vest-
dijk pretended to be a prophet, he was either a false prophet, or no prophet at all. 
How he could be regarded a prophet? And, as we will see in the next chapter, critics 
believed that they were justified in questioning Vestdijk’s authority, because, accord-
ing to them, he did not even take religion seriously. 
According to many critics, only one conclusion could be drawn from all of this. 
To wit, do you know the story of Vestdijk the prophet? No? You are right, he 
merely pretended to be one. Surely, he was not the right person to be a prophet. For 
that, he were “too naïve,” his pretensions “ridiculous,” Van der Leeuw argued.168
Teeuwen argued that Vestdijk was just a “cynic,” discussing the future and treating 
his fellow human beings with disdain without offering them anything positive.169 His 
essay was a “complete disaster,” De Vos concluded.170 According to Miskotte it was 
merely a matter of “jolly woolgathering,” a kind of “juggling” with words,171 or, as 
Kraemer argued, “vulgar libertarian language,” “irresponsible talk,” accusing Vestdijk 
of “talking his way out too easily.”172 Kraemer continued, “even the most trivial anti-
Christian mountebank in Hyde Park would not advocate such ideas.”173 Nowhere do 
we find anything profound, De Vos and Kraemer agreed.174 Yet, Teeuwen and Van 
der Leeuw argued, he seemed to be “highly self-satisfied,” “horribly self-indulgent,” 
and a “self-gratifying bourgeois.”175 Behind all of that, there was a seriousness that 
turned all the self-confident arguments into an “angry sermon” full of “atheist pa-
thos,” Miskotte continued.176 He did not seem to realize that these qualifications, 
when applied to the same essay, contradicted the earlier accusation of jolly woolgath-
ering. According to him, whatever Vestdijk turned out to be, the effect was no more 
than a “miserable confession.”177 It was merely a matter of “shouting,” Kraemer re-
marked.178 According to him, Vestdijk’s arguments were full of “affective judg-
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ments.”179 Nevertheless, whatever the affects involved, De Vos assured his “worthy 
readers, the essay would “not arouse their affect.”180 For that, Van der Leeuw found it 
“too boring;” and, he warned his readers, it “will not make you jump up from your 
chair.”181 “Pity for all the costly paper that could have been used for better purposes,” 
De Vos concluded.182
According to Noordenbos, those critiques exemplified the “professorial arro-
gance” and “self-confidence” typical of theologians, and it was completely unjusti-
fied.183 What, he asked himself, is a theologian more than just a specialist in formulat-
ing the prejudices of a specific religious tradition and who prefers the elegant, clear 
and lucid volumes of the great Karl Barth above the well-written arguments of Vest-
dijk? Even some theologians admitted that “angry ministers” and “journalistic profes-
sors” did not treat Vestdijk the way he deserved.184 Nevertheless, Kraemer could not 
help adding, Vestdijk himself sometimes gave way to the style of his critics.185 Vest-
dijk, together with Sierksma, accused some theologians and other critics of “igno-
rance,” “sins against logic,” “specialist’s arrogance,” “dictator’s aspirations,” “careless 
reading,” “insinuations,” “infantile reactions,” “scientific sale,” “existential sermons” 
and “romanticism,” “stupidities,” “emotional predilections,” “aggression,” and 
“word-salads exemplifying a kind of schizophrenia.”186 Moreover, the fierceness with 
which those critiques were formulated suggested, according to Vestdijk, “bad faith” if 
not sheer “intolerance.”187 At the very least, theologians had shown themselves to be 
highly “indecent” towards people who did not agree with their absolute viewpoints. 
The effect was “sling-and-fling pieces,”188 “some barking,” and something that 
sounded more like “vomiting” than any sensible dialogue.189 According to Barneveld, 
De Vos was as dry as dust.190 Noordenbos took him to be ludicrously insolent, arro-
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gant, non-informative, a careless reader, and incorrect because he failed to understand 
anything of Vestdijk’s argument.191 Vestdijk’s was a serious argument—nowhere did it 
give the impression of trying to derogate Christianity right from the start.192 As Van 
Praag also noted, his was a sympathetic, positive style, without falling into the trap of 
hair-splitting critique that often characterizes attacks on Christianity.193 One would 
expect serious attention and interest from theologians, yet, in fact, they had only 
snarled at him.194 Among theologians, only one reasonable and sane remark was 
made; the rest needed to be refuted by experts on religion who could not be re-
garded theologians.195 Critiques by whole or half theologians—even professors like 
Van der Leeuw and Miskotte—might account for the fact that Vestdijk’s name had 
become so well known among a-cultural circles of ultra-orthodox moralists. In Par-
liament, Reverend Zandt, or one of his fellows, fulminated against godless modern 
writers under whose guidance the world was—according to him—going awry.196
Those theologians and professors raged against Vestdijk. Sentences were distorted, 
taken out of their context—so much so that, consequently, something ridiculous, 
blasphemous or immoral appeared in its place. The polemic shows how otherwise 
reasonable and sound people are lured by this method of attack when they feel that 
their positions are threatened. Typical of this tendency is Bomhoff, who, after offer-
ing many interesting details on Vestdijk’s oeuvre, shifted to religion and complained 
loudly, much like the theologians and professors before Sierksma’s intervention.197
“Sure,” Marja held, “in this country, religion, the Christian in particular, is a weak 
point. And if we are talking about vindictiveness, then it is in the arguments which 
some believers are using. Although, these are otherwise brave people when they 
cannot see somebody else employing reasonable means to refute what is of crucial 
importance to them, like a taboo is for the primitive, a neurosis for the neurotic,” 
Marja concluded.198 Sierksma had already suggested that all this careless reading and 
quoting must have something to do with bad faith, or at best, common anxiety for 
the prospect of losing one’s security. This does not mean that Vestdijk was justified in 
claiming that Christianity would (have to) die. “Yet, if Christianity was what it 
claimed to be, it did not need this type of apologetics employing those dubious 
means,” Marja remarked quite ironically. “Our dear Lord would take care of his own 
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business.”199 And “even if his work contained something scandalous,” he continued, 
“modern culture needs a sewer’s network in order to solve its inner tensions and 
contradictions and to avoid mass destruction and terror. Against moralists,200 it was 
fun to mention that Vestdijk already characterized his own oeuvre this way before 
critics would do it.201 Where did we see the artistic hybris being abandoned out of 
human solidarity? According to Vestdijk, man is a scandal. And as such, whatever his 
philosophy concerning the future of Christianity, he is far closer to the infallible 
authorities his critics referred to. Their critique would have been far more relevant if 
they took his interest more seriously. Then they would also have recognized the 
vanity of the arguments of McCarthy and bubble blowers.”202
At least, as Sierksma concluded, countering Kraemer’s argument in particular, all 
this “makes us lose costly paper that could have been used for better purposes.”203
Worse, because Kraemer had argued for a serious dialogue. He stated that he felt 
responsible for finding the truth on matters of utmost importance.204 For that, we 
needed to be open-minded and discard the monologues that theologians were used 
to. Instead, we had to listen to each other.205 And he had honestly tried to, as Smits 
argued.206 According to Sierksma, however, Kraemer did not succeed because he 
simply held onto his own dogmatic starting-points without any intention of taking 
scientific approaches very seriously. Moreover, he argued, Kraemer’s personal attacks 
on Sierksma did not fit within a dialogue. In this way, Sierksma concluded, 
Kraemer’s attempts were bound to fail.207
True, Kraemer had been quite personal in his criticism of both Vestdijk’s and 
Sierksma’s arguments. As we have seen, according to him, they were chilling and 
killing the religious sensitivity of people.208 And though he later admitted that this 
might not have been their intention,209 other qualifications indicated that he regarded 
them as driven by emotions that could only damage people’s access to God’s revela-
tion. In fact, they were “tormented by an irritating and ineradicable Christianity” 
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and, while clearly being “anti-Christian,” continuously “scorning Christianity.”210
According to Kraemer “they hated metaphysical projection” and were among its 
fiercest persecutors.211 Kamphuis would later be even more explicit. According to 
him, Vestdijk’s arguments were merely a “confession of hate against God’s love.” 
And, whatever his pretended indifference, all of the caricatures Vestdijk had made of 
Christianity and its God could only be accounted for by some inner “vindictiveness.” 
He simply “hated the belief that God sent his Son to atone for the sins of human 
beings.”212 Behind the hypocrisy of indifference and scientificity, Kraemer believed 
that both Vestdijk and Sierksma were “struggling with the Angel,”213 much the same 
way Miskotte believed Vestdijk to be “tragically at war with God.”214
Though less explicit, other critics formulated similar points against Vestdijk (and 
Sierksma). According to Walgrave, Vestdijk was driven by vindictiveness.215 Schaik-
Willing agreed. Accordint to her, his vindictiveness was the result of his loss of tradi-
tional faith. His was a disintegrated personality, a skeptic mind, without any respect 
for others.216 He had teased the people, triggering a great deal of polemic. Given his 
way of arguing, he was understandably driven only by vindictiveness.217 Yet, Th. 
Govaart asked, “is he fighting with the remnants of a past religion and its God? If we 
look at some of his poems, we might get that impression, or is this malicious exege-
sis?”218 According to Berkouwer, Vestdijk’s style of arguing did not differ much from 
that of the theologians. His tone was highly personal, Berkouwer concluded. He 
asked himself, rhetorically, whether this might have been the effect of feeling power-
less and impotent, as Sierksma maintained, with respect to other polemists.219 Van 
Baaren remarked that though Sierksma was correct in his critique, he regretted that 
his attacks were often so fierce. This would not be so bad if it supported his case, but 
it did not. On the contrary, his style fueled alienation and misunderstanding. Apart 
from that, however, he had offered an extensive critique of his opponents’ argu-
ments, Van Baaren concluded. Thus, Berkouwer argued, with respect to Vestdijk’s 
essay, people could make up their own minds.220
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On the one hand, Vestdijk had cleared the ground with his arguments.221 Van der 
Leeuw’s complaints about hypocrisy, failure and lack of nerve were understandable. 
On the other hand, Vestdijk’s opinion of Van de Leeuw as a swindler ignored the 
truth in the latter’s confession. In any case, the controversy showed that, essentially, 
we were neither dealing with clever discussions, nor merely with psychological theo-
ries, but with the truth of the Cross.  
What also became clear from Vestdijk’s arguments was that we did not need to 
become upset with the Church, but rather realize that the Gospel of the Cross wa 
still able to move people beyond psychology, even in our times, Berkouwer con-
cluded.222 Yet, although Berkouwer did not seem to be particularly confident about 
all this, Hekstra seemed to feel far more comfortable with Vestdijk’s struggle. “That is 
also,” he claimed, “why I think that this book, despite its anti-Christian tendency, is 
comforting. Is not this attempt of one of the greatest spirits of our age to find the 
essence of faith a triumph of God?” he asked rhetorically.223
De Vos regarded Vestdijk as a novelist, widely read and heavily criticized. The 
latter’s work was accessible, but not as scientific as that of Sierksma. The controversy 
surrounding Sierksma’s arguments had not been satisfactorily concluded, De Vos 
complained. Especially theologians failed to deal properly with the challenge he’d put 
forth.224 However, according to him, Kraemer took a pastoral attitude that did not 
work in his exchange with Sierksma.225 Now, on the other hand, Fortmann’s work 
had been published. Though heavily scientific, requiring a lot of patience and perse-
verance from the reader, his argument was interesting and important.226 One critic 
made a similar remark with respect to Kamphuis’s study on Vestdijk. Even though, 
he argued, Kamphuis’s language was highly esoteric, the argument was interesting 
because it tried to shed some light on the background behind Vestdijk’s attitude 
towards Christianity and his ideas on the future of religion.227
Conclusions 
To summarize, and in order to distinguish between polemical and non-polemical 
contributions, we might say that Vestdijk had attempted to argue instead of attack 
people personally. And personal attack is something which we had identified as the 
determining feature of polemic. In this type of encounter, critics attempt to create a 
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subject behind a text. This subject provides them with the means to denounce and 
denigrate the argument. By using personal invectives, and by questioning the trust-
worthiness of its author, those critics cast doubt upon the truth of the argument. By 
pointing to the latter’s mental state, his intellectual capacities and moral characteris-
tics, they question the authority of the person responsible for the mistakes and dama-
ging arguments put forth. 
The central issue, as I have attempted to identify it, was the question whether or 
not Vestdijk was really a prophet. Apart from the question whether or not he preten-
ded to be one, many critics took this as a starting point to launch their own judg-
ments. Could Vestdijk be seen as a prophet? they asked themselves. Do not make me 
laugh! Was he a scientist then? You are kidding! For that his approach was too ab-
stract, playful, and ironic; moreover, his argument was driven by vindictiveness. 
Instead of being either a prophet or a scientist, he was simply a bourgeois intellectual. 
He did not have the nerve to be either a theologian or an autonomous individual. 
According to the theologians, only they were able to deal properly with the issue of 
religion and its future. According to other cultural critics, Vestdijk wanted only to 
eradicate religion; people had to decide on their own which future to build. In any 
case, Vestdijk’s essay was not to be taken seriously.  
Critics tried to convince their public that there was a blatant incongruity between 
pretense and result in De toekomst der religie, between reasonable expectations and the 
competence to accomplish. In this way, they suggested, Vestdijk’s entire argument 
Vestdijk was merely a joke! And the entire controversy, as far as it had been polemi-
cal, was no more than an—sometimes highly elaborate—invitation to ridicule the 
subject behind the argument and to belittle the threat which it posed to the critics 
involved.
In general, two categories of exchange are to be distinguished here. The one is 
directed at the subject behind a text and is, consequently, polemical. The other is 
more sympathetic to the subject, or author of the text, and is non-polemical. In the 
following chapter, I wish to suggest that things are a bit more complicated than that. 
For the moment, however, it is enough to classify the people contributing to our 
controversy into these two categories. Depending on whether or not they employ 
any personal verdicts, I distinguish between polemical and non-polemical critics. 
Taking each of the four periods we have defined in the previous chapter into ac-
count, we can draw the following conclusions. 
Especially during the first period of the history of the essay’s reception (from 1948 
till 1952), many critics attempted to disqualify their opponent by using a highly per-
sonal style of attack. In this period, Vestdijk was the main subject being attacked, and 
a few counter-attacks were launched. The fiercest—clearly polemical—attacks were 
launched by Zijlstra, Van Heugten, Sterkman, Mankes-Zernike, De Vos, Miskotte, 
Van der Leeuw, Teeuwen and Wapenaar. Apart from them, Gomperts, Barneveld, 
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Veenstra, Noordenbos and, most importantly, Sierksma were active on the polemical 
side of the spectrum. Others, far more moderate and to the point in their critique 
were Berkouwer, Bavinck, Popma, Walgrave, Bleeker, Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, 
Roscam Abbing, Van Praag and Rodenko. 
As becomes immediately clear, the polemical nature of an attack did not influence 
the issue of whether or not Vestdijk responded to his critics. To the assaults of 
Zijlstra, Van Heugten, Wapenaar and Teeuwen, he never responded. To the others, 
however, Vestdijk’s response was particularly harsh. And he did not fail to mention 
that he found his suspicions towards Christians confirmed in the works of several of 
his critics. Gomperts simply failed to meet the standards of a decent intellectual. Sev-
eral critics joined Vestdijk in his attack on theologians, for example Noordenbos and 
Barneveld. The latter, together with Gomperts, was attacked by Sierksma. Even 
more than Vestdijk, his friend Sierksma fiercely defended the arguments made in the 
essay—not only against literary critics, but also against theologians. 
During the second period (from 1952 till 1959), it is striking to see the polemists 
of the first period keeping silent, despite being heavily attacked by Sierksma. 
Sierksma’s contributions kept the issues brought up by Vestdijk during the first pe-
riod on the agenda. Bomhoff, De Jong, Oosterbaan, Kwee and Kraemer were re-
sponsible for the kind polemical attacks made by theologians during the former pe-
riod. Consequently, they were heavily criticized by Marja and Sierksma. The only 
one countering these critiques was Kraemer. Apart from Vestdijk and Sierksma, he 
attacked liberal theologians like Van Holk, who, according to him, were too sympa-
thetic towards the enemy. Smits took sides with Van Holk as well as with Vestdijk 
and Sierksma. Though critical of Sierksma, Berkouwer made some personal remarks 
concerning the polemists among the theologians. Wapenaar, who had not been criti-
cized by either Vestdijk or Sierksma, continued his war against the atheists. Though 
highly critical of the theologians, Hekstra would soon join him. The same held for 
Pos. Others issuing rather personal attacks were Schaik-Willing and Majorick. Their 
line of criticism, however, would soon be concluded by Verhoeven.  
The third period (from 1960 till 1972), starting with critical discussions on 
Sczcesny, showed some fierce critiques from the likes of Verhoeven and Van 
Stempvoort. The latter, after Vestdijk’s counter-critique, apologized and turned more 
moderate, avoiding qualifications which were too personal. After that, Luypen made 
some polemical remarks against Sierksma, whereas De Vos returned to Vestdijk and 
Sierksma, almost twenty years after he had launched his attacks. Though ready to 
employ the arguments of Fortmann, he still could not keep himself from making 
personal comments. Yet, only some isolated circles continued their personal invec-
tives. The same trend we see during the fourth and last period (from 1973 till 1998). 
Some polemical remarks were made by Noordegraaf, whereas only Kamphuis man-
aged to call attention to the issues raised decades before. Most commentators, how-
105 
ever, while looking back on the history of the reception of De toekomst der religie,
seemed surprised that Vestdijk’s essay had ever been able to trigger so much contro-
versy. And whereas they found Vestdijk a victim of the war his critics had waged 
against him, only Kamphuis referred to his correspondence with Theun de Vries. 
Vestdijk had argued that personal invectives were out of place, because he wanted to 
be taken seriously. Kamphuis, however, was not convinced, especially after Vestdijk 
called theologians “duffers” and “scum.”228 And, as we have seen in this chapter, he 
used many more invectives after he was attacked by the theologians. 
In this chapter we have seen how critics attempted to discuss and derogate the ar-
gument on the future of religion as well as Vestdijk as an author, while questioning 
his putative status as an authority on matters of religion. Whether deliberately or not, 
by that they displaced the text by the subject ‘hiding’ behind it.  
On the other hand, as we will see in the next chapter, critics always somehow at-
tempted to substantiate their claims on the subject which they had identified. Apart 
from displacement, we must also focus more closely on the process of condensation. 
And, in order to show that polemic really has anything to do with authority (getting 
closer to my theory as developed in the introduction), we must focus not only on the 
way in which authority was questioned, but also how it was established and de-
fended. Whereas in this chapter we have dealt with the subject created within the 
course of the controversy, in the next chapter we must deal with the rhetorical style 
by which authority insinuated itself into the encounter between Vestdijk and the 
commentators of his text. The latter objective will allow us to refine our analytical 
tools to identify polemics and distinguish it from non-polemical or merely moderate 
encounters and their different relations to the problem of authority (the principle 
Wittgenstein was talking about), as they will be studied in the last chapter. 
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III – THE POLEMIC: ITS STYLE 
Has any historical narrative ever been written that was 
not informed only by moral awareness, but specifically 
by the moral authority of the narrator? 
Hayden V. White 
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we observed how ‘Vestdijk’ was created as a subject failing 
to meet the standards of his own pretensions, as well as those of his opponents. We 
also observed Vestdijk—and later his friend Sierksma—sometimes contesting the 
picture his critics had painted of him. And, given the criteria formulated before, those 
counter-attacks were polemical as far as they attempted to show that the critics, in 
their turn, had failed to meet the standards required of people pretending to be able 
to write reviews. Instead of being directed at the argument, these attacks often aimed 
at the person behind the argument. 
In this chapter, I will attempt to show how critics tried to substantiate their 
judgments. More specifically, we shall look at the ways in which those intellectuals 
who contributed to the polemic attempted to provide their statements with positive 
authority. In this context, we must determine which style of arguing is significant for 
polemic as a way of establishing or defending authority. I shall also offer some addi-
tional characteristics of this type of intellectual encounter or exchange. 
In this chapter it will also become clear that the usual distinction between content 
and style is difficult to apply when it comes to the analysis of texts. As Nelson 
Goodman remarked, “Obviously, content is what is said, style is how.” However, he 
continues, “a little less obviously, that formula is full of faults.”1 Even content is a 
matter of how things are told. It is also possible to pass judgment upon others either 
by quoting them, or employing our own language by trying to translate their terms, 
sentences and arguments. It is possible to criticize others by attempting to explain 
what their arguments imply. By way of irony, one may also repeat them without 
making any explicit comment, if he is certain that everybody already believes that the 
other’s remarks are sheer nonsense. Even the processes of condensation and displace-
ment are important for a stylistic analysis of the texts involved in the controversy 
with which we are dealing. And though in polemics those processes are employed in 
order to create a subject as a prerequisite for a personal encounter between authors, 
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specific arguments and lines of reasoning certainly play an additional role in the con-
test. Statements condensed or displaced in ways that amount to either caricature or 
ridicule, are likely to influence the public’s attitude toward its author. Though, if 
avoiding direct personal attack, it might seem reasonable and contribute positively to 
the authority of the critic.
Whereas the processes indicated before (and described in more detail in the pre-
vious chapter) are employed in order to question the authority of the other, polemics 
require other techniques which intend to provide one’s own statements with some 
kind of positive authority. These techniques constitute styles of arguing which are 
intended to justify both criticism of the other’s position, as well as positive remarks 
which are made in order to formulate alternatives to the other’s argument. Though 
presented here as two separate techniques, in fact, they are not always so easily distin-
guished in the practice of writing.  
Some polemical contributions might be explicit in their criticism of the other, of-
fering a highly elaborate justification for their conclusions by indicating every single 
point on which their critique is based. Sometimes, they also offer an alternative to the 
other’s position. In such cases, even though the latter technique employs a rather 
positive method of debate, just by being different it implies a critique of the other. 
However, we must in such cases determine whether or not this has polemical impli-
cations.
In order to clarify the point, let us return to some of the remarks which Vestdijk 
made in his letters to Theun de Vries. According to Vestdijk, Christianity was des-
tined to die. Yet, this was likely to take hundreds of years. It would be “impossible 
either to root up Christianity” or to “exterminate the Christians.” However, “they 
could not be enlightened” either. Given these circumstances, one might wonder why 
then he had written his essay on the future of religion in the first place. If he had 
been serious when he argued that emotions and religious energies could not be coun-
tered by theoretical insights, why then did he continue lecturing against the dogmas 
of Christianity and the intolerant attitudes of the Christians? Vestdijk himself seemed 
to have anticipated this question when he argued that, indeed, dogmas were not to 
be countered homeopathically. “To me it seems,” he argued, “that it is better to use 
tricks in order to weaken dogmatic systems, rather than to counter them by means of 
alternative dogmas.”2 I would suggest that the tricks of which Vestdijk was speaking 
point to a certain style of arguing. Rather than employing a dogmatic kind of author-
ity, he wished to counter such authority while simultaneously employing another 
style of making authoritative statements. 
In order to determine which styles of arguing are more suitable for polemics, it is 
useful to begin by defining what is meant by the very concept of style. Next, the 
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different styles will be identified. Finally, we will attempt to establish the relationship 
between each of these styles on the one hand, and polemical controversy on the 
other. As might already be clear from the foregoing argument, the concept that ulti-
mately links these layers of textual encounter is ‘authority.’ As Hayden White cor-
rectly emphasized, whatever the genre we meet with in textual analysis, authority is 
always at stake. A narrative is not only a story about good and evil (moral awareness) 
but also about the status of the narrator and the legitimacy of his claims (moral au-
thority).3 The purpose of the present chapter is to indicate in which sense this applies 
for polemics. 
The relationship between style and authority 
Whereas the creation of a subject serves to denounce the argument and denigrate its 
author, styles of arguing construct relationships between critics and the public. The 
former strategy is negative, but the latter is a positive attempt to create a sense of 
authority. The ways in which relationships between critics and the public are con-
structed belong to what Robert Hariman has called ‘the artistry of power’.4 In order 
to be effective, political activity needs a specific style of conduct.  
In accordance with Hariman’s defnition, style will be defined here as a “coherent 
repertoire of rhetorical conventions depending on aesthetic reactions for political effect.”5 When 
defined more directly in accordance with my theory, style must be regarded as a set 
of rules meant to create a sense of authority in order to be regarded as effective. 
Whether or not style is employed intentionally is a question which I shall not at-
tempt to answer. First of all, in most cases where almost no comments by authors 
regarding their own texts exist, it is almost impossible to determine whether or not 
one has consciously chosen a particular writing style. And even if such comments 
were available, we could not be certain whether or not they were simply justifica-
tions made after the fact. In general, every statement made by human beings must be 
interpreted according to the circumstances in which they are made. As long as we do 
not have any criteria by which we are able to judge whether or not they are true, we 
shouldn’t simply take them for granted. 
In order to be able to consciously choose a certain style of writing, space to make 
up one’s mind is prerequisite. There must be distance between the author as the 
subject writing on the one hand, and the object which s/he is writing about on the 
other. However, in some styles of writing the link between subject and object is far 
more immediate, and therefore likely to be unconscious. In the latter case, reactions 
tend to be emotional rather than reflective. Given the intelligence and writing skills 
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of the people contributing to any textual exchange, even attacks seem extremely 
sophisticated at first; yet, the processes of condensation, and especially displacement, 
indicate that there haven’t been many reflective moments in the course of writing. As 
I will argue in the present chapter, the style chosen for polemics points to a lack of 
conscious reflection. All too often, this style of writings turns out to be counter-
productive, as it increases public interest in those who are being attacked. Yet, time 
and time again we see intellectuals attempting to outwit real or imaginary opponents 
by means of polemics. 
In short, a style of writing does not need to be chosen intentionally in order to be 
effective in extinguishing the other from the scene of positive public attention. Vest-
dijk took time to elaborate on his statements in an attempt to prevent people from 
ignoring him as a serious partner for discussion. Few of his opponents, however, 
actually dealt with the reasons which he had given for the views developed in his 
essay. Instead, they attacked him personally. People like Hendrik Kraemer recognized 
that this tactic of criticizing Vestdijk were not effective and could better be substi-
tuted by dialogue. As we shall see in the present chapter, Kraemer took time to 
elaborate on his criticism and conclusions about Vestdijk. Nevertheless, he failed to 
live up to the ideal which he had so explicitly formulated; he did not succeed in 
avoiding polemical attack, as we observed in the previous chapter. 
Thus, whether or not it has been intentionally chosen, style is a set of conven-
tions employed in order to create a sense of authority. Polemic seems to fit perfectly 
in Hariman’s conception of political style. We may even be inclined to say that po-
lemic itself is a style of activity. It stands out for its aggression. That is why it is called 
a polemic: it is a war waged with words against another. This is partly a matter of 
restating the position of the other and/or simply seeking or defending a different 
view. Yet, as we have seen, this aspect of polemic has much to do with the creation 
of its subject. Here we must focus on its style. Thus, I would argue that polemic has a 
style.
Given the diversity of ways in which a war of words can be waged (and I do not 
wish to limit myself to extreme and clear-cut examples of polemic), it is difficult to 
define polemic as a style of political conduct in and of itself (political in the sense of 
specifically addressing a public). Therefore I will attempt to distinguish between 
different styles that might be used in polemics in order to create a certain political 
effect. As we will see, these differences depend on the interplay of three aspects gov-
erning the process of constructing authority: first, that of the author with his oppo-
nent; secondly, that of the author with his public; and finally, that of the author and 
the reality he refers to in order to create a sense of authority. 
When focusing on style as a means to create a sense of authority, we are immedi-
ately reminded of the concepts Max Weber developed in the course of his analysis of 
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the problem of authority.6 According to Weber, it was possible to identify traditional, 
rational and charismatic styles of political conduct. By these, however, he referred to 
actual states of affairs within society. They were ideal-types and analytical tools used 
to describe historical processes in which one type of authority was substituted for, or 
lost its dominance to, another. Thus, Weber argued, in the West experienced a de-
velopment from traditional to rational authority, with the charismatic variant of au-
thority sometimes interfering. When a certain type of authority failed, it led to its 
replacement by another type of authority. Even in the case of charismatic authority, 
in those cases where it was able to institutionalize itself, it was easily transformed into 
either a traditional or rational kind of authority. 
With these concepts of authority, Weber referred to political realities. Important 
to him was the way in which government established itself and became an establish-
ment, whether by consent of the people or not. And though he linked his rational 
type of authority to bureaucratic institutions, he did not focus on political interac-
tions on the level of textual exchange. For this, Michel Foucault’s definition of dif-
ferent polemical styles might serve as a better starting-point. According to him,7
polemic defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a 
party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests against 
which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated and either surrenders or 
disappears.
Yet, whereas Foucault’s definition of polemics allows for the analysis of interactions 
on the level of texts, his concept is only two-dimensional. It merely establishes rela-
tionships between author and opponent, as well as a certain kind of reality. The same 
critique holds true for White’s distinction between anarchism, conservatism, radical-
ism, liberalism, fascism and reactionary discourse. These categories point to the way 
in which critics deal with certain topics or political issues. However, as in the case of 
Foucault, the relationship between the author and some possible public remains out-
side the picture. And all of these dimensions together are required in order to prop-
erly analyze the style of authority employed in the production of texts. 
The limitations of both Weber’s, Foucault’s and White’s concepts of authority 
when applied to polemics, bring us to the typology of political styles as defined by 
Hariman. The advantage of the latter’s approach is its value for the analysis of textual 
authority. At least Hariman acknowledges the fact that a political style does not imply 
any actual state of affairs. On the contrary, style is always a matter of acting ‘as if’. 
Moreover, according to him, this is not something to be criticized or countered. Our 
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encounters are inescapably rhetorical. We can better understand how things work 
between an author and his public, rather than denounce the entire process right from 
the start. 
Four styles of creating authority 
For analytical purposes, Hariman distinguishes between four styles of political con-
duct: the realist (or descriptive), the republican (deliberative), the bureaucratic 
(documentary) and the authoritarian or courtly (declarative) ones. First, I will explain 
more fully what is implied by these categories. In the following, Hariman’s typology 
will be linked to particular genres normally employed in the analysis of texts. Also, I 
will attempt to connect the different styles to the question of which of them is typical 
for polemical encounters. For that, I will return to the work of Bourdieu. 
To begin with, the realist style radically separates power and textuality, construct-
ing the political realm as a matter of fact. The voice of the author is (almost) absent, 
merging instead with a state of affairs.8 The textual nature of the arguments is dis-
simulated by giving the impression that things are being described as they are. It does 
not venture any ethical ideals and it avoids drawing attention to the rhetorical nature 
of texts. This style suggests expertise; and, in general, expertise can be an important 
element in the creation of credibility.9 The realist style is usually associated with sci-
entific and journalistic reports,10 whether presented in books, articles or lectures as 
professional/professorial opinions.11 The public is intended to recognize the authority 
of the author by the simple language used in the argument. Analysis of readers’ reac-
tions to academic texts suggests that in such cases the public appears ready to submit 
to the argument as long as it remains uncontested by another authority.12
The republican style develops a model of oratorical virtuosity for public perform-
ance. The voice of the author is prominent in a deliberative presentation of the ar-
gument. The ingenious use of syllogism is further employed to support the author’s 
original statements. And, although this gives the impression of objectivity, in general 
the subjective nature of every argument is readily admitted. It is important to suggest 
not so much expertise but rather trustworthiness and personal integrity here. More-
over, these elements refer to group norms and common values, and can be important 
to the credibility of an author. The embodiment of the author of those civic virtues is 
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the basis of his authority.13 For that, the text is elaborately orientated to its subject 
matter as well as to its audience, in such a way as to suggest both immediacy of ex-
perience and objectifying distance—the community of author and those addressed in 
the performance of the address, their joint contemplation of events in which they 
have had no part, but from which moral virtues are to be drawn.14 Those who em-
ploy the republican style always attempt to solve problems by way of dialogue and 
discussion (or polemic?), though this does not mean that they will come to an agree-
ment in the end. The republican style can be found in sermons, newspaper editorials, 
political oratory, as well as debate, discussion and day-to-day arguments.15 In many 
respects these media employ the language of the lecture. A statement is held up for 
contemplation and the community or public is implicitly asked to draw upon its own 
experience of modern life to test the validity of the proposition.16 In many respects, 
however, sermons and debates are quite unlike lectures. The performer does not 
need to be a professional or professor. S/he holds a dialogue not only with the audi-
ence but also with another (opposing) voice (even though this voice might be absent 
or imaginary). The public might be divided on particular issues, and so the orator 
must try to win them over to a particular view.17
The bureaucratic style consists of the communicative conventions that together 
constitute office culture, including jurisdictional priority of writing. Indeed, as Jack 
Goody concluded, writing is critical to the development of bureaucratic states.18 On 
the other hand, however, in the time of classical legal assemblies disputes on matters 
of law were not resolved by recourse to a specialized group, but were debated openly 
in public. They were therefore more like the political oratory following the republi-
can style. It is only with the rise of a lawyer-group that our concept of law as hieratic 
and reified emerged and with it a repudiation of free dispute.19 In the bureaucratic 
style, the voice of the author is dissimulated by using other voices and, more specifi-
cally, other texts (whether it be the text of a direct opponent or the text of other 
authorities). This style culminates in references to authors’ names, numbers or titles of 
texts, years of publication and page references, marking composite identities rather 
than a clear personal voice as in the republican style. The bureaucratic style refers the 
public to the rights and rules offered by, and found in, the words written by other 
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authorities. It is the drama of (rational) discipline and assimilation to it by the ordi-
nary people.20
Finally, the courtly style is centered on personal sovereignty. Legitimacy derives 
from the successful performance of the principle of hierarchy.21 This principle hallows 
the people as part of the court-structure. All of them pretend to be, or speak in the 
name of, the sovereign. Their speech is declarative and often presented with an aura 
of divinity or sacrality.22 Any reference to this aura is meant to put an end to reason-
able discussion, which clearly distinguishes the courtly style from both the republican 
and bureaucratic styles. Moreover, facts brought up against declarative statements are 
ignored or discarded in the courtly style. Rather, the authoritative statements are 
themselves regarded as matters of fact. The crucial difference, then, between the facts 
which figure in the realist style and those of the courtly style is that the former are 
justified by the facts themselves without any value judgment, while the latter depend 
upon the moral authority of the author, who simultaneously represents and tran-
scends the community.
As Edwin Black concluded, in such cases there is no story to be told, but rather 
all is a matter of drama and display.23 The sermon has features of the courtly style. In 
some respects it recalls the language of the lecture, in that a statement is presented for 
contemplation. However, one is not supposed to test the validity of the proposition. 
Rather the public is expected to submit, believe the statements which have been 
made and follow their prescriptions. Those who refuse to do so may be put under 
censure or sanction, whether that of the sovereign or that of the people who submit 
to its power and persecute in the name of sovereignty.24 The courtly style is necessar-
ily cruder, and more doggedly assertive, than the republican and bureaucratic styles.25
Curiously, however—and of interest to my theory of polemics—Hariman points out 
that this style involves incessant plotting for higher rank and constant anxiety about 
the precariousness of one’s position.26
Today, Hariman argues, this style has little purchase institutionally, but seems to 
be particularly resurgent within mass media representations of political events. In this 
context, Habermas even speaks of a re-feudalization of modern society.27 According 
to Hariman, however, the courtly discourse will not feature as dominant style; it 
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floats because it is no longer limited to or controlled by some political cast, and be-
cause it is marginal to the major discourses and institutional strategies of acquiring 
legitimacy in modern society. It attaches itself to a specific locale, because it consti-
tutes communicative relationships with institutional form, stability and assurances 
suited to the social relations structuring that environment, and because it provides a 
tacit means of persuasion to those holding or attempting to gain advantage there. 
This activation of style is most likely to occur where social experience is already or 
still organized around some form of personal sovereignty.28
The style of polemical texts 
Which style might be characteristic of polemical exchange is the final question to be 
answered by the theoretical exercises which serve as preliminaries to the present 
chapter. Generally speaking, the style employed in the former chapter, by which 
critics tended to attack each other personally, seemed to be mostly declarative in its 
denouncement of Vestdijk as the subject of De toekomst der religie. Yet, whereas some 
were indeed declarative, others clearly attempted to substantiate their scorn by em-
ploying different styles of arguing. As we will see, the use of these different styles 
increased in popularity during the history we are studying. What this means for the 
polemical nature of later contributions is something which will be investigated in the 
following.
We must avoid falling into the trap of linking authoritarian or declarative styles of 
arguing to an actual possession of authority. It might well be the case that the em-
ployment of a declarative voice points to a lack of authority. This is precisely the case 
which I wish to make in this study. According to me, intellectuals who feel their 
authority being threatened tend to attack others personally without attempting to 
substantiate their scorn by use of elaborate arguments or moderate judgments of the 
issues with which they are faced.  
In fact, as we will see in the next chapter, critics who express their viewpoints in 
the authoritarian style definitely did not belong to the powerful networks or well-
established political environments within Dutch society. This conclusion need not 
come as a surprise if we start from the assumption stated earlier, namely that the sub-
ject created in texts does not need to have any referent outside the text. Something 
similar holds true for the style of the texts which we are studying here. A declarative 
style of arguing can be used in order to suggest political reality, or some ideological 
implication which does not necessarily exist in everyday life. Again, texts constitute 
realities of their own. They interfere with the outside world and are meant to trans-
form, in an attempt to shift the balance of power in favor of those who create them. 
Which style is better equipped to change the political context depends on the situa-
                                                     
28 Hariman 1995: 78. 
116 
tion. The question we must answer here is whether one of the styles defined earlier 
seems to be favored for polemical exchange. In other words, since we have a typol-
ogy of political styles, it remains to be established whether a link exists between, on 
the one hand, style as a means by which power, authority, or influence are suggested 
to the reader, and on the other, the feeling that authority is being threatened by 
changes in society.  
The problem is how to determine which style is employed in polemics in order 
to establish or defend authority. According to my theory, a sovereign with a strong 
hold on power need not be polemical. If it turns to personal attack, it only suggests 
some fatal weakness dissimulated by drawing attention to the faults of the other. 
Employed as a means to counter imminent threats, such an attack is directed against 
something, and is therefore reactionary. According to me, and contrary to 
Bourdieu,29 I would argue that this type of discourse is extremely violent. 
Yet, if we maintain that reactionary discourse employs a courtly style of arguing, 
how can Hariman maintain that it functions in an environment already organized 
around a person with authority? To clarify this point, we must ask ourselves from 
which perspective this authority has should be considered: from that of the public, or 
from the standpoint of those who claim to hold authority, but feel it to be threat-
ened? This is in accordance with another remark by Hariman, claiming that, today, 
the courtly style has little purchase institutionally, but seems to be particularly resur-
gent within mass media representations of political events. This might even lead us to 
the conclusion that polemics are a structural feature of modern discourse. Always and 
everywhere, authority is at stake. This seems to support my theory that polemic is a 
means by which intellectuals attempt to defend themselves at a time in which they 
believe their authority to be threatened. Polemics (at least the most violent forms) 
only arise in a context that is politically unstable and insecure, in which a public is 
not easily identified, and in which authority must be defended against other political 
opinions. This also implies that polemics are not necessarily pursued in order to re-
store challenged authority, but may also be employed in a struggle to establish new 
social and political alternatives to established authority. Here, however, we find our-
selves on the verge of historical analysis, attempting to identify the institutional, social 
and political context of polemics—something to be dealt with in the next chapter. It 
is time now to apply the analytical tools which we have developed in the foregoing 
argument.
Different styles in practice 
As we observed in his discussion of the pretensions usually ascribed to people who 
write about the future, Vestdijk began with both the republican and bureaucratic 
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styles of addressing the public. For him, it served as a way of coming out without 
making any reference to authorities which exceeded the boundaries of his own per-
son (“I”), or the discipline he employed (“we”). He himself did not pretend to be a 
prophet, and he and his fellow interpretive psychologists had to find a balance be-
tween facts and fiction, between the creative mind and critical distance. Clearly, he 
did not aim for anything other than to offer a few hints for the future. 
Yet, in the following, we will see in more detail how Vestdijk attempted to jus-
tify his arguments.30 This, then, must be compared with the ways in which his critics 
attempted to make sense of his arguments. For that, the most important topics of 
discussion between Vestdijk and his critics will be analyzed. First, I wish to summa-
rize the most important points in advance. 
The polemic began with the attempt to declare Vestdijk unfit to offer any proper 
understanding or judgment of matters concerning religion. Some critics explicitly 
argued this point of view and attempted to convince the public to believe them. 
Even though according to them, Vestdijk pretended to be a prophet, he was either a 
false one or, worse, no prophet at all. How then could he be regarded as a prophet? 
He did not even take religion seriously, they suggested. To prove their point, they 
took issue with Vestdijk’s definition of religion. 
According to his critics Vestdijk reduced religion to an essentially human phe-
nomenon. Moreover, they interpreted his theory of projection as an attack on reli-
gious truth. After all, if all religious images were interpreted as products of the human 
imagination, based primarily on wishes and needs, then it would be impossible to 
decide whether or not God existed. By suggesting this, critics maintained, Vestdijk 
simply attempted to ridicule a phenomenon which had its true base in divine revela-
tion. And though Vestdijk responded that, according to him, projection as such was 
inevitable and essential to human beings, and certainly nothing ridiculous, critics 
continued to take issue with his critique of its metaphysical variant.  
In general, polemists ignored the fact that Vestdijk needed this theory in order to 
explain one specific characteristic of a metaphysical religion like Christianity: its in-
tolerance. As soon as projection turned into absolute claims of ‘truth’ and the repres-
sion of doubt, Vestdijk argued, intolerance and repression were inevitable. He did 
not have any problem with the content of religious ‘truth’ as such, but he absolutely 
rejected the attitude of those who took it too seriously. This led critics to argue that 
Vestdijk not only did not understand the Christian religion, but was in fact himself 
intolerant. Similar points were made against Vestdijk’s thesis that metaphysical pro-
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jection was intimately linked to the repression of sexuality. He not only failed to 
understand the Christian concept of sex and marriage, but he clearly lacked a basic 
religious education. This should not have come as any surprise after his confession 
that he had preferred to talk about philosophy instead of dogmas with his Sunday-
school teacher.
Critics also did not understand why Vestdijk preferred socialism and Buddhism to 
Christianity. At least, they refused to take Vestdijk’s own explanation regarding this 
issue seriously. According to Vestdijk, those religions and ideologies were far more 
tolerant and did not repress man’s natural functions. Basically, his critics argued, 
Vestdijk was merely searching for a religion without a God. He hated God. That was 
why He had to die, not for Vestdijk’s own sins, but rather because Vestdijk wanted 
to get rid of Him. That was also why Christianity, interpreted as the only true belief 
in God, had to die. Vestdijk simply could not accept that, if Christianity were to die, 
the Church as a community of faithful believers would not. And, surely, it would 
never die, because God did not want it to. Vestdijk’s ideas of a new religious estab-
lishment, bred at institutes that combined the best of the Christian retraite, the Bud-
dhist monastery, and the English university, were simply ridiculous. 
This, in short, is the manner in which critics attempted to justify their points 
against Vestdijk. Yet, for an analysis of the styles employed in order to convince the 
public, we must offer a more detailed discussion of the issues raised in the course of 
the controversy. The main topics to be analysed here are as follows: the definition of 
religion, the theory of religious projection, intolerance and sexual repression in 
Christianity, the value of socialism and Buddhism as alternatives, and Vestdijk’s per-
sonal hints regarding the future of religion. These topics will be discussed respec-
tively. First, I will give a short overview of the arguments offered in De toekomst der 
religie. Next, the critical comments of his opponents will be summarised. Finally, I 
will analyse Vestdijk’s (and Sierksma’s) replies to these critiques. In all of these cases, 
the styles used to present the arguments will be identified.
The definition of religion – The conflict which arose regarding the question of what 
exactly religion was all about, developed in two different directions. On the one 
hand, Vestdijk and many theologians debated an issue often posed by psychologists, 
namely whether the religious spirit stemmed from essentially human needs or 
whether it was primarily derived from an ultimate reality which believers called God. 
On the other, Gomperts and Vestdijk debated the question of whether religion was 
about spiritual happiness or primarily employed in order to counter a certain insecu-
rity by means of pleasure. 
Apart from all other qualifications, as we have seen in the previous chapter, most 
critics acknowledged that Vestdijk wished to be judged as an interpretive psycholo-
gist. Some admitted that he was justified in doing so. After all, by means of his artistic 
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talents he was able to understand people’s motives; this offered him the means by 
which to account for the actions which people take in order to fulfill their religious 
needs.
Yet, others felt it necessary to question the validity of psychology itself; some 
even denied that it could provide any fruitful knowledge. According to many critics, 
psychology failed to account for a God who was the essence of religion. For psy-
chologists, God was simply an element of religion, rather than its beginning and end. 
A discipline such as interpretive psychology aimed at understanding religion as an 
essentially human phenomenon. God and human behavior were taken to be products 
of the human mind. Critics as diverse as Wytzes, Wapenaar, Sterkman, and De Jong 
complained that, by exclusively employing human psychology, Vestdijk simply 
wished to explain the reality of God away.31 With such an approach, as Pos and Van 
Stempvoort argued, religion disappeared in man.32 Even Sierksma did not agree with 
Vestdijk on this issue. Yet, whereas other critics failed to explain why they believed 
Vestdijk to be mistaken—other than declaring their faith in God to be universally 
valid—Sierksma was far more elaborate. After a long summary of Vestdijk’s ideas, 
Sierksma argued that it was too simplistic to assume that we could put the reality 
referred to as “God” into our pocket. Nietzsche tried to, and everybody knew the 
results: he got angry. According to Sierksma, it was both stupid and impossible to 
deny that there was something,33 or as he remarked on another occasion, though he 
did not believe in God, he still knew there was an ‘X’ behind our backs, governing 
us.34 The others, as usual in the courtly style, merely counted their own judgments 
without the slightest reference to the details of Vestdijk’s argument. Sierksma, on the 
other hand, paid tribute to Vestdijk by recognizing the manner in which he had 
elaborated his points, while arguing the reasons why he disagreed, thereby following 
the rules of both the republican and bureaucratic styles. 
Instead of oversimplifying God (as Sierksma believed), other critics believed that 
Vestdijk called for a religion without a God. Marnix, Sterkman, Van Heugten, De 
Vos, Miskotte, Van der Leeuw, Wapenaar, Pos, Kraemer, Van Stempvoort and 
Kamphuis were very clear about this.35 Surely, Vestdijk had said words to that effect. 
As he argued, nobody fighting something charged with emotions like religion 
(Dutch: godsdienst), could deny being convinced of the relevance of a religion with-
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out God (Dutch: religie).36 Yet, these critics only made this point in order to indicate 
their disagreement and their belief that no reasonable person could agree with such a 
statement. They took an authoritarian stance.  
That other styles of criticism were available was shown by other critics, who defi-
nitely did not agree, yet, according to the republican fashion, did not question the 
legitimacy of Vestdijk’s point of view.37 Still others questioned Vestdijk’s arguments 
only after they had offered an extensive summary of his arguments, giving reasons or 
even facts for why they disagreed. These critics employed a complex mix of bureau-
cratic, republican and realist styles.38
In the first definition he offered of religion, Vestdijk maintained that religion was 
synonomous with “belief” (19). But, he emphasized, the question remained: “belief 
in what?” Sierksma would later argue that religion was “the belief that there is some-
thing.”39 Vestdijk, however, preferred a broader definition. According to him, reli-
gious belief encompassed “totality”, consisting of, what he called, a state of lasting 
spiritual happiness (16). Though subscribing to totality, he did not imply lasting 
health nor the experience of temporary pleasures. A doctor who cures pain, Vestdijk 
contended, was not a religious figure. Neither did sexual intercourse with a woman 
belong to the category of religious experience. By religion, he did not mean just one 
aspect of our existence as human beings. On the contrary, it included man in its 
totality: his mental and bodily functions as well as a focus on the (fancy) world 
around him. It was much like a dream in the sense that people for the most part 
remained unconscious of the process involved. The concepts of either man or God 
are too limited to refer to this state of bliss, Vestdijk concluded (20). 
Whatever de difference between Vestdijk and Sierksma on matters of religion, 
they both agreed that it had to be defined rather broadly in order to include Bud-
dhism. Buddhism has always posed a problem in the study of religion.40 To identify 
religion with one’s own belief, or the belief in God only, was to reduce the varieties 
of religious experiences and phenomena. Such a reduction could not be justified in 
the scientific world. On the other hand, belief in God was not to be excluded either. 
Vestdijk even confessed that he sometimes also believed in God.41 This was not to 
deny that there was a reality to be experienced. Yet, this experience was not to be 
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equated with the belief in God. Consequently, it had only relative value.42 To under-
stand the nature of this belief, and the fact that some claimed their religion to be an 
absolute truth while believing God to be a reality outside of it, the theory of religious 
projection was developed. Advocated as a reasonable way to make sense of a plethora 
of religious phenomena, and offering detailed arguments for it, projection became 
part of a discourse pursued in the republican style. 
In order to discuss religious projection, according to Vestdijk, one must first de-
fine religion. For this reason did he feel the need to define religion in the beginning 
of his essay (13). Distinct from belief, which is merely an aspect of our world, Vest-
dijk claimed that religion is directed toward a future state of “lasting spiritual happi-
ness” (29). The question whether or not God is instrumental in attaining this happi-
ness, or rather whether or not God is its primary source, sparked a heated debate.  
Religion, Miskotte declared, was a state of awe—it was being impressed by some 
outside “power.”43 Van Heugten agreed.44 How, they asked themselves, could Vest-
dijk ignore this? Why had he not read Rudolf Otto, Van der Leeuw or W.B. Kris-
tensen on this matter? Both Van der Leeuw and Banning suggested that Vestdijk was 
not familiar with the literature on the issue.45 Without indicating why this was im-
portant, these critics limited themselves to mere declarative statements. Vestdijk 
countered that anyone who claimed that he had not mentioned Otto had in fact not 
read his book. In a rather bureaucratic fashion, he referred to those pages in which he 
had discussed the ideas of Otto. Moreover, he argued, his own notion of totality 
included everything that had to do with transcendence.46  
Other critics were a bit more specific. Whatever the notion of transcendence in 
Vestdijk’s concept of religion, it was not a movement of man towards God, accord-
ing to these critics. Rather God approached man in order to reveal the misery in 
which he was living and to save him from his sins and guilt. Moreover, Wapenaar, 
Hekstra and Pos argued, Christ did in fact die for our sins, whether Vestdijk wanted 
to believe it or not. However, only those who believed, and cried and prayed out of 
misery: “God be merciful to me, a sinner!” and admitted that “this happened, o pity, 
because of my sins”, would be saved. Those who denied God’s grace would be con-
demned, sooner or later. “We, as much as the heavens, are the work of His hands. 
Woe unto those who, in the end, would fall into the hands of God’s wrath.”47 Kamp-
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huis also passed judgment over the unbeliever. “Woe unto those, who refuse to be-
lieve this Truth,” he concluded.48 Similarly, Miskotte held, when “faced with this 
Reality, our images, inclinations, and emotions will fade away to their own happi-
ness.”49 
Miskotte’s statement did not leave any room for discussion. With Mankes-
Zernike, on the other hand, Vestdijk attempted a dialogue. She had argued that those 
who pursued happiness would fail to find it; instead, happiness was something con-
ferred to them from the other side.50 To this, Vestdijk responded that happiness did 
not need to be consciously pursued, as he had previously argued. Why couldn’t peo-
ple feel happiness and still be impressed by a higher being?51 Certainly, Mankes-
Zernike declared, awe might include a sense of happiness which people were not 
aiming at, either consciously or unconsciously.52 But, Vestdijk asked rhetorically, 
what about Christians, then, who consciously sought peace for their souls?53 And 
what should be done, Sierksma added, with a Greek farmer who asks Artemis to bless 
his herd of young goats? Did he not engage in a religious act, even though Artemis is 
an acknowledged goddess? And if he did, was this an act of contemplation, accompa-
nied by a feeling of awe? According to Sierksma, such a farmer was interested in the 
growth of his herd. With more goats, he would be happy. And what about the Bud-
dha, he asked, who strived for happiness as well? “Everyone who argues that religion 
is not aimed at happiness ignores ninety-five percent of all religious phenomena,” 
Sierksma concluded.54 
Whereas the above mentioned critics believed ‘God’ to be the primary source of 
religion, both Vestdijk and Gomperts believed Him to be of instrumental value. The 
latter two, however, sparked a heated debate on the idea of “happiness.” Gomperts 
believed religion to have been invented and developed by man in order to get rid of 
man’s cafard, a term indicated here to mean a vague feeling of uneasiness, suffering, or 
the state of unhappiness.55 Vestdijk responded that it was a misunderstanding, if not a 
matter of careless reading, to reduce his concept of religion to a kind of therapy to 
cure unhappiness. To suggest such a thing was to ignore the spiritual dimension of 
religion—“goddamn it.” Besides, it was far too easy to tell a suffering cancer patient 
that his hope in God was merely cafard and would pass away. Vestdijk even confessed 
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that he had slapped his knees with vicious mirth after reading Gomperts’s remarks on 
this issue.56 Gomperts retorted that he had not referred to cancer patients in his ac-
count of people suffering from cafard. Vestdijk himself failed to read properly. More-
over, he had not deserved the latter’s “goddamn.”57 “You do not convince me that 
your cafard had only to do with feelings,” Vestdijk sneered.58 How, Gomperts asked, 
“when I have even argued explicitly that it was only a matter of feeling?”59 In any 
case, the fact that Gomperts did not limit himself to temporary feelings and physical 
suffering was something which Vestdijk took as a concession to his concept of relig-
ion as something aiming at lasting spiritual happiness.60 In response to this, Gomperts 
simply replied with an “amen.”61
Indeed, Gomperts retained his idea that the physical element of happiness was not 
to be excluded from religion. According to him, in Vestdijk’s conception of religion, 
desires were to be extinguished. However, he argued, this was to ignore the role of 
sexuality in the history of religions. It also excluded the possibility that sexuality 
could offer pleasure. And what about the Indian Kali and Rama-Krishna movements, 
the Greek and heathen orgies, as well as some Christian sects?62 Vestdijk answered 
that, generally speaking, sexuality was not to be regarded as a positive value within 
the field of religion. This was a fact, and did not serve as an argument for religion.63
Of course, Vestdijk admitted, desires played a role. They were, however, to be con-
trolled and directed, rather than extinguished, as a proper reading of his essay should 
have made clear. And, Vestdijk maintained, he did not ignore sexuality. On the con-
trary, there was a lot to be found on orgiastic sects and sexual problems.64 However, 
he did not believe in the orgiastic fantasies, as Gomperts did.65 Similarly, Sierksma 
even went so far as to call Gomperts a phallus-swinger.66 Yet, Gomperts asserted that 
he merely believed that phallus- and Priapus-cults were healthier than the ascetic 
tricks of mystics. Whether his critics were justified in calling him a phallus-swinger or 
ascribing him any orgiastic fantasies, was open to debate. At least he did not denigrate 
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sexuality as Vestdijk had done in De toekomst der religie.67 Vestdijk maintained that he 
had not been insinuating that Gomperts enjoyed his orgiastic fantasies; only that 
Gomperts’ claim that orgiastic behavior had healthy effects was a bit fantastic.68
Sierksma added that it was highly doubtful that intercourse within the realm of phal-
lus- and Priapus-cults could be regarded a matter of religion.69
The exchange between Gomperts on the one hand, and Vestdijk and Sierksma on 
the other, showed a curious mix of several writing styles. Often we find arguments 
supported by examples from the history of religion, combined with attempts to show 
logical inconsistencies in the other’s way of reasoning. This clearly points to a realist 
style of arguing. We also often find personal invectives and declarative statements 
which are intended to be taken as judgments, yet without any justification by facts or 
references to other authorities. The way Gomperts and Vestdijk blamed each other 
for “poor reading,” if not “bad faith,” was similar to a verdict in the courtly style. 
Vestdijk’s “vicious mirth” and his “goddamn it” did not belong to any reasonable 
discussion either. And, finally, Sierksma’s metaphorical judgment of Gomperts, com-
paring him to a “phallus-swinger,” could not be included in any kind of realist, re-
publican or bureaucratic discourse. 
For Vestdijk, a religious man aimed for totality, i.e. a “naturally-perfect man,” 
living in a reality in which subject and object are fully integrated. This led him to a 
third definition of religion: “Religion,” he argued, “is based on the unexpressed and 
unconscious pursuit of unification with the ideal embodied realiter by naturally-perfect man, or 
naturally perfect humanity…”70
Many critics simply interpreted Vestdijk’s definition of religion as “the projection 
of needs and desires,”71 or “the pursuit of unification with an ideal or ideal man, who 
by means of ‘projection’ has been made into a god.”72 In this he was merely repeating 
Feuerbach,73 or even earlier, Xenofanes.74 Yet, whereas most critics limited them-
selves to these ironical statements, as we have seen in the previous chapter, De Vos 
had concluded, based on the fact that Vestdijk did not refer to these forebears, that 
Vestdijk was dishonest in his attempts to derogate religion.75 Both De Vos and Van 
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der Leeuw also pointed out that Vestdijk’s interpretation of religion as mere human 
projection smacked of Freudianism. According to De Vos, Vestdijk offered us a sur-
rogate of Feuerbach mixed with some Freudian sauce.76 Van der Leeuw argued that 
Vestdijk’s arguments frequently heard within intellectual circles that discussed Freud 
intimately, as if he were a friend.77 Yet, both De Vos and Van der Leeuw failed to 
offer any details which might have corroborated their speculations. These critics were 
clearly limiting themselves to declarative judgments, employed mainly to disqualify 
Vestdijk. But what exactly had Vestdijk argued with respect to religious projection? 
The theory of religious projection – Early on, Vestdijk warned that there was something 
contradictory about the mechanism of projection. On the one hand, its religious 
variant was aimed at totality, in an attempt to integrate subject and object in their 
entirety. On the other hand, however, projection was primarily a function of the 
human psyche. Vestdijk’s discussion of the issues at hand shows patterns characteristic 
of the republican style. He attempted to convince people by arguing a theory, while 
simultaneously including the possible objections by critics. 
What exactly was to be understood by projection? According to Vestdijk, it was 
the transformation or recreation of subjective, intra-psychical elements into subjec-
tively determined—though taken to be objective—ideas. According to Kant, we 
‘project’ the entire perceptual world ‘out’ of ourselves. The world as we see it does 
not exist. Something, we do not know what, stimulates our senses; and according to 
the structures of our mind, this is transformed into an image. Thus, we only external-
ize what we have in mind, though we interpret it as reality (78). We believe this 
reality to be the true and only reality. The moment we all agree on this reality, how-
ever, we do not believe anymore; instead, we speak of knowledge (79). The way Vest-
dijk defines projection has nothing to do with knowledge in this sense. In his con-
ception, the senses do not stimulate the mind; rather, images are created because of 
certain emotions, needs and drives, dislike and inclination, dream and reflection, 
anxiousness and self-interest. In short, characteristic for projection is its psychic back-
ground, i.e. that which remains after the influence of both senses and reasoning has 
been abstracted (79). The possibility always exists, however, that the images we’ve 
created could be countered or corrected by sensory perception or reasoning. And this 
is what distinguishes mere projection from metaphysical projection. Of course, this is 
perfectly understandable; neither senses nor rationality could suffice to determine the 
existence of God. And though he did not exclude them from the workings of the 
heart, Pascal had earlier stated: Le coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît pas. The 
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heart has its own reasons, which, according to Vestdijk, were the laws of the psyche. 
It was exactly those laws which provided projections with their reality-effect (88).
According to Vestdijk, the metaphysical type itself did not recognize the mecha-
nism of projection. Asked about it, he would laugh in your face. Of course, the ways 
in which psychology scrutinized human personality may sometimes sound frivolous 
(89). In fact, according to many critics, it was too frivolous to consider the absolute 
character of religious belief seriously.78 “And when I realize this myself,” Vestdijk 
confessed, “I go and chat with a Calvinist. He is as sure of his supernatural world as 
‘normal’ people are of three-dimensional reality, even though Kant told them that 
also this world was merely subjective” (89). One critic regretted that Vestdijk did not 
speak more often with Calvinists.79 After all, there was nothing strange about them. 
This might surprise Vestdijk, in much the same way that Kierkegaard was surprised 
when he found out that the tax collector he met in the street was a Calvinist—only 
the circle to which Vestdijk belonged consisted of intellectuals rather than tax collec-
tors.80 However, though a Calvinist interpreted everyday life as a matter of fact, he 
did not doubt that God existed. We would not convince him otherwise by suggest-
ing to him that God the Father was merely a projection of earthly fathers, as we 
knew them; on the contrary, he would probably answer that earthly fathers were 
imperfections of our Great Father in Heaven (89). For the metaphysical type, Vest-
dijk argued, the mechanism we called projection simply did not exist. He might ask 
you skeptically: “Where is this projection?” (89). “Show me this mysterious function 
of the human mind, with which you defend your horrible habit to of denying the 
existence of God, and we will see whether it is more than just a projection of your 
own unbelief” (90).81
Vestdijk admitted that this was a conflict between absolute beliefs. And the psy-
chologist always ran the risk of being accused of metaphysical projection. Certainly, 
he admitted, we sometimes forget that our constructions are theories rather than 
reality.
Critics such as Berkouwer and Bavinck employed this argument to suggest that 
Vestdijk’s theory was itself no more than a dream—merely a projection of his own 
inner desires.82 They based their argument on Vestdijk’s own theory. Indeed, Vestdijk 
recognized that atheists who continually emphasize the non-existence of God, merely 
give the impression that they secretly long for God as metaphysical entity (91).  
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Yet, critics as diverse as Mankes-Zernike, Wapenaar, Kamphuis and Simons, 
though they did not recognize that he had argued a similar notion, interpreted Vest-
dijk’s argument as a desperate cry by someone who could not keep himself from 
resisting the appeal and apparent truth of God. To them, Vestdijk’s argument against 
God was proof of His existence.83 Yet, this was clearly a declarative statement which 
could not be supported by any facts. And, as their contributions show, these critics 
did not even attempt to prove their inferences, neither by referring to matters of fact, 
nor to their own personal faith or the work of other authorities.  
Vestdijk’s own argument, however, as he himself and Sierksma remarked, might 
merely be seen as directed against other opinions rather than against some reality.84
The problem with people who believed their ideas to be the absolute truth, is that 
they were not able to account for the subjective nature of their opinions. According 
to Vestdijk and Sierksma, projection was ineradicable. This was true for every opin-
ion, including their own. Yet, in general, Vestdijk maintained, the atheist knows his 
ideas are just projections and, thus, have only relative value; for metaphysical types, 
on the other hand, projection is absolute, i.e. its products are beyond doubt (93). 
Vestdijk himself, Sierksma argued, did not believe in his own ideals of the future; 
while, on the other hand, he was confident enough about them, to offer and defend 
them before an intelligent public of critics.85
In the end, Vestdijk maintained, the metaphysical variant of religious projection 
failed to integrate subject and object by imagining the latter as absolutely transcen-
dent. In fact, metaphysical religion was characterized by its disintegrative tendencies 
(230).
Critics such as Van Heugten, Sterkman, De Vos and Miskotte, however, ignored 
the relationship between metaphysical projection and disintegration between man 
and his environment in Vestdijk’s theory. Instead, they preferred to take issue with 
the reductive nature of his theory of projection in general, as if Vestdijk, like Freud, 
had argued that religion was merely an illusion. Worse, these critics tried to attack 
Vestdijk personally, suggesting that he was not adequately familiar with Kant’s phi-
losophy.86 Yet, without indicating how Kant should then be interpreted, or in which 
sense Vestdijk had failed to understand him, these critics clearly employed a personal 
and declarative style, judging Vestdijk to be incompetent and attempting to disqualify 
him as a reasonable partner in any discussion on Kant’s philosophy. Vestdijk answered 
                                                     
83 Mankes-Zernike 1952: 99, Wapenaar 1953: 244, Kamphuis 1973: 16-17, Simons 1974. 
84 Vestdijk 1952: 99-100, Sierksma 1959a: 93. 
85 Sierksma 1950: 563 
86 Van Heugten 1948: 700-701, Sterkman 1948ab: 134, De Vos 1952: 107, Miskotte 1952, 
117.
128 
De Vos by telling him that he had read Kant without, of course, offering any guaran-
tee that he had understood him correctly.  
Vestdijk, however, did succeed in showing his critics, by means of many page ref-
erences, that they had failed to read his essay properly.87 Sierksma agreed and even 
argued that Vestdijk offered a better summary of Kant than he had ever read in the 
works of his critics.88 Hekstra added that it was a pity to see only minor theologians 
attack Vestdijk. Of course, he argued, when even Van der Leeuw failed to offer a 
proper critique, what were they to expect from others? For this reason it would have 
been interesting if Schilder, according to Hekstra an expert on Kant and equally 
attacked by second-rate critics like Miskotte, would have taken the opportunity to 
give his opinion on Vestdijk.89 Though he took Vestdijk’s side, Hekstra clearly em-
ployed the courtly style to denounce both his and Schilder’s opponents.  
Yet, De Vos, Kraemer and Van Stempvoort, together with Miskotte and Van der 
Leeuw, maintained that Vestdijk had invoked the wrong (Freud, Nietzsche90)—and
sometimes even obscure (Ziegler! Jaensch!91)—authorities to support his case. And 
though he attempted to be objective by choosing a theoretical framework in which 
to connect religious typology to psychology, his concepts—such as metaphysics and 
disintegration—were distorted by value judgments and could not serve as neutral 
descriptions of religion.92 Moreover, Van Heugten, Sterkman and Kraemer suggested, 
in general his argument was too theoretical, or even cerebral, and arbitrary to arrive 
at a proper understanding of the essence of religion.93
The critics mentioned thus far, with the exception of Vestdijk and Sierksma, lim-
ited themselves to a declarative style of arguing. They questioned Vestdijk’s authori-
ties and his reading of them, without offering any detailed discussion of the essay, nor 
any elaboration of their own statements by either explaining why they took some-
thing to be true or indicating which authority had argued something similar. They 
simply took an authoritative stance that did not seem to require any further elabora-
tion or empirical justification, as if there could be no doubt about their judgments. 
As we previously observed, Vestdijk had already argued that projection was inevi-
table and necessary (Kant). With Nietzsche he maintained that the lie of projection is 
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the Mother of all of us.94 And whereas Berkouwer had argued that Vestdijk’s own 
ideas of the future were projections as well,95 Vestdijk would simply have agreed with 
such a statement. However, if Berkouwer meant that, as projections, Vestdijk’s ideas 
were not worth considering, he would have been polemical. Yet the fact that, time 
and again, he returned to Vestdijk’s projections,96 wrestling with the problems they 
posed to him without the urge to denounce them right from the start, shows that he 
took them seriously. Also later commentators, in line with much of what Berkouwer 
had emphasized, admitted that the interpretation of Vestdijk’s ideas as mere projec-
tions was not enough to discredit them; rather it simply implied that they could not 
be taken as absolute truth.97 And Vestdijk agreed with that. Even the theories he had 
developed were, in a sense, lies. However, in the case of metaphysical projection, the 
lie became more an illusion or hallucination (Feuerbach, Freud). This judgment 
especially had triggered the anger of theologians. This made it perfectly understand-
able that they did not always treat him on the level he deserved, as Berkouwer tried 
to account for the attitude of critics.98
Sierksma, moreover, tried to integrate the theory of projection with a philosophi-
cal anthropology. By dealing with projection within the context of the psychology of 
perception, he tried to save it from associations with the pathological. However, he 
maintained, the world created by perception, but especially in the case of projection, 
is always a subjective appropriation of an objective world and must be understood as 
a kind of adaptation and way of dealing with the unknown world outside. Man, 
conscious of his distance from the world and his radical excentricity (Plessner), needs 
these projections in order to create a unified and meaningful universe in which to 
live. According to Sierksma, God as a projection was necessary to fill the terra incog-
nita beyond the world of subjective perception. And by projecting a God, religion 
was born. 
In general, after Sierksma’s study on religious projection, published in 1956, and 
especially from the 1960s onwards (marking the third period in the history surround-
ing De toekomst der religie) critics changed their opinions concerning the relevance of 
discussions on this topic. Previously, commentators had argued that one could only 
be for or against projection, though they took the theory of projection as just another 
case of people attempting to reduce reality to human wishes. Increasingly, critics 
accepted an element of wishful thinking into their own theologies and beliefs, while 
being unable to deny that the formulation of the theory of projection was highly 
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sophisticated and could not be bluntly rejected.99 Thus, discussion and serious dia-
logue were needed in order to find common ground.100 While some acknowledged a 
subjective element in the concept of God, other critics tried to avoid the Kantian 
premises of Vestdijk’s and Sierksma’s theories of projection. Among the most impor-
tant were Oosterbaan, Kwee, Kraemer, Luypen and Fortmann.101 These critics set out 
to argue at great lengths why projections should not be taken as subjective additions 
to an unknown, objective world. Instead, they tended to reject the subject-object 
dichotomy which was characteristic of projection. Following this line of reasoning, 
some maintained that this implied that philosophy rather than psychology should 
determine the nature and reality of God.102 Yet, whatever the disagreement on 
important issues like these, commentators felt increasingly obliged to deal with them 
by means of the realist, republican or bureaucratic styles, rather then the authoritarian 
style which had previously been employed by many fellow critics. 
Nevertheless, abandoning the declarative style of arguing does not exclude the 
possibility of polemics. The way these two layers of textual encounter are combined 
in the exchange with both Vestdijk and Sierksma is exemplified in the contributions 
of Luypen, Kwee, and Kraemer. All of them found especially Sierksma arrogant in 
his preference for psychology as the discipline to help him explain religious phenom-
ena. According to Luypen, this attitude was accompanied by a vindictive attitude 
towards phenomenological psychologists such as Van Lennep and Van den Berg.103
This was a declarative statement, unsupported by careful reasoning and reasonable 
discussion, that generally characterized Luypen’s style of arguing. And it is striking 
that neither Van Lennep nor Van den Berg felt triggered to launch any kind of 
counter-attack. On the contrary, Van Lennep’s review of De religieuze projectie was 
highly sympathetic.104
Other critics, equally accused of being more polemical than the authors men-
tioned before, declared that both Vestdijk’s and Sierksma’s conception of projection 
failed to account for religion. According to Kwee Swan Liat, the theory of religious 
projection was a theoretical construct, or “magical formula”, and a projection of 
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Sierksma himself.105 “How,” he asked, “can Sierksma maintain that his psychology is 
neutral, when it only takes the world of man into account, and, implicitly, regards 
God as an invention of man and a side-effect of history?” His claims were unjustified, 
his anthropology “insufficient and false.”106 Kraemer went even further. According to 
him, Sierksma’s methodological rules, whether intentionally or not, exemplified the 
hypocrisy of people who advocate their agnostic religion. Why is it, Kraemer asked 
rhetorically, that Van der Leeuw sounded more honest and authentic when discussing 
these matters?107 Instead, Kraemer continued, Vestdijk’s and Sierksma’s psychology 
was a theoretical construct merely invented in order to deny God. In this sense, their 
theory of projection was just another manifestation of modern atheist mentality, an 
attempt to kill religious sensitivity, Kraemer declared.108
Yet, instead of sustaining their claims, both Kwee and Kraemer took their judg-
ments to be factual. Kraemer, as we have seen in the previous chapter, took it to be a 
fact that called for an explanation in terms of some existential drive. According to 
him, Vestdijk’s and Sierksma’s atheism was not so much the result of theoretical 
reflection as it was an attempt to cut out religious sensibilities; worse, their attitude 
was part of their struggle with God, the Angel.109 Kamphuis made similar comments 
regarding Vestdijk.110 However, apart from its declarative nature, this way of arguing 
has already been identified in the previous chapter as typical of polemics.  
Sierksma, however, wondered how Kraemer was able to see any anti-Christian 
sentiment in his theory of religious projection when it was explicitly developed for 
an objective anthropological exposition. Everywhere, he concluded, we see theologi-
ans taking a-religious confessions to be directed against Christians.111 This style of 
dialogue, however, would always fail to arrive at an understanding of each other’s 
positions.112 De Vos agreed with this, and even called Kraemer’s approach “pastoral” 
in the negative sense of the word.113 On the other hand, Smits, though generally far 
more sympathetic towards Vestdijk and Sierksma, at times found Kraemer’s attempt 
at dialogue extremely valuable.114 Even though these conflicting judgments might 
seem surprising, the problem might be resolved by pointing out the fact that any 
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attempt at understanding does not exclude the possibility of personal attack, as has 
become clear from the contribution of Van der Leeuw. As we have seen before, Van 
der Leeuw simply attempted to better understand Vestdijk in order to disqualify him 
as a serious partner for discussion. 
Comparing the different styles employed in order to counter Vestdijk’s and 
Sierksma’s arguments regarding religious projection, many critics employed person-
ally critical strategies. Yet, only a few of them turned to verdicts formulated in a 
courtly fashion. Especially their personal attacks, not finding any support in the texts 
of either Vestdijk or Sierksma, can not be regarded as anything but declarative judg-
ments. We found Sterkman, De Vos, Miskotte, Van der Leeuw, Van Heugten, 
Wapenaar, Van Stempvoort and Kamphuis employing this style of arguing, whereas 
Hekstra used it in order to defend both Vestdijk and Schilder from attacks by others. 
By the end of the second period, we find a shift towards more elaborate arguments 
which suggested that polemical attacks could be supported by states of affairs, disci-
plinary discourse or personal convictions. We observed Kwee and Kraemer following 
this line of arguing. Luypen continued this style of reasoning into the early years of 
the third period of our history.  
Many critics did not take Vestdijk and Sierksma seriously when they argued that 
they did not have any problems with God, but rather felt troubled by the attitude of 
the people who believed in Him. The only one who admitted that there was an 
important connection between projection in its metaphysical variant and the intoler-
ance and repression in Christianity was Van Stempvoort.115 But here we arrive at 
another important topic of the controversy. 
Christianity as an intolerant and repressive religion – To begin with Vestdijk’s arguments 
on this point, according to him, Christianity was the paradigm of metaphysical religi-
on (101). As such, he had no problems with it; what was disturbing was that its adhe-
rents could not avoid being intolerant and coercive in matters of faith. Apart from 
that, it was highly repressive towards passion and it hampered sexuality. To support 
these statements, he offered some carefully crafted arguments. 
Early on in his essay, Vestdijk made an attempt to solve the problem which he 
had posed regarding his definition of religion: if God was not necessary for religion 
how then did this concept come into being? According to Vestdijk, the issue could 
be fully explained by what he called his concept of metaphysical projection. As an 
interpretive psychologist, he needed to imagine a human being for whom this type of 
projection was an inner necessity. The metaphysical type, Vestdijk maintained, is a 
family man. He loves his wife and children, his work and property. However, being 
religious, this love cannot be limited to his family and individual property; it must 
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tend towards totality. Yet, intuitively, this man feels that, extending his love to his 
father, mother, neighbors, other human beings or even humanity as a whole, would 
cause him to lose everything he claimed to have rights to (96). Thus, his religious 
drive urges him to project an image of totality in the form of a Holy Family, consist-
ing of a Father as creator, lawgiver and ultimate authority, a Mother representing life-
giving powers, from whom also the figure of the Holy Spirit has been derived; and, 
finally, the naturally-perfect man in the figure of Eternal Man or the Son (97). This 
Holy Family has all types of mythological features and manifestations. However, as 
soon as man forgot that these were merely his own creations, that the Holy Family 
was only a dream or myth, the projection became metaphysical. By this Vestdijk 
meant that ideas could not be refuted anymore by reference to the facts of everyday 
life.
Yet, Vestdijk argued, this implied that the metaphysical type was living in a world 
built of two poles: his own family and his supernatural or -familiar family (what Vest-
dijk called: het boven-gezinnelijke). He, as a man, loved his wife and children, his work, 
and his family property (96). And for the most part he was an excellent husband and 
father (98). It would be too easy to derogate this way of life by calling it lowbrow, 
narrow-minded or petty bourgeois (Dutch: kleinburgerlijk), Vestdijk warned his read-
ers. The family could truly be a microcosm of individuals that formed a relatively 
integrated totality (99). However, as previously mentioned, the individual, being a 
religious person, could not limit his love to his family. On the other hand, he intui-
tively knew that if he extended his love to his father and mother, neighbors and 
other human beings, his family would disintegrate (96). Thus, in order to save it, he 
felt it necessary to project that love outward—to heaven. Thus began, Vestdijk con-
cluded, the projection of the Holy Family (97).  
Certainly, this way of life had religious value. But again, this value was limited, 
because, in this conception, the world outside the family and outside the Holy Family 
did not have any religious interest. Relations with the wider family, friends, col-
leagues, competitors, enemies—they were all matters of business. To love your 
neighbor was by this concept merely a matter of obligation, rather than religion (99). 
According to Vestijk, this family structure led to a repression of sexuality. A religion 
that was sublimated into a relationship with God could only allow for negative im-
ages of sexuality. This, Vestdijk argued, was especially clear in the Book of Paul 
(338). The latter advocated marriage in order to avoid the practice of fornication. 
According to him, it would have been better if man did not need a woman at all. But 
if he could not do without, then it was preferable to marry. Yet, Vestdijk com-
plained, Paul did not explain why it would be better not to marry. It seemed as if one 
felt the need to control sexuality for moral reasons rather than religious ones: sexuality 
had to be controlled in order to avoid fornication, while, in fact, Vestdijk argued, it 
frustrated the attainment of totality. This, he continued, seemed to be confirmed by 
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the practice of marriage. In matrimony, sexuality was no longer a problem; fornica-
tion between man and woman became something perfectly legitimate (339). Espe-
cially Protestants used to denigrate fornicators who were not married. This sexual 
hypocrisy, however, had to be seen as one of the most important reasons for people 
to dislike Christianity, Vestdijk concluded (340). 
According to Miskotte, Vestdijk’s critique on the Christian concept of sexuality 
only made apparent what Vestdijk himself had been arguing, namely that he lacked a 
proper catechism. Otherwise, critics argued, he would have known that sexuality was 
sanctified within the context of marriage, and that that was what made Protestantism 
superior to both Catholicism and Buddhism, since the latter religions renounced 
sexuality. And if sexuality received a bad name even among Protestants, this was 
because of Platonic influences, rather than an overzealous interpretation of the Scrip-
tures, as also critics such as Van Stempvoort, Hekstra and Kamphuis argued.116 Yet, 
though these critics made similar points to those of Miskotte, only Van Stempvoort 
joined him in using a declarative style of arguing. It was only after being countered 
by Vestdijk that he turned to a republican and bureaucratic style in which both lim-
ited claims and authorities in the field were employed in order to make his case. 
Before that he had attributed Vestdijk’s misinterpretation of the Book of Paul to a 
lack of catechist education.
Vestdijk answered that his critic’s view of his Sunday-school practice was mis-
taken. Though, as we have seen, Vestdijk himself admitted to having been a bit care-
less with his story. With his teacher, he had discussed philosophy only after dogmatic 
issues had been given proper attention. Such an interpretation of what he had written 
was perfectly understandable, Vestdijk continued. Thus, his teacher (Reverend 
Engelkes, who, Vestdijk supposed, could not defend himself anymore) was not to be 
blamed for anything. Though he did not say so explicitly, this comment suggested 
that he believed Van Stempvoort to be highly biased towards his religious education. 
At least, critic was too quick with drawing his conclusions. Worse, he continued, “if 
my critic assumes that my picture of Sunday-school practice stems from arrogance on 
my part, I must disappoint him. On the one hand, my arrogance is bigger than Prof. 
Van Stempvoort estimates. On the other hand, to argue that my description of the 
master-student relationship was a matter of arrogance, is wrong,” Vestdijk con-
cluded.117
Responding to Vestdijk, Van Stempvoort apologized for his insinuations. Yet, he 
insisted that Vestdijk had not given proper attention to the historical context behind 
Paul’s teachings. As a Jew, he did not reject sexuality, but merely tried to limit its 
value within the context of the coming of the Kingdom of Christ in the near future. 
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His writings against fornication applied to the specific situation within which the 
seaport of Corinth found itself. Paul simply had an open eye for the problems of his 
times. If there was anyone to be blamed for the misconceptions of sexuality which 
modern intellectuals held, it was the Church and its clerical tradition. This tradition 
failed to read Paul’s message properly. In order to avoid any misunderstandings, one 
must read carefully, even more carefully than we were used to. This might imply a 
change of insight on our part, Van Stempvoort argued.118
Thus, even though Van Stempvoort offered a late example of polemics pursued 
in the courtly style, his reply to Vestdijk’s critique made him change strategies in the 
same way that we have detected in other traditions of criticism in the history of the 
reception of De toekomst der religie. Nevertheless, like Hekstra and Kamphuis, he failed 
to recognize the link which Vestdijk had established between metaphysical projec-
tion, biblical statements on sexuality, and the hypocrisy which many felt to be 
characteristic of Christian practice. This exact point would later recur toward the end 
of the third period of our history. 
The editor Wim Verstappen employed exactly the same method of reasoning 
which Vestdijk had used in his essay. Blue Movie, a film directed by Verstappen, was 
rejected by the Dutch film censure for being pornographic. In his response, Verstap-
pen referred to Vestdijk’s arguments about the link between sex and religion. Ac-
cording to him, metaphysical sexuality led to intercourse for merely reproductive 
purposes. On the other hand, the kinds of sexual intercourse with which he had 
experimented in his movie were meant to express feelings of love and the experi-
ences of totality of which Vestdijk had spoken. Blue Movie was intended to show that 
love was not limited to married couples; on the contrary, there were other kinds of 
relationships that allowed for feelings of care and concern.119 Yet, as soon as people of 
the metaphysical type see naked bodies, they do not see human beings anymore, 
Verstappen complained.120
Whereas most critics focused on the damage which the Dutch film censure had 
caused to the release of the movie, Ad Dronkers simply declared that the film com-
pletely failed to accomplish its goal. Being highly “pornographic,” he could not find 
anything in the movie that convinced him of the positive moral value of the pictures. 
However, he did not tell his readers exactly what he had seen and why he did not 
think it to be worth considering. To think that the type of sexuality with which 
Verstappen’s movie dealt could ever be regarded as superior to its Christian counter-
part was to be highly simplistic, Dronkers concluded.121 Verstappen responded by 
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claiming that it was wrong to assume that he did not value Christianity. Being an 
archconservative, Verstappen confessed, “I am of the opinion that children can only 
be raised in a metaphysical environment.” Yet, according to him, Christianity had to 
be removed; it did not belong in a country like the Netherlands. As long as its men-
tality dominated public discourse, Verstappen argued, we would not be allowed to 
say any sensible word on religion. The fact that Blue Movie, after it passed the film 
censure, turned out to be a success, clearly showed that its metaphysical variant did 
not play any decisive role in Dutch society anymore.122
Though sympathy for metaphysical religion might seem a contradiction to the 
belief that Christianity had to die, the fact that Vestdijk had previously argued that 
the latter variant of metaphysical projection was the most terrible one served as a 
background for Verstappen’s remarks. Neither Vestdijk nor Verstappen denied that 
they had constructed their argument with specific reference to Christianity. This was 
the case not only because it was the religion they felt and, as Verstappen said, person-
ally related to (101), but also because it manifested most clearly how a metaphysical 
system should be developed and to which results an absolute and rigidly dogmatic 
religion leads (102). On the one hand, it isolated the individual from his fellow hu-
man beings. On the other hand, the radical difference between man and God made 
certain that they would never be identified. The very notion of the possibility of a 
unity between God and man would be scorned by theologians. However, Vestdijk 
argued, this meant that man could never be certain about his future. He had a calling; 
he had to cultivate his own little garden (105). But in return he would receive only a 
matter of divine grace. Generally speaking, man did not deserve anything. Even 
somebody who had worked hard all of his life, who had performed his work and 
whatever else was necessary in order to support his family, could never be certain of 
how God would judge him. Nevertheless, a man was expected to perform his work 
as if he would receive benefits in the afterlife. In the end, however, only God de-
cided who had been a good gardener, as Vestdijk concluded in his discussion of 
Christian—especially Calvinist—morality. According to him, a Calvinist could never 
be certain of his final judgment. It was even be possible that Voltaire—an atheist—
would in the end be judged a better gardener in the eyes of God than a faithful be-
liever (106). 
Perhaps it would be relevant here to add a short dogmatic exposition, Vestdijk 
continued. What exactly, he asked himself, is the relation between true belief and 
good deeds (or, being a good gardener)? According to Protestants, “good deeds” do 
not need to be recommended. As Luther used to say: “A good tree bears good fruit”. 
For Lutherans, this meant that good deeds indicated the inner state of a believer. 
They feared those who merely pretended to be righteous, but who in fact were sin-
                                                     
122 Verstappen 1972: 39. 
137 
ners at heart (334). For Calvinists, such behavior was perceived as less of a problem. 
They believed that if one was indeed among the chosen, he would necessarily bear 
good fruit, though he should burn his friends at the stake. We see this in Calvin 
himself. Though he attacked the Church’s claims of absolute authority, he attempted 
to lay his own (individual) claims to Truth in its place. In the end, Calvin was more 
orthodox, rigid, energetic, inflexible, and fanatic than all of the Catholic theologians 
together (234). Compared to Luther, Vestdijk concluded, Calvin was a gnawed 
Dolomite peak who had withdrawn from the world and, instead of fighting the devil 
with ink, as Luther did, regaled his own brothers in faith with the stake (235). This, 
Vestdijk asserted, was the immediate consequence of the belief that a good tree is still 
good even if it in fact bears only a waspsnest (335).
Berkouwer and Popma disagreed with this image of Calvin. However, they did 
not argue with Vestdijk, leaving it to everybody interested in the issue to develop his 
own point of view. They even admitted that it was justified to question Calvin’s 
activities in Geneva, though in general they preferred a different perspective regard-
ing what exactly happened during that time.123 Sierksma, agreeing with Vestdijk, 
went even further by arguing that Calvin was a religious dictator who attempted to 
establish his dogmatic ideal state through blood and fire.124 Kraemer retorted that this 
was vulgar libertarian language, more reminiscent of 19th century intellectual circles 
than of a scientist—educated in the disciplines of history and psychology—attempting 
to apply the method of epochè.125 However, instead of making explicit their own ideas 
on the subject, critics like Kraemer and Wapenaar suspected both Vestdijk’s and 
Sierksma’s opinions and distortions of Calvin and Calvinism to be triggered by rancor 
and vindictiveness.126 Smits, whatever his sympathies for the victims, found this ver-
dict justified.127 Even if appropriate according to the methods of phenomenology, 
Kraemer argued, how must one account for Sierksma’s judgment of Calvin as a reli-
gious dictator possessed by the devil of intolerance?128 The latter maintained, how-
ever, that whatever discussion there might be about the facts, he could never support 
the persecution of those who hold different beliefs.129
Even though their critique seemed to be formulated in the courtly fashion, nei-
ther Berkouwer nor Popma attacked Vestdijk personally. However, Wapenaar, and 
especially Kraemer, did. Whereas the former critics left it to their readers to judge the 
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author of the argument with which they themselves disagreed, the latter wished to 
impose their opinions on the public by means of declarative statements. 
Vestdijk’s argument on Christianity, of which his remark on Calvin was merely 
an aside, was even more elaborate than we have suggested thus far. In fact, he con-
tinued to establish a link between metaphysical religion and intolerance. According 
to him, we had to ask ourselves whether absolute projection would not inevitably 
turn into its opposite, namely doubt (107). If people can never be certain of divine 
judgments, he asked, how then can they be certain in their belief in God himself? 
We observed how the metaphysical type projected the purpose of his life onto 
heaven. But what if this life does not make so much sense anymore? Then he would 
feel abandoned, not only by his fellow human beings, but also by God (108). This 
theory might account for facts which could be denied. Twenty centuries of Christian 
civilization have been twenty centuries of murder, egotism, intolerance and hypoc-
risy; in short: crimes committed in the name of love (109). Perhaps things would 
have been worse without the influence of Christianity. This is almost certain. Essen-
tially, however, every metaphysical religion cultivated something of a devil in human 
beings. And Vestdijk believed that through his theory, we might be able to under-
stand why (109).  
According to Zijlstra, Vestdijk clearly showed his arrogance by daring to judge 
“the freedom of the Church of our Lord.”130 Still, Vestdijk continued, doubt had to 
be repressed violently in favor of absolute truth. The devil within, as well as the one 
without, had to be fought. In the end, the metaphysical type was intolerant, not only 
toward his doubts, but also to everything that seemed to confirm those doubts. 
Whatever the doubt – or perhaps even because of those doubts – the claims of his 
dogmatic system were absolutely normative and applied to everybody. And whether 
triggered by doubts or by absolute conviction, those claims to truth urged him to 
convert others, if necessary, even by means of violence and coercion. All this could 
take place with the best intentions. And who on earth would not prefer the stake to 
the torments of hell? Vestdijk asked his readers (111). 
Miskotte responded that he was surprised to hear Vestdijk argue against coercion 
in matters of belief. As far as he knew, everyone was free to choose his own confes-
sion, a practice which he believed must be tolerated as much as possible.131 According 
to Sierksma, Miskotte confused public intolerance with psychological pressure. And, 
he concluded, this Fehlleistung revealed Miskotte’s aspirations. Behind a mask of toler-
ance hid a religious dictator. Moreover, Miskotte believed that tolerance should be 
advocated everywhere, but in practice it should ideally also be highly suspicious of 
others. Miskotte’s tolerance clearly doubted its own intentions, which was far more 
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dangerous than open intolerance, Sierksma concluded.132 For this reason, Sierksma 
called the Christian love “dubious.”133 Kraemer replied to his opponent that, after 
reading such charged accusations, he found it difficult to keep his temper.134 Sierksma 
countered that it would be better if Christians became more conscious of the fact that 
love can be a highly ambiguous force, and that it too often embraces an aggressive 
attitude. In this way he also addressed Kraemer’s difficulties in keeping his temper. 
According to Sierksma, this was typical of Christian intolerance towards those who 
would be free from theological boundaries.135 Kraemer answered that to call some-
thing “dubious” within the context of a scientific argument was far from decent. 
Personally, he preferred a serious debate regarding the issue of Christian love.136 Yet, 
Kraemer did not admit, as Miskotte would later, that requests for the legitimacy of 
unbelief were justified if we took into account the entire history of the Christian 
monopoly of power in the West.137 To limit others’ movements, Noordenbos de-
clared, was always arbitrary and tyrannical, and characteristic of a people mentally 
deficient and intolerant.138
In addition, Vestdijk argued that he had nothing against projection; as such it was 
even inevitable and necessary.139 Personally, however, what almost exclusively both-
ered him about Christianity was the intolerance of its believers. To him, it did not 
make much difference whether it manifested itself in outright intolerance, or in pity, 
arrogance or honest attempts at conversion without seriously considering whether or 
not the other was interested in changing his belief (328). Generally speaking, neither 
did Noordenbos particularly like the “imperialistic” attitude of Christians towards 
unbelievers, as he admitted in a review of Gerhard Szczesny’s essay on the future of 
unbelief.140 Ultimately, both Vestdijk’s and Noordenbos’s rejection of Christianity did 
not have so much to do with the content of its beliefs. If necessary, Vestdijk admit-
ted, he would not have any problem accepting the Christian dogmas. Rather, it was 
the obsession implicit in these dogmas that frightened him. He even confessed that he 
would be eager to accept them if people tried to keep him from believing them. His 
resistance did not have anything to do with belief as such, nor with the form it took; 
the problem was the attitude of its believers (328). On the other hand, he doubted 
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whether things were that simple, because these dogmas allowed the dogmatic to 
behave that way in the first place: intolerance was a prerequisite for those who repre-
sented metaphysical religion. “Then,” Vestdijk admitted, “I shall also turn against the 
dogma, against metaphysical projection; and besides that, I have ten other reasons to 
do so” (329).
According to Miskotte, this was a miserable confession. Only children and 
naughty boys reacted this way.141 Together with his Fehlleistung mentioned before, 
Sierksma found this remark, again, revealing. It caused him to worry about the toler-
ance to be expected from Christian theologians.142 J. Kamphuis however, rather po-
lemically declared that he did not take Vestdijk’s willingness to believe in the Chris-
tian truths seriously. To him, this confession was merely one of his ironical tricks, 
typical of Vestdijk’s style of arguing, especially since he regarded Christianity as an 
essentially intolerant religion. Vestdijk, Kamphuis held, would never believe in the 
absolute claims made by Christians.143 Vestdijk had in fact argued a similar notion, 
though without implying that this contradicted his former statement about his will-
ingness to believe in the Christian truths as long as they were presented as projections 
of relative value (328). 
While Protestants and Catholics were supposed to remain intolerant of each 
other, Protestants had learned to be tolerant (330). And Vestdijk had not even men-
tioned those sects which had always been “liberal”. Mennonites and members of the 
Remonstrant community remained separate, not because they regarded their own 
tradition to be absolute, but because they were still highly attached to their history; 
or perhaps simply because the Dutch felt comfortable in small groups. However, 
“being a child of Remonstrant parents, Vestdijk said, I went to catechisms by a Men-
nonite minister (330), because in the village in which I lived there was no Remon-
strant community. I never perceived any dogmatic differences, not only because I 
was not interested –with my minister I preferred discussing matters of philosophy—
but because those differences were completely irrelevant” (331). 
As we have seen, Miskotte and Van Stempvoort felt that Vestdijk lacked a proper 
religious education. However, though Vestdijk reflected upon his youth within the 
context of his argument on projection and intolerance, his critics curiously took up 
this point in their attempts to counter Vestdijk’s criticism of the relationship between 
sex and marriage within Christianity. 
Dronkers was highly critical of Verstappen’s images of the social type of sexuality, 
whereas Gomperts accused Vestdijk of what he called “défaitism towards the pas-
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sions.”144 Yet, according to Gomperts this was unavoidable if one was to regard Bud-
dhism as the religion of the future. But before turning to his critics, let us further 
analyse Vestdijk’s arguments for socialism and mystical-introspective religions such as 
Buddhism. Generally speaking, Vestdijk maintained, Buddhism did not repress the 
sexual functions of man. Moreover, it was, as previously indicated, far more tolerant 
than Christianity. It also seemed better equipped to take the dignity of human beings 
into account, as we shall see. Thus, we are ready to ask ourselves whether or not it 
will indeed become the religion of the future. 
Socialism and Buddhism as religions of the future – According to Vestdijk, Christianity 
could never become the religion of the future. Apart from being intolerant (some-
thing which Vestdijk personally detested), it lacked an adequate conception of human 
dignity. According to Vestdijk, this was a prerequisite for (what he called) an inte-
grated and healthy personality. It was because of this that he preferred socialism and 
mysticism, especially Buddhism, as religions fit for future generations. Whereas the 
first option led to integration with others, the last one aimed at integration with 
oneself. Yet, what critics found particularly disturbing about this notion was that it 
would inevitably lead to a religion without God. Besides, others complained, Vest-
dijk’s preference for Buddhism was inconsistent with his arguments in favor of social-
ism; Buddhism, according to them, was essentially a religion which bred egotists, 
rather than socially responsible individuals. 
Though he limited himself for the most part to a broad and general discussion of 
religion and its future (272), Vestdijk sometimes also directly referred to the personal 
problems which some might have with Christianity (273). Here, as Berkouwer re-
marked, his otherwise highly balanced argument turned into a personal defence.145
Surely, whereas Vestdijk generally employed a realist style, his confession was clearly 
made in the republican fashion. 
Besides the intolerance of Christians, Vestdijk rejected the Christian notion of 
“human dignity.” His own personal sense of responsibility did not allow him to iden-
tify with a religion in which salvation was brought about by another person; we 
ourselves wish to earn that salvation, he told his readers. For us, he continued, it is 
humiliating to be told that Christ died on the cross for our sins, especially since we 
were never asked whether or not we agreed with that. “We refuse to be killed by so 
much generosity. Without denying the fact that somebody has died on the cross, we 
do not need to accept the meaning that has been metaphysically ascribed to it” (273). 
Smits agreed with Vestdijk on this matter. Indeed, he argued, the concept of some-
one dying on the cross for our sins was purely metaphysical and had to be understood 
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as a myth. Agreeing with Vestdijk, he confessed that he would never agree to be 
saved by another’s credits. “Count me out!” (Dutch: Geef mijn portie maar aan fikkie)
he told his readers and colleagues.146 This triggered a great deal of polemics, especially 
from J.J. Buskes, who bluntly rejected Smits’s position.147 He also agreed with Vest-
dijk that if we did not accept the truth that Christ died on the cross for us, we were 
no longer Christians. 
That God, in the manifestation of Christ, had died on the cross presented for 
most people no real problem, Vestdijk argued; they probably admired it as just an-
other sign of God the Almighty. However, the notion that those who were supposed 
to benefit spiritually from Christ’s death were also the very reason he had to be killed 
was a notion which Vestdijk found too embarrassing to accept. Many people simply 
did not wish to be parasites, he argued.. And since people can call themselves Chris-
tian merely by partaking of the blessings which came forth out of the crucifixion, 
those who refused to be parasites could necessarily not call themselves Christians 
(274).
Vestdijk did not suggest that the notion of sacrifice lacked any symbolic meaning. 
This motif, he argued, was to be found everywhere and was even to be regarded as 
essentially human. Yet, to maintain that this was the only way in which to attain 
salvation was a bit too much. Instead of letting someone else die for you, it would be 
far more noble and impressive to give your own life for others. This idea, however, 
was not to be found in any Christian dogma. The possibility of human beings laying 
down their lives in order to save God, or God himself dying on the Cross, did not 
seem to have ever occured to theologians. Some hints toward the latter idea were 
only suggested in mystical literature (274). 
The idea of Christ dying at the cross for our sins was directly linked to the idea 
that we needed to be saved in the first place. We needed to be saved because we 
were sinners. To be human was to be a sinner. According to the doctrine of original 
sin, we were guilty. To be human was to be guilty. Every single movement or obser-
vation was sinful—everything we did was something to feel guilty about (276). 
Without denying the symbolic value of the myth of the fall, Vestdijk contended, 
others did not continually need to remind him that he was a “sinner”; his own intro-
spection sufficed to convince him of that. He made mistakes, Vestdijk confessed; but, 
he felt truly sorry for them, and he tried not to commit them anymore (277). When 
others claimed the right to call him a sinner, however, and justified themselves in 
doing so by referring to theology, then he firmly objected. Of course, he admitted, 
this was a personal reaction; others, in their turn, were not obliged to agree with 
him. However, he believed that talking too much about sin and guilt, and building 
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up a theology, made people forget that they themselves were sinners, though they 
did not seem to feel guilty at all. All too often, humility toward God went hand in 
hand with arrogance toward other human beings. Though outwardly Christians, too 
many people were selfish egotists inside, Vestdijk argued (278). 
Just because he refused to make his own sinfulness the cornerstone of his world-
view, Vestdijk remarked, this did not imply that he would forget to take the realities 
of sin and guilt seriously. He did not agree with Nietzsche, who argued that “guilt” 
was a concept invented by priests in order to make people responsible for their own 
fate instead of offering them the possibilities to fight them. According to Vestdijk, 
this was the voice of the polemist, rather than the psychologist. Moreover, people 
who suffered from guilt were usually strong characters, able to support some remorse 
and punishment (279). 
Guilt, Vestdijk maintained, was characteristic of disintegrative natures. Whatever 
their metaphysical status, unconsciously disintegrated persons felt guilty toward their 
fellow human beings. They refused their neighbors proper attention, support, sympa-
thy, responsibility and love. However, given the metaphysical orientation of their 
personality, these people would always believe to have failed in fulfilling their duties. 
And instead of letting themselves suffer excessively from their guilt, they tended to 
hold God accountable for it. Yet, in the end, it was God who held them accountable. 
And since they were not able to change the figure, they simply remained the same 
that they had always been (280).  
The projection of guilt, Vestdijk held, precluded any change whatsoever (281). 
To remain the way you were was made even easier by letting somebody else pay for 
your sins. That was why Christ had to die on the Cross (282). It did not matter who 
we were, or whether we ourselves had suffered or not. Whatever sins one commit-
ted, Christ had just paid for them. This was what Vestdijk called “the capitalistic aspect 
of the metaphysical idea of guilt.” (283). Christ died for human beings in exactly the 
way that a capitalist lets people labor for him in order to make the profits necessary to 
pay off his debts. This link with the capitalist mentality is not merely a highly subjec-
tive idea, but is confirmed by the Catholic dogma of good works. Theoretically, one 
can pay off his debts to Christ by performing good works; yet, in the end, it is the 
Church that counts these profits and decides who has paid enough for his sins (283). 
According to Kraemer, this entire argument was utter nonsense and was not meant to 
be taken seriously.148 Wapenaar, on the other hand, could not conceive why Vestdijk 
had ignored the fact that the Calvinists had attempted to get rid of the Catholic vari-
ant of state-capitalism. In fact, thus, Vestdijk’s critique applied to the Catholics, rather 
than to the Calvinists.149 Moreover, Vestdijk had reduced Paul’s discussion of guilt to 
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a judiciary-metaphysical construction and a kind of administrative morality. Accord-
ing to Wapenaar this could only be taken as sarcastic criticism and a matter of scorn-
ing faith. Paul himself, however, wrote: “we speak wisdom among those who are 
mature, yet not the wisdom of this age, nor that of the rulers of this age; none of the 
rulers of this age knew; for had they known, they would not have crucified the Lord 
of glory”.150
Critics, with the exception of Hekstra,151 ignored the link which Vestdijk had es-
tablished between guilt and disintegration. Starting with the connection between 
those two concepts, his remarks regarding the parallel between capitalistism and 
Christ’s crucifixion for the sins of other human beings were perfectly reasonable. Yet, 
while according to these critics a psychological approach was out of place, the refer-
ence to capitalism could only be regarded as a “jest” or “sarcastic criticism,” as 
Kraemer and Wapenaar concluded, and could therefore not be taken seriously. How-
ever, this seemingly self-confident judgment is clearly an example of displacing the 
argument for the intentions of the author.
According to Vestdijk, continuing along the lines of his psychological approach, 
the ideas of original sin and guilt had been rightly criticized by mystics and more 
“liberal” theologians (276). Also, the doctrine of predestination mitigated the per-
sonal implications of original sin; if we were not free, than God had to be held ac-
countable for our sins, rather than we ourselves as human beings (277). Critics either 
maintained that God Himself had in fact died on the Cross, or that the doctrine of 
substitutive death was an invention of the Church. These critics argued instead for a 
more original and pure form of Christianity which derived immediately from Jesus’ 
own teachings. In a sense, Christ himself was the first socialist (278). And surely, the 
idea of Christ dying for our sins did not correspond to the biblical narrative. In the 
Gospels we do not find the concepts of “sin” or “guilt” (281). Christ not only fo-
cused on the law that requested people to love their neighbor; he also showed people 
how to fulfill this law while paying for their debts. Guilt was no longer a metaphysi-
cal category, but, instead, became a social-mystical one. Christianity, however, failed 
to follow the example of Christ (282). 
According to Vestdijk, the attempt to integrate Christianity with a social type of 
religion could only be a tactical move. For Westerners, Christian socialism or social 
Christianity was unlikely to be of much appeal. Its philosophical justification was too 
complicated for ordinary men. And its history had offered too many examples of 
violence in the name of love to be a plausible alternative. As Nietzsche rightly ar-
gued: Im Grunde gab es nur einen Christen, und er starb am Kreuz (250).
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However, Vestdijk admitted, without any idea of God or Christ, it might seem 
strange to call socialism a religion, especially when considering its ‘materialistic’ con-
ceptions (118). Whereas according to socialists religion was only a surrogate, theolo-
gians believed that socialism itself was a surrogate for religion (119). Yet, Vestdijk 
argued, like metaphysical projection, the socialist’s ideals stemmed from a drive to-
wards totality. The socialist would substitute relations with parents for those with 
humanity. Moreover, such ideals were largely derived from Christianity (119). On 
the one hand, there was the Gospel of love, and on the other hand, the doctrine of 
human equality before God (with thanks to Menno ter Braak for this insight). It was 
even possible to maintain that Christ had been “the first socialist,” while, in fact, his 
disciples preferred to emphasize the metaphysical tendencies of his teachings, and 
interpreted details that were meant as symbols, literally (120). And, as far as they 
remembered the words of Christ, they transformed them into images of a future in 
which Christ would return to this world (121). 
According to Vestdijk, metaphysical religion differed fundamentally not only 
from social, but also from the mystical-introspective religion. While metaphysical 
projection was imaginary and did not have any direct connection with everyday life, 
in social religion naturally perfect man as a symbol had been substituted for a realistic 
and factual approach of the reality symbolized, i.e. for natural perfect humanity. In 
this case, religion was not a relationship between God and man; rather it was a mu-
tual bond between human beings. According to Berkouwer, Vestdijk’s picture of 
metaphysical religion tended toward caricature. Surely, from this perspective, the 
history of Christianity must be that of disintegration. Yet, are we obliged to regard 
the social bonds of friendship and communitas as something different from the Cove-
nant between God and Abraham, His friend? On the contrary, Vestdijk clearly 
showed that he did not understand the notion of friendship in Christianity.152 Here, 
however, Berkouwer ignored the fact that Vestdijk did not deny any friendship be-
tween God and man, but instead argued that exactly this friendly relationship made 
man forget about his relationship with humanity as a whole. Though clearly a distor-
tion of Vestdijk’s argument, this was not meant as an attempt to derogate his abilities 
as a theorist on Christianity. Rather, Berkouwer attributed Vestdijk’s distorted pic-
ture of Christianity to his theory of projection, thereby allowing a possibility for 
discussion. Later, Berkouwer dealt extensively with the issue of religious projection 
himself,153 as would some of his friends and followers.154
Whereas the social type of religion was social or collectivist, mystical-
introspective religion, on the other hand, was orientated toward the individual. 
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Moreover, while social religion was orientated towards the future, the mystical type 
focused on the here and now (158). The social type pursued social improvements, 
equality and unity; it tried to improve the mutual relations between people, and man 
could be happy when, through his activities, at least part of that ideal was realized 
during his own life. The mystical type, however, tried to realize the ideal completely 
during his lifetime. He did not believe in naturally perfect humanity; rather he tried 
to embody naturally perfect man by himself. The only things he believed in were the 
religious possibilities of his own soul (158). Yet, whatever the differences, both the 
social and mystical types rejected all metaphysical projection, creating an unbridge-
able distance between human beings and God. That was also why these types were 
better equipped to deal with the problem of human dignity than the metaphysically 
oriented religion of Christianity. 
Whereas Christianity produced highly disintegrated figures, the other religious 
types were far more integrated. The difference between the social type and the mys-
tical-introspective consisted of the direction of their movement toward integration. 
Whereas the first was outwardly directed, the latter tended to turn inwardly. Noor-
denbos (as well as Sierksma, though not without qualifications155) maintained that 
such a religion was original, illuminating and appropriate for making judgments of 
the cultural predicaments of the time.156 At least they found Vestdijk’s arguments 
worth considering. 
Without explaining why, or by merely declaring that religion was simply the ‘be-
lief in God’, what bothered many critics—notably Sterkman, De Vos, Miskotte, Van 
der Leeuw, De Jong, Oosterbaan, Kraemer and Van Stempvoort—, was the fact that 
Vestdijk employed these typologies in order to argue for a religion without God, if 
that could still be regarded a religion.157 Yet, Van Heugten argued that discarding 
God implied that Vestdijk and Buddha were no longer religious, but rather mere 
atheists. Thus, he ignored the fact that, according to Vestdijk, Buddha viewed relig-
ion and atheism as one and the same thing. Van Heugten, on the other hand, pre-
ferred to follow other authorities by claiming that the Buddhist method was a-
religious. “And, of course,” he continued, “Vestdijk is free to call whatever he likes 
religious; one can also call a pencil a shoelace.” Yet, Aristotle had written that if one 
wished to make a statement, one must use the terminology that is usually employed 
in such cases.158 In this case, one had to take into account what human beings for 
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centuries already had understood by religion. They had always believed religion to be 
a relationship between man and a supernatural power.159
Already at the beginning of his essay, Vestdijk explained his disagreement with 
the definition of religion as ‘belief in God’. This definition excluded Buddhism from 
the religious scene because it failed to account for a religion without God (19). In 
this sense, being radically opposed to any metaphysical tendency, Vestdijk preferred 
the mystical-introspective religion to the social one. More than the social type, the 
mystical type was aware of the problems associated with metaphysical projection. For 
example, Vestdijk suggested, Buddhism—at least if we believed its sources, and we 
did not have any reason not to—warned us of its dangers (160). If one intended to 
root out suffering, one had to fight metaphysics. Buddha had been extremely radical 
in this; he simply ignored all projections that pretended to be metaphysical. When 
asked: “Do the gods exist or not?” he answered: “Why do you ask me?” Buddha was 
simply not interested in the gods, and so he did not feel the need to talk about them 
either (161). 
Yet, Vestdijk asked himself, if the alternative to metaphysics was mysticism, what 
exactly was meant by that? He concluded that mysticism was meant to be interpreted 
as introspection aimed at self-analysis and self-criticism. As such, Vestdijk believed 
mysticism to be the opposite of projection. Contrary to Rudolf Otto, who argued 
that mysticism was impossible to imagine without theism, Vestdijk maintained that 
both were radically different (162). According to him, Buddhism was the perfect 
example of mysticism (163).  
Several critics took issue with Vestdijk’s preference for Buddhist mysticism pre-
cisely because it denied any kind of outside reality. Buddha was as ascetic as Luther 
was when he was suffering under the Roman yoke. However, as soon as he started 
reading the Scriptures and found Jesus Christ, Luther felt released. Buddha, on the 
other hand, found peace after he decided to interpret reality as an illusion.160 This 
implied that Buddha preferred to integrate himself with Nothingness. However, by 
that, his dignity also faded away.161 Being integrated with everything and humanity as 
a whole, abandoning his wife, children, relatives, friends, personal property and the 
world, he failed to see man as a concrete human being.162 Buddha confused individu-
alism (the individual as absolute) with individuality (human life as a gift of God), as 
Wytzes noticed.163 Seen within this context, Pos asked his readers whether Buddhist 
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solidarity was of more value than Christian love.164 Surely, he maintained, everybody 
had the right to take Buddha as the spiritual summit of the world; yet, then, one also 
had the right to ask what the consequences of that would be. Buddha was merely the 
prophet of religious nihilism. And, Pos asserted, “I know those lyrical songs on 
Nothingness being ultimate happiness, nihilism being totality, emptiness being full-
ness.” According to him, however, “this was spiritual suicide, leaving the world 
behind in ruins when nothing remained to sing about anymore.”165
There would be no truth, no dignity left. Or, Pos asked his readers, did they 
think that to sink into nothingness was more dignifying than to enjoy the lilies in the 
fields, even though we acknowledged that God’s beautiful world would always be 
threatened by the powers of darkness?166 Something similar held true for Vestdijk, 
Wapenaar believed. According to him, utility rather than truth was decisive for his 
worldview. The images which man had created had been useful in bringing about a 
basic level of civilization, much the same way some liberals found the Bible useful in 
so much as it justified their holy properties. However, as soon as man, being a wild 
animal, understood that society was built merely on illusions, the time would come 
when his animal instincts would be given free reign.167 Only a cynic could argue for 
Buddhism, Teeuwen remarked. Human beings did not matter. Their lives were 
simply built of pathologies and sexual aberrations. Nothing positive was left here. 
That is why only Buddhism could offer solutions.168 Similarly, Gomperts complained 
that, following Vestdijk’s recommendations, in the end, we would abandon this 
world, masturbating between heaps of rotting sauerkraut.169
By using this style of arguing, these critics attempted to support their verdicts on 
Vestdijk: his proposals were irresponsible. Without making any detailed references—
either to facts, professionals or Vestdijk’s arguments—they simply denounced the 
latter’s proposed solutions for the problem of disintegration from which Western 
religion had been suffering. Their comments were either ironical or arrogant, and 
denied of any value the reasons which Vestdijk had been given for his way of think-
ing. Though sometimes references were made to textual traditions, critics did not 
justify their judgments by explaining what exactly was wrong with Vestdijk’s argu-
ments.
As if responding to his critics in advance, Vestdijk argued that Buddhism could 
not be translated as “Nothingness” because this term suggested something negative 
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(172). Buddhism was not nihilistic; it only used negative terms to urge man to ana-
lyze the existing order and the ideals intended to change them, in an attempt to en-
courage him to follow inner drives and strive for the better (173). Here mysticism 
resembled psychology (170), while metaphysics simply did not matter (171). 
As mysticism, Buddhism offered an extreme example of a-metaphysical tenden-
cies; and as such it had no equal in human history (174). Western mysticism has al-
ways been a compromise between true mysticism and theology. When theology 
became too symbolic, it was deemed heretical and in violation of the metaphysical 
pretensions of the Church. Those symbols functioned as means to attain unity with 
Christ, and implied autonomy from the Church as mediator of Christ on earth (177). 
Christianity is the “scapegoat,” Van Heugten complained, whereas Buddhism 
seemed to be a “lap dog.”170 Pos stated, ironically, that Vestdijk seemed to be running 
into the arms of Buddha.171 Oosterbaan and Kraemer blamed Vestdijk and Sierksma 
for not actually doing so. According to them, if the latter two were ready to accept 
the natural consequences of their ideals, why did they not convert to Buddhism?172
Writing Brahman, nor Atman; nothing was permanent. Even Nirvana did not mean 
anything.
Some critics suggested that both Vestdijk and Sierksma, being interested in origi-
nal Buddhism, took Buddha to be a historical figure. According to them, there was a 
strange incongruity here. On the one hand, they questioned Christ as a historical 
figure, suggesting that we did not know anything about Him for certain. On the 
other hand, however, they took Buddhist Scriptures at face value. Taking into ac-
count the time-span and historical distance, the sources about Jesus were far more 
reliable than those about Buddha.173
“Does not this show a curious prejudice towards Christianity?” Kraemer asked. 
“It is just a question…”174 Both Vestdijk and Sierksma responded by reminding their 
critics that they were conscious of the historical problems. Yet, the historical figures, 
though important, were not crucial for their argument. What mattered to them was 
the fact that people had created an image of both Jesus Christ and the Buddha. Yet, 
critics continued, why did both Vestdijk and Sierksma attempt to distinguish between 
Jesus as a historical figure and Christ as a metaphysical construction by Paul and the 
Church. Moreover, why did they focus on the history of Christianity for their judg-
ments, when they were comparing it to a self-made ideal of Buddhism? Why did 
they take the original variant of Buddhism to be the correct interpretation of Bud-
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dha’s teachings, thus ignoring the metaphysical tendencies in the history of Bud-
dhism? When they write about Buddhism, one feels their inspiration, Kraemer as-
serted. Theirs is a passionate argument, he continued. Yet it lacks existential and 
religious drama.  
Kraemer knew the right antidote for that. “If one, instead, wants to get some im-
pression of what I miss in these arguments, I would suggest (though I doubt Vestdijk 
and Sierksma would appreciate this) to read Karl Barth on mysticism and atheism as 
critical movements against religion. This argument is of a power and depth which all 
psychologists and philosophers of religion together could never offer me.”175 And 
Barth stood by his beliefs. Both Vestdijk and Sierksma, on the other hand, failed to 
make an existential choice for one religion or another. Convinced of the truth in 
Buddhism, its denial of any personality, the emptiness of reality, they preferred to 
retain their individualism and concept of the world as a given. Consequently, they 
stopped halfway. Thus, the question arose what would be the alternative if the wishes 
of Vestdijk, Sierksma, and Verstappen came true and Christianity indeed died and 
disappeared? Here we arrive at the last topic of our discussion. 
Some hints for the future – Many critics have taken issue with Vestdijk’s personal opin-
ion that it was not only plausible that Christianity should one day disappear, but also 
preferable. Yet, he did not wish it to disappear too rash and quickly. Christianity, 
Vestdijk claimed, had to die a worthy death. I must not leave any vindictiveness 
behind. “Sir does not wish to let any anger or envy remain for the people who 
would lose something along the way. How nice, isn’t it?” Zijlstra scorned.176 Vestdijk 
did not think it necessary to indicate a timeframe. It certainly needed some time, 
either to lose its dominant position or to develop into something else that would no 
longer be recognized as essentially Christian. “Imagine a Christian,” Vestdijk told his 
readers, “waking up one morning and arriving at the conclusion that, in fact, he was 
a Buddhist” (331). 
Vestdijk believed that psychoanalysis would have to play an important role in the 
religion of the future. For that, however, it was to be changed from a method of 
treating patients into pedagogy. The youth, especially students, had to practice medi-
tation, rather than merely being informed about sexuality, as in the Freudian analyti-
cal method (351). Courses on the symbolism of the Father, the Mother, and the Son 
were to be included in the curriculum. Afterwards, courses for the metaphysical, 
social and mystical-introspective types would be useful. We might take a lesson here 
from the Indian yoga methods: the Raja-yoga would be perfect for the mystical-
introspective, the Karma-yoga for the social, and the Bhakti-variant for the meta-
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physical type. Even though metaphysics might turn out to be just a “primitive” stage 
in the history of religions, everybody needed to know it by experience. Contrary to 
what many critics have made of his arguments, Vestdijk argued that people had to be 
taught to control their metaphysical projections, rather than to simply become athe-
ists (352). On several occasions Vestdijk made some positive comments regarding 
metaphysical religion as a necessary stage in Western culture. Some critics, however, 
took these to be highly ironical.177 By those recommendations, Wapenaar and 
Kraemer held, Vestdijk merely tried to dissimulate his negative judgment on Christi-
anity. In the end, he simply preferred a religion without God. And (though this point 
mainly arose in the controversy with Sierksma) he wished to be free from theology. 
Surely, his idea of a religious elite for the future was quite clear about that. 
In fact, Vestdijk preferred a psychoanalytical pedagogy, which required a specific 
kind of teacher. According to him, this specific type of pedagogy was not just a mat-
ter of transmitting specialist knowledge and keeping order in the classroom (353). To 
educate teachers, specific methods were needed. People were not to be educated 
how to teach, but rather how to behave. And this required a so-called para-pedagogy,
Vestdijk argued (354). As teachers, they only needed to exist; they only needed to be 
examples through their self-control, benevolence, open-mindedness, courage and 
perseverance. As such they were the opposite of the meddling bragging that in 
Europe is sold for pedagogy, Vestdijk concluded (355). 
This way, Vestdijk maintained, a new type of homo religious would replace the 
age-old priest (356). For that, however, the problems of sexuality, death and resent-
ment (envy) needed to be resolved (357). The psychologist that was needed to ac-
complish this goal was found in the mystic (359). The advantage of the latter was that 
he did not have any relationship with the world; he did not own anything. He would 
not ask for any momentary pleasure—not a wife, nor a family, nor any property, 
honor or status. He would not even own himself, neither his mind nor his body 
(359).
Yet, Vestdijk asked, how were we to imagine this para-pedagogy? According to 
him this was immediately linked to the question of its legitimacy. There would al-
ways be a danger that this para-pedagogy would end in metaphysical projections of a 
superhuman, ultimate spiritual authority—God. And who would be the highest 
pedagogue in the hierarchy? Who would decide who has the right to exercise the 
highest authority? (360). Berkelbach van der Sprenkel asked who would appoint this 
new elite. Who was supposed to build this future? How was this elite to be provided 
with authority? Vestdijk’s proposals reminded Van der Sprenkel of the famous adven-
tures of Baron von Münchhausen, who pulled himself out of the swamp by his own 
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pate.178 Curiously, these were the same words which Vestdijk had used to indicate the 
problem. Vestdijk added that in matters of the mind, jumping from the swamp were 
the order of the day. We only had to be careful not to change the figure, and assign 
those miracles to any divine intervention. Mystics did not derive their authority from 
anything other than themselves (361). Also Van der Leeuw referred to these mystics 
as later variants of Baron von Münchhausen.179 While Rodenko mentioned Sancho 
Panza, who, much like Vestdijk, struggled with the nihilistic tendencies of his soul,180
other critics had simply invoked their hero for ironical purposes. While Vestdijk 
admitted that there was indeed something ironical about the enterprise, many com-
mentators, without indicating that Vestdijk himself had been conscious of the diffi-
culties, simply attempted to invalidate his ideas by means of this analogy. Kraemer 
argued that Vestdijk was talking his way out here. The result, indeed, was disappoint-
ing.181 According to De Vos, Vestdijk was merely jesting.182
Vestdijk, nevertheless, continued his argument. Mystics needed to be educated in 
solitude. Monasteries, supervised by the state, were to receive a highly selective 
group of students; those students were to follow a specific curriculum and graduate as 
pedagogues. And not only future pedagogues, but also anybody else who intended to 
play an important role in public life, would be required to achieve this grade. Besides 
that, of course, they would be allowed to study at normal universities (361). More 
specifically, Vestdijk imagined a kind of monastery that would be more or less a syn-
thesis of the Roman Catholic retraite, the Buddhist monastery and the English univer-
sity. And even though participation would be voluntary, there would have to be 
strong discipline. The curriculum would aim at competence in psychology and the 
practical methods of mysticism, and, more generally, “spiritual care”: the student 
must be able to concentrate, control his bodily functions, be able to express his inner 
feelings; he needed to understand himself; follow gymnastics, be able to work in 
community (362). In general: the student must be able to live a solitary life as much 
as he must be ready to guide the people if necessary (362).  
Critics have scorned Vestdijk’s new elite for its solitariness. Moreover, the insti-
tutes at which the new elite was to be educated—especially Vestdijk’s curious mix of 
the Catholic retraite, the Buddhist monastery and the English university—were re-
garded as absolutely ridiculous. Many found it incredible how Vestdijk had come up 
with such a ludicrous idea! What was worse was that he wanted to place these insti-
tutes of higher learning under state-supervision. Vestdijk found the intolerance of 
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Christians highly problematic, but he himself suggested that his ideas for the future be 
enforced by means of state power! Previously, he had argued that those who refused 
to be tolerant should be forced by the state. Together with the reign of his new elite, 
this implied nothing other than intolerance towards Christians. With this remark, 
Wytzes tried to indicate some contradiction in Vestdijk’s argument.183 Even more 
critically, Kamphuis concluded that Vestdijk’s ideal of the future sounded similar to 
the situation which the atheist regimes of Eastern Europe had created for the Church. 
The times of the Inquisition would return.184
While the critics were correct in their judgment of Vestdijk’s intolerance towards 
the intolerant, as well as in their view that people could only differ on the value of 
this kind of intolerance, things were somewhat more complicated in the case of state-
supervised institutes for religious education, as a thorough reading of Vestdijk’s ar-
gument shows. According to him, both their selection and their being sanctioned by 
the state would make students feel privileged, while at the same time providing them 
with authority over the “profane” masses, including future students. And the people 
would submit to these pedagogues, rather than show their usual disdain for traditional 
prigs (363). If, through the activities of some unqualified masters, authority seemed to 
be threatened, the state had to take its responsibility. And we had to be careful, Vest-
dijk warned. Pedagogy might easily turn into mystagogy and myth mania; an attempt 
might even be made to legitimize authority by metaphysical projections (364). This 
remark was all the more striking when Kamphuis judged Vestdijk himself to be a 
mystagogue.185 However, Vestdijk continued, because mystics did not have any au-
thority above them, they were, strictly speaking, of a higher order than the Catholic 
saints. That also meant, however, that they would always run the risk of being vener-
ated rather than followed, as we also see in the Indian tradition (364). Vestdijk knew 
it would be extremely difficult to create a system of masters whose authority did not 
need to be legitimized by any “higher” or supernatural power. Yet if there were no 
difficulties, we would not need to wait five centuries (or more) to realize this project 
(365).
Vestdijk seemed to argue that a kind of enlightened politics was needed as long as 
the masses did not regard the new elite of spiritual masters to be legitimate. How 
difficult it would be to make this new hierarchy of powers function properly, Vest-
dijk indicated by the significant amount of time it would probably take to realize the 
project. Moreover, both Vestdijk and Sierksma added another important fact. To 
critics who found a contradiction between the ideals for which they advocated, and 
the fact that neither of them had converted to either mysticism or Buddhism, they 
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answered that for Westerners it would be impossible to get rid of the old mentality 
and to become accustomed to the Eastern methods of spirituality. Kraemer told 
Sierksma that he was surprised to see him attack Prof. Oosterbaan’s “intelligent re-
mark” that, while proposing Buddha and Buddhism as the only scientifically appro-
priate answers to the religious problems of the West, he refused to become a Bud-
dhist himself and thus attempted to avoid an existential decision.186 Of course, 
Kraemer continued, “I do not want to deny him the right to his own heroic existen-
tialism. Yet, he fails to account for this inconsistency between argument and personal 
choice, especially given his scientific arrogance. He cannot escape by referring to the 
19th century prudery: Religion ist Privatsache. One must have the courage to pay for his 
high voice,” Kraemer concluded.187 Yet, Noordegraaf would later suggest that we 
should not expect this kind of courage from Vestdijk; his attitude during World War 
II and his membership of the Kultuurkamer were telling enough.188 Surely, these were 
self-confidently derogatory and highly personal declarations by Kraemer. And, 
clearly, he did not justify them with references to any other authority than his own. 
However, he might have thought that, together with the other points which he had 
previously made, these just indicated a negative obsession. For people with some 
sensibility, he claimed, it could be felt everywhere.189 Wapenaar pointed to a certain 
ambivalence in Vestdijk’s attitude towards Christianity. The latter had confessed 
several times that he appreciated the contribution of Christianity to our culture. It 
was the same with his attitude towards God: even though he denied His existence, 
he did not seem to be free from Him. As an old catechist manual by Reverend Hel-
lenbroek answered the question whether there were people who denied God’s exis-
tence: “Yes, but this is more a wish than a firm belief.”190
Both Wapenaar and Kraemer employed a courtly style of arguing. Though we 
previously observed how they invoked the spirit of Barth, in this case they took 
responsibility for their own verdict on Sierksma. This time, Wapenaar referred to an 
authority of his own religious tradition, Hellenbroek. Yet, the latter’s statement was 
not invoked in order to point out facts concerning people under similar circum-
stances as Vestdijk; on the contrary, it was only used in order to lend even more 
credibility to the verdict passed on Vestdijk. In the end, by means of declarative 
statements, both Wapenaar and Kraemer attributed Vestdijk’s (and Sierksma’s) way of 
reasoning to a lack of nerve. They clearly did not limit their judgments to the actual 
arguments of their opponents. 
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Whereas Berkouwer attempted to explain Vestdijk’s caricatures by referring to his 
preference for Buddhism, limiting himself to the text, Kreamer simply believed that 
both Vestdijk and Sierksma were agitated.191 They simply despised Christianity, 
Christians, and God.192 According to Kamphuis, they felt haunted by them, they tried 
to get rid of them.193 The influence of this mentality on the masses was considerable 
and “dangerous,” some critics argued. Many young people had mistaken those cari-
catures for the truth, and consequently abandoned the faith of their parents.194
Both Vestdijk and Sierksma considered it stupid to conclude that they hated 
Christianity, Christians, and God, based solely on the caricatures created by their 
opponents. In his polemic with Kraemer, Sierksma even explicitly asked him to re-
fute his accusations, both personally and publicly, if he wished to have any type of 
meaningful dialogue. “Whatever we have against Christianity,” Sierksma confessed, 
“we cannot deny that we are Christians ourselves. Whether we like it or not, we are 
too Christian to become Buddhists, even if we wanted to. This is already sufficient 
reason against Oosterbaan’s and Kraemer’s attempts to have us converted to Bud-
dhism.”195 Continuing in this personal fashion, he told his readers: “I am not anti-
God, nor anti-religious. You either believe in God, or you do not. Does that mean 
that I am anti-Christian?” According to Sierksma, Kraemer was forgetting that criti-
cism of Christianity did not mean that he held Christianity personally responsible. 
Finally, he asked, “Am I anti-theology? I am simply not interested in it. For me, it is 
a matter of endless discussion. Barth, venerated by Kraemer, I find boring, except 
when he is discussing Mozart.” Certainly, he continued, “apart from theology there 
are theologians, and Kraemer, with his personal comments, forces me to answer this 
point. I am working at a theological faculty. Though I deal with the Study of Relig-
ions, attending Church ceremonies is requested. Yet, if refraining from either Church 
or theological business has any serious consequences for me in the sense that I am 
treated like an outlaw, then I have the right to be seriously disappointed. If Kraemer 
reads some anti-theological sentiments in my books, then the background of all this 
might be clear. If he wants personal, he will get it: I will treat him as a symptom of a 
scientifically and theologically dubious situation.”196
Apparently shocked by Sierksma’s critique, Kraemer attempted to shift from a de-
clarative and personal to a republican style of arguing, containing personal confessions 
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together with friendly remarks towards his opponents. Unluckily, however, Sierksma 
felt the need to conclude that he did not find Kraemer’s remarks to the point. The 
required common ground needed for a proper dialogue was missing. Their exchange 
was neither conversation nor polemic, neither scientific discussion nor literary con-
troversy.197 If we are not able stand aloof from personal backgrounds, Sierksma con-
cluded, we will never find common ground together.198 Kraemer had not taken his 
scientific intentions seriously, Sierksma complained. According to Kraemer, some 
personal obsession was behind all of this. Everything scientific about his arguments 
was dismissed as a pose. Yet, Sierksma confessed rather ironically: “I do not want to 
refute his belief, just like I do not want to refute his belief in metaphysical projec-
tions.199 I simply find him a highly incompetent psychologist and a careless reader. 
And all of this led to a useless exchange that did not deserve the paper and the energy 
spilled upon it,” he concluded.200
Conclusions: to be polemical or not 
In this chapter, we have seen critics try to establish or defend their authority by me-
ans of different rhetorical styles. While it was impossible to touch upon every single 
issue that came up during the controversy, I have selected the most important issues 
which triggered polemical comments by critics. 
Strikingly, we have met with different people holding the same opinions. Neither 
Berkouwer, Bavinck or Van Praag, nor De Vos and Wapenaar agreed with what they 
understood to be Vestdijk’s argument, namely that religion was merely a projection 
of human needs and desires. And even though not every single theologian made an 
issue of it, none of them would have agreed that Christianity was necessarily intole-
rant and repressive. Likewise, nobody—not even literary critics—would ever admit 
that Buddhism was superior to Christianity and should therefore serve as its substitu-
te. Finally, none of the theologians would have agreed that Vestdijk’s para-
pedagogues were better equipped to solve social problems than theologians.  
Yet, the style with which critics formulated their disagreement differed considera-
bly from one case to another. Some of them tried to argue with facts (as in the realist 
style), or reference to established authorities in the field (the bureaucratic style), or 
sometimes readily admitted that they were offering a personal opinion (republican 
style). Others, however, denounced Vestdijk’s or Sierksma’s opinions outright by 
suggesting (whether consciously or not) that their own authority was enough to 
outwit their opponent. Instead of offering critical remarks which countered the ar-
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guments by their opponents, they merely declared them to be inferior to their own 
opinions.
In the present chapter I have tried to give many examples of the declarative style 
of arguing. To put things into perspective, I have sometimes compared these instan-
ces with comments made by critics who employed other writing styles. While Vest-
dijk generally limited himself to a non-declarative style of reasoning, it was relatively 
easy to demonstrate the differences. He argued either in a realistic or republican fas-
hion, offering elaborate arguments, often referring to authorities in the field, and 
sometimes allowing himself to make some personal confessions. Yet, as we have seen 
in the previous chapter, even Vestdijk could not avoid attacking others personally. 
Similarly, whatever the careful way of reasoning by which he proceeded, he also 
sometimes employed the declarative style of arguing, as we have seen in his dialogue 
with Gomperts. The same held true for Sierksma. Though arguing carefully, Sierks-
ma aimed even more often than Vestdijk to denounce other opinions in a courtly 
fashion, as became clear in his attacks on Gomperts and Barneveld. 
As usual in the case of critics, they disagreed with Vestdijk and Sierksma. Yet, cri-
tics as diverse as Berkouwer and Fortmann kept themselves far from the declarative 
style of arguing which was often employed by their like-minded fellows. Other ex-
ceptions were Walgrave, Bavinck, Popma, and Janse de Jonge and, for the most part, 
Luypen. Yet, though the latter agreed on most issues with Fortmann and used a simi-
lar style of writing (the realist one), he failed to restrain himself from criticizing Sierk-
sma’s state of mind in order to denounce his argument against phenomenology—
without, of course, being able to support his statements by facts or psychological 
research. We have frequently observed this kind of reasoning in the present chapter 
directed against the persons of both Vestdijk and Sierksma. We have seen Zijlstra, 
Wytzes, Van Heugten, De Vos, Miskotte, Van der Leeuw, Teeuwen, De Jong, 
Kraemer, Pos, Van Stempvoort and Kamphuis complain that God had been explai-
ned away by the way in which religion had been defined in De toekomst der religie—
without attempting to make clear why this was a bad thing. Apart from being a sim-
ple observation, it functioned to denounce Vestdijk’s approach. The latter’s theory of 
projection was discarded as a matter of jest or a product of his own imagination by 
people like Mankes-Zernike, Wapenaar, and Kamphuis. The argument that Christia-
nity was necessarily intolerant and repressive, as also supported by Verstappen, was 
countered declaratively by Zijlstra, De Vos, Van der Leeuw, Miskotte, Wapenaar, 
Kraemer, Van Stempvoort, Dronkers and, again, Kamphuis. To prefer Buddhism to 
Christianity was baseless and ought to be discarded, as people like Sterkman, Van 
Heugten, Wytzes, Van der Leeuw, Teeuwen, Wapenaar, De Jong, Oosterbaan, Pos, 
Kraemer and Van Stempvoort made clear. Concerning Vestdijk’s prospects for the 
future and his proposals to actively solve the problems of the West, some critics reac-
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ted with scorn, such as Zijlstra, Wytzes, Van Heugten, De Vos, Van der Leeuw, 
Wapenaar, Kraemer, Van Stempvoort, Noordegraaf and Kamphuis. 
On all of these issues, an impressive list of contributors to the controversy em-
ployed the courtly style. This does not imply that they did not manage any other 
style of arguing. On the contrary, some critics used the declarative style less systema-
tically than others, who only used it incidentally. Some changed their style according 
to the circumstances. After the interventions of Sierksma, we see the courtly style 
being less often employed. Kraemer and Van Stempvoort became more moderate 
and realist in their later contributions.  
We must imagine a continuum between the two poles of polemical attacks on the 
one hand, and non-polemical interventions on the other. It is possible to distinguish 
between clear cases that are to be classified closely at both ends of the continuum. At 
the polemical side are those contributions in which critics used a declarative style 
together with personal invectives. Apart from those, we have met with examples 
which are far less easily classified. Sometimes the latter aspect of polemics is combined 
with systematic application of other styles of arguing. Also, sometimes the declarative 
style is not used within the context of arguments ad hominem. So, generally speaking, 
we can identify four different categories. The first is employing both the declarative 
style of arguing and personal invective. Needless to say that this is providing for the 
most aggressive kind of polemics. The second does not use any personal invective. Its 
critique, however, is declarative. By trying to impose the authority of the critic over 
that of the opponent, it is polemical as well. The third does not use a declarative style 
of arguing. Though moderate, I take it to be polemical because it employs personal 
invective. Only the final category, neither referring to personal characteristics of the 
opponent, nor trying to impose one’s own authority on the public, can safely be 
excluded from the field of polemics. 
Putting together the results of our analysis as carried out in chapters II and III, we 
get the following picture. For each period in the history of the reception of De toe-
komst der religie I will indicate who belongs to which category.  
In the first period (1948-1951), Wytzes’s and Wapenaar’s contributions did not 
show any attempt to denigrate their opponent; yet they used the courtly style to 
counter Vestdijk’s arguments. Consequently, these critics belong to the second cate-
gory. People like Barneveld, Gomperts, and Noordenbos, on the other hand, em-
ployed a non-declarative style of arguing, at times together with personal invectives. 
They are thus classified as belonging to the third category. Critics such as Zijlstra, 
Van Heugten, Teeuwen, Mankes-Zernike, De Vos, Miskotte, Van der Leeuw, 
Bomhoff, Vestdijk and Sierksma clearly belonged to the first category; they used to 
employ both personal invectives and a courtly style of writing. The rest of the con-
tributors to the reception during this period did not show any polemical inclination. 
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With respect to the second period (1952-1959), only Van Schaik-Willing is to be 
classified as belonging to the third category, since she used (some) personal invectives. 
Smits and De Jong employed a declarative style of arguing and, consequently, belong 
to the second category. Critics such as Wapenaar, Majorick, Oosterbaan, Kwee, Pos 
and Kraemer offered the most significant polemical contributions of this period. The 
rest of the intellectuals remained moderate and to the point. 
Considering the third period (1960-1972), we have seen Dronkers denounce 
Verstappen’s arguments in favor of both Vestdijk and his own film in a courtly fash-
ion. He belonged to the second category. Offering a highly sophisticated discussion 
of the problems which Sierksma (and Vestdijk) had formulated, at one point Luypen 
could not keep himself from personal invective. Other contributors paid tribute to 
the intelligent arguments which Sierksma had put forward and admitted that they felt 
positively challenged to respond to him. The only one who offered a significant 
polemical contribution was Van Stempvoort. Something similar held for Noordegraaf 
and Kamphuis (and those who identified with the latter’s opinions). Their contribu-
tions, belonging to the first category of our scheme, were written during the final 
period (1973-1998) of the reception.  
In accordance with my theory, I must attempt to find correlations between the 
textual strategies as outlined and illustrated in the last two chapters, and the social 
conditions of their employment as means to arrive at certain ends. In other words, I 
must define the context within which those encounters, whether polemical or not, 
occurred. This, as I have previously mentioned, will be my objective in the next 
chapter.
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IV – THE POLEMIC: ITS SOCIAL CONDITIONS
It is not enough to say these are antiauthority struggles; 
we must try to define more precisely what they have in 
common.
Michel Foucault 
Introduction
In this chapter, I wish to focus on the context of polemical exchanges between Vest-
dijk and his critics after the publication of De toekomst der religie. At first sight, this 
might surprise readers who remember my references to Derrida, who argued that 
there is nothing outside of the text. To be sure, I only held this statement to be valid 
for the moment, i.e. for our analysis of the content and style of the contributions to 
our controversy. First of all, I warned not to take the picture which critics painted of 
Vestdijk (and Sierksma) at face value. Clearly, critics did not denounce the Vestdijk 
who lived in Doorn, went for daily walks with his dog in the countryside near his 
home village, and, upon returning to his house and maid, either played the piano or 
continued working on his books.1 This was the Vestdijk whom none of his reviewers 
knew. On the contrary, critics tried to create a subject (‘Vestdijk’) who, according to 
them, could be held accountable for the errors and distortions written in De toekomst 
der religie. Secondly, many commentators employed a declarative style of arguing in 
order to insinuate some kind of authority to the reader. According to me, however, 
this does not necessarily mean that these intellectuals were in fact acknowledged as 
leading authorities on ‘Vestdijk’ and the topics about which he had written. Through 
both subject and style, critics tried to impose their opinions of Vestdijk (or Sierksma) 
on their public. Yet, we must remain critical; we cannot take these opinions merely 
for granted without any further investigation. As long as there is nothing indicating 
that their picture of Vestdijk is confirmed by the facts available, nor by the critics’ 
actual authority, it is perfectly legitimate to hold that there is nothing outside of the 
text by which we can determine whether or not we can take them seriously. 
Yet, still then, I must clarify in which sense we are to discuss the context of our 
controversy. According to me, it is again Freud who indicated a way to solve this 
problem. In chapter II, we saw how words were used to create subjects. We found 
some striking similarities between the way this was done in polemics on the one 
hand, and the processes of condensation and displacement in witwork on the other. 
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In both cases, a subject was created and taken as the source of a text, while at the 
same time becoming the object of laughter. However, as Freud emphasized, apart 
from the aforementioned processes, two other things are required. For a text to be 
effective and create laughter there must be an author (the one who writes something 
that might be received in jest) and an audience (those who interpret the text as a 
joke). Thus, while in general the techniques of condensation and displacement suffice 
to identify a story to be potentially humorous, without the consent of the audience it 
fails to be recognized as witty.2 This is even worse if the public believes that the au-
thor intended to be humorous. In that case, the author himself could become the 
object of laughter. Yet, it is unlikely that the critics who contributed to the polemic 
had the intention of making fun of themselves. In general, stories are told in order to 
create mirth at the expense of somebody else. For this, the content of the joke does 
not need to be true or justified from our point of view as outsiders. Mostly, however, 
truth is not an issue which people consider when they laugh. To ask oneself whether 
or not a joke is justified is to miss all the fun. To conclude that a joke is indeed 
unjustified might create anger, rather than laughter. Yet, as long as there are people 
who share in the fun, the story is effective. Its effect satisfies the author because s/he 
thereby gets the consent of the public which s/he was aiming for. This public is often 
not self-evident; rather it has to be created by means of the text. The techniques of 
condensation and displacement are employed for the purpose of getting the consent 
of the audience. 
Still the question remains how to imagine the audience which constituted the 
context of the polemic which we are studying here. Norman Fairclough proposed an 
answer in his work on discourse analysis. According to him, employing language as 
discourse is a social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or an expression 
of situational variables. This has at least three implications, he argued. Firstly, dis-
course is a mode of action. As we have seen in previous chapters, apart from creating 
a subject in language, it also tries to establish relationships between author and audi-
ence. As Fairclough says, discourse is a form in which people act upon the world as 
well as upon each other. Secondly, being a mode of action, discourse has a link with 
social structure. It contributes to the constitution of all those dimensions which di-
rectly or indirectly shape and constrain it: its own norms and conventions, as well as 
the relations, identities and institutions which underlie them.3 It is precisely the social 
dimension of discourse that is of interest for our purposes. Fairclough explicitly links 
his approach to that of Foucault, who had argued that language was highly important 
in constituting realities, yet he never believed that an analysis of discourse could be 
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limited to texts only. As Ian Hunter summarized Foucault’s arguments on the issue, 
texts did not have an inside (in thoughts) nor did they have an outside (in things).4
Foucault’s reformulation of the concept of discourse derives from his attempts to pro-
vide histories of knowledge, which are not histories of what men and women have 
thought. Foucault’s histories are not histories of ideas, opinions or influences nor are 
they histories of the way in which economic, political and social contexts have shaped 
ideas or opinions. Rather they are reconstructions of the material conditions of thought 
or ‘knowledges’. They represent an attempt to produce what Foucault calls an archeol-
ogy of the material conditions of thought/knowledges, conditions which are not re-
ducible to the idea of ‘consciousness’ or the idea of ‘mind’. 
Applied to the analysis of our controversy, critics do not need to be conscious about 
the conditions that determine their discursive intervention; nor does somebody need 
to choose consciously for polemic as the proper means of dealing with a given situa-
tion. The only thing that is relevant for us is to define which are the social, i.e. dis-
cernible, conditions which make polemic inevitable, or at least understandable. In 
this way, the discursive event which we call polemic is not to be taken primarily as 
an expression of an individual’s ideas or intentions, but rather as the outcome of the 
material conditions that actually determine which direction the activities of some-
body (or some body) will take.  
In the words of Foucault, polemic is not consciously directed against authority. It 
is rather a matter of countering a threat to one’s own position and recognition before 
a public that one is not necessarily conscious of either. That this is a theory worth 
considering can only be shown by discerning what polemical contributions have in 
common, not merely on the textual level, but also with respect to their social condi-
tions.5
We must then ask ourselves what these conditions are. In the case of intellectuals, 
it is highly unlikely that these are economic conditions.6 On the contrary, we are 
talking here about forms of cultural capital. These include the means available to 
define the other, while creating relationships of subordination and some kind of hier-
archy.7 As has previously been indicated in the introduction, intellectuals are people 
with the ability to formulate opinions. They are used to identifying topics and per-
sons and elaborating on them. By that, however, they also establish their position 
over both opponents and the public. These two dimensions of discourse are necessary 
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in order to provide for the authority for which intellectuals strive, according to my 
theory.
In order to search for and select the proper conditions, it might be useful to focus 
on some factors that possibly influenced the way in which our controversy devel-
oped. In the first chapter, the polemical reviews declined, even relative to the actual 
number of contributions to the reception of De toekomst der religie in general. How 
can this development be explained? 
First of all, as we have suggested earlier, the aforementioned trend might be at-
tributed to the mechanisms peculiar to any history of textual appropriation. Thus, 
whatever the relevance of the topics dealt with in the controversy, attention will 
sooner or later turn away from the text with which everything began. This could be 
the case because discussion becomes more rational, i.e. realistic, republican, or bu-
reaucratic and less personal. According to this approach, controversy naturally shifts 
from polemics towards serious discussion, dealing with the real issue rather than the 
mind or morals of the author held accountable for the original text. However, with-
out ignoring the progressive tendencies in history, I do not believe that the field of 
textual exchange develops autonomously—rather it is influenced by outside factors 
and factors attributable to context. This is suggested by the fact that since the contro-
versy surrounding De toekomst der religie, debates among intellectuals over religious 
issues were never as widespread and lasting as the one triggered by Vestdijk (and 
Sierksma). Thus, there is more to it than only textual history.  
Three other explanations will be considered in the following. The first one, often 
referred to as the so-called secularization-thesis, might help to account for our po-
lemic by pointing to the changing role of religion in the postwar Netherlands. The 
second one is seeking to explain polemics by considering the position of intellectuals 
within the public sphere. The third one, finally, presents us with a more sophisticated 
version of the second explanation. Here we are trying to relate the position of each 
intellectual within the different public spheres in which they were acting. 
The secularization-thesis 
With regard to the changing role of religion in the public sphere, sociologists and 
theologians have endorsed the so-called secularization-thesis. Yet, the thesis is a bit 
complicated, given the fact that the term secularization has been conceptualized into 
three different directions.8 First, it means that religion is declining. People are less 
religious than before. Religious activities become less important for the lives of those 
involved. Second, secularization means that religion itself becomes more secular. 
Depending on the circumstances, it has adapted itself to the sensibilities of the people. 
Religious claims are less rigid and dogmatic than they are supposed to have been 
                                                     
8 Dekker 1992: 38. 
165 
before. Third, secularization means that the influence of religion on public life has 
decreased. Religion is no longer the principle by which people are organized into 
groups or even pillars, as it was during the first half of the twentieth century.  
According to me, these definitions of the term secularization are highly problem-
atic. This mainly has to do with the way the term ‘religion’ is employed here. How 
are we able to determine whether or not people are less religious than before? One of 
the main critiques of the secularization-thesis has to do with the fact that people still 
believe in supernatural beings or powers exceeding human control; and they still 
devote part of their lives to activities related to these beliefs. Instead of being less 
religious, many people have simply shifted towards types of religion that are generally 
more invisible or implicit.9 It is possible that when scholars argue that people are less 
religious nowadays, they merely wish to suggest that the latter no longer attend 
church every week. It is also possible—and this is indicated by the second definition 
of secularization—that people no longer take for granted what theologians tell them. 
Whether this accounts for, or rather is an effect of the fact that these theologians tried 
to formulate the gospel and related dogmas in a more popular way, employing the 
language of the secular disciplines, is something we do not know for sure. Yet, this 
also implies that theological discourse, rather than ‘religion’ has become secularized. 
Moreover –and this is something indicated by the third definition of secularization– 
churches and/or networks of clerics, rather than ‘religions’, were the true foundations 
of pillar organizations. Surely, as some concluded, the “churches do not have any 
direct influence on the major decisions of society, but all indicators of religious 
commitment indicate stability or even increase of religious sensibility.”10 This is pre-
cisely the way people have always been ‘religious’, as Peter Raedts argued. According 
to him, only with the christianization efforts during the nineteenth century did peo-
ple start to involve themselves intensely with church activities. Thus, we must realize 
that the so-called secularization process is actually a return to things as usual in the 
history of Christianity.11
                                                     
9 Luckmann 1967; cf. for recent developments in this area Bailey 1997, 1998, 2002 as well as 
the journal Implicit Religion; whereas Ter Borg 1991 offers a philosophical reflection on the 
issue, the historiography and anthropology of Volkskultur (German) or volkscultuur (Dutch)
mainly provides textual as well as fieldwork materials on those aspects of culture that remained 
implicit in old-fashioned and official histories; on the Netherlands, cf. Rooijakkers & Van der 
Zee 1986, Gijswijt-Hofstra & Frijhoff 1987, Boissevain & Verrips 1989, Roodenburg 1990, 
Rooijakkers 1994, Watling 1999, Dekker, Roodenburg & Rooijakkers 2000. 
10 Halman & Riis 2003: 3; relevant data for the Netherlands in Dekker 1997, Becker & Vink 
1994, Becker, De Hart & Mens 1997, Becker & De Wit 2000. 
11 Raedts 1990; cf. also Van Rooden 1996. 
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Whereas ‘religion’ is a concept too vague to be employed within the context of 
the secularization-thesis,12 discourse and related social institutions are categories em-
pirical enough to be useful for our own purposes. Yet, even then the question re-
mains in which sense the thesis is relevant for the analysis of the controversy we are 
dealing with. In the first chapter we observed that, after the second period, literary 
critics no longer contributed to the polemics. This might allow for the conclusion 
that to them, even arguments their fellow intellectuals did not seem to be a challenge 
any longer. However, this does not apply for theologians and critics with ties to 
church-related institutions. At the very least, we must distinguish here between intel-
lectuals from several different communities. Whereas some critics from the NHK 
were among the fiercest during the first period, as early as the third period almost all 
of them had become moderate, if not outright sympathetic towards Vestdijk and 
Sierksma. Though generally far more moderate, among the intellectuals of the GKN 
and RKK we do not find any polemical contributions from the third period on. In 
which sense do all of these facts fit the secularization-thesis? Moreover, some critics 
from the NHK and the VGKN continued to attack Vestdijk. These two facts cannot 
be equally covered by our thesis.  
The institutional position of intellectuals 
A third explanation for the way in which the polemical controversy surrounding De 
toekomst der religie developed, concerns the positions which each of the communities 
of intellectuals identified before it was held within the public sphere in the Nether-
lands after World War II. To begin with the literary critics, they had always been 
both at the margins of intellectual life and internally highly divided. To say that there 
was something of a clash between artists and the breakthrough movement of the 
1950s, as Ido Weijers has argued,13 is to overestimate both the unity of the former 
and the importance of the latter. With regards to the overall situation in the public 
sphere, recent studies by Tity de Vries and Jan-Willem Duyvendak have generally 
focused on the movements that were either of special interest for their own personal 
development, or have from our point of view come to dominate the intellectual 
scene.14 They seem to regard the public the way Habermas did in his study on the 
structural transformations of the public sphere.15 He took this public sphere to be a set 
of relations between intellectuals ending up in a uniform group of people communi-
cating through rational debate. Research indicated that this thesis is highly problem-
                                                     
12 For recent overviews of attempts to define ‘religion’ cf. Platvoet 1990, Asad 1993a, Van der 
Veer 1996, Platvoet 1999. 
13 Weijers 1991. 
14 De Vries 1996, Duyvendak 1999. 
15 Habermas 1962 in German, 1989 translation in English. 
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atic. The public never consisted of one uniform community of intellectuals. On the 
contrary, the public sphere has always already been highly fragmented. And, finally, 
that debate was rationally conducted, is something that cannot be reasonably de-
fended in the face of past controversies.16 Whatever the manners governing public 
meetings,17 communication in the sense of aiming at mutual understanding has sel-
dom been its objective. And this is confirmed by our observations of the situation in 
the Netherlands during the period we are studying. 
The literary field has always been divided and relations between writers highly in-
flammatory. Generally speaking, however, till the 1960s the intellectual élites were 
no less fragmented than anyone else, notably by religious and political affiliations 
which separated them into groups that were easily identifiable by membership to 
specific institutions, whether church, political parties or media. This held for three 
communities which are relevant to our analysis, namely those organized around the 
RKK, GKN and VGKN. The latter pillar organization marked a serious rift within 
the Dutch Reformed community, though without shaking the structure completely. 
Till the 1960s, both the RKK and GKN evolved internally, adapting to criticism 
from within and successfully meeting the challenges from without.18 Only after this 
period, during the 1960s and 1970s, did these two pillar institutions lose their grip on 
their public. Before that time, the so-called breakthrough movement failed to gain 
ground among members of the other communities. Originally, this movement was 
meant as an attempt to mutually refuel socialism and religion, mainly supported by 
theologians from the NHK.19 From the early 1960s onwards, an ecumenical trend 
started, eventually leading to a new super-pillar.20 Intellectuals from the RKK and 
GKN joined all kinds of breakthrough institutions. Only members of the VGKN, as 
well as those of the conservative liberal circles, continued independently from other 
organizations.21
In general, we might conclude that, from the perspective of authority, both liter-
ary critics and intellectuals from the breakthrough movement up until the 1960s were 
likely to regard Vestdijk’s argument as a serious threat to their own positions. Their 
fellows from the pillars either felt secure within their own communities or were 
welcomed into the breakthrough circles from the 1960s on. However, even when 
                                                     
16 Cf. Calhoun 1992, Israël 2001. 
17 Cf. Elias 1978, Burke 1993, Van Vree 1999. 
18 Kuiper 1972, Duffhues, Felling & Roes 1985, Simons and Winkeler 1987, Winkeler 1989, 
Dekker 1992, Luykx 2000, Kuiper 2002. 
19 Bank 1978, De Keizer 1979, Weijers 1991, Duyvendak 1999. 
20 Ruiter & Smulders 1996: 285-287. 
21 Jongeling 1979, Dijkstra 1998. 
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formulated in this way, this thesis does not cover all of the polemical contributions 
made during the period which we are studying. Further refinement is thus required. 
A fourth explanation developed here—elaborating on the critique leveled against 
critics such as Weijers, De Vries and Duyvendak—concerns the position of each 
intellectual, not only within the public sphere as a whole, but also within each pillar 
in particular. The same way it’s possible to distinguish generally between secure and 
more vulnerable authoritative positions, we can also separate dominant intellectuals 
from marginal ones within pillared communities. There are several indicators which 
might help us to classify each individual whom we must analyse with in this chapter. 
Bourdieu referred to the university as the primary institution through which to pro-
vide people with authority and a dominating position within the hierarchy of intel-
lectuals. However, even if this was the case, this would not exclude the possibility of 
other important institutions—or even more detailed distinctions—determining the 
outcome of the struggle for recognition within the field of intellectual production.22 
We can safely argue that on the topic of ‘religion’, especially during the first two 
periods of the reception, disciplines like theology and phenomenology of religion 
were generally regarded as more competent and valid than psychology and literary 
criticism. It is here that the secularization-thesis again rears its head. During the 
1960s, disciplines which had originally been recognized as authoritative on matters of 
religion lost ground to more worldly ones within the universities.  
 Certainly, all this might sound highly abstract. When applied to our study of 
the controversy surrounding Vestdijk’s De toekomst der religie, we can better begin by 
identifying the polemical frontiers along which people attempted to either defend or 
identify their authority before a public that did not seem to have previously accepted 
their judgments as self-evident. Thus, let us turn to the facts as we analyse each of the 
major groups evident in the public sphere of the postwar Netherlands. The literary 
critics, the Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, breakthrough, and Free Reformed 
intellectuals will in the following be dealt with consecutively.  
 
Literary and cultural critics 
It has been argued that literary critics, as outsiders to the intellectual establishment, 
are far more polemically inclined than any other group in the field. Especially Weij-
ers, in his study of the conflict between literary critics and members of the break-
through movement, offers a clear example of this tendency.23 Yet, as we have seen in 
previous chapters, it was exactly the latter group of critics that contributed exten-
sively to our controversy. Moreover, Weijers treats literary critics too much as a 
                                                     
22 For the Netherlands, cf. the early research done by sociologist F. van Heek; Van Heek 1945, 
Van Heek & others 1958; also Keulemans, Idenburg & Pen 1953. 
23 Weijers 1991. 
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category distinct from the rest of the intellectual scene; he also underestimates the 
potential for conflict within the field of literary production itself.  
In order to develop a more adequate picture of the literary scene, I will first at-
tempt to identify the networks and magazines that played a role in the polemic, and 
attempt to locate those who had contributed to it. Secondly, I will indicate the status 
differences between the institutions and individuals, and suggest how relations of 
hierarchy triggered polemical attack. As far as I can tell, the position of literary critics 
is structurally similar to that of cultural critics that neither belonged to established 
pillar structures, nor could reasonably be counted among the theologians of the 
breakthrough movement. For this reason, I include these cultural critics in my discus-
sion of the relevant social conditions of their literary counterparts. 
Immediately after World War II, the field of literary production was defined in 
terms of a struggle between reconstruction and experiment.24 The most challenging 
creators and critics, formerly organized around Forum, did not survive the war ex-
perience. Ter Braak committed suicide, Marsman drowned in an attempt to flee to 
England, and Du Perron died of a heartattack. Their devastating critique of the liter-
ary trends that had dominated in the pre-war period left room for new developments 
and experiments later on. At the same time, however, it allowed post-war critics to 
fight over the heritage of these forebears. Reconstructive efforts mainly pivoted 
around the question of what the Forum-tradition implied for the contemporary situa-
tion. The first problem with which critics struggled was how to create an image of 
the modern individual; the second issue upon which they focused was the proper 
relationship between artists and their social environment. 
To put things briefly, the very attempt to reconstruct the meaning of pre-war 
criticism for contemporary problems created space in which to experiment. Many 
different anwers to these problems now seemed to be available. Novelists and poets 
began to experiment with new ways of expressing the modern sentiment. Anna Bla-
man, Gerard Reve and Willem Frederik Hermans are often mentioned among the 
novelists, whereas Hans Andreus, Remco Campert, Hugo Claus and Lucebert were 
among the poets referred to by critics.25 These experiments received their institutional 
counterparts in publishing houses and a plethora of newly founded journals. Van 
Oorschot, De Bezige Bij and Bert Bakker were prominent on the publisher’s market. 
Together with smaller enterprises, they also provided for the great number of journals 
which appeared immediately after the war, such as Columbus, Proloog, Het Woord, Ad
Interim, Criterium, Podium, and Libertinage.26 Though identified as being inspired by 
                                                     
24 Anbeek 1990: 178-179, 1997, Ruiter & Smulders 1996: 279-286.  
25 Anbeek 1986, Goedegebuure & Anbeek 1988: 51-63, Anbeek 1990: chapters 10-11, Weij-
ers 1991, Anbeek 1997. 
26 Bakker 1985, Calis 1993, 1999, 2001. 
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some explicit and well-established world view, and as such regarded as part of exist-
ing pillar organizations, even journals like De Nieuwe Stem, Roeping, and Ontmoeting
experimented with new ways of thinking about contemporary issues. It is difficult to 
see them as merely the successors of pre-war magazines like De Stem, De Gemeen-
schap, and Opwaartsche Wegen. Just as the role Roeping had played before, the newly 
founded journals explicitly tried to transcend old pillar boundaries. The attempts 
failed. De Stem was not able to get the attention of a public outside of the circle 
around Het Humanistisch Verbond (HV). The public of Roeping was limited to mem-
bers of the RKK, whereas readers of Ontmoeting mainly belonged to the GKN 
(members of the VGKN would soon found their own journals). Yet, the fact that 
these magazines preferred not to bear the names of older journals was clearly meant 
to indicate a break with the pre-war period in which the public had been marginal-
ized and cut off from the wider social environment. 
Of the journals mentioned above, only some got involved in the controversy sur-
rounding De toekomst der religie. This has to do with the fact that magazines like Co-
lumbus and Proloog did not survive the first few years after the war. Criterium only
allowed Vestdijk to counter an early critique by A. Mankes-Zernike. By means of 
mergers and new initiatives, editors of these journals did not lose their employments. 
Paul Rodenko, who had been an editor of Columbus, joined Podium. The same hap-
pened with Hermans. He had been one of the editors of Criterium. As such, he got 
into a fight with Sierksma and J.B. Charles, who were among the main editors of 
Podium. When they left, Hermans did not have any problem with joining the Po-
dium-circle. Another former editor of Criterium, Hans Gomperts, founded his own 
journal, Libertinage. And between Podium and Libertinage arose one of the fiercest 
polemics on De toekomst der religie.
Apart from Podium and Libertinage, also Ontmoeting, Het Woord, Nieuw Vlaams 
Tijdschrift, Vandaag, Roeping, Het Boek van Nu, as well as more cultural critical maga-
zines such as De Vlam, De Vrije Katheder and De Nieuwe Stem, would eventually be-
come involved with the controversy. P.A. Hekstra only criticized GKN as well as the 
breakthrough theologians for their (possible) way of dealing with Vestdijk. More 
critical and polemical comments on Vestdijk were published by Hekstra in VGKN 
magazines such as Stijl and Ruimte. Marja took issue with the so-called breakthrough 
theologians in Het Algemeen Handelsblad and the NRC, triggering a reply by J. Bom-
hoff. Hans Redeker offered some sympathetic—though highly critical—comments 
on Vestdijk in Het Woord. Polemical contributions on Vestdijk were published by 
Jeanne van Schaik-Willing and editors of Roeping, such as Cornelis Verhoeven and 
Lambert Tegenbosch. After he was invited to offer his comments on AVRO radio, 
P. Sterkman published the text of his review in Het Boek van Nu. The same held for 
H. van Praag, who wrote for De Vlam. Finally, O. Noordenbos attacked both a Ro-
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man Catholic cleric and breakthrough theologians in magazines such as De Vrije 
Katheder and De Nieuwe Stem.
Whether arguing for or against Vestdijk’s ideas, all of the commentators involved 
shared a critical—if not polemical—inclination. Why? What was it that—despite 
their different points of view—all of these critics held in common?  
As a literary critic, Hekstra was clearly involved in a kind of authority struggle 
with the establishment of theologians within his own pillar community.27 On the 
other hand, together with his fellow members of the VGKN, he saw equal threats in 
both the GKN and the theologians of the breakthrough movement.28 Later in this 
chapter, I will consider the relationship between Free Reformed intellectuals and the 
wider public sphere in more detail.  
Critics such as Noordenbos, Marja, Redeker, Rodenko and Sierksma shared 
much in common.29 All belonged to what was called the regional initiatives (either 
from Utrecht, Groningen or Friesland; in any case outside of Amsterdam, the cultural 
capital of the Netherlands), which fueled the cultural debate in the postwar Nether-
lands.30 Noordenbos, Marja and Sierksma studied theology, though they did not 
count themselves among the believers. Redeker was a student of philosophy, whereas 
Rodenko was very much interested in psychology. Their position within the field of 
literary criticism was marginal compared to that of the intellectuals that had studied in 
Amsterdam and belonged to its inner circles. Even though they participated in new 
initiatives, each of these critics stayed outside of the institutional-political scene. 
Noordenbos, Redeker, Marja were (board)members of the HV (as was D.H. Prins).31
This association had been founded in order to unite those who neither belonged to 
any church nor aimed at the establishment of a political party. Institutionally, they 
continued the ideals of the NVB, while refusing to support breakthrough theologians 
and socialists in the PvdA.32 And given their opposition towards the political institu-
tionalization of socialism, as well as the role played by theologians in that process, 
they fiercely rejected the theologians’ criticism of Vestdijk’s arguments on religion. 
Whatever their potential disagreement with Vestdijk, they preferred to emphasize 
                                                     
27 Literary critics do not figure in the historiography of the VGKN; cf. Jongeling 1979. 
28 The contributions of Hekstra and fellow critics like M. Siesling and D.J. Buwalda to maga-
zines like Stijl and Ruimte indicates this; for the conflict in the field of theology, cf. Brinkman 
1983: part 2.  
29 On Noordenbos cf. Trapman 1999: 103-122; on Marja cf. Van Delden 1985, Hazeu 1985; 
on Redeker cf. Bakker 1986: 366-369; on Rodenko cf. Calis 1993, 1999, 2001, Hilberdink 
2002; on Sierksma cf. Jenner 1982, Calis 1993, 1999, Delvigne 2000. 
30 Bakker 1985: 229. 
31 Kuilman 2001: 22-24. 
32 Van Baalen 1998. 
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their common interest in religion, and contested the authority of theology as the only 
legitimate arena in which to speak out on the issue. As we have seen in previous 
chapters, especially Noordenbos, Marja and Sierksma were quite explicit about that. 
And whereas Vestdijk’s counter-critiques of the theologians were not published in 
other media, Sierksma offered his friend the opportunity to have them published in 
Podium. Similarly, Hermans agreed to publish a response by Vestdijk in Criterium.
Yet, it is far too easy to conclude from this that there was anything like a fixed 
faultline between breakthrough intellectuals on the one hand, and ‘humanist’ literary 
critics on the other. The latter can only be placed under the same label for the sake of 
convenience; internal conflicts prevailed over polemical controversies with so-called 
outsiders. At the end of the 1940s, a fierce polemic occurred between Rodenko (and 
Hermans) on the one hand, and Sierksma on the other (each of their contributions 
were published in Podium).33 Later Sierksma joined Hermans in his attack on J.B. 
Charles (former editor of Podium, contributing to De Nieuwe Stem) in the early 
1950s.34 A humanist like Kwee Swan Liat (member of the HV) joined progressive 
theologians in their polemics against Sierksma in Vox Theologica at the end of the 
1950s. Intellectuals such as P. Smits (editor of Kerk & Wereld), on the other hand, 
referred positively to Vestdijk and Sierksma in their debates with fellow theologians 
(In de Waagschaal) in the late 1950s. And contrary to his earlier support of Sierksma, 
Marja attacked his friend in a review for In de Waagschaal in the early 1960s.35
Other opponents in the field of literary criticism supported Vestdijk’s critique of 
the theologians as well. G.H. Barneveld attacked a Roman Catholic cleric as well as 
certain breakthrough theologians for their polemics against Vestdijk. His attack on 
Father J. van Heugten can be explained by the fact that both were intimately in-
volved in the polemics between the Amsterdam Student Corps and the Catholic 
student association Thomas (of which van Heugten was president at the time when 
Barneveld was a student).36 Barneveld’s scorn for breakthrough theologians had to do 
with their cultural and political activities, as well as their dominant positions within 
the PvdA. Although he—along with Gomperts—disagreed with Vestdijk on some 
important topics in De toekomst der religie, both were moderate in their critique. Yet, 
as we have seen, their reviews triggered polemical attacks by Sierksma, and Vestdijk 
himself failed to restrain himself against Gomperts. The question to be answered is 
why? What did Vestdijk and Sierksma have in common with the other critics which 
might account for their polemical attitude? 
                                                     
33 Delvigne 2000: 66-67; cf. also Calis 1993: 289-290, 301-306, 321-324. 
34 Delvigne 2000: 69-72. 
35 Hazeu 1985: 117. 
36 Ligtenberg & Polak 1990. 
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Even though Gomperts and Vestdijk seemed to belong to the same area of cul-
tural activity (the latter being even more prolific as a creative artist), there still existed 
a kind of hierarchy. According to Ton Anbeek, Gomperts was unparalleled as a liter-
ary critic during the first decades after the war.37 To begin with, more than any other 
intellectual Gomperts was recognized as one of the foremost heirs to the heritage of 
Forum, especially the tradition of literary criticism begun by Ter Braak.38 Surely, 
Vestdijk’s reputation had been built up by the opportunities which Ter Braak offered 
him to publish in Forum, as well as the latter’s positive reviews during his lifetime, 
and the well known essay De duivelskunstenaar (‘The magician’).39 Yet, during the 
war, it became clear that he did not feel comfortable with the thought of having a 
friend who apparently did not want to make any compromise with the Nazis. Vest-
dijk himself, though he’d been taken hostage, did not dare to stand up against the 
Germans during the rest of the war.40 It is likely that he felt vulnerable to criticism by 
somebody who—apart from being persecuted under the Nazi regime—could con-
vincingly count the master among his mentors.41 Since Gomperts had defended Ter 
Braak in Propria Cures against attacks by the Roman Catholic literary critic Anton van 
Duinkerken, they met each other frequently. His contribution to Propria Cures indi-
cates a second significant factor which contributed to Gomperts’s reputation. Sec-
ondly, having been a student in Amsterdam and, more importantly, a member of the 
Amsterdam Student Corps, his network created a significant advantage over people 
from the provinces (mostly in Groningen and Friesland). It was only after the war 
that Vestdijk got involved in the cultural scene in Amsterdam, or, as he himself called 
it, a “mondane artist’s life”.42 Jeanne van Schaik-Willing introduced him into this 
world. Through her, he met with his first wife, Henriëtte van Eyck. However, in-
stead of going to live with her in Amsterdam, he stayed in Doorn, far away from his 
fellow artists. Only after long periods of either hard work at home or treatment in 
mental hospitals, did he find the time to visit his wife.43 Thirdly, at the time that 
Gomperts entered into our controversy, he just had replaced Vestdijk as the main 
literary critic of Het Parool. The latter left after a serious conflict with the editors of 
the newspaper.44 The fact that they did not publish his response to the attacks of H. 
de Vos—to whom we will return later—might have played a role. Anyhow, even 
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41 Calis 1999: 341-342. 
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though Ben Stroman invited him to write for Algemeen Handelsblad,45 it is difficult to 
imagine that his relationship with Het Parool and Gomperts was not influenced by 
recent developments.  
Apart from the controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie, Vestdijk’s letter to 
Hermans in another case with Gomperts offers a second example of his attitude to-
wards the latter in this period. In 1950, Gomperts published a review in Het Parool of 
Het petitionnement, a novella written under the name of Max Croiset. Instead of 
Croiset, Gomperts suspected Vestdijk to be its real author; and far from being a mas-
terpiece debut, according to Gomperts it was only a mystification. In Algemeen Han-
delsblad, Vestdijk denied that he had authored the novella. Gomperts, however, did 
not believe him. Hermans offered to attack Gomperts in Vestdijk’s stead. Vestdijk 
agreed, and emphasized that the article could “not be dirty enough”.46 Eventually, 
Gomperts publicly admitted that he had been wrong and that Croiset, rather than 
Vestdijk, had indeed written the novella.47
Yet, whatever the competition between Vestdijk and Gomperts to gain the status 
of prime literary critic in the Netherlands, Gomperts’s position was even more 
threatening to Sierksma. The latter desparately tried to enter into the cultural scene of 
Amsterdam. In the late 1940s, attempts were successful, and the editors were able to 
inaugurate what they called the ‘Podium Building’, somewhere in the Jordaan.48 Yet, 
one of the editors, who was happy to leave Amsterdam soon after, admitted in pri-
vate correspondance that he felt ambivalent about Podium. On the one hand he was 
proud to have been part of it. And he admired the “intellectual exercises” by 
Sierksma and Rodenko. Yet, on the other hand, he had always had the feeling “that 
they were living above their means, that they were playing a game.”49 Whereas the 
status difference between the cultural scene of Amsterdam and that of the province 
posed a first threat to a positive sense of self-identity among the editors of Podium, a 
second problem was increasing the pressure on Sierksma cum suis.
After Gomperts quit his activities for Criterium, he founded Libertinage together 
with W.F. van Leeuwen. The two editors knew each other from the Corps. More-
over, the father of Van Leeuwen—the director of a yeast and meths factory in 
Delft—served as the mecaenas of the magazine. He also financially guaranteed the by 
then famous publisher Van Oorschot in Amsterdam if subscriptions declined.50 Podium,
on the other hand, had problems finding a proper publishing house almost right from 
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the start. For years, the editors ran from one to another. Founded as an illegal paper 
during the war, the editors contacted Van Gorcum in Assen after liberation. For two 
years this company published the magazine. At the end of this period, the printing 
quality did not satisfy Sierksma any longer.51 Talks with Proloog were initiated in order 
to arrange a merger. From the side of the latter magazine, Marja took the initiative.52
Apart from being interested in extending their public, the people at Podium were 
mainly focused on their publisher, Contact in Amsterdam. The merger failed. Yet, 
when Proloog finished its activities soon after, Contact was prepared to sign a contract 
with Podium. After a year, however, the publisher was disappointed with the profits. 
The editors either had to agree on a change of layout, or look for another publishing 
house. Sierksma then decided to initiate talks with Criterium. He knew that a merger 
would be difficult, but business with Meulenhoff would be promising for the image of 
his journal. Yet, as was to be expected, the editors could not come to an agreement. 
And as soon as De Driehoek in ‘s-Gravenland showed interest for Podium, Sierksma 
decided to cut off talks and continue on his own. The cooperation lasted from 1948 
till 1950.53
It was exactly at the time that the editors of Podium struggled to get their maga-
zine pubished that Sierksma began his polemical attacks on Gomperts and another 
critic belonging to the latter’s circle, G.H. Barneveld. The latter published a critique 
of De toekomst der religie in Propria Cures, as well as Libertinage. Moreover, like J.H.W. 
Veenstra—another literary critic from this circle who often wrote for Het Parool—
Barneveld contributed to a volume published for Vestdijk’s fiftieth birthday in which 
some highly sympathetic comments on both the author and his work were made. 
Barneveld allowed himself only one critical remark. Yet, for Sierksma, this was rea-
son enough to attack. According to me, this was not just because he disagreed with 
Barneveld (and Gomperts). Without taking into account the difficulties with which 
Sierksma had to deal at that time, it is difficult to understand his aggression. 
Whereas Sierksma—along with Hermans—often clashed with Gomperts,54 Vest-
dijk did not seem to be interested in a polemical exchange with the latter. In general, 
he did not have much to complain about regarding the reception of his essay by 
critics belonging to the Gomperts circle. Ten years after their controversy, Josine 
Meyer wrote a sympathetic critique of Vestdijk’s arguments on religion in Tirade.
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Her closest intellectual mentor was Jacques de Kadt.55 He had been one of the other 
moving forces behind Libertinage, generally regarded as the precursor of Tirade in the 
Forum-tradition.56
P. Sterkman did not belong to any of the circles which I have outlined thus far. 
Rather than a literary critic, Sterkman was a philosopher who participated in liberal-
protestant circles that still dominated the ‘neutral’ or ‘independent’57 broadcastcorpo-
ration AVRO in the early years after World War II. It was usually the highly re-
garded critic P.H. Ritter jr. who reviewed literary work for the AVRO-
microphone.58 For this special occasion, however, he invited Sterkman to comment 
on an essay that went far beyond the competence of ordinary literary critics. Yet, 
whereas Ritter had a firm reputation within the field of criticism, of Sterkman only a 
few interventions in the public sphere can be traced. His review of De toekomst der 
religie was one of three contributions for the book program of AVRO.59 Sociologi-
cally speaking, Sterkman was only a marginal intellectual. In accordance with the 
hypothesis I developed throughout this study, it should come as no surprise that 
Sterkman allowed himself a few polemical remarks. Ritter, on the other hand, of-
fered the readers of Het Boek van Nu a highly sympathetic interview with Vestdijk.60
The only literary critic with whom I have not dealt till now is Jeanne van Schaik-
Willing. She was a close friend of Vestdijk’s. As we have seen, she was the one who 
introduced him to Henriëtte van Eyck, who soon after became his wife. His friend-
ship with Jeanne remained, as correspondence between the two clearly shows.61 Vest-
dijk would dedicate his essay Het eeuwige telaat (‘Eternal Belatedness’) to her.62 She 
contributed to a collection of essays edited by Max Nord upon the occasion of Vest-
dijk’s fiftieth birthday.63 Vestdijk, in his turn, attempted to boost her reputation 
within the literary scene. He even called her the “Virginia Woolf of the Nether-
lands.”64 And she indeed gained a reputation. She wrote several novels, of which one 
together with Vestdijk.65 She was awarded several times for her oeuvre. She published 
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in De Gids, De Groene Amsterdammer, Critisch Bulletin, and sometimes, being a Catho-
lic, in the Nieuw Vlaams Tijdschrift. Only her contacts with the latter magazine might 
have been a point of discussion with Vestdijk. Maurice Roelants was one of the 
editors. The latter had been involved in Forum-activities, until he got into a conflict 
with Ter Braak over the publication of a “pornographic” story. According to most 
commentators, tensions between the secular and Roman Catholic—between the 
Northern and the Southern—Netherlands eventually announced the end of the most 
influential literary critical magazines that were published shortly before the war.66
Whereas Ter Braak continued writing for Groot Nederland,67 Roelants joined Nieuw 
Vlaams Tijdschrift and was an editor from 1946 till 1952.68 In precisely this magazine, 
she made her polemical comments on Vestdijk. Whereas the other magazines ac-
counted for her status in the field of literary production, Nieuw Vlaams Tijdschrift did 
not have the reputation that other periodicals had, and this clearly put Roelants in a 
marginal position compared to the status of Vestdijk as an heir of Forum. Moreover, 
the magazine’s public clearly differed from the public she wrote for in the Northern 
Netherlands. It might well be that in Flanders she was a stranger in her own Catholic 
country. Attacking Vestdijk could have been very helpful in establishing her status 
among both Flemish artists and their public. Whereas Podium, the magazine with 
which Vestdijk was associated during the controversy surrounding De toekomst der 
religie, was notorious for its polemical style,69 Nieuw Vlaams Tijdschrift preferred to 
include every literary eruption and offer a general collection of Flemish artistic crea-
tivity.70
The case of Schaik-Willing shows how important immediate social conditions 
can be for the way in which people react to things with which they are faced. Even a 
friend can become an opponent if the public requires it. Certainly, Schaik-Willing 
had been a Catholic convert. One of her spiritual leaders had been M. Schoen-
maekers, “an important philosopher and defendant of esoteric Catholicis,” as she 
would say.71 The episcopacy, however, banned the kind of mysticism for which he 
advocated and Schoenmakers himself was excommunicated.72 He was also one of the 
“para-philosophers” whom Cornelis Verhoeven recognized as inspiring.73 Much like 
Schaik-Willing, Verhoeven contributed to the polemics surrounding Vestdijk. The 
                                                     
66 Oversteegen 1969: 375-376. 
67 Van Dijk 1994: 52-55. 
68 Bakker 1985: 290. 
69 Calis 1993: ch. 3 and 5. 
70 Bakker 1985: 288-289. 
71 Schaik-Willing 1977: 59. 
72 De Jager 1992: 11-12. 
73 Verhoeven 1973: 40-49. 
178 
same was true for the art historian Bernard Majorick—who wrote for Nieuw Vlaams 
Tijdschrift74 and Lambert Tegenbosch, who was together with Verhoeven one of the 
editors of Roeping.75 Even though they were only loosely connected with Catholic 
organizations, the magazines for which these critics wrote remained too closely asso-
ciated with them to be recognized by contemporaries as creative leaders in the field 
of literary critical production.76
Schaik-Willing, Verhoeven, as well as Tegenbosch—a fellow editor of Roeping—
are intermediate figures; they fit somewhere between literary criticism and the Ro-
man Catholic pillar structure. The intellectuals with which we shall deal in the next 
part of this chapter clearly belonged to the latter. 
The Roman Catholics 
As previously mentioned, literary and critical journals such as De Gemeenschap and 
Roeping played a marginal role within the Catholic intellectual community. These 
magazines were founded by the younger generation during the 1920s in order to 
create a platform for radical criticism of the pillarization process, which culminated in 
the foundation of a Catholic university in Nijmegen. This new generation wished to 
cross borders with the outside world. Artists and intellectuals from other communities 
were permitted to publish in these Catholic magazines.77 And the latter gained a pub-
lic far beyond the one limited by pillar boundaries. In this way Gomperts was able to 
counter the attack of Anton van Duinkerken on Ter Braak in De Gemeenschap. On 
the other hand, Van Duinkerken remembered, during his studies at the seminary, he 
did not dare openly read his favorite magazine Roeping. His mother provided him 
with copies, carefully wrapped in the laundry she sent him.78 And even lay intellectu-
als such as Gerard Brom, one of the founders of the Catholic University and a profes-
sor of literary studies, did not wish to get involved in any way with the two jour-
nals.79 According to him, the younger generation was far too radical and limited itself 
to a small élite of intellectuals within the Catholic community. These intellectuals did 
not understand, according to Brom, that their style of arguing could have devastating 
consequences for the future of Catholicism itself. As we will later see, younger intel-
lectuals such as K. Schilder and K.H. Miskotte would receive the same criticism 
when they raised their voice against ‘the establishment’.80
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However, as sociologist Herman Bakvis summarized the position of these critical 
voices, even though this rather amorphous group—often referred to as an ‘undercur-
rent’ in Dutch Catholic life—might not have caused any immediate change in public 
opinion, its activity had nevertheless long-term consequences.81 The threat of immi-
nent war changed the attitude of some leading Catholics. Together with Van Du-
inkerken and others, Brom agreed to join the Comité van Waakzaamheid, which was 
established in 1936 by Ter Braak and Du Perron in order to counter the spirit of 
National Socialism.82 The humanist H.J. Pos and the socialist Jan Romein participated 
as well. Shortly thereafter, however, Catholic political leaders as well as the episco-
pacy urged Van Duinkerken cum suis to keep away from this “communist cell”. Or-
dinary Catholics might after all get easily confused and develop doubts about their 
membership of Catholic organizations in general. One after the other gave in, leaving 
the Comité.83 Yet, as soon as the war ended, some Catholics joined the initiatives of 
the NVB as well as the PvdA and participated with their own Katholieke Werkgemeen-
schap. Even the Bishop’s Mandement of 1954 failed to end these activities. This shift 
became even more pronounced when the ‘undercurrent’ became dominant not only 
in politics but also in the Church itself, particularly in many of the seminaries as well 
as the theological faculty at the University of Nijmegen.84
Whereas the literary critics had early on indicated directions, in the end, intellec-
tuals with university employment would take the lead. They would mediate the 
increasing role of lay people within the community. The leading position of both 
theology and philosophy of morals within the hierarchy of disciplines would be sub-
stituted by the more secular approaches of pedagogy, psychology and psychiatry. The 
role of the latter in the advisory boards of the bishopric would steadily increase dur-
ing the 1950s, and eventually become dominant during the 1960s and 1970s.85 Yet, 
even though the progressive theologians and intellectuals were influential, the church 
leaders played an active role in the process. Whereas the early historiography inter-
preted the Bishop’s Mandement of 1954 as a serious blow to dissenting groups within 
the Catholic community, detailed research indicates that already at that time a “silent 
revolution” was taking place. The Mandement was only supported by a small major-
ity of the clerics.86 And, as soon as Bernard Alfrink became cardinal in the Nether-
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lands and a young generation of bishops was appointed, new developments were 
eventually even supported by the hierarchy.87
With these developments in mind, the question is whether or not it is possible to 
account for the polemical contributions by intellectuals from the Catholic commu-
nity. The answer, I believe, is in the affirmative. For that, however, it is especially 
important to distinguish between the period before 1960 on the one hand, and the 
one after 1960 on the other. In the first period, the difference between literary critics 
and clerics teaching at the university is dominant. In the second period, it is mainly 
the difference between literary critics and philosophers on the one hand, and psy-
chologists on the other, which is striking.  
The first polemical contribution to the controversy surrounding De toekomst der 
religie came from the ordained priest, J. van Heugten (1890-1963). Though a cleric, 
his reputation was largely built from his work as a critic for Jesuit magazines such as 
Boekenschouw and Katholiek Cultureel Tijdschrift Streven.
Van Heugten definitely did not belong to the ‘undercurrent’ of critical voices that 
began to dominate Catholic public opinion. He never contributed to progressive 
papers such as De Gemeenschap or Roeping. According to Van Duinkerken, Father Van 
Heugten was typical of the intellectuals working within the paradigm that attempted 
to mediate between received dogma and the everyday experience of educated lay 
people.88 This was a method of prescription and example, rather than one of empiri-
cal research. He definitely did not employ the new methods of phenomenological 
and systematic psychological description of literary and religious activities.
However, the question is whether a conservative spirit within some specific pillar 
community is enough to account for his polemical attack on Vestdijk. As we will 
later see, adjusting to recent developments within scientific disciplines does not nec-
essarily moderate one’s attitude towards outsiders. This becomes clear when we com-
pare Van Heugten’s review of Vestdijk to that of Cornelis Verhoeven. The latter—an 
editor of Roeping—was closely associated with one of the main protagonists of the 
phenomenological movement, namely Bernard Delfgaauw.89 Delfgaauw frequently 
contributed to the magazine. Yet, these contacts did not prevent Verhoeven from 
being highly polemical. On the other hand, this does not imply that adherents of the 
phenomenological method necessarily react agressively towards those who employ 
other methods or hold other beliefs. As we will later see, the Catholic tradition offers 
several examples of intellectuals who received extensive training in the application of 
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phenomenological methods, yet who were highly sympathetic in their attitudes to-
wards Vestdijk and Sierksma.  
Thus, if we must decide whether paradigms, or the social status of the people in-
volved, have the most explanatory value in the case of polemics, the examples which 
I have given suggest the latter. In their case, employing different paradigms had more 
to do with living during different periods of time. If we ask ourselves what they had 
in common, we are forced to conclude that Van Heugten did not belong to the 
inner circle of Cartholic authorities throughout his whole life, nor did Verhoeven 
during the first decades of his carrier. 
Critics have highlighted the positive character traits of both Van Heugten and 
Verhoeven. According to Van Duinkerken, his friend Van Heugten was not a man 
who was used to receiving attention. Instead, he used to let people have it their way. 
His authority did not impose itself on others, but spontaneously flowed from his 
presence, as Van Duinkerken remembered. Students always liked to cooperate with 
him and his readers never felt limited by his critiques to develop their own opinions. 
At times he engaged in debates, but the shy smile with which he received scorn and 
derision convinced the public that they were right.90 Something similar could be said 
of Verhoeven. Critics mention the soft voice with which he used to speak in public. 
His style of writing was also cautious and careful, as if he continuously warned him-
self not to be rash in his judgments of the object which he wished to approach and 
describe. His method consisted of trying time and again, from different angles, to 
describe things of which he admitted he could not say everything. On the contrary, 
he acknowledged that every single thing was intimately connected and associated 
with so many other things that every attempt to define it must be taken as a form of 
violence against something that is ultimately inexplicable.91
Yet, if all this is true, what then should we make of their scorn for Vestdijk’s ar-
guments? Another story about Van Heugten tells that he in fact did not accept any 
attack from students. He even urged the board of the Catholic student association to 
dismiss the leaders of the movement whom he felt were threatening his authority.92
And Verhoeven, in his turn, became well known for his controversy with Hermans 
and Frits Staal on issues raised by Wittgenstein.93
As I have previously suggested, I believe that we must take a look at the social 
status of these two intellectuals if we wish to find an explanation for their polemical 
attacks against Vestdijk. Van Heugten was never appointed to a university or semi-
nary. And even though he was one of the editors of Streven, his activities were lim-
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ited to literary criticism. At the time he got involved with the controversies regarding 
Vestdijk, Hermans and Staal, Verhoeven was an editor of Roeping, a magazine of 
literary and cultural developments. Only in the 1980s was he recognized as one of 
the foremost literary critics and philosophers of his age. He got the P.C. Hooft award 
for his oeuvre and was appointed professor of Ancient Philosophy and Metaphysics at 
the University of Amsterdam. 
As I have been arguing, intellectuals that do not belong to the leading circles of 
their communities tend to be more aggressive towards those who are perceived as a 
threat to their positions as spokespersons for a certain public. Yet, this critique could 
as easily turn against the fellow Catholics. At the end of the 1950s—in the same 
magazine in which Van Heugten published his review—Th. Govaart attacked all of 
those critics who rejected Vestdijk’s arguments on religion, and admired Vestdijk’s 
gift as a writer. Here we see the progressive ‘undercurrent’, though it was still made 
up of outsiders within the community of Catholics, feeling free to associate with 
intellectuals outside of the community itself. Something similar, though in a different 
period, is observable by clerics such as A. van der Wey during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The distance which Van der Wey felt between himself and the mainstream of Catho-
lic critics was great enough to prompt him to use outsiders in order to attack his 
fellow theologians in—at that time—progressive newspapers such as De Tijd and 
Trouw.
Thus, with respect to the problem of outsiders within the Catholic community, 
we might conclude that in the period before the 1960s a conservative literary critic 
like Van Heugten preferred to attack Vestdijk, whereas the more progressive Govaart 
took his fellow Catholics as objects for his verdicts. On the other hand, during the 
period after 1960 a progressive like Verhoeven felt triggered to scorn Vestdijk, 
whereas Van der Wey later preferred to criticize Catholic theologians even by posi-
tively invoking the theories which Vestdijk had been putting forward. 
Yet, what about the intellectuals who played a more significant role within the 
Catholic world? As we have seen in the case of Van Duinkerken and other literary 
critics, their magazines remained in the margins of the general field of cultural pro-
duction. As early as the nineteenth century, Struyker Boudier argues, the reputation 
of theology and philosophy grew after they developed into separate disciplines, to be 
distinguished from the arts as well as the other sciences. The cultural paper De Katho-
liek turned into a theological paper— dubbed the Studia Catholica—in the early 
1920s, after it was adopted by the Theological Faculty of Nijmegen University as its 
medium. Only in 1960 did the theological experts show any interest in a lay audience 
when they renamed the magazine Tijdschrift voor Theologie.
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Especially Jesuits and Dominicans attempted to raise the general level of contribu-
tions to dogmatic thinking.94 The former had established their position in the media 
during the ninetheenth century through their magazine Studiën. This, however, was a 
generally religious and cultural critical paper. Shortly before the war, the theological 
and philosophical faculties of the Jesuit Seminaries in the Netherlands issued Bijdragen
to allow for more specialized contributions to Catholic thinking. After the war, 
Studiën changed its name into Katholiek Cultureel Tijdschrift, soon to be called simply 
Streven, being the Dutch counterpart of the Belgian paper Streven which had been 
established fifteen years before. Since 1930, the Belgian Dominicans had their own 
paper, namely Thomistisch Tijdschrift, later renamed Kultuurleven. This magazine, how-
ever, did not offer any thorough philosophical articles. Thus, just like the Jesuits, they 
founded the Tijdschrift voor Philosophie at the end of the 1930s to offer the experts 
space in which to publish their contributions. During the first decades, this magazine 
would generally be recognized as highly important to the development of Catholic 
thinking.95
 Against this background, we must consider the status of J.H. Walgrave (1911-
1986).96 Though he did not agree with Vestdijk’s arguments, he avoided polemical 
attack. His status as a leading intellectual was already well established at the time the 
controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie was launched. First of all, his contribu-
tion appeared in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, the magazine of which he was chief editor 
and to which he of course frequently contributed. Secondly, he was one of the fore-
most representatives of the so-called ‘Leuven School’ of Dominican philosophers, 
founded by cardinal D.J. Mercier in the late nineteenth century.97 Concentrated in 
the Higher Institute for Philosophy (HIW, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte), this ten-
dency within the Catholic intellectual scene took neither tradition nor the authority 
of the Church as its point of reference. It even managed to emancipate itself from 
theological tutelage, advocating a purely rational science of its own.98 Not surpris-
ingly, there was a lot of freedom for thought and difference of opinion, along with an 
openness to scientific developments in physics, biology and psychology—all of which 
were taken to be disciplines that posed important challenges to theology and philoso-
phy.99 The members of the ‘Leuven School’ tried to apply the insights derived from 
other disciplines to political science, sociology and economics.100 Thirdly, Walgrave 
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played an important role in the movement known as Katholieke Actie. This initiative, 
which was supported by some progressive clerics, was meant to encourage lay people 
to involve themselves more closely in church activities.101 Walgrave himself empha-
sized that it was absolutely necessary to encourage lay people to play a more impor-
tant role within the church. Only through them was it possible to keep in touch with 
the outside world. And though their critical attitudes were sometimes “unpleasant,”102 
lay people had to be frequently consulted by theologians and church leaders in order 
to help them formulate a policy. 
Yet, whatever his activities in favor of developments that would change hierar-
chies within the Catholic community, according to Walgrave clerics needed to re-
main in control of the people—the same way that philosophy was necessary to keep 
control over other, more secular disciplines. Institutionally, then, his approach was 
conservative. And even though it was still dominant during the late 1940s and early 
1950s, thereafter more progressive intellectuals would successfully challenge the status 
quo. Especially during the 1960s, secular disciplines such as sociology and psychology 
would gain ground within the theological faculties of the Catholic universities. At the 
same time, Catholic philosophy would increasingly be practiced at state universities. 
A clear example of the latter development was the growing influence of Delfgaauw, 
who had been a student of H.J. Pos at the University of Amsterdam, and taught there 
till 1960 when he became a professor of philosophy at Groningen University. It 
would be interesting to see whether, or in which sense, these circumstances deter-
mined the heated debates that arose within the Vereeniging voor Thomistische Wijsbe-
geerte (‘Society for Thomistic Philosophy’).103 In any case, Delfgaauw is regarded as 
having launched a definitive blow to the tradition of the ‘Leuven School’, while 
developing the phenomenological method for philosophy.104 
It is possible to consider W.A.M. Luijpen (1922-1980) as one of the last represen-
tatives of the old philosophical tradition.105 Even though he was an Augustinian rather 
than a Dominican, he had studied in Leuven. And as we have seen in his contribu-
tion to our controversy, he still regarded philosophy as the queen of all sciences. 
Soon after his studies at the HIW, he became a teacher in Eindhoven and visiting 
professor at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Only in the late 1960s 
did he receive appointments to the universities of Tilburg and Delft. At the time in 
which he attacked Vestdijk and Sierksma, he was young and lacked an established 
position among his fellow philosophers. According to my theory, the social condi-
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tions to which Luijpen was subject did not favor a sympathetic treatment of the ar-
guments offered by opponents who advocated a psychological approach to religious 
phenomena.
 Whereas the authority of the ‘Leuven School’ was questioned during the 1950s, 
and Luijpen was not able to save its position, the University of Nijmegen took the 
lead in extending scholarly activities within the Catholic community. The HIW had 
favored these developments, but the intellectuals of Nijmegen continued by subvert-
ing the traditional hierarchy between philosophy and the more secular disciplines.106
In order to secure the position of the clergy, the episcopacy had ordered the 
foundation of a Catholic university in the early 1920s. Ironically, however, some of 
the most progressive intellectuals were involved in the process. Gerard Brom and 
Johannes Hoogveld played a decisive role. And to indicate their position within the 
Catholic community, it is worthwhile to mention that both, along with Titus 
Brandsma—one of the first professors of philosophy in Nijmegen—joined the Comité
van Waakzaamheid in 1936.107 After World War II, Nijmegen, guided by Brom and 
L.J. Rogier, would become the most important catalyst of lay emancipation.108 What-
ever the objections made by the clerics, in 1952 Van Duinkerken was appointed as a 
successor of Brom at the chair of general literature and Dutch literature in particular, 
even though he had to renounce his membership of the PvdA.109 The trend towards 
secularization would become more powerful with the establishment of the medical 
faculty in 1951, and the faculties of mathematics and physics in 1957, which were 
soon followed by the establishment of an independent social faculty in 1964. More-
over, scientific disciplines would become increasingly fragmented, and research 
would become increasingly professionalized.110 The most significant result of all this 
was the shift from theology and morality towards mental health psychology, along 
with intensive treatment in psychiatric hospitals.111
The most prominent representative of the tendencies just indicated was H.M.M. 
(Han) Fortmann (1912-1970), a secular priest who from 1956 until his death was a 
professor of pastoral and cultural psychology at Nijmegen University.112 Together 
with the members of the so-called ‘Utrecht School’ he would become an inspiring 
and one of the most important spokespersons on matters concerning mental health.113
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By this he definitely did not pretend to offer a theologogical or specifically religious 
conception of man. Rather he focused on the ways in which pastors should take care 
of human beings who found themselves in problematic situations. His approach 
showed some striking similarities with that of non-Catholic psychologists of the same 
period, especially as employed by J.H. van den Berg.114 Both represented a develop-
ment in the direction of an increasing freedom from Church authority for the arts 
and scientific disciplines.115 Surely, psychology became more important and was ap-
plied to areas such as education, mental health care, social services of the governent, 
pedogogical institutes, and emergency centers.116 Continuing the line started by 
Hoogveld—who before the war had founded the empirically oriented study center 
for youth education—and together with F.J.J. Buytendijk, J.J.G. Prick117 and his own 
student H.J.L van Luijk,118 Fortmann attempted to fully integrate the results of psy-
chological research into a religiously inspired worldview. Whereas most Catholics did 
not include any findings of the social sciences into their concepts, the scholars men-
tioned faithfully tried to come to terms with an approach that might easily be taken 
as a danger to dogmatic systems.119 Yet, soon after, psychologists understood that the 
truth claims of religion could not be saved by this approach. Either they continued 
along empirical lines, or they turned psychology itself into a kind of religion.120
Fortmann represented a period of transformation in which intellectuals attempted 
to reformulate religious inspirations in order to make them seem respectable to out-
siders. For these purposes, they employed a wide range of different media, from arti-
cles in newspapers, to lectures to the educated public, to highly specialized books. 
Within his own community, Fortmann’s position remained unquestioned. And at the 
time in which he contributed to the reception of Vestdijk’s essay, his authority was 
widely acknowledged and his books regarded to be well informed, reliable, and use-
ful as guides for psychologists and psychiatrists as well as politicians alike.121
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In the wake of these revolutionary developments at one of the key Catholic insti-
tutes, media with similar inclinations merely followed the line indicated by Fort-
mann’s initiatives. This way, the leading literary and cultural critic of De Volkskrant, 
Gabriël Smit was able to include some positive references to Vestdijk and Sierksma in 
his review of Als ziende de onzienlijke. Supported by the authority of a Catholic psy-
chologist, the two critics just mentioned did not pose any threat.122 The same way, 
Catholic intellectuals felt when they were either invited or allowed to publish their 
comments in ecumenical and even secular media. Van Luijk’s review of Fortmann’s 
magnum opus appeared in Wending, originally a Netherlands Reformed break-
through monthly. Sociologist L. Laeyendecker contributed to the Vestdijkkroniek. 
S.W. Couwenberg, an expert on constitutional law, made some neutral comments 
on Vestdijk in Civis Mundi, a magazine devoted to commentary on political and 
cultural issues. 
It is worthwhile to remember that all of these developments were the eventual 
outcome of tendencies which began as undercurrents critical of the dominant role 
that both episcopacy and traditional theology used to play within the Catholic com-
munity. Within this context, Buytendijk needs to again be mentioned. He surely had 
strong links to the phenomenological approach exemplified by the research program 
of Fortmann at Nijmegen University. However, other than Fortmann, he had not 
grown up in a Catholic environment. In the early 1920s he was a member of the 
GKN. While teaching at the Free University of Amsterdam, he got into a conflict 
with the establishment and left the community. Soon, he would become a professor 
at Utrecht University. At the latter institute he founded, together with H.C. Rümke, 
the ‘Utrecht School’ of interdisciplinary phenomenological studies, to which also J. 
van Lennep belonged.123 In the meanwhile he converted to Catholicism. In the late 
1950s he would be appointed to the University of Nijmegen. 
This career not only suggests the way in which progressive elements were inte-
grated into Catholicism, but it also invites for a comparison with the situation within 
the GKN. Buytendijk’s move towards the RKK might indicate some difference 
between the intellectual atmospheres in the Dutch Reformed community and that of 
the Roman Catholics. And whereas the Catholic authorities in the 1960s were far 
from polemical towards Vestdijk, the Dutch Reformed might have been. On the 
other hand, this is to overlook a time gap of forty years. Upon leaving the Free Uni-
versity, Buytendijk went to Utrecht and was for a long period merely a marginal 
Catholic. During his stay in Utrecht, and especially after World War II, things had 
changed rapidly at both the Free University and the Catholic University at Nij-
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megen. Far from being different, in fact, the changes within the Dutch Reformed 
and Roman Catholic communities were parallel, as will become clear from our ac-
count of the developments within the GKN.124 
 
The Dutch Reformed 
As mentioned above, Buytendijk started his carreer as a physiologist at the Free Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. The latter institute was found by the Dutch Reformed politi-
cal leader Abraham Kuyper in 1880. He founded the university as an attempt to 
defend the orthodoxy against attacks from secular tendencies at the other theological 
faculties. The Law of Higher Education (Wet op het Hooger Onderwijs of 1876) pro-
vided those faculties with a so-called duplex ordo structure. This meant that dogmatics, 
ethics and practical theology became separated from literary and historical courses 
taught according to secular methodologies. Kuyper aimed at a university independent 
of both state and church. Nevertheless, although he tried to involve orthodox 
movements struggling with secular tendencies within the Netherlands Reformed 
Church, eventually his Free University became associated with the Dutch Reformed 
Churches.125 He thus created an institute at which politicians and lawyers, doctors and 
natural scientists, writers and literary critics could be educated. Yet, according to 
Kuyper cum suis, simplex ordo theology had to remain above all other sciences, much 
as philosophy had been for generations of the Catholic clergy.126  
Like all other disciplines, psychology had to be based on theological principles, as 
was widely admitted among Dutch Reformed specialists. The main advocate of this 
approach, L. Lindeboom, was even called a “theological imperialist.”127 Not surpris-
ingly, when in 1907 a chair of Psychology was established at the Free University, it 
was established as part of the Theological Faculty. In addition, the ‘Valerius-clinic’ 
was founded three years later as a kind of laboratory for the academic study of insan-
ity. 
Soon, however, the position of theology as the leading source of authority would 
be questioned. In the early 1920s, a young generation of theologians, highly inter-
ested in philosophical and psychological approaches to religious phenomena,128 tried 
to challenge the supremacy of the orthodox, dominant and often aristocratic brand of 
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leading intellectuals.129 The exegesis of biblical texts in which every story was taken 
literally, was no longer taken for granted by all theologians. This even led to an in-
ternal crisis when the Synod of the GKN banned all alternatives to revived interpre-
tations and dogmatic thinking. Pastor J.G. Geelkerken was dismissed, and went on to 
found his own church.130 Apart from banning theological dissent, church leaders also 
forbade students to become members of the NCSV (‘Dutch Christian Student Asso-
ciation’). According to its critics, participation in activities related to those kinds of 
ecumenical organizations was a betrayal of the GKN. Likewise, J.B. Netelenbos, who 
had argued for a future merger between GKN and NHK, was dismissed.131
Whereas some were forced to leave, others simply decided to look for other op-
portunities after their intellectual mentor, Herman Bavinck, died in 1924. Pos left the 
Free University for the University of Amsterdam, while Buytendijk and the Dutch 
Reformed psychiatrist L. Bouwman switched over to Utrecht. Pos, on the other 
hand, turned towards the humanists, whereas Buytendijk became a Catholic. To-
gether, they would become members of the Comité voor Waakzaamheid.132 Here 
Buytendijk met with the repression from which he had been trying to escape when 
he left the Dutch Reformed community. And like his fellow Catholics, he decided to 
terminate his activities for the Comité after talks with members of the episcopacy. 
Bouwman would be the only one of the ‘progressive’ elements to stay with the 
GKN. At the State University of Utrecht, however, he felt free to follow his intellec-
tual preferences. Much like Fortmann, he challenged the supremacy of theologians 
within their respective communities. Instead of eternal truths, the claimed, they cared 
more about the mental health of the believer. Instead of teaching psychology of relig-
ion, they focused on pastoral psychology, by which they clearly tried to avoid any 
theological claims.133 Bouman—a professor of psychiatry, neurology and theoretical 
biology—argued for autonomy for the psychological approach from any dogmatic 
claims. Significantly, his work did not include any biblical references.134 While offer-
ing his students introductions to the theories and methods of phenomenology, his 
courses easily fit into the discourse developed by the ‘Utrecht School’ of Rümke and 
Buytendijk.135
Bavinck’s other students all remained at either the Free University or the Re-
formed Seminary in Kampen. We are tempted to think here of leading authorities 
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like G.C. Berkouwer,136 J.H. Bavinck and S.J. Popma,137 as well as K. Schilder.138 Yet, 
not until the war would they become leading intellectuals in their own right. For the 
moment, dogmatic conservatives dominated the intellectual scene within the Dutch 
Reformed community.139 In the field of psychology, J. Waterink continued the tradi-
tion started by Lindeboom.140 And even Schilder claimed that psychology belonged to 
the field of theology.141
Yet, in dogmatics, the tradition which Schilder had begun as an editor of the 
weekly magazine, De Reformatie, would continue as an undercurrent of ‘progressive’ 
critics of the ‘conservative’ establishment. De Reformatie was meant as an alternative to 
orthodox Dutch Reformed magazines such as De Standaard and De Wachter, as well as 
the progressive Netherlands Reformed Bergopwaarts that would later be succeeded by 
Wending.142 After the schism within the GKN at the end of the war, De Reformatie
would become the leading magazine of the VGKN. 
Another strand within dogmatics, which was more favorable towards develop-
ments within psychology, would create the undercurrent which prepared the Dutch 
Reformed community for the silent revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. Of all the 
critics who contributed to the controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie, Popma, 
Bavinck and Janse de Jonge played a leading role in this development. Yet, without 
Berkouwer, who has been regarded as the primary mediator between a generation of 
established dogmatics on the one hand, and that of people representing the more 
secular disciplines,143 it is doubtful whether or not they would have been able to help 
accomplish the revolution for which they are credited. 
Before the war, G.C. Berkouwer (1903-1996) continued a tradition of dogmatic 
thinking which merely served apologetic purposes. Only after the war did he begin 
to feel increasingly attracted to more progressive tendencies within theology, espe-
cially the tendency inspired by phenomenology, or what has in general been called 
the trend towards verification of dogmatic presumptions.144 Whereas before the war 
he took part in the polemical controversy between Neo-Calvinists and Barthians, 
from the mid-1950s onwards he published some highly sympathetic commentaries on 
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Barth and some of his followers, such as Miskotte, Van der Leeuw and Kraemer.145
His contacts with theologians of the NHK and RKK are widely recognized.146 And 
his dogmatic work on anthropology would even be of much help to phenome-
nologically oriented psychologists such as Janse de Jonge.147
It is difficult to imagine a field of intellectual activities within the Dutch Re-
formed community in which Berkouwer was not involved. Though he was a leading 
dogmatic at the Free University from 1940 till 1973, he educated generations of 
theologians. His series of dogmatic studies would be the most ambitious project un-
dertaken by any Dutch theologian during the second half of the twentieth century. It 
would serve as a point of reference for intellectuals tied to the GKN, yet trying to 
meet the intellectual challenges posed to them by new developments in modern 
thinking. His opinions on issues of public importance were available in Gereformeerd 
Theologisch Tijdschrift, monthlies such as Horizon and Bezinning, and weeklies such as 
Centraal Weekblad and Gereformeerd Weekblad. He reached his widest public through 
his Saturday column in Trouw from 1948 till 1953, as well as through his bi-monthly 
contributions from 1953 till 1963.148
The dominance of the phenomenological paradigm, as well as the increasing in-
fluence of psychological approaches, can be shown by the work of other leading 
Dutch Reformed intellectuals. Before the war, S.J. Popma (1899-1988) frequently 
contributed to De Reformatie.149 Besides that, he was elected to the Synod during the 
war.150 The Germans regarded him as one of the leading Dutch Reformed intellectu-
als. He was therefore taken hostage to Haaren, where came into close contact with 
Kraemer.151 Shortly after the war, he was a student-pastor in Amsterdam, where he 
met his Catholic fellow Van Heugten. Popma also worked with Janse de Jonge at the 
Valerius-clinic. He was appointed a teaching position at the University of Utrecht. 
After Janse de Jonge died, Popma was appointment to the Free University.152 Janse de 
Jonge himself (1917-1964) had been a student of Bouman, remained faithful to the 
phenomenological approach153 and would become one of the main representatives of 
a Dutch Reformed ‘School’ of mental health psychology.154 Together with Popma, 
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Berkouwer and C.A. van Peursen (professor of philosophy at the University of Lei-
den, later at the Free University),155 he would play a decisive role in the overthrowing 
of orthodox tendencies within the Reformed community.156 In 1963, one year before 
his untimely death, Janse de Jonge was appointed professor of psychiatry and psycho-
pathology at the Free University.157 Finally, J.H. Bavinck (1895-1964), the nephew of 
the late Herman Bavinck, was generally acknowledged as the leading missionary of 
the Dutch Reformed community.158 In the 1920s, he was a member of the NCSV, of 
which Kraemer was president. And even though the Synod warned students not to 
get involved in the activities of the NCSV, but rather strongly advised them to join 
the Gereformeerde Studentenbeweging (GSB), Bavinck did not give in to these kinds of 
pressures.159 On Java, he met Kraemer again. And whereas at home contacts between 
the Dutch Reformed Churches on the one hand and the Netherlands Reformed 
Church were scarce, in the East missionaries of both communities often worked 
closely together. And both Kraemer and Bavinck also participated in the International 
Missionary Conference at Tambaram in 1938. After his service in the East, Bavinck 
was appointed professor of missionary theology and psychology at both the Calvinist 
Seminary in Kampen and the Free University at Amsterdam. 
None of the Dutch Reformed intellectuals mentioned thus far was ever polemi-
cally involved in the controversy surrounding Vestdijk and Sierksma. In this sense the 
position of Berkouwer might be comparable to that of Walgrave (even though 
Berkouwer’s role was more decisive to the future of his community). Similarly, the 
position of Popma and Janse de Jonge might be comparable to the place occupied by 
Fortmann (even though the latter’s role was likely to be far more important than that 
of the other two).
However, as we have indicated, some of these intellectuals—Bavinck in particu-
lar—had close contacts with Kraemer. The latter’s activities had been developed 
quite independently from theology as well. Yet, whereas the above mentioned intel-
lectuals did not scorn Vestdijk, Kraemer became notorious for his personal attacks on 
Vestdijk, and especially Sierksma.  
In terms of paradigms, the intellectuals involved here were phenomenologically 
oriented; yet their attitude towards arguments such as those offered by De toekomst der 
religie differed completely. Why? Why did Kraemer—along with outstanding theolo-
gians and scholars of religion such as Miskotte, Van der Leeuw and De Vos—react so 
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aggressively, whereas leading intellectuals from both Catholic and Dutch Reformed 
communities remained moderate, if not sympathetic, towards Vestijk and Sierksma? 
Following my hypothesis, this can only be explained by referring to the status of 
these opinion leaders within their own communities. First of all—especially com-
pared to critics like Kraemer, as we will later see—the intellectuals, as members of the 
Dutch Reformed Churches, could safely count on a public that was still highly faith-
ful to the pillar-structure to which it belonged. And, secondly, all of them held key 
positions—whether at the Free University or the Synod—within the very structure 
which they supported with their activities. This was exactly the way in which the 
status of Popma differed from that of Van Heugten. Both were student-pastors at the 
time that they began to contribute to the controversy, but Popma had already been 
playing an important role in church politics, whereas Van Heugten would never be 
more than a literary critic. 
Furthermore, whether or not the status of intellectuals in fact determines their 
way of arguing must be confirmed by those whom we have identified as having po-
lemical attitudes towards Vestdijk. Compared to Bavinck, Pos (1888-1971) was a 
minor figure within the field of missionary activities. He played an important role in 
the East. He advised colonial authorities, taught at the seminary and visited many 
congregations in the archipel.160 Together with Bavinck and Kraemer, he attended 
the conference in Tambaram.161 Yet, back in the Netherlands, he would never re-
ceive a teaching post at a university. And he did not contribute frequently to leading 
media in the Dutch Reformed world. Something similar held for Teeuwen (1898-
1964),162 Wapenaar (1883-1967),163 and Wytzes (1908-1987). Though respectively 
practicing as an ordinary minister, a poet and a high-school principal, none of them 
would play any dominating role in the intellectual scene. However, pretending to be 
literary and cultural critics—as Van Heugten did for part of the Catholic commu-
nity—they felt the need to face the challenge of De toekomst der religie. They could 
not count on the approval of the public, as leading intellectuals like Berkouwer and 
Bavinck could. So, they had to find a way to compensate for their lack of authority 
within the field of Dutch Reformed criticism. And, in accordance with my theory, 
they did so by launching polemical attacks on Vestdijk, attempting to disqualify the 
latter by employing a declarative style of arguing. 
Now that we have dealt with both the Roman Catholic and the Dutch Re-
formed opinion leaders, it is time to draw some preliminary conclusions before I 
proceed to the polemical affair that received by far the most attention within intellec-
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tual circles. Among the Catholics Van Heugten, Jeanne van Schaik-Willing and Cor-
nelis Verhoeven took a polemical stance, whereas from the side of the Dutch Re-
formed especially Teeuwen, Wapenaar, Wytzes, and Pos distinguished themselves 
from other—far more moderate—voices. Other than what is suggested by their de-
clarative style of arguing, these were only minor intellectuals who contributed to 
magazines which played a minor role within the respective communities. Van Heug-
ten, Van Schaik-Willing and Wapenaar were literary critics without the status as-
cribed to the main theological, philosophical and increasingly psychological trends 
within the intellectual scene at those times. Yet, theologians such as Teeuwen and 
Pos also only played a secondary role in the intellectual interactions. Verhoeven was 
in the early 1960s already a very prolific writer. However, as a critic who wrote for a 
magazine of only minor importance within the community, he clearly did not have 
the authority which he would receive in later years. I would say that his comments 
on Vestdijk are comparable to those of Van Duinkerken on Ter Braak in the late 
1930s. Young and without any secure position within the Catholic environment, 
both felt the need to attack any outsider with whom they—given their positions as 
outsiders or even enfants terribles within their own community—could easily be asso-
ciated.
Immediately, then, the question arises whether all of this also holds for the intel-
lectuals with whom we still have to deal in the rest of this chapter. We will focus 
here on progressive theologians and philosophers who seemed to hold highly re-
spected positions at universities and within churches, but yet who were fiercely po-
lemical. Can our hypothesis help us to shed some light on this problem? 
Breakthrough intellectuals 
The intellectuals who constituted the progressive intellectual community actually did 
not belong to any structure comparable to that of the Roman Catholics or Dutch 
Reformed communities. Some were members of the NHK, whereas others counted 
themselves either among the Mennonites or Arminians. And, as we will see, they 
were even internally divided on dogmatic issues, though not one of them was a 
dogmatic theologian. Yet, even these conflicts lasted only till the 1960s. After that 
time, we see a growing tendency towards integration between members of not only 
different factions within the NHK, but even between intellectuals of other churches, 
congregations and associations as well. And this was the period in which progressive 
elements succeeded in their attempts to create what has been called a ‘super-pillar’.164
The main characteristic of the intellectuals who belonged to the networks constitut-
ing this super-pillar was their solidarity with those who neither agreed with their 
opinions, nor shared their way of life. This attitude was shared by the progressive 
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elements within the old pillar-structures. Instead of being organized around churches, 
the ‘super-pillar’ was founded on an intricate web of university departments, welfare 
organizations and civil servants. This was the world on which, Weijers, De Vries and 
Duyvendak, as mentioned before, focused their studies on the post-war intellectual 
developments. 
Already in the early 1920s and late 1930s we find outsiders within the established 
pillar-structures trying to join broader intellectual and political movements. Dutch 
Reformed students and theologians contacted the NCSV. Roman Catholics were 
intent on playing a leading role in the anti-Nazi movement. And, as we will see in 
the case of Schilder, too much involvement in the protest against Nazism was per-
ceived as a threat to official pillar-policy. 
Yet, whereas intellectuals such as Van Duinkerken, Buytendijk and H.J. Pos were 
prepared to support Ter Braak’s activities for the Comité van Waakzaamheid, G. van 
der Leeuw, who was invited to participate as well, is reported to have replied that he 
preferred to join the fascist dictatorschip of Franco. Likewise, in 1937 the editors of 
Het Vaderland asked Van der Leeuw to review Ter Braak’s Van oude en nieuwe chris-
tenen.165 In his attack on De toekomst der religie, Van der Leeuw wrote that he regarded 
his piece on Ter Braak to be “a devastating critique.”166 Without taking Ter Braak’s 
reply to the earlier review in account (which wouldn’t be published until many years 
later)167, Van der Leeuw regretted only that he “did not try to understand his oppo-
nent and, consequently, did not destroy him.” However, that was exactly what he 
attempted to do to Vestdijk. By denouncing the latter’s arguments as expressions of a 
tortured soul, he clearly tried to outwit his opponent. 
Why did Van der Leeuw feel the need to “destroy” both Ter Braak and Vestdijk? 
It was not the result of a conflict with the Comité in general. Shortly before he was 
invited to join, he co-edited an international protest against the national-socialist 
anti-semitic policies. Both Van Duinkerken and Buytendijk participated in this initia-
tive.168 Later on, the latter two would accept Ter Braak’s invitation for the Comité.
Why did Van der Leeuw refuse, and fiercely attack Ter Braak and Vestdijk? 
In application of my hypothesis, I would suggest that people like Van der Leeuw 
on the one hand, and Ter Braak and Vestdijk on the other, were competing for an 
audience that did not belong to the old-school and still strongly established pillar-
structure.169 And even though during the first few years immediately after World War 
II the breakthrough movement seemed to be successful, it would soon become clear 
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that politics and society turned out not to be that easily transformed as these revolu-
tionaries had been expecting. Van der Leeuw’s carrier offered a striking example of 
that.
Van der Leeuw’s role within the public sphere after he left The Hague did pro-
vide for a place among the dominant intellectuals. And even though he was a prolific 
writer, he did not hold a position which was easy to demarcate from competing 
intellectuals. First of all, being an intellectual belonging to the NHK, he could never 
count on an audience comparable to that of the leading voices within the Roman 
Catholic and Dutch Reformed communities. True, his record as a professor in the 
Phenomenology of Religion at the University of Groningen was astounding. He was 
president of the International Association for the Study of Religion. He also partici-
pated in the international Eranos-meetings between leading intellectuals such as Eliade 
and Jung. His introduction to its method and materials has long been regarded as a 
landmark in the history of the academic discipline.170 Yet, his ambitions were also 
extended to other areas of Dutch culture. His appointment to the cabinet of Drees 
and Schermerhorn in 1945 as Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences might have 
come as a surprise. Yet, the essays he had written on issues of public importance are 
likely to have called the attention of the more politicially involved intellectuals 
within the breakthrough movement. However, his attempts at reform and the exten-
sion of state influence on educational matters were doomed to fail. After one year, 
when new elections were held, Van der Leeuw returned to the University of Gron-
ingen, where he had previously been professor of Theology and the Phenomenology 
of Religion. Even within his own party, he did not find support for his ideas for an 
active cultural policy.171 And while it was already impossible to unite Catholics and 
Protestants, Dutch Reformed critics asked themselves how on earth Van der Leeuw 
planned to create a sense of national unity.172
Not having been too successful as a minister, Van der Leeuw’s authority in the 
public sphere was mainly associated with the role he played as editor of—and fre-
quent contributor to—the opinion magazine Wending.173 This magazine would play 
an important role in the controversy surrounding Vestdijk and Sierksma. It is thus 
quite relevant to ask ourselves how we should to situate this periodical within the 
contemporary field of cultural production.174
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As Margreet Braams observed in her study of Wending, the magazine is hardly 
mentioned in any of the secondary literature on postwar Dutch history. According to 
her, this is perfectly understandable because it cannot easily be classified within a 
pillar or political party. Surely the magazine had some affinity with the newly estab-
lished PvdA. Yet it was certainly not the voice of the party, nor did it have any offi-
cial connection with the PvdA. The same held for its link with the NHK; there was a 
clear kinship with its dominant ideals, yet no official bond existed between the two. 
And, consequently, the paper was difficult to include in the standardized conceptual 
distinctions made for ordinary description.175 It is only due to ecumenical tendencies 
within the Protestant communities that Wending was included into the bibliographical 
projects mentioned before.176 Also, within the same Protestant context, a short over-
view of the history of the magazine was published.177
Yet, given the fact that periodicals are only recently receiving scholarly attention, 
Braams’s explanation for the fact that Wending does not figure prominently in the 
historiography needs to be qualified. Surely, the magazine was meant for outsiders of 
the established pillar organizations. Yet, this is not the reason why it did not get the 
attention it certainly deserved according to Braams herself. Here, history has been 
interpreted by means of the concepts used by the subjects under study, rather than 
those developed from an analytical historian’s point of view. Moreover, the fact that 
literary critical magazines were the first to receive serious attention clearly testifies 
against Braams’s earlier remarks.  
In general, magazines edited and meant for outsiders are often of far more interest 
to historians than the more ‘conservative’ ones. Previously, I mentioned Roeping and
De Reformatie as ‘progressive’ journals within their communities. These magazines are 
frequently mentioned in the historiography of both the Roman Catholic and Dutch 
Reformed traditions, whereas Streven, Horizon, and Bezinning are not. Yet, when 
Braams characterizes Wending as a “progressive Netherlands Reformed monthly,”178
we are tempted to ask ourselves what precisely is meant by ‘progressive’. 
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Often the postwar Netherlands has been characterized as a conservative country. 
Apart from a few attempts at experimentation within the fields of art and literature, 
intellectuals and politicians dominated in their attempts to restore the prewar situa-
tion of confessionally organized parties. The Netherlands was a pacifist democracy 
and society in which different interests were settled by means of compromise. This 
image has long reigned under the guidance of eminent political scientists such as 
Lijphart and Daalder, as well as historians such as Kossman.179 Following their line of 
reasoning, Braams asks herself the question how Wending, being a progressive maga-
zine, fit within the general picture of restoration and regression.180 She quite hastily 
concludes that Wending belonged to the broader movement that tried to break 
through the established pillar-structures. Its initiatives were directed against restora-
tion and regression. 
Yet, remembering the developments within both the Roman Catholic and Dutch 
Reformed communities which I have already covered, it might become clear that it 
is difficult to apply terms such as ‘regression’ to their intellectual developments. A 
binary opposition like the one between progress and restoration is also difficult to 
apply if we want to identify the difference between Wending on the one hand, and
Roeping and De Reformatie on the other. The latter two magazines allowed for criti-
cism of established traditions within their communities. And whereas the editors of 
Horizon and Bezinning terminated their activities in the early 1960s, the others simply 
continued—though in the case of Roeping, this was accomplished by reformulating 
ambitions and a name change. On the other hand, De Reformatie and an editor of 
Wending such as Van der Leeuw have at times been counted among the ‘conserva-
tive’ movements within the Dutch public sphere.181
To me, all intellectuals who actively try to change the discourse and social institu-
tions of their communities or disciplines, in a way that allows for the development of 
an assumed potential, can be designated ‘progressive’. In this sense, we can find ‘pro-
gressives’ both inside and outside the established pillar organizations. Given this fact, 
it is unlikely that the term ‘progressive’ will help us to clarify why some turn to po-
lemics while others do not. 
For this reason I object to the way in which Weijers, De Vries and Duyvendak 
take the term ‘progressive’ as synonomous with such a concept as ‘the intellectual’.182
I completely agree with Duyvendak’s conclusion that Lolle Nauta was entirely wrong 
when he argued that theologians were by definition not intellectuals. At the same 
time, Duyvendak tends to limit the theologians among the intellectuals to the mem-
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bers of the breakthrough movement or the ‘Utrecht School’; or, more generally, to 
those theologians that did not teach at the Free University or the Catholic universi-
ties, whether in Nijmegen or Tilburg.183 This, according to me, shows a curious 
predilection towards all those people and professors who argue from their own insti-
tutional settings (whether churches, universities or pillarized media) on issues of pub-
lic importance. Rather than investigating whether they indeed had something to say, 
Duyvendak merely assumes or decides that their contributions were not worth not-
ing. The question is why these people and professors are excluded from the picture. 
It cannot be for the content of their arguments; in general, these did not differ con-
siderably from that of the members of the ‘Utrecht School’. So, it must be their insti-
tutional position and their association with the ‘primitive’ pillar-structure that deter-
mines the way in which they tend to be judged by others. However, I do not find 
myself justified in arguing from intentions. What is significant to me is the fact that all 
intellectuals during the first decades after the war directed their opinions to a highly 
limited public. Whatever their intentions, the audience of the breakthrough maga-
zines did not surpass that of the traditional ones which to the pillar communities. And 
whether the former played a more significant role in the transformation of the public 
sphere in the postwar Netherlands than the latter has never been empirically verified. 
With respect to the terminology employed by Duyvendak cum suis, rather than being 
determined by the facts, it is founded upon ideological assumptions.184
This is not to deny the differences between ‘progressive’ intellectuals within es-
tablished pillar organizations and those who were active outside of this institutional 
tradition. For most intellectuals, this holds true for at least the first two decades after 
the war. It was only during the 1960s that progressive elements engaged in a network 
of people and institutions of a so-called ‘super-pillar’. The difference with opinion 
leaders from pillared organisations is that they refrained from polemics, whereas ‘pro-
gressive’ intellectuals tended to react aggressively. And whereas these ‘progressive’ 
intellectuals reacted polemically, from the 1960s on, their attitudes changed. Instead 
of trying to attack their opponents, they shifted toward more moderate styles of argu-
ing as soon as they became part of a pillared environment.  
According to my hypothesis, the main difference between the critics had to do 
with the institutional network in which they moved. The circles around Wending,
Het Parool, Vrij Nederland and, though less markedly, De Groene Amsterdammer were 
‘progressive’ in the sense that they turned against the pillar structure in an attempt to 
                                                     
183 Duyvendak 1997, 1999: 31-35; reference to Nauta 1990, 1991. 
184 Van Doorn has been calling the so-called ‘progressive’ intellectuals the “clerics of the prole-
tariat”; by that he clearly pointed to the fact that, contrary to their own claims, their ambitions 
were far from universal or, for that matter, of interest of the nation as a whole; cf. Van Doorn 
1996ab. 
200 
transform the political scene of the postwar Netherlands. Neither the audience nor 
the editors of the media with which we are dealing can easily be identified. There 
surely was a network of people pulling the strings. This was especially the case with 
Het Parool, Vrij Nederland and De Groene, which were closely linked to each other by 
means of personal unions. And when, shortly after the war, De Groene and Vrij Neder-
land lost subscribers, Het Parool supported both magazines financially. It also helped 
Vrij Nederland to develop into the main ‘progressive’ alternative to Elseviers Week-
blad.185
However, tight connections did not prevent conflicts. Even a merger between 
Vrij Nederland and De Groene would turn out to be impossible.186 At the same time, 
Vestdijk had problems with Het Parool. Through his friend Max Nord, who was one 
of the editors, he got involved as a literary critic. Yet, readers often complained that 
his pieces were ‘too difficult’. Vestdijk became weary of such criticism. In the sum-
mer of 1949, after receiving an offer by Algemeen Handelsblad to write a weekly 
commentary on literary matters, he left Het Parool.187 Even though there is no proof, 
it is tempting to speculate whether De Vos played any role in this case. The latter had 
written a ‘dirty’ critique of Vestdijk, as Vestdijk himself complained. Yet, the editors 
did not permit him to reply. Instead, they asked De Vos to write a second review in 
which he clarified some of his points against De toekomst der religie. Vestdijk sent a 
counter-critique. Yet, the editors refused to publish it. This also held for opinion 
magazines such as De Groene, Vrij Nederland, and Wending, none of which permitted 
Vestdijk to answer his critics. He was a regualar contributor to the first magazine, and 
an avid reader of the latter two. 
Vestdijk’s contributions, and the fact that he, together with his friend Sierksma, 
read these kinds of papers, shows that the ‘progressive’ media was attractive to a 
broad public. As Mulder and Koedijk argue in their study of Het Parool, there was no 
media for that had defined a group of people based on social, religious, political or 
geographical characteristics as possible subscribers. Though loosely connected to 
NVB and PvdA, magazines like the ones mentioned here did not enjoy the close 
links that Trouw, De Waarheid, Het Vrije Volk, De Volkskrant, NRC or Algemeen Han-
delsblad had with their respective communities of writers and readers, whether ARP, 
CPN, PvdA, KVP or VVD.188 Not until the early 1960s would a certain distance be 
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created between the media and its political counterparts. Only De Waarheid would 
remain an exclusively CPN paper. Yet, it would require more a thorough investiga-
tion to determine whether the generally ‘independent’ position of the four media 
forms which we are dealing with here had anything to do with the ‘polemical tem-
peraments’ which Koomen speaks of with respect to Vrij Nederland at the end of the 
1970s.189
As previously mentioned, whether or not the intellectuals that used these media 
forms as vehicles for their ideas were more ‘progressive’ than their colleagues from 
the ‘pillar-communities’ is a matter of perspective. With respect to content, ‘progres-
sive’ ideas did not differ considerably from ideas developed by ‘conservatives’. Like 
the former, the latter were mainly inspired by phenomenology and existentialism. 
Both were attempting to qualify these intellectual tendencies by Christian dogmatic 
terminology. And, in a sense, Weijers is correct when he states that the anthropologi-
cal project of the ‘Utrecht School’ was turned into a highly successful pastoral project 
organised around the religious expert. As he says, phenomenology became the na-
tional science of spiritual regeneration.190 Yet, Weijers is wrong in supposing that this 
only held for the ‘Utrecht School’; a similar tendency was present in both the Ro-
man Catholic and Dutch Reformed intellectual communities. 
In a sense, the paradigm of existential phenomenology helped to transcend the 
traditional pillar-boundaries. Religious experts, whether theologians or not, partici-
pated in the newly established Association of Scientific Research (Verbond voor Weten-
schappelijke Onderzoekers).191 Apart from members of the ‘Utrecht School’ like 
Buytendijk, Rümke, Langeveld and Pompe, also intellectuals such as Banning, Van 
der Leeuw, Dippel, Heering, and Nauta (all of whom were contributors to Wending)
participated in this circle of intellectual élites. And whereas theologians like De Vos, 
Miskotte and Buskes bolonged to the NHK, other leading intellectuals like Janse de 
Jonge, Fortmann, Van Peursen and Delfgaauw did not. Yet, whatever the progres-
siveness of all these intellectuals, only a few of them felt triggered to react polemically 
to the challenges posed by Vestdijk and Sierksma. And keeping the argument of the 
previous chapters in mind, many of these names turned up in my introductory over-
view of the history, subject and style of the controversy surrounding De toekomst der 
religie.
Of those critics we found Mankes-Zernike, Banning, Van der Leeuw, De Vos, 
Miskotte, Bomhoff, Buskes, Oosterbaan, De Jong, Dippel and Kraemer reacting 
polemically, whereas the others were far more moderate, if not friendly, towards 
Vestdijk and Sierksma. Immediately, then, the question arises how we should ac-
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count for this difference. Which characteristics can be identified in the former intel-
lectuals, who fiercely attacked the arguments which Vestdijk had put forward? In 
which sense did their position differ from that of critics like Heering, Berkelbach van 
der Sprenkel, Roscam Abbing, Nauta, Bleeker, De Fetter, Van Holk, Smits, Sirks, 
Hidding, Nijk, Sperna Weiland, and H. Faber?  
One important difference is that the members of the first group were socialists 
who contributed to Het Parool, Vrij Nederland, De Groene or Wending, and a liberal 
theological magazine with breakthrough sympathies like Vox Theologica.192 Most of 
these people held highly respected positions at various state universities and within 
the social-democratic Labour Party. Banning was professor of the Sociology of Re-
ligion at Leiden University.193 Van der Leeuw served as a professor History and Phe-
nomenology at the University of Groningen194 and served as a minister in the first 
postwar cabinet.195 De Vos (in much the same manner as Van Heugten: “a highly 
sympathetic person”196) was a professor of the Philosophy of Religion in Amsterdam 
and Groningen,197 whereas De Jong, rector of the Theological Seminary of the Neth-
erlands Reformed Church at Hydepark,198 was actively involved in Church politics. 
The same held for Dippel. The latter—a chemist at the Philips laboratories at Eind-
hoven—also played a leading role in the Dutch Association for Scientific Research 
(Vereniging voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek).199 Together with Banning,200 he was one 
of the founding fathers of the PvdA.201 Kraemer, who was a missionary by profession 
and a professor of the History and Phenomenology of Religion at Leiden University, 
played an important role in the NVB.202 Buskes, minister in Amsterdam, and Mis-
kotte, the later Professor Dogmatic Theology at Leiden University, were among the 
first to sign an official letter encouraging people to vote for the PvdA.203 And Bom-
hoff, being a teacher of Philosophy in Enschede and professor of Literary Studies at 
Leiden University, was a member of the PvdA and a close friend of Banning,204 Mis-
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kotte205 and De Vos.206 Though we do not know about any kind of active involve-
ment in the PvdA, Mankes-Zernike—a Mennonite, and the first female minister in 
the church history of the Netherlands—was highly sympathetic towards socialism and 
participated in the leftist study group of modern theologians.207 She clearly was ‘pro-
gressive’ in the sense that she was ahead of her time, playing an active role in the 
public sphere.208 Another Mennonite, J.A. Oosterbaan, was one of the main figures in 
the community, professor of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics at the Univer-
sity—as well as the Mennonite Seminary—of Amsterdam.209 Equally polemical was 
Kwee Swan Liat, prominent member of the ‘Humanist Association’ (HV, Human-
istisch Verbond),210 and professor of Philosophy at the Technical University in Eindho-
ven.211 Even though he was not a theologian in the strict sense, his contribution to 
the controversy appeared in the progressive magazine Vox Theologica. Kraemer, fi-
nally, was a chief member of the NVB and PvdA, highly prominent within the NHK 
and a professor of the Phenomenology of Religion at Leiden University.212 
As we have seen, the media forms in which the fiercest critiques were published 
did not hold any fixed positions within the public sphere. As Mulder & Koedijk 
concluded, there were no magazines that defined a group of people based on social, 
religious, political or geographical characteristics as possible subscribers.213 Moreover, 
the contributors also belonged to highly diverse intellectual circles. Authors always 
had to take colleagues or readers into account that would not agree with their state-
ments. If authors wanted to get some attention, as I have suggested throughout this 
study, they could do so by attacking others and making fun of them. 
Intellectuals who contributed to Het Parool, Vrij Nederland, De Groene or Wending 
could not be sure about the way their public would react to Vestdijk and Sierksma, 
let alone their commentary on the arguments developed by those two. And even the 
editors of the papers just mentioned did not always agree with each other. Some of 
them, like Max Nord, were friends of Vestdijk’s, and allowed him to publish fre-
quently. Others clearly did not mind including reviews of Vestdijk’s essay, like those 
of De Vos, Miskotte, Mankes-Zernike and Van der Leeuw, but remained highly 
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critical of Vestdijk’s opinions. Moreover, none of these papers offered Vestdijk the 
opportunity to defend himself against his critics. This at least meant that, for the 
moment, his opponents had won the battle for recognition. Except in Vrij Nederland,
where short excerpts of other critiques—as well as a letter of P. Grashoff in which he 
attacked Miskotte—were published, nobody else had the guts to take Vestdijk’s side. 
This was all the more striking because, especially among the liberal Netherlands Re-
formed theologians as well as those from Remonstrant circles, there were those who 
were sympathetic to Vestdijk’s arguments. And, in my opinion, it was precisely be-
cause of the factions and possible fissions within their own environment that the 
critics involved felt triggered to attack their opponent in order to ruin his reputation 
once for all. When this strategy failed, critics started to question each other openly. 
Within this context, we must place Kraemer’s critique of Van Holk, Buskes’ attack 
on Smits, and Dippel’s attempt to conquer Nijk’s position. 
Dutch Reformed and Roman Catholic intellectuals, like their counterparts within 
the NHK, were struggling to integrate theological viewpoints and approaches with 
the more secular psychological ones. Yet, other than their colleagues outside the 
established pillar structures, they worked well within the pillar structures until the 
1970s. The position of theologians at the state faculties in the Netherlands, however, 
did not offer any security comparable to that of the Free and Catholic universities. 
Even though Van Iersel speaks of a ‘Leiden’ tradition in the Study of Religions, lead-
ing missionaries such as Kraemer definitely did not belong to it.214 On the other hand, 
one representative of ‘Leiden’, K.A.H. Hidding, continuing the approach developed 
by C.P. Tiele in the late nineteenth century, was recognized as providing important 
steps towards the autonomy of Religious Studies from the authority claims made by 
theologians.215 This might explain why Kraemer, rather than the more liberal theolo-
gians, chose to attack both Vestdijk and Sierksma polemically. 
Not one of the liberal theologians would ever attack either Vestdijk or Sierksma. 
At that time, the middle-orthodox denomination within the NHK dominated the 
public sphere. In the Nederlandse Protestanten Bond, they looked for support among 
the Arminian Brotherhood. J.C.A. de Fetter, who wrote for cultural magazines like 
De Gids, was an Arminian minister in Rotterdam and an important thinker on mat-
ters concerning anthropology and pastoral care.216 H. Faber was an intermediate fig-
ure. He contributed to Wending, but early on he commented on De toekomst der religie
in a church periodical. And though highly sympathetic to the phenomenological 
approach of intellectuals like Janse de Jonge and Fortmann, he never showed any 
aggressive inclinations towards either Vestdijk or Sierksma. This also held for others 
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who only contributed to the controversy in purely theological magazines. They 
merely addressed the inner circle of faithful adherents, open to new developments 
within Psychology of Religion and Religious Studies in general. Roscam Abbing was 
a professor of Biblical Theology, Practical Theology and Christian Ethics at Gronin-
gen University.217 Bleeker taught at Groningen after he replaced Van der Leeuw 
during the latter’s ministry. Yet, his approach was far more open to psychological and 
sociological approaches to religious phenomena.218 Van Holk219 even acknowledged 
the right of anti-metaphysical tendencies within the Philosophy and Psychology of 
Religion, as his comments on Sierksma clearly show. The same held for Sirks and 
Hidding. 
The conflict between the so-called middle-orthodox theologians and the liberal 
ones within the NHK reached its most dramatic episode with a contribution of the 
Leiden sociologist and theologian P. Smits to the magazine Kerk & Wereld at the end 
of the 1950s. At Easter, he wrote in the liberal weekly that he did not believe that 
Christ had died for our sins (in Dutch: “Geef mijn portie maar aan fikkie”). Though 
many colleagues agreed with him, others demanded he defend his argument.220 The 
fiercest critique he received, however, came from Buskes, who wrote several articles 
on the case for the moderately or middle-orthodox monthly In de Waagschaal.221 Ac-
cording to him, Smits’s way of practicing theology was much like that of “a show-
man in a shooting gallery.” Yet, whereas the Synod of the NHK decided that Smits 
could no longer remain a member, Buskes protested. Nevertheless, Smits’ rights as a 
retired minister and professor were taken away and he was forced to leave his editor-
ship of Kerk & Wereld to others. Not until the early 1970s was he rehabilitated and 
allowed to become a member of the NHK again. When Sierksma died, the editors of 
Vrij Nederland asked Smits to write a long obituary, in which he took the time to 
elaborate on the ideas which he appreciated in both Sierksma and Vestdijk. 
As in the case of the traditional pillar organizations, the 1960s were also a turning 
point for the so-called ‘progressive’ institutions. Previously, breakthrough theologians 
had been eager to attack critics like Vestdijk and Sierksma as well as liberals like Smits 
cum suis. After the 1950s, we see the struggles between middle-orthodox and liberal 
strands within the NHK coming to a close, and new ecumenical tendencies develop-
ing together with representatives of the old pillar organizations. Also, the conflicts 
with outsiders began to cease. Miskotte and De Vos did not feel the need to scorn 
Vestdijk anymore. And, in general, the people at Wending changed their attitude 
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towards new trends in the study of religions, as their discussion of Sierksma’s contri-
butions shows. Taking a more cooperative attitude towards intellectuals who did not 
belong to breakthrough institutions in the strict sense, they expanded their potential 
public considerably. Apart from the more thorough discussions, editors tried to ad-
dress a broader public by including more popular contributions as well. This was the 
time when its leading intellectuals started to take positions that were more closely 
connected with the everyday experiences of the ordinary people. The amount of 
subscribers rose considerably during this period.222
At that time, Wending had been through a period in which the liberals dominated. 
Even though Banning had to be counted among them, he never played a significant 
role in the direction of the magazine. As we have seen, the attempts at dialogue by 
Kraemer had also sadly ended in disaster. However, under the editorship of J.M. van 
Veen, and especially J. Sperna Weiland, the magazine initiated its own attempts at 
debate with new trends in scholarship, theology and social policy. Dippel, as an or-
thodox Barthian and one of the most utopian thinkers of all of the PvdA-members, 
attempted to counter the modernist developments, but he did not succeed. As Sperna 
Weiland formulated the new direction which Wending would take, there would be 
room for dialogue, controversy, and a clash of opinions. Yet, the main difference 
with the former period was that the editors did not expect to reveal any truth, but 
merely offered the reader some points for consideration, and the facts to make up his 
or her own opinion. In this manner, Wending took sides with both cognitive relativ-
ism and the cultural revolution in the Netherlands during the 1960s. As A.J. Nijk 
argued, the aim was to publish a ‘progressive’ magazine that would exemplify the 
ideals of socio-cultural training and a radical democratic society.223 Intellectual trends 
such as neo-marxism and liberation theology became en vogue among most of the 
contributors. Yet, their aims were far less utopian and more pragmatic than they had 
been at earlier times when Van der Leeuw attempted to change the political scene. 
Sperna Weiland successfully saved the Central Interfaculty at Erasmus University—of 
which he was the rector magnificus at that time—from financial cuts ordered by 
Minister Wim Deetman in 1983-84.224 Despite the more pragmatic the approach, 
however, public interest in Wending steadily decreased from the early 1970s on. For a 
long time, subsidies from the publisher prevented the magazine from an early death. 
Not until the fall of the Berlin Wall, and finally of the Soviet Union, did the editors 
decide terminate their activities for the magazine.225
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Whereas the attitude of Wending editors towards people like Vestdijk and 
Sierksma changed considerably during this period, the polemical attack by P.A. van 
Stempvoort was published in a magazine that was commonly regarded as the enemy 
of the ‘progressive’ media, namely Elseviers Weekblad. Van Stempvoort was a profes-
sor of Ancient Christian literature and the New Testament at Groningen University, 
and was often invited to discuss current issues from a biblical perspective for the 
NCRV. Though regarded as an expert on matters concerning the New Testament, 
he did not belong to any close circle of intellectuals. Yet, in his work he often re-
ferred sympathetically to ‘progressive’ authorities such as Kraemer and Van der 
Leeuw226. He also offered, together with Delfgaauw, an introduction to an essay by a 
revolutionary Roman Catholic intellectual.227 It is likely that the editors of Elseviers
only invited him because he was well known for his comments on a lot of different 
issues, including business ethics.228 The least we can say is that he did not write for 
this magazine on any regular basis. And whereas Elseviers oriented itself on liberal 
theology, even inviting humanists to discuss with representatives from Roman 
Catholic and Dutch Reformed communities, the position of ‘progressive’ intellectu-
als before an audience like that of Elseviers was far from secure. 
This might also explain why a theologian such as Berkelbach van der Sprenkel 
did not feel the need to be polemical. Again, as I have argued in the aforementioned 
cases, this possibly had something to do with the institutional position of the two. 
Van Stempvoort’s chair at Groningen University did not have the high status that 
was associated with Berkelbach van der Sprenkel’s chair of Dogmatic and Practical 
Theology at Utrecht University. And the crucial role of the latter within the organi-
sation of the NHK is generally acknowledged.229 But even that does not explain eve-
rything. Miskotte’s chair at Leiden had a similar status as the one at Utrecht. More-
over, Berkelbach van der Sprenkel had strong ties with the ‘Utrecht School’. Being a 
theologian among outstanding psychologists such as Rümke, J.H. van den Berg and 
P.A.H. Baan,230 it is far from certain that he would feel at ease in this setting. Yet, the 
most important institutional difference between him and Van Stempvoort was their 
respective stage of performance. The medium was the message here. As a newspaper, 
the status of Utrechts Nieuwsblad was originally far less controversial than that of the 
outspoken and more ‘progressive’ papers such as Het Parool, and the other aforemen-
tioned opinion magazines.231 And for the broad public, psychologists did not hold the 
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authority that they would from the 1960s on. Thus, it is likely that the position of 
Berkelbach van der Sprenkel was likely to be far less controversial than that of Van 
Stempvoort, at least for the public of a liberal magazine like Elseviers. 
Whereas intellectuals who held leading positions within the super-pillar that pro-
vided for the new establishment during the 1960s and 1970s would change their 
attitude towards outsiders like Vestdijk and Sierksma, it is still important to retain the 
distinction which we made earlier, namely that between dominant and marginal 
intellectuals. Ad Dronkers and J. Noordegraaf, who offered the last polemical contri-
butions from the ‘progressive’ theological circles, are clear examples of the latter 
category. Whereas Dronkers was a film critic, Noordegraaf focused on literary arti-
facts. They neither belonged to the theologians in the strict sense, nor to the group of 
professionals that dealt with problems of mental health, both within the church and 
in society in general. Something similar, though at an earlier stage within the history 
of our controversy, is observable in the last institutional setting which we shall discuss 
within this context, namely the VGKN. 
 
The Free Reformed 
The intellectuals that we will deal with here held different positions within the 
community organized around the Free Reformed Churches in the Netherlands 
(VGKN). These were founded by K. Schilder after the Synod of the GKN decided 
that his political viewpoints could no longer be tolerated. Together with the VGKN, 
a new Theological Seminary was also opened in Kampen. Later, a newspaper and 
several literary magazines would follow. 
Historian George Harinck counts Schilder among other leading apologetics of his 
time, in the sense that he sought a new modus between traditional (liberal) dogmatic 
theology and the more existential and phenomenological approaches to religion. 
According to Harinck, within this apologetical movement, Schilder acted on the 
same level as Van Duinkerken and Miskotte.232 Even though they were not literary 
critics, Miskotte and Schilder clearly perceived modern literature as a challenge for 
academic theology.233 Whereas Van Duinkerken clashed with Roman Catholic au-
thorities and Miskotte joined the NHK breakthrough initiatives, Schilder found 
himself in his own conflicts with the leading intellectuals of the GKN. All of them 
played dominant roles within the critical media of their respective communities. 
Whereas Van Duinkerken was an editor of De Gemeenschap and Roeping, and Mis-
kotte of In de Waagschaal, Schilder acted as the main editor of De Reformatie, even 
after his schism with the GKN.234 
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Of the so-called ‘younger generation’ within the GKN, Schilder was the most 
challenging intellectual, and by far the most difficult character to deal with. Accord-
ing to him, the authority of Kuyper especially need not remain unquestioned, but 
rather had to be tested against both the Scriptures and the reality of modern everyday 
life. By this he did not intend to downplay the important role which Kuyper had 
played in both church and society. On the contrary, at that time he had been a revo-
lutionary force in theology and politics. Yet, unlike V. Hepp and H.H. Kuyper (the 
so-called “epigones” of Abraham Kuyper235), Schilder believed that the master’s 
achievements should be tested and, if necessary, corrected. Especially through De 
Reformatie, Schilder tried to attack the established positions. And it was through this 
weekly that he gained a reputation for his polemical style.236 Yet, he was not the 
‘progressive’ critic that some of his fellow members of the younger generation 
would’ve liked to think. On the contrary, apart from Dutch Reformed intellectual 
leaders,237 he fiercely attacked Netherlands Reformed breakthrough-theologians such 
as Miskotte and O. Noordmans.238
Within the context of my own investigations, it is worth considering the explana-
tion which other critics have developed in order to account for Schilder’s polemical 
style of writing. Surely, the separation of GKN and VGKN was, at least partly, due 
to the obstacles which his style formed to everybody who tried to find a compromise. 
Yet, many years later, even his opponents would wonder why the conflict had ended 
as it actually had. Miskotte found the attitude of the Synod unjustified, whereas 
Berkouwer—many years later—felt sorry for the part he had played in the affair. But 
why did they not try to hold Schilder himself accountable for the failure to find a 
solution to the conflict?
The entire history might be due to Schilder’s polemical style of writing itself. Yet, 
this does not answer the question why he turned to polemics in the first place. Some 
have tried to find an answer by focusing on Schilder’s inspiration. As J. Veenhof says, 
on the one hand he was kind and hated people who behaved grandly; yet, on the 
other hand his polemics were often bitter and insulting. He was always honest; how-
ever, he often played with people and did not mind showing personal preferences. 
He was highly suspicious towards others’ intentions, always having the sense of being 
a misunderstood genius. But what exactly was the source of this feeling? This is an 
interesting and important question for which we do not yet have an answer, Veenhof 
concludes.239 Some have speculated that he, being a genius, used to create his own 
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world. That must have been the background of his communicative distortions.240
While honest, Veenhof argues, his polemics must have stemmed from the frustration 
of realizing that his attempts at convincing people of his ideas were failing. That 
made him feel acutely disappointed. It also explains why Schilder is still highly in-
truiging as a polemist.241 Yet, where exactly did his fierce reactions come from? 
According to Harinck, Schilder’s polemical style of arguing found its source in his 
“existential commitment” to the convictions of Groen van Prinsterer and Kuyper. 
The Reformed community was independent and needed to develop its own princi-
ples. Based on these principles, it had built an impressive web of institutions, for 
instance Christian schools, Christian journalism, Christian politics, Christian sciences, 
and even Christian social and literary culture. The completion of these institutions, 
however, had made its people weak. Members had lost the conviction that these 
institutions were born not of financial transactions and attentive organization, but 
through persistence with the Reformed faith.242 Curiously, Harinck argues, historians 
in general do not pay attention to the real inspiration behind the process of pillariza-
tion. They tend to forget that history, to borrow from Huizinga, is the spiritual form 
in which people account for the/ir past. According to him, studying Schilder’s po-
lemics might be used as a corrective to the historian’s neglect. 
Yet, whether or not Harinck—or Huizinga, for that matter—is correct cannot be 
an issue for us to discuss here. According to me, the spiritual aspect is taken too seri-
ously, as if it is somehow an expression of a reality-out-there. Yet, being an outsider, 
I am not allowed to choose for either Schilder or his opponents. Neither am I al-
lowed to decide whose theology offers the correct account of the relationship be-
tween either God and man, or Jesus Christ and culture. I can try to explain why 
Schilder felt the need to attack intellectuals like Hepp, Kuyper, Miskotte and 
Noordmans polemically. And when Harinck says that this had to do with the danger 
which their ideas, ideals and theologies posed to the Reformed community, I am 
inclined to agree. However, this can hardly be taken as a ‘spiritual’ account of polem-
ics; rather it is a social-psychological one. I definitely do not agree with Harinck’ 
argument that, ultimately, Schilder did not deal with persons or institutions, but 
rather with the principles behind these manifestations.243 What Harinck calls the “ul-
timate” for me is merely a matter of marking one’s position from that of others who 
are taken to be threats to one’s own acclaimed status within the field of intellectual 
production. According to Harinck, however, Schilder saw in his polemics a stimulus 
for contact and reflection, even with opponents. It was the task of a polemist to cre-
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ate a sense of community. That is why Schilder could write that to forget about po-
lemics was like abandoning your brother. He wished for an open discussion of diver-
gent positions. In this manner he gained a sense of community, or to use the termi-
nology of the church, ecumenality.244 The point is that Harinck confuses open 
discussion with polemics. When others say that Schilder was playing with people, it is 
difficult to imagine how this serves a serious debate on issues raised by opponents. 
Rather it suggests that he tried to outwit his opponents in order to experience a sense 
of community, not so much with the ones whom he attacked, but instead with a 
public that heartily agreed with his arguments and was prepared to accept his author-
ity.
I believe that Harinck’s observations are equally inadequate when he tries to find 
the commitment shared by intellectuals as diverse as Schilder, Van Duinkerken and 
Miskotte. According to him, the spirit of these three ‘young’ intellectuals was gov-
erned by their experiences of World War I. The war forced them to rethink the 
Christian tradition.245 Yet, it does not explain why they reacted polemically, or why, 
as Harinck wonders, Van Duinkerken became far less agressive than Schilder toward 
the end of his life.246 As I have previously indicated, Van Duinkerken was able to 
successfully integrate into mainstream Roman Catholic culture, whereas the newly 
established Free Reformed community still had to identify itself between Reformed 
Churches on the one hand, and the Netherlands Reformed ‘breakthrough’-
movement on the other. The same held for Miskotte, who, being a member of the 
latter movement, did not belong to any established party, whether before or immedi-
ately after World War II. 
Van Duinkerken attacked Ter Braak, but later treated Vestdijk kindly. The latter, 
however, was severely criticized by Miskotte. Schilder, on the other hand, did not 
refer to Vestdijk at all. According to my theory, this shouldn’t come as any surprise, 
because Schilder should not have felt threatened by the argument put forward in De
toekomst der religie the way Miskotte did. Similarly, intellectuals who, according to 
their expertise, felt the need to comment on Vestdijk did so in a very moderate and 
even sympathetic way. 
The poet and essayist P.A. Hekstra was far less critical of Vestdijk than he might 
have been if there had been no conflict with members of other churches. Of the 
various angles from which intellectuals could criticize Vestdijk’s essay, he felt that 
both the traditional and modern intellectual paradigms within the GKN were inade-
quate. Moreover, he defended Vestdijk against the critique of Miskotte. More gener-
ally—as a special branch of the ‘younger generation’ within the Reformed tradition 
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had recently separated from the GKN and become utterly hostile to the break-
through movement—it is even likely that Hekstra, as well as literary and cultural 
critic M. Siesling, were more eager to counter other, far more imminent dangers. 
Even Vestdijk’s arguments could be helpful in this war. Surely, they did not agree 
with his ideas, nor with his ideals; yet, apparently there was no reason to attack him. 
Hekstra even criticized ‘Marnix’ for doing so. 
Both Hekstra and Siesling are examples of the type of critics we found in the 
RKK earlier on. Occupying a place in the margins within their own community, 
such as Govaart and Van der Wey, they tended to employ the criticism of outsiders 
(like Vestdijk) in order to attack intellectuals more closely associated to their own 
institutional background and theological convictions. From previous chapters we 
know that ‘Marnix’ and Kamphuis took another direction.   
‘Marnix’ was the pseudonym under which A. Zijlstra (1874-1968) published his 
comments on current issues in a local newspaper when he was still active in Gronin-
gen politics and journalism. His sharp and fashionable critiques on important matters 
caught the attention of Kuyper. The latter even invited him to write for De Stan-
daard. After Kuyper’s retirement in the early 1920s, Hendrik Colijn asked him to 
become Kuyper’s successor as chief commentator of this leading periodical within the 
Dutch Reformed community. Like Schilder, Zijlstra would become a journalist in 
the polemical tradition of Kuyper and Groen.247 His fiercest attacks were directed 
against Karl Barth and his friends at the NCSV. Early on he chose to side with Schil-
der. Apart from his journalistic activities, he was a member of Parliament for the 
ARP. Like many other important public figures, he was taken hostage and sent to 
Buchenwald during the war. And like their fellows in Beekvliet, they spent their 
time deliberating on the future of the Netherlands after the liberation from the Nazis. 
Yet, he did not believe in any kind of breakthrough-politics and refused to partici-
pate in ecumenical dialogue.248 Not surprisingly, he followed Schilder’s example and 
left the GKN and ARP. He was one of the moving forces in the VGKN, as well as 
the founder of the Reformed Political Association (Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond). He 
also became one of the chief commentators on current political and intellectual issues 
for De Reformatie. During the first few years after the war, it was unclear what exactly 
the future would hold for this magazine. The editors had to find their place among 
the other media. It had to transform itself from a leading Dutch Reformed magazine 
into a Free Reformed periodical. It was meant to offer direction to people who had 
become confused by recent developments within the churches. Moreover, Zijlstra 
needed to define a new public after he left his fixed position as “coregroup”-
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member249 within the old pillar-structure. Under these circumstances, it is possible to 
imagine that he worried about the threat which Vestdijk’s “atheist” arguments posed 
to the authority of intellectuals who were still struggling to find their proper niche 
within the field of cultural production. And from his own work during that period, it 
becomes clear that, as a politician, he felt hampered when faced with attacks from 
outside. He realized that, under the present conditions, it was impossible to forbid 
the publications of unbelievers, even if they were of an “atheist” spirit.250 If he 
couldn’t forbid it, then he certainly took the opportunity to attack the spirit of athe-
ism—a threat disguised behind the figure of Vestdijk. 
Yet, whereas Schilder was without any doubt that the leading figure within the 
Free Reformed community, Zijlstra, would remain “the intellectual of the small 
people” (intellectueel der kleine luyden).251 Though erudite, he would always remain the 
schoolteacher who had not finished his university studies. This did not hold the same 
way for figures like Siesling and Hekstra. Literary criticism was their job. And within 
the confines of their expertise, they seemed to feel quite confident, at least with re-
spect to Vestdijk; they used to fiercely attack theologians from both the GKN and 
NHK. Apparently, they did not feel the need to attack Vestdijk. Schilder himself did 
not even respond to De toekomst der religie. And whereas the other two critics were 
faithful to the authority of Schilder, Zijlstra had his own career, though he was not 
quite sure of his status compared to the other opinion leaders within the community. 
In addition, he was used to commenting on issues of which he was not an expert. 
And Vestdijk’s book certainly dealt with problems in which he was not professionally 
experienced.  
Something similar held for the Free Reformed minister J. Kamphuis. After the 
death of Schilder in 1952, the professors at the Theological Seminary became the 
editors of De Reformatie. Soon troubles arose and the publisher appointed new editors, 
of whom the Free Reformed Reverend J. Kamphuis would become the most 
prominent.252 He remained the chief editor of the magazine until 1970. In 1972 he 
began to contribute to the community newspaper Nederlands Dagblad. During this 
time, he was commonly regarded as one of the major opinion leaders within the Free 
Reformed community.253 Yet, his authority did not remain unchallenged. In 1958, 
the Synod appointed Kamphuis as professor of Church History. Yet, immediately 
afterwards, a polemic flared with regard to the competence of Kamphuis. His reputa-
tion, critics suggested, was built more on his authority as a journalist and a commen-
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tator, than on his expert knowledge of history. This was only the beginning of the 
troubles.254 In 1967, he would become one of the most important players in a conflict 
between theologians and opinion leaders.255 Yet, Kamphuis remained a leading au-
thority within the community. Soon after, he was appointed ordinary professor of 
Church History. At that time, he made made some polemical comments on Vestdijk 
in a lecture given to students at the Seminary in Kampen. 
In 1979 he accepted the most prestigious chair of Dogmatics at the Seminary. 
And even though his polemical comments on Vestdijk were re-published during this 
period, he did not return to the topics which he had covered in his lecture. Only at 
the end of the 1990s, after he was invited to comment by the editors of the Reforma-
torisch Dagblad, did his polemical attitude towards Vestdijk resurge. Why? 
According to the hypothesis which I have developed, arguments are means rather 
than the ends of any polemic. What is really at stake in this kind of exchange is the 
authority of the intellectual involved. It is not my intention to explain in which sense 
Kamphuis felt his authority to be challenged in his conflict with his own colleagues. I 
shall leave it to others to study this matter in more detail. The question I wish to 
answer is why he felt the need to attack Vestdijk personally. Many comments on De 
toekomst der religie were to the point; others, however, were unmistakably directed 
against the man behind the argument. What made Kamphuis react in this way? 
In his lecture at the Seminary in 1973, Kamphuis recognized that Church History 
was a marginal enterprise within the field of Theological Studies. We are thus 
tempted to infer that his attack on Vestdijk might have been a way to compensate for 
the general lack of authority which historians have within orthodox communities, 
especially when compared to disciplines like Dogmatics and Ethics. Moreover, Kamp-
huis could not formally figure as an expert within his area of teaching. He never 
earned a doctorate. Whether his appointment to the chair of Dogmatics in 1979, was 
taken as a final victory over his critics within the Free Reformed community is of 
little importance for our purposes. Yet, like Zijlstra, he would always remain the 
journalist, ready to comment on a variety of issues far beyond any professional com-
petence. Never would he be the kind of professor that kept himself within the limits 
of his research topics. And if invited to, Kamphuis did not mind moving beyond the 
boundaries of his own limited community. In 1998, upon the 100th anniversary of 
Vestdijk’s birthday, he agreed to comment on Vestdijk’s oeuvre in general and De 
toekomst der religie in particular. Yet, he did so for a public that did not so much be-
long to the VGKN as to an association of different churches. In addition, even 
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though dogmatics are still highly esteemed among these people, rising levels of 
education renders them far more critical towards authorities than ever before.256
Conclusions 
In summary of the material which I have offered in this chapter, it is again striking to 
see such sustained polemics on a single essay by such a highly diversified group of 
people during a period of fifty years. This fact, of course, has to do with the rele-
vance of the topic; apparently, many people recognized that it had something to do 
with their positions within the field of cultural interactions. Yet, as I have argued, 
this is not only a matter of topic. Surely, the fact that people felt triggered to react 
had something to do with their interest in matters concerning the concept of relig-
ion, ideas about the future of Christianity, the question of whether the latter religion 
was necessarily intolerant and repressive, the value of Socialism and Buddhism as 
possible alternatives, etc. However, the problem dealt with throughout this study is 
how to explain why some intellectuals reacted polemically, whereas others, though 
highly critical, were far more sympathetic to Vestdijk’s arguments and refrained at-
tacking him personally. It has been impossible to show that those with polemical 
inclinations were ideologically more distant from Vestdijk than others; on the con-
trary, it is striking that so many orthodox-Protestant critics reacted so moderately, 
while literary critics—whose ideas more closely resembled those of Vestdijk—often 
reacted aggressively and denigrated Vestdijk personally. So, I believe we should 
search somewhere else for an explanation of polemics. As I argued before, it is not 
the topic, but rather the social position of intellectuals within the field of cultural 
production that determines whether or not they are likely to react aggressively. 
First of all, we found conflicts within the field of literary and cultural criticism. 
Two frontiers were especially important here. The first was between literary critics 
contesting authoritative positions that, according to me, were likely to be perceived 
as dominant within the field. The second was between literary and cultural critics on 
the one hand, and theologians on the other. None of these groups could reasonably 
be counted among either the cultural or political establishment. Whereas literary 
critics would never dominate the public sphere, the theologians whom we have 
discussed here either belonged to the breakthrough movement within the NHK or 
to the minor cultural critical circles within the pillared communities. The 1960s (the 
third period in the reception of De toekomst der religie) formed a turning point in the 
history of polemics around Vestdijk. Literary critics did not participate in the contro-
versy at this time. It is likely that this had much do to with the fact that they no 
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longer perceived theologians as a threat to their position. It is likely that the process 
of secularization rendered religious authority obsolete. Whereas the breakthrough 
movement had begun to lose momentum soon after the war, theologians in general 
lost their dominance as a distinct category of intellectuals. They got involved in more 
mundane issues, such as mental health. Whereas the discipline of Theology had 
played an important role within the public sphere till the 1960s, afterwards it was 
Psychology and Psychiatry, together with professionals working within the psycho-
therapeutic disciplines, that would begin to dominate both the intellectual and politi-
cal scenes. 
This brings us to the second category of intellectuals who contributed to the con-
troversy, namely the ‘progressive’ theologians within the NHK and the Mennonite 
community. They were among the fiercest critics. All of them belonged to the 
breakthrough movement. The latter movement not only lost its momentum soon 
after the war, but it would take even less time for theologians to become highly dis-
appointed with the result of their own interventions. In their struggle for ‘religion’ to 
play a more important role in public life, they perceived Vestdijk’s arguments as a 
threat to their positions within the field of politics. By the end of the 1950s, sympa-
thetic comments on Vestdijk made by liberal theologians from NHK, as well as 
Arminian circles, would mark the last episode in the struggle of the breakthrough 
movement with De toekomst der religie. During the 1960s they would join the process 
by which a new super-pillar would be established, together with the liberal theologi-
ans whom they had previously loathed. Apart from the increasing role which Psy-
chology and Psychiatry played within the field of theology, they welcomed contribu-
tions by intellectuals from the traditional pillar organizations. And whereas the 
breakthrough movement failed to accomplish its objectives during the first decade 
after the war, they would eventually come to dominate the field of social organiza-
tions which mediated between the individual and the state, thanks to ‘progressive’ 
circles within the traditional pillars. Only marginal intellectuals would continue to 
react polemically. 
Thirdly, apart from those intellectuals who acted without any secure institutional 
foundation to support their initiatives, within the pillar organizations polemical con-
tributions were also to be found—namely by intellectuals who belonged either to the 
RKK or the GKN. And similar to the ‘progressive’ intellectuals within the NHK 
after the 1960s, only who played a marginal role would feel triggered to react po-
lemically on Vestdijk and Sierksma—not only literary critics, but also minor theolo-
gians who had failed to dominate the public for which they were writing. However, 
apart from making fun of outsiders, they frequently attacked leading (at least more 
dominant) authorities within their own pillar organization as well. Within the Ro-
man Catholic community, this pattern continued till the late 1970s. 
217 
Finally, the pattern indentified with respect to the aforementioned pillar organiza-
tions can also be found in a community that commented upon De toekomst der religie
throughout the entire history of its reception. Again, whereas leading intellectuals did 
not comment on the essay, marginal figures reacted highly polemically, either to-
wards Vestdijk or towards theologians from the communities competing for their 
public. Worse, by the end of the fifth period of our history, we not only see the last 
real intellectual interest in Vestdijk’s arguments on religion, but these last comments 
also indicate the end of an era in which theological discourse played a role in public 
life. Even here, theologians struggled with the first signs of secularization, without 
any strong indication of a merger with the networks and webs of institutions which 
provided for the aforementioned super-pillar. 
The secularization thesis—often invoked to explain ecumenical tendencies, dia-
logue as well as consensus, as the primary goal of public discourse—cannot serve to 
illuminate the history of the controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie. Certainly, 
it might be helpful to understand why literary critics no longer feel the need to scorn 
Vestdijk’s argument. In other cases—especially at the end of the last period of the 
reception—it cannot be applied. Without a doubt, secularization made ecumenical 
tendencies and dialogue worth pursuing; it turned out to be the only way for theolo-
gians to reatin at least some influence within the public sphere. On the other hand, 
however, consensus as the primary goal of public discourse is not intrinsic to the 
process of secularization. As Lijphart has argued, at the time that the old pillar organi-
zations still dominated the public sphere in the Netherlands, consensus had already 
been regarded as indispensable in matters of practical politics, and parties did so with 
the permission of church authorities and leading theologians. This did not mean that 
the latter agreed with their political opponents. Yet, they understood that in a plural 
society like the Netherlands, tolerance and compromise was at times inevitable. A 
similar attitude can be recognized in our controversy. The leading intellectuals of the 
established pillar organizations were highly moderate in their replies to Vestdijk’s 
arguments. Only after the theologians of the breakthrough movement became inte-
grated into the main trends within the public sphere, did they abandoned their previ-
ously employed polemical style. 
Instead of secularization, it is the social condition of each single individual—or in-
tellectual, in our case—that determined the manner in which they responded to the 
challenge which Vestdijk (and Sierksma) put forward. Whether minor intellectual or 
member of a circle that could not count on an established relation to the public 
which they were aiming for, I have reasons to believe that those who reacted po-
lemically to Vestdijk’s arguments in De toekomst der religie perceived their authority to 
be threatened. And, given the material which I have presented throughout this study, 
it is understandable that they employed a polemical style of writing in order to 
counter the possibly dangerous effects which Vestdijk’s way of reasoning might have 
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on their own credibility, and, consequently, their legitimacy as spokespeople for a 
certain public. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION: AUTHORITY IN QUESTION 
The analysis of the controversy triggered by Simon Vestdijk’s De toekomst der religie 
confirms my initial hypothesis. As I argued, polemic is a means by which intellectuals 
try to defend or establish their authority before a public against real or imaginary 
threats.
Starting with Vestdijk’s conclusion that Christianity should die—and that, accord-
ing to him, in the long run it would—we have seen various reactions from various 
people. While some agreed with Vestdijk’s arguments, others fiercely rejected them. 
Some limited themselves to points which Vestdijk had made throughout his essay, 
while others felt challenged to account for the way he had formulated his arguments. 
Some found the argument wholly convincing, while others questioned Vestdijk’s 
competence in handling the issues to which he pretended to give answer. Some ar-
rived at their own conclusions after seriously pondering Vestdijk’s arguments, while 
others merely rejected them outright.  
I have posed the question of how different people were able to arrive at so many 
different conclusions of one and the same text. In addition, it is striking to observe 
critics using employing different styles of arguing to make their points. For our pur-
poses, the polemical contributions to the controversy have been the most interesting. 
In the introduction, I defined polemic as an attack directed against a person before a 
public by means of words. Compared to other kinds of intellectual exchange, both 
subject (always a person) and style of polemic (whether autocratic or declarative) 
provide for its distinctive character. 
As we have seen in the second chapter, there is something about the subject of a 
polemic that sets it apart from other types of intellectual exchange. Whereas ‘normal’ 
discussion focuses on the arguments and the line of reasoning, polemics tend to sub-
stitute an author for the arguments. If a polemical critic considers the line of reason-
ing unsound, he does not limit himself to that conclusion. Rather, he tries to account 
for it by creating a subject behind the argument. Instead of reaching any positive 
conclusions about the subject or ‘author’, he will try to derogate him before the eyes 
of the public. The reason why the arguments of the ‘author’ are so widely off the 
mark is that s/he is either incompetent or, worse, mentally or morally disturbed. 
True, the judgment might be correct. But in polemic, the facts and reasons offered in 
order to make the case against the other are questionable from a scientific point of 
view. First, the conclusions on the other’s arguments are not made after serious dis-
cussion or analysis of the issues at hand. Second, apart from the argument, random 
facts about the life of the ‘author’ are sporadically invoked to further justify the con-
clusions drawn from the text. In general, the attack always lacks the thorough and 
systematic analysis of both text and biography required in order to support the final 
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verdict. The only thing which the critic accomplishes is in fact to create an incongru-
ity between expectations (serious discussion, the truth, respected author) and the 
outcome (distortions, nonsense, stupidity or personality disorder). This is the mecha-
nism which Freud identified as indispensable for humor and its most violent 
manifestations in scorn.
Some critics derogated Vestdijk for pretending to be a prophet. Even though 
there are many ways to talk about the future, linking an essay written by a novelist to 
the grand prophetic traditions of biblical times was clearly meant to trigger laughter 
among the public. Vestdijk himself seemed to have expected this. He explicitly 
warned his readers not to overestimate his ambitions. His careful way of reasoning 
and consideration of the facts were more similar to the modest attempts made by 
scientists to understand the world in which we live. Apart from the fact that a scien-
tific approach does not preclude disagreement, his critics already found it humorous 
that a novelist pretended to discuss a topic which, they claimed, belong to their field 
of expertise. Especially theologians made an issue out of this. Vestdijk cum suis coun-
tered that theologians could not be regarded as legitimate experts on religion either. 
They could better limit themselves to dogma, rather than scientific theory. The theo-
logians in their turn argued that religious belief did not exclude the possibility of 
scientific approach. They scorned the pretensions of atheists, who laid claim to value-
free judgments, but who merely belonged to the herd of intellectuals and petty bour-
geois who merely observed religion from outside its walls without having the nerve 
to choose either for God or the devil.  
Yet, apart from creating an incongruity between expectations and actual out-
come, how did they attempt to convince their public of these statements? As we have 
seen in the third chapter, critics could choose between four different styles of arguing 
in order to suggest competence and create a sense of authority. The problem for us 
has been to figure out which one is most likely to occur in the case of polemics—and 
here appears a striking difference with serious discussion and dialogue. In polemical 
controversies, neither facts nor references to other—commonly regarded as compe-
tent—authorities play a significant role, as is common to the realistic and bureaucratic 
styles. Whereas serious discussion strives to reach an adequate representation of real-
ity, and dialogue requires agreement on some policy as an objective, polemic is sim-
ply employed in order to conquer the position supposedly held by the other. Apart 
from attacking the authority of the opponent, it implies an unlimited claim on au-
thority by the critic himself. This style focuses on the person who is trying to make 
his point. Yet, rather than being modest, as is typical for the republican style of argu-
ing, the autocratic or declarative style does not leave any room for doubt. And given 
the aggressive nature of polemics, the latter style is characteristic of this kind of con-
troversy. 
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Some critics tried to suggest that Vestdijk had failed to meet his scientific ambi-
tions because he denied that God even existed. According to Vestdijk, religion was 
not so much the belief in God as the belief in the possibility of arriving at a sense of 
totality and lasting spiritual happiness. Yet, whereas Vestdijk tried to convince his 
readers by means of extensive and elaborate arguments, his opponents simply dis-
carded his conclusions without explaining why. Vestdijk’s theory of religious projec-
tion, meant to account for the particular form which ideas of God usually took, was a 
mere sophism. His argument that Christianity was an essentially intolerant and sexu-
ally repressive dogmatic system was an outright scandal. That Christianity would 
someday die and be substituted by Socialism and Buddhism was simply ridiculous. 
And the idea that future religious leaders would be bred at institutes which combined 
the best of the Christian retreat, the Buddhist monastery and the English university, 
made critics burst with laughter. Yet, were there any specific reasons to react in this 
manner? If so, these critics failed to sufficiently clarify their objections in order to let 
their style of arguing be counted among the realist, bureaucratic or republican alter-
natives commonly associated with a sophisticatedly political or scientific attitude. 
They failed to clarify why Vestdijk should be regarded as a ‘false’ prophet rather than 
a scientist—a mere intellectual and bourgeois, rather than an interesting challenge to 
meet. The only means employed to make us believe them, was the authority of the 
critic himself, aggressively imposing itself on the public. 
Having identified its important characteristics, I tried to account for polemic in a 
way that differs from the one employed in the very contributions which I defined as 
polemical. It would be too easy to conclude that the intellectuals involved in the 
controversy were merely distorting Vestdijk’s argument—even worse if I were to 
simply attribute this to either mental or moral disorder. Yet, as I have been arguing, 
the manner in which polemists react to some real or imaginary threat is highly similar 
to what Robert Robins and Jerrold Post identified as the paranoid personality disor-
der. I employed this concept to connect the sense of threat which I assumed to be at 
the root of any polemical attack on the one hand, and the subject and style character-
istic of polemics on the other. Still then, the question remains why people feel 
threatened. For that, I referred to the conceptual dichotomies available in sociology, 
namely that between dominant and marginal intellectuals or between establishment 
and outsiders. 
I developed the following hypothesis. According to me, polemic is a means by 
which intellectuals attempt to defend or establish their authority before a certain 
public against real or imaginary threats. Authority can be attributed to anybody who 
is recognized by a certain public as a legitimate spokesperson. Intellectuals, taken here 
to be intelligent individuals who speak out on issues of public importance, aim for 
authority. It is supposed that especially those at the margins of the public sphere, or 
outsiders to specific circles of intellectuals, are quick to feel their authority at stake. 
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On the other hand, members of the establishment, regarded as the opinion leaders of 
their communities, are likely to feel far more self-confident and secure. And whereas 
I assume the reply of outsiders to perceived threats to be polemical, those by domi-
nant intellectuals are likely to be less aggressive, more modest and to the point. 
In order to test whether this was indeed the case, the final chapter was meant to 
correlate the polemical contributions identified in chapters II and III to specific posi-
tions within the public sphere. With respect to the public in the Netherlands in the 
first two decades after World War II, its highly fragmented nature is particularly strik-
ing. It is even possible to speak of many different public spheres. Each of the pillared 
communities provided for its own media and public. This implies that we can safely 
speak of a Roman Catholic, a Dutch Reformed and a Free Reformed sphere in 
which the authority of its leading intellectuals was heavily institutionalized and hardly 
challenged by outsiders to their own circle. On the other hand, the intellectuals at 
the margins of these pillar-communities tended to react highly polemical, towards 
both opinion leaders within their own communities and to outsiders. The same held 
for intellectuals outside of the established pillar-organizations. In general, ‘progressive’ 
breakthrough intellectuals reacted polemically to the challenge posed by De toekomst 
der religie. The latter were attacked by literary and cultural critics that did not belong 
to their circle. Yet, even though they held different—if not directly opposed—
positions within the controversy, they could not count on a fixed public. Whereas 
literary and cultural critics generally belong to the outsiders, the breakthrough intel-
lectuals had to find their own niche within the public square. Whereas the first group 
had always been institutionally disadvantaged compared to other circles of intellectu-
als, the second group would only become dominant during the 1960s. In the end, 
the latter would be successful in breaking through the established pillar boundaries 
and building their own ‘super-pillar’. 
Are these findings confirmed by historical developments within the course of the 
controversy itself? In the case of the ‘progressive’ breakthrough intellectuals, the 
answer is yes. Within the traditional pillar-communities, things changed in the sense 
that institutional boundaries became increasingly obsolete. Within breakthrough 
circles, these processes signaled a shift from polemics towards dialogue. Apart from 
the contributions to our controversy, the debate between atheist R.F. Beerling and 
certain leading theologians was also clear proof of the changing climate.1 And 
whereas opinion leaders within the pillared communities had not reacted polemically 
towards outsiders, marginal intellectuals would not limit their attacks to outsiders. 
Instead, they began to question the authority of the ‘progressive’ élites within their 
own communities as well. As previously indicated in the introduction, this tendency 
continued well into the 1990s when, upon the centennial anniversary of the Free 
                                                     
1 Beerling 1973; contributions by H.J. Heering, H. Berkhof and H. Adriaanse.  
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University in Amsterdam, the Leiden professor Henk Versnel was invited to explain 
why he thought it reasonable not to believe in God. Dutch Reformed opinion lead-
ers certainly did not agree with him. Yet, fierce attacks only came from circles that 
felt increasingly cornered by ‘progressive’ intellectuals which they perceived as just as 
threatening as atheist outsiders like Versnel.2 The ‘progressives’ on the other hand, 
organized a public session in which Versnel was allowed to continue his critique on 
Christianity as exemplified in the work of leading theologian Harry Kuitert.3 Elabo-
rate criticism of religion by Herman Philipse did not trigger any controversy compa-
rable to the one around Vestdijk (and Sierksma) fifty years before. According to my 
own hypothesis, this must be explained by the fact that, at the end of the twentieth 
century, religion in general—and Christianity in particular—no longer played any 
significant role within the public sphere in the Netherlands. From a dominant institu-
tional factor both religion and Christianity turned private and became largely im-
plicit. 
Whatever proponents of the secularization-thesis—who believe that religion is at 
the root of every controversy—might suggest, it does not mean that only with the 
disappearance of Christianity from the public sphere that polemics died out as well. 
On the contrary, even today we frequently see this type of intellectual exchange. As 
we have seen, many theologians reacted moderately—some were even sympathetic—
to Vestdijk’s arguments. Moreover, economy, politics or any other cultural issue 
might also trigger disagreement and—if authority is perceived to be threatened—
aggression and attack. 
Even though my research confirms the hypothesis which I have put forward, the 
possibility still exists that it will fail to stand future tests. First, some might disagree on 
the criteria which I have developed to distinguish between polemical and non-
polemical contributions. By means of different concepts, reviews and replies which I 
have classified as polemical might turn out not to be polemical at all. Then the link I 
established between text and context will also fail to make sense. Second, those who 
agree with the way I defined polemics might disagree on the position which I as-
signed to each of the intellectuals within the public sphere. Future statistics and de-
tailed biographical research on individuals about whom I did not find many sources, 
might arrive at radically different conclusions than I did. 
On the other hand, as a theory, my proposal to explain polemics might be fruit-
fully applied to other cases as well. In my introduction, I have referred to Norbert 
Elias, who developed a theory to explain the relations between established leaders 
and outsiders in a small village community. In his work, this community becomes a 
microcosm which illuminates a wide range of sociological configurations, including 
                                                     
2 Versnel 1991, Velema 1993. 
3 Versnel & Kuitert 1993. 
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racial, ethnic, class and gender relations. Another example is offered by anthropolo-
gist Talal Asad in his study of relations between British intellectuals and Muslims in 
the wake of the Rushdie affair. As he says:4
It is common knowledge that the Rushdie affair precipitated a sense of political crisis 
in Britain. Large numbers of Muslims publicly expressed their anger and distress at 
the publication of The Satanic Verses, demonstrated in London, petitioned Penguin 
Books to withdraw the book, and then the government to ban it. The government 
rejected the call for banning and warned Muslims not to isolate themselves from their 
host society. Newspapers and television almost unanimously condemned the “fun-
damentalism” of Britain’s Muslims. On February 14, 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini 
issued his shocking death sentence on Rushdie. This greatly aggravated the sense of 
crisis in Britain, although most prominent Muslims there publicly dissociated them-
selves from it. Ten days later, home secretary, Douglas Hurd, made a speech at a 
gathering of Muslims, emphasizing the importance of proper integration for ethnic 
minorities, the need to learn about British culture without abandoning one’s own 
faith, and the necessity of refraining from violence. At the beginning of July, his 
deputy, John Patten, wrote an open letter among similar lines, to “a number of lea-
ding Muslims.” Two weeks later, he produced another document, entitled “On 
Being British,” which was circulated to the media […] First I want to pose a questi-
on. Why did the British government feel the need to make these statements at this 
juncture? Why were these statements widely applauded by the liberal middle classes, 
whose pronouncements both before and after the government’s intervention repea-
tedly denounced “Muslim violence”? This was not because there was an unmanagea-
ble threat to law and order in the country […]. The Rushdie affair in Britain should 
be seen primarily as yet another symptom of postimperial British identity in crisis, 
not—as most commentators have represented it—as an unhappy instance of some 
immigrants with difficulties in adjusting to a new and more civilized world. 
Asad goes on to argue his case in more detail. His analysis could be equally applied to 
the Netherlands, and in particular to the rise of populist Pim Fortuyn. Yet, the con-
troversy which he triggered indicates a dimension ignored by both Elias and Asad. 
Rather than being merely a conflict between Muslims and either British or Dutch 
identity, we must include the relations between intellectuals and politicians within 
the field of cultural production. Whereas Asad argues that the dominant attitude of 
British intellectuals was highly critical about the supposed Muslim failure to integrate, 
in the Netherlands it took a fierce polemic between Fortuyn and his political oppo-
nents to change the attitude of government. Rather than being directed at Muslims, 
                                                     
4 Asad 1993b: 239-241. 
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the argument was about the definition of—as well as the proper way to address—the 
problem which Muslims supposedly presented to Dutch society. And this is also the 
context in which Fortuyn’s conclusion that Islam represented a backward culture 
should be understood. Personally, he did not have any problems with Muslims per se.
Asked whether he knew any Muslims personally, he answered that with some of 
them he had even shared the bed. He only detested those cultures which bore the 
imprint of Islam. Yet, his public claims on Islam were not merely the expression of 
personal opinion. On the contrary, his statements were framed in such a way as to 
tease his opponents in both politics and the media.5
Yet, given the proximity of time and topic, the controversies around Rushdie 
and Fortuyn are likely to be charged with public sentiment. The fact, already, that 
leading intellectuals, including university professors, found it necessary to offer their 
own opinions on the issues as well as the persons involved implies a serious disadvan-
tage for proper analysis. The advantage of the history I described is that it seems far 
less relevant today. It is therefore possible to exclude value judgments which might 
interfere in the case of more recent polemics. Moreover, the material available to test 
my hypothesis is quantitatively far more impressive than that offered by Asad or any 
analysis of the controversy around Fortuyn until now. And, whereas Elias did not 
deal with intellectuals, my hypothesis is qualitatively more sophisticated than the one 
suggested by Asad, as well.   
Whatever the advantage of my research over that done by others, it still belongs 
to the marketplace of ideas. This means that others might not find my argument to 
be convincing at all. And, as I have previously stated, I am looking forward to meet 
their arguments. To repeat: far from pretending to offer truths, my study must be 
read as an invitation to look at the textual and historical material available from a 
particular point of view. I would already be grateful if my thesis triggered people to 
develop theories which are better able to account for more facts than I have attemp-
ted account for. In this sense, theory is like technology employed in order to produce 
commodities. I will only be able to sell them when people consider them useful 
either to make sense of the reality in which they find themselves or to explore new 
worlds which they have hitherto never thought of. And rather then being economi-
cally profitable, again, I would be glad to have played my little part in—what Popper 
called—the evolutionary growth of knowledge. 
                                                     
5 For a description of the controversy, cf. Pels 2003, Wansink 2004. 
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SUMMARY 
In this study I have attempted to show that polemic is a means by which intellectuals 
defend or establish their authority before a public against real or imaginary threats. 
First of all, polemic has been defined as a war waged with words in order to over-
power another individual. Second, those who participate in this kind of war are intel-
lectuals, defined here as intelligent individuals who speak out on issues of public 
importance. Third, rather than issues of public importance, it is authority which is 
really at stake in polemics—authority being attributed here to intellectuals who are 
recognized as legitimate spokespersons by the/ir public. These three elements are tied 
together by the concept of the paranoid personality as described by Robin Robins 
and Jerrold Post. As they argue, paranoid people constantly look for hidden meanings 
because they are insecure. These hidden meanings are interpreted as attacks on their 
person by somebody regarded as the enemy. Not being able to stand this attack, they 
try to neutralize its effects by means of launching a counter-attack. The enemy has to 
be defeated in order to support a compensatory grand delusion of being the only 
legitimate authority. I assumed all of these elements to be present in the case of po-
lemical exchange. 
In this manner, I believe that we are able to understand certain aspects of the con-
troversy surrounding Simon Vestdijk’s De toekomst der religie, which lasted from 1948 
until 1998. Given the fact that some critics felt triggered to react polemically, 
whereas others did not, I asked myself how we should account for the differences. 
The historical overview offered in the first chapter shows that the role played by 
polemic in the controversy declined after 1960. And even though critics continued to 
pay attention to the arguments put forward by Vestdijk, only a few polemical refer-
ences were made by the end of the period which I have studied. Yet, what exactly is 
the difference between polemical and non-polemical contributions? Two aspects are 
important within this context. The linguistic analysis pursued in the second chapter 
focused on the personal attack as typical for the polemical manner of addressing Vest-
dijk’s arguments. The rhetorical analysis pursued in the third chapter focused on the 
autocratic or declarative style of arguing as a distinguishing feature. Finally, a socio-
logical analysis was employed to correlate the findings of the previous chapters to the 
institutional position of the critics who contributed to the controversy. 
In his essay, Vestdijk argued that, sooner or later, Christianity would die. And, as 
he admitted, he would have no problem with its eventual demise. In the end, he 
found Christianity a metaphysical religion that mistook its own images for absolute 
truth. Understandably, such a religion could only be intolerant, as its history of vio-
lence and persecution made clear. Moreover, its rigid dogmatic system did not allow 
for sexuality to flourish, as religious energies were directed away from worldly pleas-
ures. Instead of focusing exclusively on his relationship with God, the Christian had 
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to become integrated with his fellow human beings and with himself. However, 
Socialism and Buddhism would be the religions of the future, Vestdijk predicted. 
Instead of theologians, teachers bred at institutions which resembled the Christian 
retreat, the Buddhist monastery, and the English university, would become the future 
leaders of the western world. 
Whereas some found Vestdijk’s arguments quite interesting, many critics 
staunchly opposed. This was especially the case during the first years after the initial 
publication of De toekomst der religie. Over time, the intensity of reactions decreased, 
both quantitatively and quantitatively. Based on these two aspects, I have identified 
four different periods. During the first period (1948-1951), contributions almost 
exclusively focused on Vestdijk’s essay. The fiercest attacks were to be found imme-
diately after its publication as well. During the second period (1952-1959), the way 
in which Fokke Sierksma sided with Vestdijk heavily influenced the controversy. His 
severe criticism of certain opponents triggered new attacks. Yet, replies were gener-
ally more moderate and thorough. Attention was no longer limited to Vestdijk’s essay 
either. During the third period (1960-1972), De toekomst der religie became part of 
other discussions, either on the development of the modern mentality in general, or 
on Vestdijk’s oeuvre as a whole. During the final period (1973-1998), critics contin-
ued to focus on the essay. Interest, however, was limited to small circles of either 
Vestdijk fans or marginal religious communities.
These developments in the history of the reception of the essay become far more 
specific when we make an analytical distinction between two kinds of contributions: 
polemical and non-polemical. I defined polemics as an attempt to discredit another 
person before a certain public. The difference with non-polemical has been demon-
strated in detail by means of both linguistic (chapter II) and rhetorical analysis (chap-
ter III). Whereas the first type of analysis primarily refers to the textual mechanisms 
specific to humor and scorn, the second one employs the concept of style as reper-
toire of conventions depending on aesthetic reactions for political effect. 
As we have seen in chapter II, some critics tried to counter the line of reasoning 
Vestdijk which had developed throughout his essay by means of detailed discussion. 
Others, however, created a highly distorted image of the argument. This process of 
condensing the other’s statements went together with an attempt to account for the 
argument by means of creating an image of its author as incompetent, or even suffer-
ing from mental or moral disorders. I defined the latter approach as indispensable for 
polemics. Even though Vestdijk warned his readers not to mistake him for a prophet, 
critics accused him of pretending to be one; and, as was to be expected, he failed. 
Certainly, Vestdijk pretended to follow the rules of scientific description. According 
to his critics, however, he was a mere amateur—an artist at best. And even though he 
tried to understand religion, the fiercest among his opponents regarded him as an 
outsider—not so much because they found him unable to understand religious peo-
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ple, but rather because he did not wish to take them seriously. Keeping outside of the 
church, observing rather than participating or submitting himself to the one and only 
God, Vestdijk was a bourgeois. Yet, friends of Vestdijk countered, did these critics 
mean that only theologians were able to make legitimate claims on issues concerning 
religion? How could these people be taken seriously? If Vestdijk failed to live up to 
the scientific ideal, it was even worse for the theologians, Sierksma (among others) 
argued.
As we have seen in chapter III, some critics tried to counter Vestdijk’s ideas either 
by referring to facts or other authorities in the field of scientific research, or by vent-
ing their own personal opinions. Others, however, tried to impose on the public 
their verdicts of both the argument and its author by means of an autocratic or de-
clarative style of reasoning. This style is employed in order to let readers take judg-
ments for granted merely because the one who is expressing them is saying so. Intel-
lectuals who make these judgments do not show any sign of restraint or second 
thoughts. Whatever Vestdijk had argued, critics simply declared that Christianity 
would not die—because it represented the truth about man and his place in the 
world. Rather than focussing on man’s relationship with God, love for one’s 
neighbors was part of one’s devotion towards his Creator. Instead of a mere procrea-
tive act, sexuality was regarded as holy-yet-limited to marital relationships. And 
whereas Socialism was integrated into the Christian Gospel, Buddhism could not be 
legitimately called a religion at all. Clearly, the fact that they did not agree with Vest-
dijk had little to do with facts, legitimate personal preferences or other authoritative 
references. On the contrary, their argument was simply true in and of itself. Vestdijk’s 
distortion of the issues was attributed to mere incompetence or, worse, a personality 
disorder. 
The final issue, dealt with in chapter IV, is how to explain for the polemical reac-
tions to Vestdijk’s argument in De toekomst der religie. I have attempted to employ the 
secularization-thesis to account for the way in which our controversy developed. 
However, taking secularization to be the process by which religious institutions and 
authorities lose hold over the public sphere, the question is how it can be linked to 
the number and intensity of polemical contributions. The results of this type of 
analysis are twofold. On the one hand, we find polemics die out because religion no 
longer dominated the public sphere in the Netherlands. This holds especially for the 
ways in which circles of literary and cultural critics dealt with the issues at hand. On 
the other hand, polemics did not play any role within circles in which religious au-
thorities, and theologians in particular, still enjoyed a strong authoritative hold on 
discussions of public importance within their specific spheres of influence. The situa-
tion within the tightly organized pillar structures of the Dutch Reformed and Roman 
Catholic churches is a case in point. These conclusions point to a more detailed dis-
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cussion of developments within the public sphere/s in the Netherlands from 1948 
until 1998. 
Rather than the secularization-thesis, I have applied a postmodern sociological 
analysis in which the position of intellectuals within their institutional setting was 
assumed to determine their behavior and the development of their ideas. Two factors 
are important here. First, do intellectuals belong to a tightly organized institutional 
environment in which authorities enjoy a close relationship with their public? If not, 
then they are likely to react polemically. If in fact they do belong to some highly 
organized environment, the question of whether they holding dominant or marginal 
positions is important to consider. Whereas dominant intellectuals usually remain 
moderate, even when faced with offensive arguments, marginal intellectuals often 
react highly polemically. This hypothesis is confirmed by my analysis of the sources 
which deal with the controversy surrounding De toekomst der religie. Literary and 
cultural critics were polemical in their replies to both Vestdijk and the theologians. 
They held marginal positions within the public sphere. Even though in the historiog-
raphy considerable attention has been paid to the group of ‘progressive’ breakthrough 
intellectuals, until the 1960s they did not belong to a well-established institutional 
framework. On the contrary, their links to the public were still under construction. 
Only during the 1960s, when the traditional pillar-structures broke down, were they 
able to build a network of institutions that would dominate the public sphere until 
the turn of this century. And whereas breakthrough intellectuals during the late 
1940s, as well as the 1950s, were generally inclined to polemics, from the early 1960s 
on they abandoned this style of arguing—with the exception of a handful of critics at 
the margins of the ‘progressive’ public sphere. The same held for critics who were 
part of the traditional pillar-structures. Intellectuals that held important positions 
within the Dutch Reformed and Roman Catholic institutions did not react polemi-
cally to either Vestdijk or Sierksma. Only the marginal intellectuals fiercely criticized 
Vestdijk, and often even other critics who belonged to the same pillar organization. 
The latter tendency was observable within the Free Reformed community as well. 
Thus, I would argue, polemic—being a personal attack performed in the authori-
tarian or autocratic style of arguing—becomes relevant in cases where one feels that 
s/he is an outsider to the established or dominant circles of power. And it must be 
interpreted as an attempt by which intellectuals strive to defend or establish their 
authority against perceived threats in the same way that others argue their own ideas 
and ideals.  
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SAMENVATTING
Met deze studie heb ik willen aantonen dat polemiek een middel is waarmee intellec-
tuelen proberen hun autoriteit te verdedigen dan wel te vestigen voor een bepaald 
publiek tegenover reële dan wel denkbeeldige bedreigingen. Om te beginnen heb ik 
polemiek gedefinieerd als een oorlog die gevoerd wordt met woorden met de bedoe-
ling een tegenstander te verslaan. De mensen die zich met dergelijke vorm van oor-
logvoering bezighouden zijn intellectuelen, dat wil zeggen: intelligente mensen die 
gewend zijn zich uit te spreken over zaken van algemeen belang. Ik ben er tenslotte 
vanuit gegaan dat laatstgenoemde issues niet de eigenlijke reden zijn voor de pole-
miek. Waar het werkelijk om gaat is door het publiek erkend te worden als een auto-
riteit die met recht kan gelden als woordvoerder met betrekking tot zaken die het 
algemeen belang aangaan. Deze drie elementen uit de hypothese komen bij elkaar in 
het door Robbins en Post ontwikkelde concept van de paranoïde persoonlijkheid. 
Geplaagd door gevoelens van onzekerheid, is deze altijd op zoek naar verborgen 
betekenissen. Die betekenissen worden gezien als even zovele aanvallen op zijn per-
soon door iemand die hij bij gevolg als zijn vijand beschouwt. Niet in staat dergelijke 
aanvallen te weerstaan, probeert de paranoïde persoonlijkheid het negatieve effect 
daarvan te neutraliseren door middel van een tegenaanval. De ander zal hoe dan ook 
verslagen dienen te worden om te helpen bij het creëren van de idee de enige legi-
tieme autoriteit te zijn. Iets van dit alles speelt, naar ik aanneem, een rol bij polemiek. 
Op deze manier zijn we in staat om enkele aspecten van de controverse rond De 
toekomst der religie van Simon Vestdijk te begrijpen. Het feit dat sommige critici pole-
misch reageerden, terwijl anderen gematigd kritisch zo niet positief waren, riep voor 
mij de vraag op hoe dit verschil kon worden verklaard. Het historische overzicht 
zoals ik dat in het eerste hoofdstuk gegeven heb, laat zien dat polemiek na 1960 snel 
aan belang inboette. En hoewel critici nog altijd interesse hadden voor de visie van 
Vestdijk, aan het eind van de door mij bestudeerde periode waren er nog maar enke-
len die zich uitgedaagd voelden tot een polemische interventie. Maar wat is nu pre-
cies het verschil tussen polemische bijdragen enerzijds en niet-polemische anderzijds? 
Twee aspecten zijn in dit verband van belang. In de linguïstische analyse die ik heb 
uitgevoerd in het tweede hoofdstuk worden persoonlijke aanvallen gezien als typisch 
voor een polemische wijze van reageren op argumenten die Vestdijk naar voren 
bracht. De retorische analyse van het derde hoofdstuk vestigt de aandacht op de auto-
cratische en stellige manier van argumenteren zoals die door polemisten wordt 
gehanteerd. De sociologische analyse van het laatste hoofdstuk, tenslotte, is bedoeld 
om het aldus gecreëerde onderscheid tussen polemische en niet-polemische reacties 
te relateren aan de institutionele positie van de verschillende mensen die een bijdrage 
leverden aan de controverse. 
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In zijn essay beweerde Vestdijk dat, vroeger of later, het Christendom zou ster-
ven. En, zo voegde hij eraan toe, hij zou er geen traan om laten. Volgens hem was 
het Christendom een metafysisch georiënteerde religie die haar eigen beelden voor 
de enig ware werkelijkheid hield. Zoals te verwachten kon een dergelijke religie niet 
anders dan intolerant zijn, zoals een lange geschiedenis van geweld en vervolgingen 
heeft aangetoond. Bovendien leidde een rigide dogmatisch systeem tot de repressie 
van seksualiteit en onderlinge solidariteit doordat religieuze energie zich richtte op 
het bovennatuurlijke in plaats van de medemens. In plaats van uitsluitend gericht te 
zijn op zijn relatie met God, diende de mens te streven naar integratie met zijn me-
demens en met zijn eigen zelf. In plaats van het Christendom, zouden volgens Vest-
dijk Socialisme en Boeddhisme de religies van de toekomst zijn. In plaats van theolo-
gen, zouden leraars die waren opgeleid aan instituten die het beste van de Christelijke 
retraite, de Boeddhistische kloosters en de Engelse universiteit in zich verenigden de 
toekomstige leiders worden van de westerse wereld. 
Terwijl sommigen de ideeën van Vestdijk met veel interesse lazen, waren er an-
deren die zeiden zijn visie op geen enkele wijze serieus te kunnen nemen. Dat laatste 
was vooral tijdens de eerste jaren na de publicatie van De toekomst der religie het geval. 
Na verloop van tijd zou zowel het aantal als de toon van de reacties veranderen. Op 
basis van die twee criteria is het mogelijk om vier periodes te onderscheiden. In de 
eerste periode (1948-1951) richtte reacties zich vrijwel uitsluitend op het door Vest-
dijk geschreven essay. De felste kritieken volgden direct na publicatie. In de tweede 
periode (1952-1959) werden reacties sterk beïnvloed door de wijze waarop Fokke 
Sierksma zich aan de kant van Vestdijk schaarde. Zijn scherpe kritieken gaven aanlei-
ding tot nieuwe aanvallen. Over het algemeen waren reacties gematigder en hadden 
ze meer diepgang. Vestdijk speelde een beduidend minder grote rol in deze periode. 
Deze trend zette zich door in de derde periode (1960-1972). De toekomst der religie
werd onderdeel van een bredere discussie over de ontwikkeling van de moderne 
mentaliteit in het algemeen dan wel over het gehele werk van Vestdijk. In de laatste 
periode (1973-1998) bestond er in bepaalde kringen nog altijd belangstelling voor 
diens essay. Het ging hier echter om vrij geïsoleerde groepen fans enerzijds en margi-
nale religieuze gemeenschappen anderzijds. 
Deze ontwikkeling wordt specifieker wanneer we een analytisch onderscheid 
aanbrengen tussen twee soorten reacties: polemische en niet-polemische. Ik heb 
polemiek gedefinieerd als een poging iemand anders in diskrediet te brengen voor 
een bepaald publiek. Het verschil met niet-polemische bijdragen heb ik meer in 
detail aangegeven door middel van zowel een linguïstische (hoofdstuk II) als een 
retorische analyse (hoofdstuk III). Terwijl de eerste vorm van analyse zich in de eer-
ste plaats richt op taalkundige mechanismen die specifiek zijn voor humor en spot, 
wordt bij de tweede vorm gebruik gemaakt van het begrip stijl—opgevat als een 
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repertoire van conventies dat probeert politiek effectief te zijn door in te spelen op 
mogelijke reacties van het publiek. 
Zoals in hoofdstuk II is duidelijk geworden, waren er commentatoren die op de 
argumenten van Vestdijk reageerden door middel van een uitgebreide samenvatting 
en (soms gedetailleerde) kritiek. Anderen, echter, gaven een zeer vertekend beeld van 
de inhoud van De toekomst der religie. Het proces waarbij de woorden van iemand in 
gecondenseerde vorm worden samengevat en weergegeven ging in dergelijke geval-
len veelal gepaard met een poging het resultaat te verklaren door een beeld van de 
auteur op te roepen als was het iemand die incompetent zou zijn als hij al niet leed 
aan mentale dan wel morele storingen. En deze manier van argumenteren zie ik als 
essentieel element in polemiek. Ook al had Vestdijk zijn lezers gewaarschuwd hem 
niet voor een profeet te houden, critici beschuldigden hem er niettemin van te pre-
tenderen een profeet te zijn; en, zoals te verwachten viel, hij wist zijn zogenaamde 
pretenties niet waar te maken. Vestdijk pretendeerde de regels van het wetenschappe-
lijk handwerk te volgen. Volgens zijn critici was hij echter niet meer dan een ama-
teurtje—een kunstenaar in het meest gunstige geval. En hoewel hij probeerde religie 
te begrijpen, beschouwden zijn felste criticasters hem als een buitenstaander, nog niet 
eens zozeer omdat hij niet in staat was religie te begrijpen, maar vooral omdat hij 
volgens hen religie niet serieus wenste te nemen. Door van buitenaf naar religie te 
kijken zonder eraan deel te hebben of zich te onderwerpen aan de ene ware God, 
week Vestdijk in niets af van de doorsnee bourgeois, zo oordeelden zijn tegenstan-
ders. Vrienden van Vestdijk daarentegen vroegen zich af of dit betekende dat alleen 
theologen geacht konden worden legitieme uitspraken te doen over zaken die be-
trekking hadden tot het religieuze? Volgens hen konden die evenmin serieus worden 
genomen. Als Vestdijk al niet voldeed aan de regels van het wetenschappelijk ideaal, 
dan gold dat nog in veel sterkere mate voor de theologen, zo oordeelde Sierksma (en 
anderen met hem). 
Zoals we in hoofdstuk III gezien hebben, probeerden sommige commentatoren 
hun kritiek op Vestdijk te onderbouwen met een beroep op feiten, het werk van 
bepaalde autoriteiten binnen de wetenschap of hun eigen persoonlijke overtuiging. 
Anderen, daarentegen, gaven er de voorkeur aan hun oordeel over zowel argumen-
ten als auteur publiek te maken door hun beweringen op autocratische of autoritaire 
wijze te uiten. Deze stijl van argumenteren wordt gebruikt om lezers te overtuigen 
dat iets waar is simpelweg omdat degene die de bewering doet het zegt. Intellectue-
len die zich van deze stijl bedienen vertonen geen spoor van twijfel. Wat Vestdijk 
ook aan argumenten naar voren bracht, critici stelden gewoonweg dat het Christen-
dom toch niet zou sterven. En het zou niet sterven simpelweg omdat het de waar-
heid omtrent de mens en zijn plaats in deze wereld openbaarde. In plaats van zich 
uitsluitend te richten op zijn relatie met God, was liefde voor de medemens onlos-
makelijk verbonden met de aanbidding van de Schepper. In plaats van slechts een 
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reproductieve activiteit te zijn, was seksualiteit voor christenen heilig zolang het deel 
was van het huwelijk tussen man en vrouw. En terwijl het Socialisme heel goed met 
het Christendom kon samengaan, was er volgens critici geen twijfel aan dat het 
Boeddhisme geen aanspraak kon maken op de status van religie. Het oordeel van 
deze critici diende niet door feiten, anderen autoriteiten te worden ondersteund. Het 
werd ook niet als geloofswaarheid gepresenteerd. In tegendeel, hun beweringen 
waren gewoon waar. En de wijze waarop Vestdijk de waarheid had vertekend kon 
slechts worden verklaard uit incompetentie of, erger nog, een persoonlijkheidsstoor-
nis.
In hoofdstuk IV wordt tenslotte de vraag behandeld hoe polemische reacties op 
de door Vestdijk naar voren gebrachte argumenten zijn te verklaren. Ik heb een 
poging gedaan enig licht te werpen op de ontwikkelingen in de receptie van De
toekomst der religie met behulp van de zogenaamde secularisatie-these. Echter, wanneer 
we secularisatie beschouwen als een proces waarbij religieuze instituties and autoritei-
ten hun invloed op de publieke ruimte verloren, dan rijst de vraag hoe daarmee de 
afnemende rol van polemiek verklaard zou kunnen worden. Twee conclusies zijn 
gerechtvaardigd in dit verband. Enerzijds verliest polemiek aan belang doordat religie 
op een zeker moment de publieke sfeer in Nederland niet langer domineerde. Als 
verklaring is dit vooral van belang voor de wijze waarop literaire en culturele critici 
zich mengden in de discussie. Anderzijds, religieuze autoriteiten, in het bijzonder 
theologen, die een belangrijke rol speelden in de processen van opinievorming bin-
nen hun eigen gemeenschap, blijken zich van polemiek te onthouden. De situatie in 
hecht georganiseerde zuilstructuren zoals die rond de GKN en de RKK zijn in dat 
verband illustratief. Deze conclusies impliceren dat een meer gedetailleerde studie van 
ontwikkelingen binnen de publieke sfeer in Nederland van 1948 tot 1998 noodzake-
lijk is. 
In plaats van de secularisatie-these, heb ik me vervolgens gebruik gemaakt van 
een postmoderne sociologische analyse waarin de positie van intellectuelen binnen 
een bepaalde institutionele setting wordt verondersteld hun gedrag en de ontwikke-
ling van hun ideeën te bepalen. Twee factoren zijn van groot belang in dit verband. 
Allereerst: behoren intellectuelen tot een goed georganiseerd institutioneel milieu 
met als specifiek kenmerk de hechte relatie tussen autoriteiten en hun publiek? Zo 
niet, dan zijn zij geneigd polemisch te reageren. Maar als zij, vervolgens, wel behoren 
tot het eerder genoemde institutionele milieu: bezetten zij daarin dominante of mar-
ginale posities? Terwijl intellectuelen met een dominante positie gewoonlijk gema-
tigd zijn, zelfs wanneer ze geconfronteerd worden met zware kritiek, hebben intel-
lectuelen die zich in de marge van een bepaalde gemeenschap bevinden veelal zeer 
polemisch zijn. Deze hypothese wordt bevestigd door mijn analyse van het beschik-
bare materiaal met betrekking tot de controverse rond De toekomst der religie. Literaire 
and culturele critici waren polemisch in hun reactie tegen zowel Vestdijk als de theo-
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logen. Gewoontegetrouw bezetten zij marginale posities in de publieke sfeer. Hoe-
wel in de historiografie relatief veel aandacht is besteed aan de groep van zogenaamd 
‘progressieve’ doorbraak-intellectuelen, behoorden zij tot de jaren 1960 niet tot enig 
goed georganiseerd netwerk van instituties. In tegendeel, aanvankelijk konden zij in 
het geheel niet beschikken over een achterban. Pas in loop van de jaren 1960, toen 
het grootste deel van de oude zuilenstructuur in elkaar zakte, zouden zij in staat zijn 
zich de dominante rol in de publieke sfeer te verwerven zoals wij die kennen. En 
terwijl doorbraak-intellectuelen van eind 40-er en 50-er jaren over het algemeen 
geneigd waren tot polemiek, werd er vanaf de jaren 1960 radicaal afscheid genomen 
van deze stijl van argumenteren—behalve door critici die zich in de marge van de 
‘progressieve’ publieke sfeer bevonden. Hetzelfde gold voor intellectuelen die deel 
uitmaakten van de traditionele zuilstructuren. Critici die zich op centrale posities 
bevonden binnen de Gereformeerde en Rooms-katholieke organisaties reageerden 
niet polemisch op argumenten van Vestdijk en Sierksma. Alleen intellectuelen in de 
marge hadden de neiging Vestdijk dan wel hun collega’s binnen dezelfde zuil aan te 
vallen. Dezelfde tendens zagen we ook onder leden van de Vrijgemaakt-
gereformeerde gemeenschap. 
Kortom: als persoonlijk gerichte aanval waarbij gebruikt gemaakt wordt van een 
autoritaire of autocratische wijze van argumenteren, is polemiek een middel waarvan 
alleen intellectuelen zich bedienen die geen deel uitmaken van het establishment of 
een dominante positie hebben binnen de institutionele omgeving waartoe zij beho-
ren. Het dient dan te worden gezien als een poging om de eigen autoriteit de vesti-
gen dan wel te verdedigen tegenover de dreiging die voor hen uitgaat van de manier 
waarop anderen hun overtuiging verkondigen. 
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